Wilkerson, et al v. Stalder, et al
Filing
534
RULING denying 484 and 510 Motion to Dismiss. Defendants may file a joint motion in opposition to injunctive relief no later than November 7, 2013, or maintain motions already filed. A hearing is set on the merits of the preliminary injunction for November 13, 2013 at 9:30 A.M.. Signed by Judge James J. Brady on 11/1/2013. (LLH)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ROBERT KING WILKERSON, ET AL
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 00-304-JJB
RICHARD STALDER, ET AL
RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter is before the Court on the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Docs. 484 and
510). Plaintiff has filed an opposition. (Doc. 490). Additionally, pursuant to the Court’s request,
Plaintiff submitted a supplemental brief on pendant jurisdiction. (Doc. 486). Oral argument is
not necessary. For the reasons stated herein, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED.
I.
Background
This case has a long and storied history with the Court. The complaint alleges that the
Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections has held the three plaintiffs,1 including
the plaintiff involved in the present matter, Albert Woodfox (“Woodfox”), in extended
lockdown, or solitary confinement. The complaint alleges that Woodfox has been in extended
lockdown for 41 years in violation of his constitutional rights. Specifically, the complaint asserts
claims under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as corresponding state laws.
The present matter before the Court involves invasive strip searches of Woodfox as he
leaves and enters his cell. During these searches, Woodfox, at 68 years-old, is forced to strip
until he is naked, bend at the waist, lift his genitals, and spread his buttocks so that officers may
inspect his anus. These invasive searches are conducted as often as six times a day despite the
fact that Woodfox is shackled at his wrists, ankles, and waist when outside of his cell; is under
constant observation or escort; and typically has no contact with individuals other than prison
1
Mr. Herman Wallace is now deceased. A motion to substitute party (doc. 517) is pending before the Court.
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personnel.
Woodfox contends that these searches are done in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights and has petitioned the Court seeking to enjoin any further constitutional
violations.
Similar to the underlying litigation, the present matter has a storied, albeit shorter, history
with the Court. Woodfox originally sought injunctive relief by way of a temporary restraining
order (“TRO”). (Doc. 477). The motion requesting the TRO relied heavily upon a consent
decree obtained in Louisiana state court, which prevented the Defendants from conducting the
invasive strip searches under certain circumstances. On August 27, 2013, this Court held a
telephonic conference on the merits of the TRO. The Court denied the TRO and set a date for
the preliminary injunction hearing.2 (Doc. 479).
Additionally, given Woodfox’s apparent
reliance upon the state court consent decree, the Court requested supplemental briefing on
whether or not it should assert jurisdiction over any claim for injunctive relief that was allegedly
bound by a state court decision. A hearing date was set on the issues of the Court’s jurisdiction
and the merits of a preliminary injunction.
Pursuant to the Court’s request for briefing, Woodfox filed a supplemental brief on
jurisdiction and argued that this Court had both original and pendant jurisdiction over this matter.
(Doc. 486). The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure asserting several theories explaining why this Court lacked
jurisdiction and why the preliminary injunction should be dismissed on the merits. (Doc. 484).
On the date set to hear arguments, and upon the Court’s observation that Woodfox had not
requested a preliminary injunction, the Court decided to pass without prejudice on deciding the
merits of the preliminary injunction until Woodfox submitted a proper motion and to rule on the
2
However, unbeknownst to the Court, Woodfox had not sought a preliminary injunction in his motion for a TRO as
is customarily done.
2
jurisdictional issues based upon the motions already submitted. (Doc. 492).
subsequently filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. (Doc. 505).
Woodfox
In response, the
Defendants submitted a supplemental motion to dismiss. (Doc. 510).
II.
Discussion
Originally, Woodfox argued that there are two grounds upon which the Court may assert
jurisdiction.
First, Woodfox argued that this Court has original jurisdiction over his
constitutional claim. He avers that the strip searching policy and practice is “further proof that
[his] confinement is cruel and unusual and in violation of [his] Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights.” (Doc. 486). In the alternative, Woodfox argued that the Defendants violation of
a standing state issued consent decree provided grounds for the Court to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction. However, as the briefing process on this issue has progressed, Woodfox has all but
abandoned any argument touching upon the state consent decree and focused exclusively on the
underlying unconstitutionality of the invasive strip searches.
Concomitantly, the focus of the Defendants’ arguments has changed. The Defendants
have asserted a whole host of arguments, most of them completely lacking in merit, contending
that this Court lacks supplemental jurisdiction to enforce the state court issued consent decree.
