Douglas v. City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge et al

Filing 30

RULING denying 21 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 24 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Plaintiff's claim against City of Baton Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge is dismissed. Signed by Judge James J. Brady on 9/10/2013. (SMG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ANTHONY W. DOUGLAS
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 09-154-JJB-SCR
CITY OF BATON ROUGE AND
PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE

RULING ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Anthony W. Douglas’s (“Douglas”)
Motion (doc. 21) for Summary Judgment, and Defendant City of Baton Rouge and Parish
of East Baton Rouge’s (“City”) Motion (doc. 24) for Summary Judgment. Defendant
filed a Memorandum (doc. 23) in Opposition to Plaintiff’s motion, and Plaintiff
subsequently filed a Response (doc. 28). Additionally, Plaintiff filed a Memorandum
(doc. 29) in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. There is no need
for oral argument. Jurisdiction is based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the reasons stated
herein, Plaintiff’s Motion (doc. 21) for Summary Judgment is DENIED, and Defendant’s
Motion (doc. 24) for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Background
Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant was initially terminated in 1999. After a
long and protracted legal dispute, which will not be recounted here, Plaintiff was
reinstated to work in 2006. However, in 2007, Plaintiff allegedly failed a drug/alcohol
test that was given in connection with his employment, and Defendant again sought to
terminate Plaintiff’s employment. After legally challenging the termination, the Plaintiff
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and Defendant entered into a settlement and release agreement in 2007. The settlement
and release agreement was entered in open court at the Louisiana 19th Judicial District
Court. In the agreement, Plaintiff agreed to resign from employment, release all claims
against the Defendant, and never seek employment again with Defendant. (See Doc. 24,
Ex. A and Ex. F). As was previously recounted by the Louisiana First Circuit Court of
Appeal, in one of the numerous lawsuits between these parties:
The written stipulation detailing the dollar amounts agreed to be paid and
outlining the terms and conditions of the settlement were prepared by the
City/Parish. A copy of the stipulation was received by the trial court, the
parties, and all counsel, and it was filed into evidence at the March 9, 2007
hearing. At the hearing, the trial court questioned Mr. Douglas on the
record regarding his understanding that the settlement agreement “puts an
end to all of the litigation between you and the City[/Parish].” Mr. Douglas
indicated that he understood and that he desired to put an end to the
litigation. Mr. Douglas asked a question about the stipulation that he must
“never” seek employment with the City/Parish in the future, and it was
explained to him that it was one of the City/Parish’s conditions of
settlement. Mr. Douglas indicated on the record, “[t]hat’s agreeable” and
the trial court stated, “[a]ll right. This case is fully settled.”
City of Baton Rouge v. Douglas, 984 So. 2d 746, 748 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2008).
However, after entering the agreement in open court, Plaintiff sought to reverse his
acceptance in a letter dated March 22, 2007. (See Doc. 24, Ex. C). As a result, Defendant
subsequently filed a “Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement,” which was granted by
the Louisiana 19th Judicial District Court in a ruling dated April 30, 2007. (See Doc. 24,
Ex. D and Ex. E). Plaintiff subsequently signed the settlement on May 14, 2007, but
wrote next to his signature that he “signed pursuant to court order.” (Doc. 24, Ex. F, p. 4).
On that same day, Plaintiff obtained a notarized document entitled “Disagreement with
Settlement and Receipt Release.” In that document, Plaintiff asserted he signed the
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physical copy of the settlement agreement “in total protest and duress, in fear of being
held in contempt of court and being jailed.” (See Doc. 21, Ex., p. 2). Plaintiff later filed
an appeal regarding the judgment enforcing the settlement agreement, “arguing that the
trial court erred in enforcing the settlement agreement because his consent was vitiated
by duress, the settlement was against public policy, and he did not feel the settlement was
fair or equitable to him.” City of Baton Rouge, 984 So. 2d at 750. Nevertheless, the
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment enforcing the
settlement agreement. Id.
Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a “Petition to Annul Judgment, Absolute Nullity of
Contract and Damages,” which was dated March 17, 2009. In this petition, Plaintiff again
sought to nullify the trial court’s 2007 judgment and settlement agreement. (Doc. 24, Ex.
L). Two days later, on March 19, 2009, Plaintiff filed the Complaint (doc. 1) in the
present matter, asserting that Defendant violated 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) with regards to the
settlement and release agreement. After a conference before the Magistrate Judge, the
federal action was terminated, without prejudice to the right of the parties to reopen the
proceedings, due to the prior, pending litigation in state court. Later, in the state court
proceedings, the trial court sustained the Defendant’s peremptory exception of res
judicata, and the First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the decision on June 8, 2012. See
City of Baton Rouge, Parish of East Baton Rouge v. Douglas, 2012 WL 2061419 (La.
App. 1 Cir. June 8, 2012). In its decision, the First Circuit Court of Appeal provided:
[T]he trial court correctly sustained the peremptory exception raising the
objection of res judicata. Although styled as a petition for nullity, Mr.
Douglas is attempting to relitigate the validity of the compromise
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agreement and the April 30, 2007 judgment ordering him to consummate
the settlement agreement. These arguments were considered and rejected in
Douglas III.
Id. at *2. After the Louisiana Supreme Court denied the writ application, Plaintiff filed a
Motion to Proceed in this federal action. (See Doc. 11). See also City of Baton Rouge v.
Douglas, 98 So. 3d 875 (La. 2012). Plaintiff then submitted the present Motion (doc. 21)
for Summary Judgment, requesting this Court to grant summary judgment as to
Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant failed to follow the requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)
with regards to the 2007 settlement and release agreement. Defendant subsequently filed
its own Motion (doc. 24) for Summary Judgment, in which Defendant avers that
Plaintiff’s claim is barred by res judicata, as a result of previous Louisiana state court
orders and judgments that are final and conclusive.
Analysis
Summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact.” Fed. Rule Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party seeking
summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating the absence of evidence to support
the non-moving party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). When
the non-moving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only
demonstrate that the record lacks sufficient evidentiary support for the non-moving
party’s case. Id. The moving party can do this by showing that the evidence is insufficient
to prove the existence of one or more essential elements of the non-moving party’s case.
Id. A party must support its summary judgment position by “citing to particular parts of

