White v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company et al

Filing 67

RULING granting 45 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendants, and this matter shall be dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Judge Brian A. Jackson on 8/5/2011. (JDL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CHRISTOPHER WHITE
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 3:09-00991-BAJ-DLD
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, STATE FARM
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY
COMPANY and STATE FARM
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY

RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment filed by
defendants, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, State Farm Life
Insurance Company, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, and State Farm
General Insurance Company (doc. 45). Plaintiff, Christopher White, opposes
defendants’ motion (doc. 55). Defendants have filed a reply to plaintiff’s opposition
(doc. 62). Jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1367.
BACKGROUND
Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, defendants have set forth the following facts
that they claim are material to the present motion for summary judgment (doc. 451).1 Plaintiff, however, has not controverted these facts pursuant to Local Rule
56.2. Therefore, pursuant to Local Rule 56.2, the following facts are deemed
admitted for purposes of the motion.
1

The Court notes that pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, defendant’s statement of material
facts is supported by citations to evidence in the record. (See doc. 45-1).

On March 1, 2007, plaintiff entered into an Insurance Agent Agreement with
defendants as a Term Independent Contract Agent (“TICA”) (doc. 45-1, ¶ 17). The
stated term of the agreement was one year from March 1, 2007 until February 29,
2008 (doc. 45-1, ¶ 18). On January 4, 2008, plaintiff was notified that he would
not receive another contract when his TICA agreement ended (doc. 45-1, ¶ 53).
Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to continuous discrimination which
culminated in defendants’ refusal to provide him with an opportunity to continue
his employment as an insurance agent for defendants (doc. 1-2, p. 2).

On

October 22, 2010, the Court dismissed plaintiff’s claims of retaliation under LSAR.S.. § 51:2256, abuse of rights, and breach of the implied duty of good faith (doc.
25). The claims which remain for the purpose of defendant’s motion for summary
judgment are plaintiff’s claims arising under the Louisiana Employment
Discrimination Law LSA—R.S. 23:301 (“LEDL”)2 and Title VII. Plaintiff, however,
asserts in his opposition to the motion for summary judgment that he has
voluntarily abandoned his claims arising under the federal employmentdiscrimination statutes (doc. 55-3, p. 2), thus leaving before the Court only
plaintiff’s claim that defendants discriminated against him in violation of his rights
pursuant to the LEDL.
Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claims under the LEDL are prescribed. In
support of that argument, they note that the present suit was not filed until July 30,
2009, whereas plaintiff received notice on January 4, 2008 that defendants had
2

Plaintiff cited LSA-R.S. § 23:1006 as the basis of his state law claim (doc. 54, p. 2). The
statute was revised, however, in 1997, into LSA-R.S. § 23:301, et seq.
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decided not to offer him another contract at the end of his one year term (doc. 622, p. 2).
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(a). In determining whether the movant is
entitled to summary judgment, the court reviews facts in the light most favorable to
the non-movant and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. Coleman v.
Houston Independent School District, 113 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 1997). After a proper
motion for summary judgment is made, the non-movant must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
The non-movant’s burden, however, is not satisfied by some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts, or by conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated
assertions or a scintilla of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075
(5th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-movant “fails to make
a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
The LEDL provides, in pertinent part, that:
F. It shall be unlawful discrimination for an insurer to
engage in any of the following practices:
(1) intentionally fail or refuse to appoint or discharge any
insurance agent, or otherwise to intentionally discriminate
any insurance agent with respect to his compensation,
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terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because
of insurance agent’s race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.
LSA-R.S. § 23:322(F) (1997).
A defendant seeking to invoke the defense of prescription bears the initial
burden of proving that prescription has occurred; if the defendant shows that the
time delay has passed between the tortuous act and the filing of a lawsuit, then
the burden shifts to plaintiff to prove that an exception to prescription applies. King
v. Phelps Dunbar, L.L.P., 743 So. 2d 181, 188 (La. 1999). LSA-R.S. § 23:303
defines the prescriptive period applicable to claims brought under the LEDL and
provides, in pertinent part:
D. Any cause of action provided in this Chapter shall be
subject to a prescriptive period of one year. However, this
one-year period shall be suspended during the pendency
of any administrative review or investigation of the claim
conducted by the federal Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission or the Louisiana Commission on Human
Rights. No suspension authorized pursuant to this
Subsection of this one-year prescriptive period shall last
longer than six months.
LSA-R.S. § 23:303(D) (1997) (emphasis added).
The Louisiana Supreme Court, looking to United States Supreme Court
precedent, has held that prescription runs in employment discrimination claims
under Louisiana law when “injury or damage is sustained,” and that injury or
damage is sustained at the time the plaintiff is notified of the adverse employment
action. Eastin v. Entergy Corp., 865 So.2d 49, 53 (La. 2004). The Eastin court
found that “it is well settled that the damage is sustained in any employment
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discrimination at the earlier of the date the employee is informed of his termination
or his actual separation from employment.” Id. The court further found that “the
proper focus is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the
consequences of the act become painful.” Id. at 54.
In the present case, the adverse employment action was the decision by
defendants to refuse to reappoint plaintiff, or rather, to refuse to offer him another
contract.

