Petite v. Hinds

Filing 13

ORDER AND REASONS granting 11 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 03/05/2025. (go)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SYDNEY PETITE AND R.H., A MINOR

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO.: 24-2033

COLIN JACOB HINDS

SECTION H
ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is Defendant Colin Jacob Hinds’ Partial Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 11). For the following reasons, the
Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Sydney Petite and Defendant Colin Jacob Hinds were married
on August 5, 2016 and were divorced on January 5, 2021. In June 2018, the
couple’s 8-week-old son, R.H., awoke crying. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
became so enraged that he forcefully inserted a pacifier under the baby’s
tongue, causing severe damage and impairment to the tongue. Plaintiff
alleges that as a result of the incident, R.H. suffered feeding and speech
problems.
On the night of the incident, Plaintiff arrived to the scene as R.H.
screamed “incessantly in pain, with blood gushing from his mouth.” 1 Plaintiff
alleges that she suffered mental anguish and emotional distress from
viewing the scene and attending the child’s subsequent treatments for
several years.
1 Doc. 1.

1

In this diversity case, Plaintiff brings claims against Defendant for state
law domestic abuse and battery of R.H. and for her own mental anguish and
emotional distress under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.6. Defendant has
moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s emotional distress claims, arguing that they are
prescribed. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to this Motion. The Court may
not, however, simply grant the instant Motion as unopposed. The Fifth Circuit
approaches the automatic grant of dispositive motions with considerable
aversion. 2 Accordingly, the Court will consider Defendant’s Motion on its
merits.
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead
enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 3 A claim is
“plausible on its face” when the pleaded facts allow the court to “[d]raw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”4
A court must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and must “draw
all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” 5 The Court need not, however,
accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. 6
To be legally sufficient, a complaint must establish more than a “sheer
possibility” that the plaintiff’s claims are true. 7 “A pleading that offers ‘labels
and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action’”

e.g., Servicios Azucareros de Venezuela, C.A. v. John Deere Thibodeaux, Inc.,
702 F.3d 794, 806 (5th Cir. 2012); Johnson v. Pettiford, 442 F.3d 917, 918 (5th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam); John v. State of Louisiana (Bd. of Trs. for State Colls. and Univs.), 757 F.2d 698, 709
(5th Cir.1985).
2 See,

3 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)).
4 Id.
5 Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009).
6 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 667.
7 Id.
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will not suffice. 8 Rather, the complaint must contain enough factual
allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of each element of the plaintiff’s claim. 9
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim for mental distress as a
bystander to her son’s injury is time-barred and must be dismissed. The
Louisiana Supreme Court has explained that “bystander damages are
intended to provide a remedy when severe mental distress arises directly and
immediately from the claimant’s observing a traumatic injury-causing event
to the direct victim,” and to recover, “the claimant who observes the injurycausing event (or soon thereafter comes upon the scene of the injury) must be
contemporaneously aware that the event has caused harm to the direct
victim.” 10 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s injury occurred in June 2018 when she
observed the harm to her son. At the time of her injury, the liberative
prescriptive period of one year applied to all delictual actions under
Louisiana law. 11 As such, Plaintiff’s claim for bystander damages was timebarred after June 2019, but she did not file this action until November 2024.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claim for
emotional distress damages pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.6 is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
8 Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
9 Lormand, 565 F.3d at 255–57.

10 Whitfield v. City of New Orleans, 431 F.Supp. 3d 818, 824 (E. D. La. 2019) (quoting

Trahan v. McManus, 728 So. 2d 1273, 1279 (La. 1999)).
11 See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3492 (repealed by Acts 2024, No. 423, § 2, eff. July 1, 2024).
“The Louisiana legislature repealed the former Article 3492 and replaced it with Article
3493.1 and a two-year prescriptive period that applies “prospective[ly] . . . to delictual actions
arising after” July 1, 2024.” Parker v. Chet Morrison Contractors, LLC, No. CV 23-5122, 2024
WL 3970312, at *7 (E.D. La. Aug. 28, 2024).
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New Orleans, Louisiana, this 5th day of March, 2025

JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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