Slaughter v. Atkins et al

Filing 237

MEMORANDUM RULING granting 160 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 161 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 181 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 182 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Atkins and Anderson are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Elizabeth E. Foote on 09/16/2014. (Williams, Lysandra)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RALPH SLAUGHTER

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-00190

VERSUS
DALE ATKINS ET AL.

JUDGE ELIZABETH ERNY FOOTE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAREN HAYES

MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court are the following motions: Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by
Defendant Dale Atkins (“Atkins”) and adopted by Defendant Johnny Anderson (“Anderson”)
[Record Documents 160 and 161, respectively]; and Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
by Defendant Atkins and adopted by Defendant Anderson [Record Documents 181 and
182, respectively].1 The motions are opposed by Plaintiff, Ralph Slaughter (“Slaughter”)
[Record Document 199]. Defendants Atkins and Anderson replied [Record Document 2023],2 to which Slaughter then filed a sur-reply [Record Document 214]. For the reasons that
follow, the Defendants’ motions are hereby GRANTED.
1

As Record Documents 181 and 182 appear to simply be repetitive filings of the exact same
motions found at Record Documents 160 and 161, this ruling hereinafter refers only to Record Documents
181 and 182. However, references to Record Documents 181 and 182 are intended to apply with equal
force and effect to Record Documents 160 and 161. Similarly, references to Record Document 181 are
intended to apply with equal force and effect to Record Document 182, as the latter is merely a full
adoption of the former. [See Record Document 180, Minutes of October 3, 2011 telephone status
conference held by Judge Foote, p. 2 (“Defendants Atkins and Anderson have filed identical Motions for
Summary Judgment on the claims that are still pending against them (the 1983 claims). [Record
Documents 160 and 161]. The Court dismissed all other claims against these Defendants in its September
21, 2010 Ruling. [Record Document 158].”) As Record Documents 181 and 182 are the exact same as
Record Documents 160 and 161, the Court’s earlier assessment of those two motions applies with equal
weight to Record Documents 181 and 182.].
2

Defendant Atkins filed a Motion for Leave to File a Reply [Record Document 202]. That motion
was granted by this Court [Record Document 204], and the Reply itself was intended to be filed at [Record
Documents 205 and/or 207]. Due to a docketing error by the clerk, the image of Defendant Atkins’ reply
was never individually docketed; therefore, the Court references the filing of the proposed reply for
substantive purposes, which can be found at Record Document 202-3. Likewise, Defendant Anderson
filed a motion to adopt Atkins’ reply [Record Document 203], which was granted [Record Document 206].

Page 1

BACKGROUND FACTS3
The instant litigation arises out of the termination of Slaughter from his former
position as President of the Southern University System (“Southern”) and the alleged
retaliation against Slaughter by the Board of Supervisors of Southern University (the
“Board”) and some of its members. This case follows a long procedural history, with
relevant factual events dating back to 2006. For purposes of this ruling, the Court will
attempt to elucidate the factual and procedural path that preceded the instant ruling.
Slaughter was appointed President of Southern on April 1, 2006. The office of the
President reports directly to the Board, which consists of sixteen members, appointed by
the Governor of Louisiana and subject to confirmation by the Louisiana State Senate. The
Defendants in the instant lawsuit consist of the Board itself, as well as three past members
and one current member of the Board.4
While employed as the President of Southern, Slaughter filed a lawsuit in the 19th
Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, State of Louisiana. That suit was filed
against then-Defendants: the Board; the Honorable Kathleen Blanco, individually and in her
official capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana; Dale Atkins, individually and in her
official capacity as acting chair and member of the Board; and John Joseph, individually
and in his official capacity as a member of the Board.5 On May 30, 2007, the Defendants

3

This section includes factual recitations made in previous rulings by the Court, as well as
allegations contained in the complaint and supplemental and amending complaint, and statements of fact
included in the parties’ briefing.
4

Defendants Atkins, Anderson, and Lea Polk-Montgomery served on the Board in the past,
including times relevant to the facts giving rise to this litigation, while Defendant Tony Clayton currently sits
on the Board.
5

USDC Civil Docket No. 3:07-cv-00379-RET-CN (M.D. La.).