The undisputed facts establish that plaintiff received notice of that

adverse employment action on January 4, 2008. Therefore, pursuant to the plain
language of LSA-R.S. 23:301(D), the prescriptive period for filing an action under
the LEDL could have extended only until July 5, 2009—one year and six months
after plaintiff’s notification of the adverse employment action. As is noted supra,
plaintiff filed the petition in this matter on July 30, 2009, over three weeks after
July 5, 2009.
Nonetheless, plaintiff argues:
Eastin stands for the principle that, under the LSA-R.S.
23:303(D), damage is sustained and the prescriptive period
begins to run when the “employee is informed of his termination”
or when his employment actually terminates, whichever occurs
sooner. In the instant case, White was not an employee, and he
was never terminated; rather, his contract- by its own specific
terms- expired on February 29, 2008.

(Doc. 55-3, p. 8 (quoting Eastin, 865 So.2d at 54)(emphasis in original)).
Plaintiff further argues that, “unlike an employee who is notified of his
‘termination,’ [he] did not begin to suffer injury or damage until after the natural

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expiration of his contract” (Id., at 8-9). Plaintiff asserts that, unlike an employee
who receives notice that his employment contract will be terminated, he incurred
no damage when he received notice that his independent contractor agreement
would not be renewed.
The Court finds no merit in plaintiff’s argument. As the Eastin court noted,
“the proper focus is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the
consequences of the act become painful.” Moreover, plaintiff has pointed to no
valid reason, statutory provision, or case law that supports his argument that
independent contractors should be treated differently than employees with regard
to prescription of claims asserted under the LEDL.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that no genuine dispute of material fact
exists regarding prescription as to the LEDL claim and that defendants are entitled
to summary judgment, dismissing all claims asserted under the LEDL as
prescribed.
The Court also notes that, in the opposition to the motion for summary
judgment, plaintiff briefly mentions a breach of contract claim (doc. 55-3, p. 2).
Insofar as plaintiff may have intended reference to his claim of breach of the
implied duty of good faith, that claim has already been dismissed (see doc. 25),
and the mention may be due simply to a typographical error. To the extent that
plaintiff may have intended to assert a claim for breach of contract aside from the
claim of breach of the implied duty of good faith, the Court’s review of the record
has demonstrated no previous assertion of such a claim. Moreover, plaintiff has
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failed to direct the court to any specific provision of the contract which defendants
are alleged to have breached. More importantly, plaintiff has failed to set forth
evidence to establish a genuine dispute of fact regarding a breach of contract
claim.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment, filed by
defendants, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, State Farm Life
Insurance Company, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, and State Farm
General Insurance Company (doc. 45), is hereby GRANTED, and this matter shall
be dismissed with prejudice.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, August 5, 2011.

JUDGE BRIAN A. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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