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materials in the record” or “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence
or presence of a genuine dispute.” Fed. Rule Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
Although the Court considers evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the non-moving party must show that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1986). Conclusory allegations
and unsubstantiated assertions will not satisfy the non-moving party’s burden. Grimes v.
Tex. Dep’t of Mental Health, 102 F.3d 137, 139–40 (5th Cir. 1996). Similarly,
“[u]nsworn pleadings, memoranda or the like are not, of course, competent summary
judgment evidence.” Larry v. White, 929 F.2d 206, 211 n.12 (5th Cir. 1991).
1. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 24)
Defendant avers that the Plaintiff’s claim is barred by res judicata based on
multiple, prior state court rulings that are final and definitive. Accordingly, this Court
must determine if those prior state court judgments bar the Plaintiff’s present claim. “It is
now settled that a federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive
effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment
was rendered.” Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984).
“Section 1738 requires federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to state court
judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the State from which the
judgments emerged.” Id. (quoting Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461,
466 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the relevant state judgments
were rendered by Louisiana courts, this Court must look to the Louisiana law on res

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judicata to determine the preclusive effect to give to those judgments and whether the
Plaintiff’s claim is barred in the present matter.
“Louisiana jurisprudence holds that claims are barred by res judicata when all of
the following are satisfied: (1) the judgment is valid; (2) the judgment is final; (3) the
parties are the same; (4) the cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit existed
at the time of final judgment in the first suit; and (5) ‘the cause or causes of action
asserted in the second suit arose out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject
matter of the first litigation.’” Camsoft Data Systems, Inc. v. Southern Electronics Supply,
Inc., 2010 WL 3719608, at *2 (M.D. La. Sept. 15, 2010) (quoting Burguieres v.
Pollingue, 843 So. 2d 1049, 1053 (La. 2003)). “These requirements are strictly construed,
and each element must be proved beyond question.” Id. (citing La. Workers’ Comp.
Corp. v. Betz, 792 So. 2d 763 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2001)). “Likewise, any doubts regarding
whether each element has been satisfied are resolved in favor of overruling the motion for
res judicata.” Id. (citing Betz, 792 So. 2d 763; Goodman v. Spillers, 686 So. 2d 160 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 1997)).
Looking at the first and second requirements, neither party disputes that the
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal judgment on June 8, 2012 was a valid, final
judgment. Furthermore, the third res judicata requirement is met because the parties in
both actions are Anthony W. Douglas and the City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton
Rouge. (See Doc. 24, Ex. M) (slip copy of June 8, 2012 First Circuit Court of Appeal
decision whereby the named plaintiff is “Anthony W. Douglas” and one of the named
defendants is the “City of Baton Rouge, Parish of East Baton Rouge”).
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Turning to the fourth requirement, the cause of action presently asserted by the
Plaintiff existed at the time that final judgment was issued by the Louisiana First Circuit
Court of Appeal on June 8, 2012. In his Opposition (doc. 29), Plaintiff avers that he
received his right-to-sue letter from the EEOC on December 19, 2008, well before the
relevant state suit was commenced on March 17, 2009. (Doc. 1, p. 7 & Doc. 24, Ex. L, p.
10). Moreover, in his state court “Petition to Annul Judgment, Absolute Nullity of
Contract and Damages,” Plaintiff actually asserted his claim for the invalidity of the 2007
settlement and release agreement, based on an alleged violation of the Older Workers
Benefit Protection Act. (See Doc. 24, Ex. L, p. 7).1 Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s present
claim clearly existed at the time of the First Circuit Court of Appeal’s final judgment in
2012, and thus, the fourth requirement for a finding of res judicata under Louisiana law is
satisfied.
The final requirement for res judicata is that the cause of action arose out of the
same transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the first litigation. The