Page 2

removed the action to this court, the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Louisiana. In that suit, Slaughter alleged, inter alia, that he was illegally retaliated against
by the Defendants for reporting, protesting, and complaining about sexual harassment in
the workplace and for providing testimony and evidence before a federal grand jury, all in
violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, Title IX,6 Louisiana’s anti-reprisal statute,7 and
Louisiana tort laws.
Ultimately, that suit (hereinafter referred to as “the original Federal litigation”)
culminated in a settlement, by which the parties executed two documents: (1) a Settlement
Agreement and Authentic Act of Release, and (2) an Employment Contract between the
Board and Slaughter.8 The Settlement Agreement required Slaughter to dismiss any and
all claims which he had or may have against the then-Defendants and Johnny Anderson.9
The Settlement Agreement was also expressly conditioned upon execution of the
Employment Contract, which provides, in relevant part, as follows:
The Board hereby employs Dr. Ralph Slaughter to serve as President of
[Southern] and Secretary to [the Board].... This agreement is issued for the
fiscal year (July 1 – June 30) commencing July 1, 2007 for a fixed term of two
(2) years ending June 30, 2009. This agreement shall expire and terminate
on June 30, 2009. Contingent upon a favorable performance review and
affirmative act of [the Board] on or before April 1, 2009, this contract may be
extended.10

6
7
8

Title IX is codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq.
La. R.S. 23:967.
See Record Document 181-2, p. 2, ¶ 4; Record Document 158 (prior ruling of the Court).

9

See Record Document 158, pp. 2-3; see also Record Document 181-2, p. 2, ¶ 4, which
references the substance of the agreement.
10

See Record Documents 158, p. 3 and 159, p. 4 (USCA Docket No. 10-30258, Mandate issued
October 29, 2010).

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Slaughter signed both of these contracts, which then became effective upon the
dismissal with prejudice of the original Federal litigation.11 Slaughter then served the twoyear term contemplated in the Employment Contract and was given a favorable
performance review. However, the Board met on March 27, 2009, and by a vote of eleven
to five, elected not to renew or extend Slaughter’s contract beyond its stated expiration date
of June 30, 2009, such that Slaughter’s employment with Southern would cease on that
date.12 Thereafter, on April 3, 2009, Slaughter filed the instant suit, alleging that the
Defendants herein conspired to punish him and force him from his position as President
of Southern, in retaliation for the filing of the original Federal litigation, for engaging in
activity protected by Title VII, and for providing testimony and evidence in connection with
the original Federal litigation.13 Specifically, Slaughter alleges that these Defendants have
violated Title VII,14 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(2) and (3), as well as state laws for the
torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress and abuse of rights.15
The Court previously dismissed all other claims against these Atkins and Anderson,
the two Defendants who filed the pending Motions. The Court previously ruled that

11
12

Record Document 16-3, Exhibit “A”, p. 8, ¶15.
Record Document 158, p. 3.

13

Record Document 42, pp. 1-2, ¶ 2, which supplements and amends ¶ 17 on p. 5 of the original
complaint [Record Document 1].
14

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.

15

See Record Documents 1, 42, and 158; but see Record Document 158, wherein all claims,
other than those arising under 42 U.S.C. §1983, against Defendants Atkins and Anderson were dismissed.
[Record Document 158, p. 14 (“...all §1985 claims against Atkins and Anderson must fail.”); p. 33 (“...no
reasonable juror could find that any of Defendants’ acts could rise to the level of extreme and outrageous
conduct... plaintiff[‘]s intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against Atkins and Anderson must
be dismissed.”); and p. 35 (“No Louisiana court has found a cause of action under the doctrine of abuse of
rights for the failure to renew an employment contract...plaintiff’s abuse of rights claims against Atkins and
Anderson must be dismissed.”).

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Slaughter’s Section 1983 claims could survive summary judgment, in that Slaughter had
“alleged facts which, if believed, would be sufficient to establish that Atkins and Anderson
reached an agreement with Clayton and Montgomery such that they acted under color of
law for purposes of § 1983.”16 The Court expressed no opinion as to whether the
Defendants reached an understanding to deprive Slaughter of his constitutional rights or
whether Slaughter suffered an actual deprivation of his constitutional rights.17 Accordingly,
Defendants Atkins and Anderson now move for summary judgment on these Section 1983
claims.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) directs that a court “shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”18 Summary judgment is appropriate
when the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, admissions, depositions and affidavits on
file indicate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
When the burden at trial will rest on the non-moving party, the moving party need not
produce evidence to negate the elements of the non-moving party’s case; rather, it need
only point out the absence of supporting evidence. See id. at 322-323.

