Cooper v. Alford et al

Filing 39

ORDER and Reasons granting 36 Motion to Dismiss and the court VACATES the preliminary default entered against Defendant, Laura Camille Alford and dismisses all of Plaintiffs claims asserted against Defendant Alford, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman. Signed by Judge A. J. McNamara on 04/21/10. (PAH, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA EVAN E. COOPER VERSUS LAURA CAMILLE ALFORD, ET AL * * * CIVIL ACTION NO: 08-709 SECTION: "D"(2)

ORDER AND REASONS Before the court is the court's own Motion to Dismiss Claims Against Defendant, Laura Camille Alford (Doc. No. 36). Plaintiff,

Evan E. Cooper, filed a memorandum in opposition. (Doc. No. 38). The motion, set for hearing on Wednesday, April 21, 2010, is before the court without oral argument. Now, having considered the

Plaintiff's memorandum, the record, and the applicable law, the court finds that the motion should be granted for the same reasons the court granted the "Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss" (Doc. No. 29) filed by Defendant, Van H. Kyzar. (See Order and Reasons, Doc. No. 37). Namely, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction in "cases ... brought by statecourt losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced

and

inviting

district

court

review

and

rejection

of

those

arguments."

Exxon-Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 Here,

U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2002).

Plaintiff impermissibly asks this court to overturn two state court judgments issued before he filed this federal suit. Further, the plain language of Servicemembers Civil Relief Act at 50 App. U.S.C. § §521(g) confirms that Plaintiff should have sought relief in the court(s) in which the subject judgments were entered. That section provides: (g) Vacation judgments (1) or setting aside of default

Authority for court to vacate or set aside judgment

If a default judgment is entered in an action covered by this section against a servicemember during the servicemember's period of military service (or within 60 days after termination of or release from such military service), the court entering the judgment shall, upon application by or on behalf of the servicemember, reopen the judgment for the purpose of allowing the servicemember to defend the action if it appears that (A) the servicemember was materially affected by reason of that military service in making a defense to th action; and the servicemember has a meritorious or legal defense to the action or some part of it.

(B)

SCRA, §521(g)(emphasis added). 2

While

this

court

expresses

no

opinion

regarding

whether

Plaintiff may be able to seek relief under the SCRA through the proper state-court appellate system, the court finds that under Rooker-Feldman, it lacks jurisdiction to revisit the underlying state court judgments via Plaintiff's SCRA claim or any other recast constitutional, federal or state law claim asserted herein, all of which are inextricably intertwined with those state court judgments. Thus, the court VACATES the preliminary default entered

against Defendant, Laura Camille Alford, and GRANTS its own Motion to Dismiss Claims Against Defendant, Laura Camille Alford,

DISMISSING all of Plaintiff's claims asserted against Defendant Alford, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under RookerFeldman. New Orleans, Louisiana, this 21st day of April, 2010.

______________________________ A.J. McNAMARA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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