Ratcliff v. MedSouth Record Management, LLC

Filing 75

ORDER AND REASONS granting 56 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying as moot 56 Motion to Dismiss; and denying 59 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Martin L.C. Feldman on 10/5/2011. (CAA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SUSAN RATCLIFF, individually
and as representative of a class

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 08-718

MEDSOUTH RECORD MANAGEMENT, LLC

SECTION “F”

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are two motions: (1) the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment combined with its motion to dismiss; and (2)
the plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment. For the reasons
that

follow,

the

defendant’s

motion

for

summary

judgment

is

GRANTED, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED as moot, and
the plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.
Background
This putative class action lawsuit arises out of alleged
overcharging for medical and billing records by a company that
services record requests for medical providers.
In July 2007, after being injured in a car accident, Susan
Ratcliff received medical treatment at Our Lady of the Lake Primary
Care

Physicians

Louisiana.

(Family

Practice

Associates)

in

Baton

Rouge,

She then sued the other driver and his insurer to

recover for her personal injuries.

She hired Brad M. Boudreaux to

pursue her personal injury claim; Mr. Boudreaux requested, paid
for, and received a certified copy of Ms. Ratcliff’s medical and

1

billing records from Our Lady of the Lake Primary Care Physicians,
through MedSouth Record Managment LLC.1
On September 29, 2008 Ratcliff sued MedSouth Record Management
LLC in state court in Baton Rouge, seeking to represent a class
consisting of:
All individuals and legal entities who have paid to the
Defendant sums invoiced by the Defendant that are beyond
those charges authorized by La.R.S. 40:1299.96 for the
production of “medical, hospital or other record[s]”
within the State of Louisiana.
Ratcliff, on behalf of the putative class, asserts that MedSouth
has improperly charged fees not authorized by statute and has
accepted the overcharges in bad faith such that it must not only
refund the excessive fees collected, but also asserts that MedSouth

1

In pursuing her personal injury claim, on May 7, 2008
her attorney, Brad M. Boudreaux, requested a certified copy of
records from Family Practice Associates related to her medical
treatment, including billing records, pursuant to La.R.S.
40:1299.96. On May 19, 2008 MedSouth Record Management LLC mailed
two separate “prebill” invoices to Mr. Boudreaux for the release of
the requested records; the invoices consisted of invoices for
handling fees for medical records, a handling fee for billing
records, and charged $1.00 per page for copies of the first 25
pages of billing records; also, two separate certification fees
were charged. The records sent to Mr. Boudreaux were separated
into “medical records” and “billing records”, which were invoiced
separately. Because the medical records and billing records were
separately produced, the $15.00 handling charge authorized by
Louisiana law was billed twice, as was the $15.00 certification
fee, and the $.42 for postage was also charged twice.
Mr.
Boudreaux paid the two invoices in the amounts of $53.34 (which was
for the production of 22 pages of medical records) and $32.42
(which was for the production of two pages of billing records), and
Ms. Ratcliff eventually reimbursed him at the conclusion of her
personal injury claim by withholding the amount from the settlement
disbursement.
2

must pay interest on the excessive fees charged.2

In particular,

Ratcliff contends that
(a)

(b)

(c)
(d)

(e)

MedSouth separately invoiced class members a $15
handling charge for “billing records”, which
MedSouth has wrongfully claimed to be separate from
the “medical, hospital or other record[s]” under
La.R.S. 40:1299.96
by
improperly
separating
“billing
records”,
MedSouth has charged $1.00 per page for the first
25 pages of “billing records” instead of the charge
authorized by La.R.S. 1299.96
MedSouth has improperly charged class members a
“certification fee” for routine certification of
the records
MedSouth has charged the class members a per-page
copy charge for production of a copy of the class
members’ written requests for records and the
accompanying release authorizations
MedSouth has improperly charged class members a
per-page copy fee for the production of a copy of a
blank certification form provided by the class
members for MedSouth’s convenience, which is not
part of the health care provider’s “medical,
hospital, or other records”.

On November 4, 2008 MedSouth removed the lawsuit to the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, invoking the
court’s subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action
Fairness

Act,

28

U.S.C.

reassigned to this Court.

§

1332(d).