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The exact wording Plaintiff used in his “Petition to Annul Judgment, Absolute Nullity of Contract and Damages”
is as follows:
The courts erred in ordering Petitioner to sign off on a release agreement when Petitioner objected
to the release agreement. The courts ignored the clear language. . . . Petitioner never received a
notification of right under the Older Worker Benefit Protection Act. The action of the courts to
force Petitioner to sign a release agreement is a fundamental violation of Petitioner’s rights under
the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution and Art. 1, 2, and 3 of the Constitution of the State of
Louisiana of 1974, which guarantee Due Process of Law and Equal Protection of the Law.
Pursuant to laws state herein, Petitioner had every right to reject the City Parish’s release
agreement, West’s Key No. Digest, Discharged § 9.35 and 9.36. Older Workers Benefit Protection
Act. 201, 104 Stat. 983, 29 USC § 626(f), Waiver. The US Supreme Court has long held the
violation of these rights is a violation of the US Constitution and States Constitution see Delores
M. Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc.(118 S. Ct. 838 no. 96-1291 1/26/1998).
(Doc. 24, Ex. L, p. 7) (emphasis added).

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claims in the prior state court litigation clearly arose out of the 2007 judgment and the
settlement and release agreement. In its ruling, the First Circuit provided that:
After the Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs in Douglas III, Mr.
Douglas filed a petition in the trial court seeking to recognize the absolute
nullity of the April 30, 2007 judgment of the trial court and the settlement
agreement that Mr. Douglas executed pursuant to the April 30, 2007
judgment. Mr. Douglas set forth numerous bases for recognizing the nullity
of the April 30, 2007 judgment, this court’s decision in Douglas III, as well
as the settlement agreement that he executed pursuant to the April 30, 2007
judgment, with the central argument being that the prior judgment ordering
him reinstated to employment could not be set aside.
City of Baton Rouge, Parish of East Baton Rouge, 2012 WL 2061419, at *1. The prior
state suit between these parties, which was decided in the valid, final judgment by the
First Circuit Court of Appeal on June 8, 2012, arose out of the 2007 judgment and the
settlement and release agreement. As the First Circuit provided in its decision:
[T]he trial court correctly sustained the peremptory exception raising the
objection of res judicata. Although styled as a petition for nullity, Mr.
Douglas is attempting to relitigate the validity of the compromise
agreement and the April 30, 2007 judgment ordering him to consummate
the settlement agreement. These arguments were considered and rejected in
Douglas III.
Id. at *2. Therefore, it is evident that not only did the prior state lawsuit arise out of the
same transaction or occurrence as the present matter (i.e., the 2007 judgment and the
settlement and release agreement), but moreover, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of
Appeal rejected the prior state lawsuit regarding this same matter, transaction, and
occurrence based on a peremptory exception of res judicata.
Therefore, all five requirements for a finding of res judicata under Louisiana law
are clearly established in this case. Because this Court must “give the same preclusive
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effect to state court judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the
State from which the judgments emerged,” the Plaintiff’s claim in this case is barred by
res judicata based on the prior, final, and valid judgments rendered by the Louisiana state
courts. Migra, 465 U.S. at 81. Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material fact and
Defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 21)
As a result of this Court’s finding that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by res judicata,
the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is moot.
Conclusion
Therefore, the Defendant’s Motion (doc. 24) for Summary Judgment is hereby
GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Motion (doc. 21) for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s claim against City of Baton
Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge is dismissed.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on September 10, 2013.

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

JUDGE JAMES J. BRADY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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