16
17

Record Document 158, p. 13.
Record Document 158, p. 11 at n. 29 and p. 13 at n. 38.

18

Rule 56 was amended effective December 1, 2010. Per the comments, the 2010 amendment
was intended “to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding summary judgment motions and to
make the procedures more consistent with those already used in many courts. The standard for granting
summary judgment remains unchanged.” Therefore, the case law applicable to Rule 56 prior to its
amendment remains authoritative, and this Court will rely on it accordingly.

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Once the movant carries its initial burden, it is incumbent upon the non-moving party
to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute as to a material fact. Matsushita Elec.
Indus.l Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Wallace v. Texas Tech. Univ., 80
F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996)(citations omitted). Such a showing requires the non-moving
party to come forward with “specific facts” showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at
587. This burden is not satisfied with some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by
conclusory or unsubstantiated allegations, or by a mere scintilla of evidence. Little v. Liquid
Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)(citations omitted). However, “[t]he evidence
of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his
favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (citations omitted); Reid v. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986)(the court must “review the facts
drawing all inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion”).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Defendants Atkins and Anderson now move for summary judgment on plaintiff’s
remaining Section 1983 claims, wherein Slaughter argues that they violated his First
Amendment and Due Process rights by not renewing his employment contract with
Southern.
As a preliminary matter, Slaughter argues that this Court should defer or deny these
Motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) because Defendants Atkins and
Anderson allegedly have failed to respond to this Court’s subpoena duces tecum for
various telephone records, emails and text messages regarding potential evidence of a
conspiracy between Atkins and Anderson and the other Defendants. Slaughter has filed
two separate Motions for Contempt, Sanctions and Adverse Inference [Record Documents
Page 6

186 and 220] on this matter. The Court declines to defer or deny these Motions for
Summary Judgment under Rule 56(d) because it finds the information sought by Plaintiff
is not relevant to the issues presented by Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment.
Additionally, Slaughter argues that Defendants did not file a valid Statement of Uncontested
Facts as required by Rule 56. The Court finds this argument to be unfounded.
I.

First Amendment Claim

A successful First Amendment claim made under Section 1983 requires that a
plaintiff show that (1) he suffered an adverse employment action, (2) his speech involved
a matter of public concern, (3) his interest in commenting on matters of public concern
outweighed the government employer’s interest in promoting efficiency, and (4) his speech
motivated the adverse employment action. Johnson v. Louisiana, 369 F.3d 826, 830 (5th
Cir. 2004). A Plaintiff must satisfy all four requirements to recover for a First Amendment
retaliation claim. Harris v. Victoria Idep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1999).
Defendants contend that Slaughter has not suffered an adverse employment action, that
his interest in commenting on matters of public concern are outweighed by the
government’s interest in promoting efficiency, and Slaughter’s speech was not the
motivating cause of any potential adverse employment action.19
Assuming, arguendo, that Slaughter is able to satisfy the first three requirements of
a prima facie case, the last element requires further analysis. The last element of the test
is one of causation. Johnson, 369 F.3d at 830. “[I]f the decision-maker who imposed the
adverse employment action was not motivated by the speech, then the speech did not
cause the adverse employment action.” Id. In order to prevail, a Plaintiff must be able to