However, now realizing that Woodfox’s position has changed, the Defendants argue that this
Court lacks original jurisdiction to entertain Woodfox’s request for injunctive relief because the
state court retains exclusive jurisdiction over this issue regardless of whether Woodfox asserts
his claim under, or independently of, the consent decree. Simply put, “Woodfox cannot ignore
the Consent Agreement and pretend it does not exist” because “his claims are merged under this
Agreement.” (Doc. 510-1).
3
In support of this argument, the Defendants cite two Fifth Circuit cases. The first, Haspel
& Davis Milling & Planting Co. Ltd. v. Bd. of Levee Comm’r of the Orleans Levee Dist., 493
F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2007), involved a group of landowners who had originally filed suit against
the state in state court. This original litigation resulted in a settlement agreement approved by
the court through a consent decree. Id. at 573. Years later, the landowners filed suit in federal
court arguing that the state’s failure to pay the amount set by the consent judgment constituted an
unconstitutional taking. Id. The federal court held that by entering into the settlement agreement,
the landowners had compromised their takings claim and their only recourse was to enforce their
rights under the settlement agreement. Id. at 576. The court reasoned that this holding was
required by the terms of the settlement agreement which explicitly released all of the
landowners’ claims. Id. at 576-77.
The second, Jackson v. Alabama Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 657 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1981),
involved a plaintiff who instituted a Title VII action against his former employer in federal court
arguing that his employment termination should be reviewed and he should be rehired pursuant
to a consent decree entered in state court. The federal court characterized the subsequent federal
suit as an attempt to enforce the state issued consent decree. Id. at 690. Viewed through this
lens, the court held that the plaintiff’s only remedy was found in the enforcement of the consent
decree because it “created” the right that the plaintiff sought to invoke. Id.
Defendants cite each case for two propositions. Defendants rely upon Haspel for the
proposition that when a plaintiff enters into a consent judgment, he compromises any claims that
he might have under the agreement. Defendants cite Jackson for the proposition that when a
plaintiff enters into a consent decree, his sole remedy is found in the enforcement of that decree
because it is the decree that creates the rights that he is trying to enforce. However, reliance
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upon these cases is inapposite as both cases are easily distinguishable from the matter presently
before the Court. Unlike the consent decree in Haspel, the consent decree in the present case
does not explicitly release Woodfox’s claims.
Likewise, unlike the plaintiffs in Jackson,
Woodfox is not specifically attempting to enforce the consent decree in federal court. Instead,
his original intention for mentioning the consent decree was to demonstrate a likelihood of
success on the merits, rather than as a primary means of asserting jurisdiction. (Doc. 490, at 5).
Furthermore, unlike the plaintiff’s right to review of his termination, Woodfox’s right to protect
his constitutional interests is found outside of the consent decree.
These cases do not support the Defendants’ argument that Woodfox’s claims are merged
under the consent agreement thereby precluding the Court’s assertion of original jurisdiction.
Instead, the cases stand for the proposition that when claims are explicitly released or when the
consent decree creates the right sought to be enforced, then the consent decree provides the only
avenue by which the plaintiff may seek and attain relief. These rules are not implicated by the
present facts. The Defendants do not cite, nor could the Court find, any case law that would
preclude a court from asserting jurisdiction under the present circumstances. Therefore, the
Court holds that it has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to adjudicate
Woodfox’s motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to protect his constitutional rights. 3
3
Finding that it has original jurisdiction over Woodfox’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the Court believes that
it is unnecessary to entertain the Defendants’ arguments concerning supplemental jurisdiction. However, out of an
abundance of caution, the Court will summarily address some of these arguments. The Court finds that the doctrines
upon which the Defendants attempt to rely are inapplicable to the present matter. Sovereign immunity does not bar
a claim for prospective injunctive relief against state actors. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1978). This
Court has decided, and the Fifth Circuit has affirmed, that qualified immunity does not apply in this case. See Doc.
62. The Younger abstention doctrine, as well as the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, are not implicated here
because there is no pending or ongoing state court proceeding. See Texas Ass’n of Business v. Earle, 388 F.3d 515,
519 (5th Cir. 2004) (requiring that the “[criminal] dispute must involve an ‘ongoing state judicial proceeding’” for
Younger abstention to apply); Village of Bolingbrook v. Citizens Utilities Co. of Illinois, 864 F.2d 481, 481 (7th Cir.
1998) (affirming the district court’s holding that under § 2283, “the federal court is not authorized to enjoin ongoing
proceedings.”) (emphasis added). Finally, the Buford abstention doctrine is not implicated because the ultimate
issue of whether or not the invasive strip searches, like the other contested conditions of confinement, violate
Woodfox’s constitutional rights is not a “difficult question[] of state law,” Health Net, Inc. v. Wooley, 534 F. 3d 487,
5
The Court will now turn to the Defendants’ affirmative defense.4 Defendants contend
that collateral estoppel prevents Woodfox from re-litigating the issue of the strip searches’
legality because of the previous state court litigation that resulted in the consent agreement.