The

case

was

recently

Ratcliff and MedSouth have filed cross-

motions for summary judgment addressing whether MedSouth charged
fees not authorized by the version of La.R.S. 40:1299.96 that was
2

Ratcliff contends that, if invoiced properly, the
records should have only cost her a total of $40.34 -- which breaks
down as follows: $15.00 handling charge plus $24.00 ($1 per page
for 24 pages of records) plus $1.34 in postage -- instead of
$85.76.
3

in effect when Boudreaux obtained Ratcliff’s medical and billing
records in May 2008.

MedSouth also seeks to dismiss the state

court petition on the ground that Ratcliff, the named plaintiff, is
not the proper party plaintiff.
I.
A.
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows
a party to move for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.3

Such a motion is rarely

granted because it is viewed with disfavor.

See Lowrey v. Tex. A

& M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d
1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982)).

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, or Rule 12(c) motion, the Court “accepts ‘all well-pleaded
facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.’”

See Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid

3

The defendants’ motion for partial dismissal and the
plaintiff’s motion to dismiss certain counterclaims appear to be
grounded in Rule 12(c) insofar as the parties consider the
allegations asserted in the defendants’ answer and counterclaims
and the plaintiff’s answer to the counterclaim in addition to the
complaint.
Regardless, the standard for deciding a motion for
judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is the same as the one for deciding a motion under
Rule 12(b)(6). Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 543-44 (5th Cir.
2010). “A motion brought pursuant to [Rule 12(c)] is designed to
dispose of cases where the material facts are not in dispute and a
judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance
of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts.” Great Plains
Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312
(5th Cir. 2002)(citation omitted).
4

Transit, 369 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jones v. Greninger,
188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999)).

But, in deciding whether

dismissal is warranted, the Court will not accept conclusory
allegations in the complaint as true.

Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.

Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th
Cir. 1982). Indeed, the Court must first identify pleadings that
are conclusory and, thus, not entitled to the assumption of truth.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ---, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). A
corollary:

legal

conclusions

“must

be

supported

by

factual

allegations.” Id. at 1950. Assuming the veracity of the wellpleaded factual allegations, the Court must then determine “whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
“‘To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d
600,

603

(5th

Cir.

2009)(quoting

Iqbal,

(2009))(internal quotation marks omitted).

129

S.Ct.

at

1949

“Factual allegations

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint
are true (even if doubtful in fact).”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotation marks, citations, and footnote
omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

5

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949

(“The plausibility standard is not akin

to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”). This is a
“context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on
its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
pleads

facts

that

are

merely

consistent

“Where a complaint

with

a

defendant’s

liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.”

Id. (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 557) (internal quotations omitted).
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider
documents that are essentially “part of the pleadings” -- that is,
any documents attached to or incorporated in the plaintiffs’
complaint that are central to the plaintiff’s claim for relief.
Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th
Cir. 2004) (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d
496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000)).

Also, the Court is permitted to

consider matters of public record and other matters subject to
judicial notice without converting a motion to dismiss into one for
summary judgment.

See United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana

Health Plan of Texas Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 2003).
However, if the Court considers matters outside the pleadings that
are neither part of the pleadings nor matters of public record,
Rule 12(d) mandates that the Court treat the motion as one for
summary judgment under Rule 56. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). If the motion

6

is converted, “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity
to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.”

Id.

B.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 instructs that summary
judgment is proper if the record discloses no genuine dispute as to
any material fact such that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

No genuine issue of fact exists if

the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact
to find for the non-moving party.

See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.

v. Zenith Radio., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

A genuine issue of

fact exists only "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the non-moving party."

Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The Court emphasizes that the mere argued existence of a
factual dispute does not defeat an otherwise properly supported
motion.

See

id.

Therefore,

"[i]f

the

evidence

is

merely

colorable, or is not significantly probative," summary judgment is
appropriate.

Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted).

Summary judgment

is also proper if the party opposing the motion fails to establish
an essential element of his case.
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

In this regard, the non-moving party

must do more than simply deny the allegations raised by the moving
party.

See Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 974 F.2d

646, 649 (5th Cir. 1992).

Rather, he must come forward with

7

competent evidence, such as affidavits or depositions, to buttress
his claims.

Id.

Hearsay evidence and unsworn documents do not

qualify as competent opposing evidence.

Martin v. John W. Stone

Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1987). Finally, in
evaluating the summary judgment motion, the Court must read the
facts

in

the

light

most

favorable

to

the

non-moving

party.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
II.
A.
This Court is called on to interpret Louisiana’s statute
applicable to charges health care providers can charge for copies
of records pertaining to a patient’s health care.