19

Record Document 181-1, p. 7

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show that he engaged in protected conduct and that the protected conduct was a
substantial or motivating factor in his discharge. Beattie v. Madison County School Dist.,
254 F.3d 595, 601 (5th Cir. 2001). The burden then shifts to the defendants to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that they would have come to the same conclusion in the
absence of the protected conduct. Id.(citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
The question of whether an employee’s protected conduct was a substantial or
motivating factor in an employer’s decision to take action against the employee is a
question of fact, ordinarily rendering summary disposition inappropriate. Click v. Copeland,
970 F.2d 106, 113 (5th Cir. 1992). However, if the employer is able to show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that it would have taken the same adverse employment
action against the employee even in the absence of the employee’s protected conduct, then
the protected conduct in question does not amount to a constitutional violation justifying
remedial action. Mooney v. Lafayette County Sch. Dist., 538 Fed. Appx. 447, 455 (5th Cir.
2013).
Slaughter cites his own Declaration and the Affidavits of Joseph Cedric Shelton,
Leonard London, Cedric Upshaw, Jamal Taylor, Diane Craig, Shanna Little, Cynthia
Robinson, and Tony Clayton as evidence of the causal link between his alleged adverse
employment action and his testimony in the original Federal litigation.20 As noted by Judge
Tyson in his prior Ruling, the Affidavits of Joseph Shelton, Leonard London, Cedric
Upshaw, Jamal Taylor, Diane Craig, and Shanna Little either do not give evidence of a

20

Record Document 199, Exhibits “A”-“O”.

Page 8

conspiracy to terminate the Plaintiff because of Plaintiff’s testimony or are inadmissible
hearsay.21
Likewise, the Affidavit of Cynthia Robinson, the deposition testimony of Tony
Clayton, and the deposition testimony of Matthew Butler do not provide evidence that
Slaughter suffered an adverse employment action because of his testimony in the original
Federal litigation.22 The only relevant evidence provided by Slaughter is Jamal Taylor’s
statement that Anderson told him the Plaintiff’s testimony was “unfounded” and that the
Plaintiff “needed to be gone”.23 This statement by Jamal Taylor is the only evidence
Slaughter provides to substantiate his claim that his testimony in the original Federal
litigation was the substantial or motivating factor in any adverse employment action by the
defendants. Primarily, Defendant offers only innuendo, with the suggestion of nefarious
dealings amongst the defendants, but without any evidence to support his claims.
On the other hand, Defendant Anderson has submitted eighteen reasons why he
opposed rehiring Slaughter for his position as President of Southern University, including
poor verbal communication skills, poor relationship building with faith-based institutions,
and a focus on personal gain, rather than the betterment of the University.24 As evidence

21

Record Document 158, p. 27.The Court notes that these Affidavits are the same evidence
presented to Judge Tyson for his review in the prior Ruling on Summary Judgment.
22

Record Document 199-1, Exhibits “E”, “G”, and “O”. Cynthia Robinson testifies about her
experience at Southern after testifying in the prior Federal litigation but does not reference any retaliation
against Slaughter. Tony Clayton testifies that Defendant Anderson made a suggestion about a possible
replacement for Slaughter and that he spoke with other Board members about potential interim Presidents
prior to the March 27, 2009 Board meeting. Matthew Butler testified that Slaughter did not attend the
Essence festival in 2009. None of the above testimony provides evidence that the motivation for any
adverse employment action Slaughter suffered was his testimony in the prior Federal litigation.
23
24

Id. at Exhibit “F”.
Record Document 24.

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to support his conclusions, Anderson submitted to the Court the Oral Reasons for
Judgment made by Judge Timothy Kelley of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish
of East Baton Rouge.25 Judge Tyson, in his prior Ruling, accepted Judge Kelley’s factual
findings and stated that “several of Anderson’s reasons for opposing the retention of
Plaintiff as President of Southern University are clearly supported by the record (lack of
credibility and trustworthiness, abuse of authority, inability to cooperate with others, fixation
on initiating conflict among University leaders and staff, loss of respect among his
peers.)”.26 Specifically, Judge Tyson cited the following portion of Judge Kelley’s Oral
Reasons for Judgment:
Now, the weekend prior to his last day[,] Dr. Slaughter emptied his office and
the stadium suite of just about anything that wasn’t nailed down, and he even
took things that were nailed down or screwed into walls and windows.
Clearly, he took a great deal to which he had no claim or right. While this is
not a suit for conversion or theft, the fact must be recognized and cannot be
understated. Southern University, from the first day after his departure,
attempted to inventory and calculate the value of the property inappropriately
taken by Dr. Slaughter....Now, this is not a trial for theft or conversion, but
throughout the course of the last four days, this Court has been shocked to
learn of the abuses of authority and the abuse of position of power that Dr.
Slaughter has exhibited during his tenure. His testimony from the stand was
the least credible testimony I have heard in thirteen years as a Judge. It’s
clear at this time that a very, very dark era at Southern University passed on
June 30th of 2009[,] when Dr. Slaughter finally left that campus.27
Judge Tyson stated that “in light of this evidence, no reasonable juror could infer that
Anderson acted to punish Plaintiff because Plaintiff had testified in his prior lawsuit or
before a Grand Jury.”28 Additionally, Judge Tyson found that “there is certainly no evidence
25
26
27
28