When a federal court is called upon to determine the preclusive effect of a state court
judgment, the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, requires it to refer to the preclusion
law of the state that rendered the judgment. Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic
Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985). Since a Louisiana state court issued the consent agreement,
Louisiana law governs its preclusive effect.
Under Louisiana’s collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, doctrine, “once a court decides
an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision precludes relitigation of the same
issue in a different cause of action between the same parties.” Hudson v. City of Bossier, 766 So.
2d 738, 743 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2000). While collateral estoppel is premised on a final judgment, it
also applies when the parties enter into a settlement or compromise. Bailey v. Martin Brower
Co., 658 So. 2d 1299, 1301 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1995). However, such settlements are only given
preclusive effect if both parties mutually intended to put an end to the litigation. Rivett v. State
Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 508 So. 2d 1356, 1359 (La. 1987). The party proffering the defense of
res judicata bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence such an intent. Id.
The State’s position is consistent with both Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit
jurisprudence. See Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 414 (2000) (“But settlements ordinarily
496 (5th Cir. 2008), but rather a question of federal law. In a similar vein, since the Court is asserting jurisdiction
over the constitutional claim independently of the consent decree, there is no need to determine whether the state
court has exclusive jurisdiction. The Court believes that if the consent decree is to play any role in the determining
the propriety of a preliminary injunction, it would solely be for evidentiary purposes.
4
Since there are no arguments in the motions to dismiss touching upon the merits of the preliminary injunction and
it is the only argument not addressing the Court’s jurisdiction, the Court is left to surmise, perhaps in error, that the
Defendants’ collateral estoppel argument speaks to the 12(b)(6) element of the Defendants’ motions. However,
collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense brought under Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Finding no 12(b)(6) arguments, the Court must deny the Defendants’ motions on 12(b)(6) grounds.
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occasion no issue preclusion…unless it is clear…that the parties intended their agreement to
have such an effect.”); Hughes v. Santa Fe Intern. Corp., 847 F.2d 239, 241 (5th Cir. 1988)
(holding that a consent decree does not generally give rise to issue preclusion unless the parties
intended that it have preclusive effect). Indeed, it is well established that “consent judgments
ordinarily support claim preclusion but not issue preclusion.” 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND
PROCEDURE § 4443, pp.
384-85 (1981) (emphasis added). The parties’ intent must be clearly reflected in the record and
by the words of their agreement. Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Engineering & Mach., Inc.,
575 F.2d 530, 540 (5th Cir. 1978).
Here, Defendants have not provided the Court with the record of the state trial court to
clearly demonstrate the parties’ intent. Furthermore, the consent agreement does not contain
language that clearly reflects the parties’ intention to preclude further litigation. Cf. Mansel v.
Builders Gypsum Supply, No. 05-CV-0965-RF, 2006 WL 3062898, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 16,
2006) (finding that the consent decree made the intent of the parties’ clear by specifically
designating which claims would not be precluded in future litigation). Therefore, the Court finds
that Woodfox is not barred from seeking injunctive relief as it pertains to the invasive strip
searching practice and policy.
Finally, the Defendants argue that Woodfox’s motion for a preliminary injunction is
procedurally flawed because it is not tied to any permanent relief. This is a needlessly technical
argument. The Court finds that the preliminary injunction is of the same character and seeks the
same relief as the underlying cause of action as both the injunction and the underlying cause of
action involve alleged violations of Woodfox’s constitutional rights and request injunctive relief.
Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Fla., 122 F. 3d 41, 43 (11th Cir. 1997). Therefore, the Court will
7
exercise its discretion and hear the merits of whether to grant or deny the preliminary injunction.
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 757 (E.D. La. 1987).
III.
Conclusion
Woodfox is seeking injunctive relief pursuant to a claim that the Defendants have
violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches which is also part and
parcel of his claims asserting cruel and unusual conditions of confinement. The rights which he
seeks to redress are not “created” by consent decree, but rather by federal law. Additionally, the
consent decree does not preclude this Court from ruling on the merits of the preliminary
injunction as issue preclusion does not apply under the present circumstances.
Therefore,
finding no bar to exercising its jurisdiction, the Court will hear arguments on the propriety of a
preliminary injunction.
Accordingly, the Defendants’ motions to dismiss (docs. 484 and 510) are DENIED.
Defendants may file a joint motion in opposition to injunctive relief no later than
November 7, 2013, or maintain motions already filed.
A hearing is set on the merits of the preliminary injunction for November 13, 2013 at
9:30 A.M.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on November 1, 2013.
JUDGE JAMES J. BRADY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
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