The plaintiff

contends that the statute has never permitted separate charges for
production of billing records and has never authorized collection
of certification fees, whereas the defendant submits that the
statute

has

never,

until

recently,

expressly

prohibited

the

challenged charges and fees.
“It is well established that statutes are to be construed in
such a manner as to effectuate their purpose.”

Smith v. Cajun

Insulation, Inc., 392 So.2d 398, 400 (La. 1980)(citations omitted).
Courts

interpreting

Louisiana

statutes

must

be

mindful

of

principles of judicial interpretation, as well as statutory rules
for interpretation.

As the state high court has observed:

A statute’s meaning and intent is determined after
consideration of the entire statute and all other
statutes on the same subject matter, and a construction
8

should be placed on the provision in question which is
consistent with the express terms of the statute and with
the obvious intent of the Legislature in its enactment of
the statute. Where it is possible, the courts have a
duty in the interpretation of a statute to adopt a
construction which harmonizes and reconciles it with
other provisions.
Moreover, when a law is clear and
unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd
consequences, it shall be applied as written.
A
construction of a law which creates an inconsistency
should be avoided when a reasonable interpretation can be
adopted which will not do violence to the plain words of
the statute and will carry out the Legislature’s
intention. Ultimately, it is clear that the law provides
that the statute be accorded a fair and genuine
construction. A reasonable construction in light of the
statute’s purpose is what is required.
ABL Mgmt., Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors of Southern Univ., 773 So.2d
131, 135 (La. 2000)(internal citations omitted); Moss v. State of
Louisiana, 925 So.2d 1185, 1196 (La. 2006)(“The rules of statutory
construction are designed to ascertain and enforce the intent of
the legislature.”).

Moreover:

it is presumed that every word, sentence, or provision in
a law was intended to serve some useful purpose, that
some effect is to be given to each such provision, and
that no unnecessary words or provisions were employed....
As a result, courts are bound, if possible, to give
effect to all parts of a statute and to construe no
sentence, clause or word as meaningless and surplusage if
a construction giving force to, and preserving, all words
can legitimately be found. Finally, it is presumed that
the legislature acts with full knowledge of well-settled
principles of statutory construction.
Moss v. State of Louisiana, 925 So.2d 1185, 1196 (La. 2006).
Relevant statutory rules applicable here include:
•

“No Section of the Revised Statutes is
retroactive unless it is expressly so stated.”

9

•

•

La.R.S. 1:2.4
“Words and phrases shall be read with their
context and shall be construed according to
the common and approved usage of language.
Technical words and phrases, and such others
as
may
have
acquired
a
peculiar
and
appropriate meaning in the law, shall be
construed and understood according to such
peculiar and appropriate meaning.
The word
‘shall’ is mandatory and the word ‘may’ is
permissive.” La.R.S. 1:3.
When the wording of a Section is clear and
free of ambiguity, the letter of it shall not
be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing
its spirit. La.R.S. 1:4.
B.

Mindful of these statutory interpretation principles, the
Court first considers the language of the version of La.R.S.
40:1299.96 that was in effect at the time Ratcliff’s counsel
requested and paid for her medical and billing records:
§ 1299.96.

Health care information; records

A. (1) Each health care provider shall furnish each
patient, upon request of the patient, a copy of any
information related in any way to the patient which the
health care provider has transmitted to any company, or
any public or private agency, or any person.
(2)(a) Medical records of a patient maintained in a
health care provider’s office are the property and
business records of the health care provider.
(b) Except as provided in R.S. 44:17, a patient or
his legal representative, or in the case of a deceased
patient, the executor of his will, the administrator of
his estate, the surviving spouse, the parents, or the
children of the deceased patient, or, after suit has been
4

Accord La.C.C. art. 6 (“In the absence of contrary
legislative expression, substantive laws apply prospectively only.
Procedural and interpretive laws apply both prospectively and
retroactively, unless there is a legislative expression to the
contrary.”).
10

instituted, the defense counsel or the defense insurance
company seeking any medical, hospital, or other record
relating to the patient’s medical treatment, history, or
condition, either personally or through an attorney,
shall have a right to obtain a copy of such record upon
furnishing a signed authorization and upon payment of a
reasonable copying charge, not to exceed one dollar per
page for the first twenty-five pages, fifty cents per
page for twenty-six to five hundred pages, and twentyfive cents per page thereafter, a handling charge not to
exceed fifteen dollars for hospitals, nursing homes, and
other health care providers, and actual postage. The
individuals named herein shall also have the right to
obtain copies of patient X-rays, microfilm, and
electronic and imaging media, upon payment of reasonable
reproduction costs and a handling charge of twenty
dollars for hospitals and ten dollars for other health
care providers. In the event a hospital record is not
complete, the copy of the records furnished hereunder may
indicate, through a stamp, coversheet, or otherwise, that
the record is incomplete....
La.R.S. 40:1299.96 (emphasis added).
It is undisputed that MedSouth, which produces records on
behalf

of

health

care

providers,

is

regulated

by

La.R.S.