Record Document 65-2, Exhibit “A”.
Record Document 158, n. 71.
Record Document 158, p. 28, n. 71.
Id.

Page 10

that the Board anticipated that Plaintiff’s contract would be renewed.”29 When discussing
the nexus between the conspiracy between the defendants and Plaintiff’s testimony in
federal court for the Section 1985 claims, the Court found that “...there is insufficient
evidence for a jury to conclude that either Atkins or Anderson acted to punish Plaintiff
because Plaintiff had testified in his lawsuit or before a Grand Jury.”30
Slaughter has not provided further evidence that would support his contention that
Atkins or Anderson were substantially motivated by his testimony in the prior lawsuit or
before the Grand Jury when they allegedly encouraged the members of the Board not to
renew Slaughter’s employment contract. The evidence provided by Defendants and this
Court’s prior findings make clear that the Defendants’ decision not to renew Slaughter’s
contract was not substantially motivated by his testimony in the prior Federal litigation. As
such, Slaughter has not created a trial issue of material fact and his First Amendment
Claim against defendants cannot survive summary judgment.
II.

Due Process Claim

Slaughter has argued that Atkins and Anderson violated his procedural due process
rights by damaging his reputation and denying him a hearing when they failed to renew his
contract with Southern.31 Atkins and Anderson argue that Slaughter lacks a protected
property interest in his continued employment and thus does not have either a substantive
or procedural due process claim.32

29
30
31
32

Record Document 158, p. 24.
Id. at p. 26.
Record Document 199-5, p. 19, ¶8.
Record Document 202-3, p. 8.

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The United States Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he requirements of procedural
due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s protection of liberty and property. When protected interests are implicated,
the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount. But the range of interests protected
by procedural due process is not infinite.” Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 569-570 (1972). The Court found that determining whether due process rights
apply does not depend on the weight of the particular interests involved but rather the
nature of those interests. Id. at 570-571. The Court in Roth found that there could be a case
in which liberty interests would be implicated by the State’s refusal to re-employ a person,
namely if, in declining to rehire that person, the State made charges against him that might
seriously damage his standing and associations in the community. Id. at 573. The Court
stated that “[i]t stretches the concept too far to suggest that a person is deprived of ‘liberty’
when he simply is not rehired in one job but remains as free as before to seek another.” Id.
at 575.
The Court found in Roth that when a non-tenured teacher was not rehired at the end
of the school year, “there is no suggestion that the State, in declining to re-employ the
respondent, imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take
advantage of other employment opportunities.” Id. at 573. Therefore, the teacher’s liberty
interest was not implicated. Id.
Here, Slaughter has not alleged any particular acts of defendants Atkins or Anderson
that were designed to seriously damage his standing and associations in the community
or otherwise stigmatize him in a manner that would foreclose on his ability to take

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advantage of other employment opportunities.33 Applying the guidance set forth in Roth,
Slaughter has not alleged any actions by defendants Atkins and Anderson that implicate
his liberty interest, and there is no evidence suggesting they violated his procedural due
process rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s due process claims against Atkins and Anderson
must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Atkins and Anderson’s Motions for Summary
Judgment [Record Documents 160, 161, 181 and 182] are hereby GRANTED. The
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Atkins and Anderson are hereby DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana this 16th day of September,
2014.

33

Plaintiff’s complaint includes an allegation that “a purportedly ‘anonymous’ letter was received by
defendants Clayton and Montgomery accusing Petitioner of illegally having a Southern University
employee work for him at his personal residence.” See Record Document 1. However, there is no
evidence in the record that this letter was sent by either Atkins or Anderson. All of Plaintiff’s other charges
against his reputation are made against other defendants.

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