Hayes v. Berthelot, et al

Filing 39

ORDER & REASONS: IT IS ORDERED that Robinson's 37 Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. Signed by Judge Barry W Ashe on 3/6/2025. (pp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

PAUL HAYES

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 24-1434

AUSTIN BERTHELOT, et al.

SECTION M (5)

ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Lloyd Robinson.1 Plaintiff Paul
Hayes responds in opposition.2 Having considered the parties’ memoranda, the record, and the
applicable law, the Court issues this Order & Reasons denying the motion.
I.

BACKGROUND
This case involves constitutional and state-law claims arising out of an arrest. Hayes

alleges that on July 11, 2020, he and Robinson, an officer with the Lutcher Police Department,
“exchanged words” as a vehicle in which Hayes was a passenger passed Robinson’s parked police
car.3 According to Hayes, later that afternoon Robinson went before a justice of the peace and
falsely swore out an arrest warrant accusing Hayes of misdemeanor assault in violation of La. R.S.
14:38 for supposedly threatening Robinson and others.4 Nearly three years later, on June 4, 2023,
defendant Berthelot, formerly a deputy of the St. James Parish Sheriff’s Office (“SJPSO”),
initiated a traffic stop on a vehicle driven by Hayes for purportedly failing to yield when crossing
railroad tracks in violation of La. R.S. 32:175.5 Hayes maintains that he did not violate the

1

R. Doc. 37.
R. Doc. 38.
3
R. Doc. 21 at 3.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 4.
2

aforementioned traffic law, stopped promptly when ordered, and followed Berthelot’s instructions,
including exiting his vehicle.6 Hayes claims that, when Berthelot returned to his police cruiser and
learned of the outstanding July 2020 misdemeanor arrest warrant, Berthelot ordered Hayes to turn
around and face the vehicle without explaining why.7 Hayes claims that when he asked for
clarification in a polite manner, Berthelot put him in an “arm bar,” applying sufficient force to
break Hayes’s arm.8 Hayes further alleges that the St. James Parish district attorney’s office
declined to prosecute him for the supposed 2020 assault on Robinson and that he was acquitted of
the 2023 traffic violation.9
Hayes filed this suit against Berthelot, Robinson, St. James Parish Sheriff Louis, in his
official capacity, and St. James Parish, as well as Rickey Babin, in his official capacity as district
attorney for the 23rd Judicial District, State of Louisiana, and in his alleged capacity as custodian
of records for the district, and Tyler Cavalier, also in his alleged capacity as records custodian of
the district (together “the DA Defendants”).10

Hayes alleges federal and state malicious-

prosecution claims against Robinson and Berthelot.11 He also alleges against Berthelot federal
claims for unreasonable seizure and excessive force and a state-law tort claim for “unlawful
method of arrest pursuant to warrant” in violation of article I, section 13 of the Louisiana
Constitution and article 217 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure.12 As to Sheriff Louis
and St. James Parish, Hayes alleges that they are liable to him for Berthelot’s unconstitutional
actions pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).13 Finally, with

6

Id.
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 5-8.
10
Id. at 1-17.
11
Id. at 3-5, 12-13.
12
Id. at 4-5, 14-15.
13
Id. at 8-12, 15-16.
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respect to the DA Defendants, Hayes alleges that they violated the Louisiana Public Records Act,
La. R.S 44:1 et seq., by improperly destroying records related to the 2020 arrest warrant.14 Upon
motions filed by other defendants, this Court dismissed Hayes’s claims against the DA Defendants
and Sheriff Louis, and Count VII against Berthelot.15
II.

PENDING MOTION
Robinson filed the instant motion to dismiss, arguing that Hayes’s complaint does not

allege a claim against him.16 Robinson offers his own version of what transpired between him and
Hayes on July 11, 2020, and states that Hayes’s behavior toward him stemmed from Robinson’s
towing of Hayes’s vehicles from a public street.17 Robinson states that he “did the right thing in
filing the assault charges against [Hayes]” after Hayes threatened him.18 He further argues that it
was the district attorney’s responsibility, not his, to either timely prosecute Hayes for the assault
or remove the warrant from the system.19 Robinson also points out that he had nothing to do with
Berthelot’s arrest of Hayes in 2023, which Robinson views to be the heart of the lawsuit.20
In opposition, Hayes contends that Robinson’s motion to dismiss should be construed as
an answer because it offers Robinson’s version of events without citing legal authority explaining
why Hayes’s complaint fails to state a claim against Robinson.21

14

Id. at 6-7, 16.
R. Docs. 35; 36.
16
R. Doc. 37.
17
R. Docs. 37-1 at 1-2, 6.
18
Id. at 2-3.
19
Id. at 3, 6.
20
Id.
21
R. Doc. 38 at 1-2.
15

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III.