40:1299.96. See Smart Document Solutions, LLC v. Miller, 970 So.2d
49 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/31/07).

The parties dispute centers on

whether or not MedSouth charged fees in violation of the version of
La.R.S.

40:1299.96

that

requested her records.

was

in

effect

at

the

time

Ratcliff

MedSouth contends that it is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law because the statute did not, until
recently,

prohibit

it

from

either

producing

billing

records

separately from other medical records or prohibit it from charging
a “certification fee”.

Ratcliff, on the other hand, contends that

she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law that La.R.S.
11

40:1299.96 has at all times prohibited MedSouth from producing
billing

records

separately

from

other

records

concerning

a

patient’s medical treatment and that the statute also prohibited
MedSouth from collecting “certification fees”.

Applying the clear

words of the statute in effect at the time Ratcliff made her
records request, the Court disagrees.
This statute, originally enacted in 1979, by its terms,
regulates the provision of copies of health care records and limits
the fees that can be charged for their provision.

Simply put, it

“permits release of a patient’s medical records by a health care
provider upon presentation of written authorization and payment of
copying and handling charges.”

Moss v. State of Louisiana, 925

So.2d 1185, 1197 n.6 (La. 2006).

The statute has been amended

several times, including in 2001 and 2003 to raise the handling
charge and to make $15.00 handling charge applicable across the
board to production of records from all healthcare providers.

The

statute was amended by Act 763 in July 2008 to clarify the right to
obtain records after a “claim” has been made in addition to after
a “suit” has been filed; Act 763 also added to (A)(2)(b) the
following sentence, which is relevant to the plaintiff’s claim
here: “If requested, the health care provider shall provide the
requestor, at no extra charge, a certification page setting forth
the completeness of records on file.”

By Act 740 in 2010, the

legislature amended the statute by rewriting (A)(2)(b) to provide:

12

(i) Except as provided in R.S. 44:17, a patient or his
legal representative, or in the case of a deceased
patient, the executor of his will, the administrator of
his estate, the surviving spouse, the parents, or the
children of the deceased patient, or after a claim has
been made, the insurance company or its counsel, or,
after suit has been instituted, defense counsel or a
defendant seeking any treatment record, including but not
limited to any medical, hospital, invoice or billing
statement, or other record relating to or generated as a
result of or in connection to the patient’s medical
treatment, history, or condition, either personally or
through an attorney, shall have a right to obtain a copy
of the entirety of the records in the form by which they
are generated, except microfilm, upon furnishing a signed
authorization.
If the original treatment records are
generated, maintained, or stored in paper form, copies
shall be provided upon payment of a reasonable copying
charge, not to exceed one dollar per page for the first
twenty-five pages, fifty cents per page for twenty-six to
three hundred fifty pages, and twenty-five cents per page
thereafter, a handling charge not to exceed twenty-five
dollars for hospitals, nursing homes, and other health
care providers, and actual postage. If treatment records
are generated, maintained, or stored in digital format,
copies may be requested to be provided in digital format
and charged at the rate provided by this Item; however,
the charges for providing digital copies shall not exceed
one hundred dollars, including all postage and handling
charges actually incurred. If requested, the health care
provider shall provide the requestor, at no extra charge,
a certification page setting forth the extent of the
completeness of records on file. In the event a hospital
record is not complete, the copy of the records furnished
shall indicate, through a stamp, coversheet, or
otherwise, the extent of completeness of the records.
Each request for records submitted by the patient or
other person authorized to request records pursuant to
the provisions of this Subparagraph shall be subject to
only one handling charge, and the health care provider
shall not divide the separate requests for different
types of records, including but not limited to billing or
invoice statements. The health care provider shall not
charge any other fee which is not specifically authorized
by the provisions of this subparagraph, except for notary
fees and fees for expedited requests as contracted by the

13

parties.5
Thus, the parties agree that this newer version of the statute
expressly

includes

in

its

scope

along

with

medical

records,

invoices and billing statements; that it also expressly provides
that records requests shall be subject to only one handling charge;
and, finally, that it expressly forbids (with two exceptions)
charging any other fee that is not specifically authorized by the
applicable

Subparagraph.

