Martin v. Willstaff, Inc.

Filing 26

ORDER granting 22 Motion to enforce the settlement. Signed by Judge Martin L.C. Feldman on 2/6/2013. (CAA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DENISE MARTIN

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 09-0661

WILLSTAFF, INC.

SECTION F
ORDER

Local Rule 7.4 of the Middle District of Louisiana requires
that any memoranda in opposition to a motion be filed twenty-one
days after service of the motion.

No memorandum in opposition to

the defendant’s motion to enforce the settlement, which was served
on plaintiff January 16, 2013, has been submitted.
Accordingly,

the

motion

is

deemed

to

be

unopposed,

and

further, it appearing to the Court that the motion has merit,1 IT

1

This case arises from alleged employment discrimination.
On August 19, 2009, Denise Martin sued Willstaff, Inc. in this
Court, alleging violations under the Family Medical Leave Act.
Before Ms. Martin filed this federal lawsuit, Willstaff had sued
Ms. Martin in state court in December 2008, seeking a declaratory
judgment, temporary restraining order, and injunctive relief
against plaintiff for violation of her contract’s noncompete
clause. The state court subsequently granted defendant a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction.
In June 2009, again, before the filing of this federal
lawsuit, the parties reached an amicable resolution of their state
lawsuit and agreed to settle the matter. The settlement agreement
specifically states that plaintiff released defendant from any and
all claims and rights of action arising from FMLA and other
employment-related statutes.
On June 16, 2009, counsel for
defendant sent the settlement documents to plaintiff’s counsel for
plaintiff to execute the settlement agreement. Plaintiff’s counsel
acknowledged that plaintiff possessed all of the settlement
paperwork and consent judgment, but had given it to her bankruptcy
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attorney so that he may include it in the bankruptcy proceeding.
On December 2, 2009, plaintiff filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy.
In February 2010, a status conference was scheduled to be held
in the state court case.
The parties acknowledged that a
settlement had been reached, but noted that the bankruptcy matter
was complicating the settlement. Both parties, however, agreed
that a status conference was not needed. As a result, the parties
notified the state court that they had resolved the case and that
the upcoming status conference was not necessary. The parties also
informed the state court that a joint motion to release the bond
would be filed shortly. On February 9, 2010, defendant filed an
unopposed motion for release of plaintiff’s bond, requesting that
the $15,000 surety bond be released because the parties had reached
a resolution in the case.
On March 11, 2010, a scheduling conference was held in the
federal lawsuit. Again, both parties explained that a settlement
had been reached but plaintiff’s bankruptcy was complicating the
matter. To date, plaintiff has failed to execute the settlement
documents despite repeated communications from the defendant.
Defendant now moves the Court to enforce the settlement agreement.
Fifth Circuit precedent indicates that a binding settlement
agreement exists when there is a manifestation of mutual assent,
usually in the form of an offer and an acceptance. See, e.g.,
Courtney v. Andersen, 264 F. App’x 426, 430 (5th Cir. 2008);
McCardell v. Verizon Wireless Tex., LLC, No. 09-1419, 2011 WL
841519, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 16, 2011); Turner Marine Fleeting,
Inc. v. Quality Fab & Mech., Inc., No. 02-0091, 2002 WL 31819199,
at *4 (E.D. La. Dec. 13, 2002). “If a party to a [federal] suit
who has previously authorized a settlement changes his mind when
presented with the settlement documents, that party remains bound
by the terms of the agreement.” Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott &
Co., 662 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1981).
Here, the plaintiff has been represented by an attorney of his
choosing throughout the entire course of settlement negotiations
and, therefore, the settlement agreement is presumptively informed,
willing, and valid. See Gautreaux v. Apache Corp., No. 07-5653,
2011 WL 2637275, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 4, 2011). An attorney of
record is “presumed to have authority to compromise and settle
litigation of his client.” Mid-South Towing Co. v. Har-Win, Inc.,
723 F.2d 386, 390 (5th Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks
ommitted). Plaintiff’s counsel in this case communicated to the
defendant that plaintiff had accepted defendant’s settlement offer.
Plaintiff did not change her mind until after she received the
settlement papers and after the defendant had notified the court
and canceled its bond. Therefore, the plaintiff is bound by the
terms of the agreement. See, e.g., Fulgence, 662 F.2d at 1209;
2

IS ORDERED that the defendant’s motion to enforce the settlement is
GRANTED as unopposed.

New Orleans, Louisiana, February 6, 2013

____________________________
MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

McCardell, 2011 WL 841519, at *2 (“Although Plaintiff ultimately
refused to sign a written settlement agreement, her lawyer’s
communication of her agreement to defense counsel binds
Plaintiff.”); Lopez v. Kempthorne, No. 07-1534, 2010 WL 4639046, at
*4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2010) (“If a party knowingly and voluntarily
enters into a settlement, the agreement will not be voided because
that party changes his mind later.”); Lege v. Wal-Mart La. LLC, No.
07-1694, 2009 WL 5195949, at *4 (W.D. La. 2009) (noting that the
plaintiff failed to advance a reason for refusing to execute the
settlement documents other than he changed his mind after his offer
had been accepted, and cited no authority for the proposition that
changing one’s mind renders an otherwise valid settlement agreement
unenforceable).
Accordingly, the Court orders enforcement of the settlement
agreement and dismisses plaintiff’s claim.
3