LAW & ANALYSIS
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a complaint to contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule
8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The statement of the claim must
“‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A pleading does
not comply with Rule 8 if it offers “labels and conclusions,” “a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action,” or “‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557) (alteration omitted).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to move to dismiss
for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). A claim is plausible on the face of the complaint “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Plausibility does not equate
to probability, but rather “it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are
‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Thus, if the facts

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pleaded in the complaint “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘shown’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)) (alteration omitted).
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court employs
the two-pronged approach utilized in Twombly. The court “can choose to begin by identifying
pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions [unsupported by factual allegations],
are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. However, “[w]hen there are
well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “‘[The] task, then, is to determine whether
the plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable claim that is plausible, not to evaluate the plaintiff’s
likelihood of success.’” Body by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381, 385 (5th
Cir. 2017) (quoting Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cty. Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 854 (5th Cir.
2012)). A court’s review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “is limited to the complaint, any
documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that
are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v.
Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000)).
B. Federal and State Malicious-Prosecution Claims Against Robinson (Counts I and II)
Hayes purports to allege malicious-prosecution claims against Robinson under federal law
(Count I) and state law (Count II).22 With respect to federal law, there is a Fourth Amendment
malicious-prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602 U.S.
556, 558 (2024). “[T]he gravamen of the Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution, as

22

R. Doc. 21 at 12-13.

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[the Supreme Court] has recognized it, is the wrongful initiation of charges without probable
cause.” Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 43 (2022). “To succeed on such a claim, a plaintiff must
show that a government official charged him without probable cause, leading to an unreasonable
seizure of his person.” Chiaverini, 602 U.S. at 558 (citing Thompson, 596 U.S. at 43 n.2). After
Thompson, the Fifth Circuit held that a plaintiff “asserting a Fourth Amendment malicious
prosecution claim under § 1983 must prove [the state-law elements of malicious prosecution], in
addition to the threshold element of an unlawful Fourth Amendment seizure.” Armstrong v.
Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 279 (5th Cir. 2023) (reinstating the rule that the elements of the state-law
tort of malicious prosecution and the elements of the constitutional tort of Fourth Amendment
malicious prosecution are coextensive).
Under Louisiana law, there are six elements of a malicious prosecution claim:
“(1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil judicial
proceeding; (2) its legal causation by the present defendant in the original
proceeding; (3) its bona fide termination in favor of the present plaintiff; (4) the
absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (5) the presence of malice therein;
and (6) damage conforming to legal standards resulting to plaintiff.”
Lemoine v. Wolfe, 168 So. 3d 362, 367 (La. 2015) (quoting Jones v. Soileau, 448 So. 2d 1268,
1271 (La. 1984)); see also Armstrong, 60 F.4th at 279. The Louisiana supreme court has defined
“malice” as follows:
“Malice is found when the defendant uses the prosecution for the purpose of
obtaining any private advantage, for instance, as a means to extort money, to collect
a debt, to recover property, to compel performance of a contract, to ‘tie up the
mouths’ of witnesses in another action, or as an experiment to discover who might
have committed the crime. Malice may be inferred from the lack of probable cause
or inferred from a finding that the defendant acted in reckless disregard of the other
person’s rights.”
Kelly v. W. Cash & Carry Bldg. Materials Store, 745 So. 2d 743, 761 (La. App. 1999) (quoting
Miller v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 511 So. 2d 446, 453 (La. 1987)). In that regard,

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“[m]alice exists when a charge is made with knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard
for the truth.” Id. “The crucial determination in regard to the absence of probable cause is whether
the defendants had an honest and reasonable belief in the allegations they made.” Id. “Actions
for malicious prosecution have never been favored, and hence, in order to sustain them, a clear
case must be established.” Id.
Here, Hayes alleges that Robinson lied about their interaction on July 11, 2020, in order to
obtain the misdemeanor assault warrant against him.23 According to Hayes, he did not threaten
Robinson, and Robinson obtained the misdemeanor assault warrant without probable cause and
with malice.24 Hayes further alleges that the criminal proceedings were terminated in his favor
when the district attorney’s office “refused” the charges.25 Although Robinson’s account of what
occurred differs from Hayes’s account, it is not this Court’s place now to choose between the two.
Suffice it to say, at this stage of the proceedings, Hayes has alleged enough to overcome
Robinson’s motion to dismiss. The claim must be vetted through the discovery process, if not
beyond.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Robinson’s motion to dismiss (R. Doc. 37) is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 6th day of March, 2025.

________________________________
BARRY W. ASHE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

23

R. Doc. 21 at 3, 12-13.
Id.
25
Id.
24

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