However,

the

parties

dispute

the

legislative implication of the amendments that have been passed
since the plaintiff requested and received her records.

Even

though the parties seem to agree that the amendments do not apply
retroactively,6 the parties dispute whether the version of the
statute that was in effect in May 2008 prohibited MedSouth from (1)
separately producing and charging Ratcliff for billing records and
medical records and (2) charging a certification fee.
The Court finds that the version of the law in effect in May
2008 clearly and unambiguously permitted Ratcliff to obtain records
relating to her medical treatment once she paid a handling fee, a
specified copying charge, and actual postage.

And the statute did

not, at that time, forbid MedSouth from imposing a charge for

5

This subparagraph was recently amended again by Act 125
during the 2011 Legislative Session.
6

Indeed, neither side suggests that the amendments to the
statute were not substantive; substantive changes to legislation
apply prospectively only. See Harrison v. Otis Elevator Co., 935
F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1991)(citation omitted).
14

certification.

Nor did the statute in effect at that time forbid

separately producing records and charging the relevant copying,
handling, and postage fees.

In fact, the statute in effect at the

time of Ratcliff’s request was silent as to certification and,
thus, did not restrict or limit the imposition of a fee for this
service.
expressly

Because
(or

the

even

statute

impliedly)

clearly
forbid

did
the

not

by

charges

its

terms

imposed

by

MedSouth, no further interpretation in search of the legislature’s
intent may be made.

See La.C.C. art. 9.

Ratcliff’s arguments are unpersuasive -- she would have this
Court engage in statutory interpretation when the words of the
statute are clear and unambiguous.

There is no dispute that the

law allowed MedSouth to charge a specific, reasonable copying
charge, a $15 handling charge, and actual postage for “medical,
hospital, or other record[s] relating to the patient’s medical
treatment, history, or condition”.

The plaintiff contends that

“medical, hospital, or other record relating to the patient’s
treatment, history, or condition” is broad enough to encompass
billing records.

Even if the Court accepts the plaintiff’s

argument that billing records are included within the scope of the
types of items the statute identified, Ratcliff fails to persuade
just

how

the

terms

of

the

statute

15

silently

forbid

separate

production of similar (but perhaps different) types of records.7
It is true, as the plaintiff points out, that the statute by
its

terms

(at

the

time

the

services

were

rendered)

did

not

expressly permit separate charges for production of billing records
and did not expressly authorize the collection of certification
fees.

However, this falls far short of suggesting that such

practices, nowhere mentioned, were prohibited.
the

statute

interpreted

as

written.

to

forbid

(certification),

and

The

statute

charges

cannot

for

be

as

The Court applies
written

services

interpreted

to

not

cannot

be

mentioned

forbid

records

production practices, no matter how unscrupulous the plaintiff
suggests that they are; they were not mentioned in the statute or
included in some catch-all limitation such as “no other fees may be
charged for records requests.”

Indeed, a later version of the

statute expressly forbids the billing practices the plaintiff
challenges.8

The Court will not apply retroactively substantive

7

The Court notes that even her lawyer singled out “bills”
in submitting his request. When Ratcliff made her records request,
by letter, she requested “a CERTIFIED copy of any and all medical
records, a copy of the medical file, a copy of any and all medical
bills, and any information whatsoever, which you have in your
possession pertaining to Susan Ratcliff” and she also requested, by
form, “ANY AND ALL Records, Materials, Bills.”
8

In fact, if the Court accepted the plaintiff’s
invitation to engage in statutory interpretation, the Court would
apply this, among other principles, in ascertaining legislative
intent:
Where a new statute is worded differently from the
preceding statute, it is presumed that the legislature intended to
change the law.
La.R.S. 12:177(C).
Of course, this would not
support adopting the interpretation advanced by the plaintiff.
16

amendments absent the state legislature’s express invitation to do
so.
At the time services were rendered, La.R.S. 40:1299.96 did not
prohibit the fees that MedSouth charged Ratcliff.
MedSouth’s

motion

for

summary

judgment

is

Accordingly,

GRANTED,

and

the

plaintiff’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED.
MedSouth’s motion to dismiss is DENIED as moot.

The plaintiff’s

case is hereby dismissed.

New Orleans, Louisiana, October 5, 2011
______________________________
MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

17