Service Steel Warehouse, Co., L.P. v. Eakin

Filing 30

RULING denying 15 Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. Signed by Judge Brian A. Jackson on 8/5/2011. (PJH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SERVICE STEEL
WAREHOUSE, CO., L.P.
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 10-151-BAJ-DLD
SAMUEL F. EAKIN
RULING
This matter is before the Court on a motion by defendant, Samuel Eakin, to
dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule
12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (doc. 15). Jurisdiction is based on
28 U.S.C. § 1332.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Service Steel Warehouse Co., L.P., filed the complaint in this
matter on March 4, 2010, alleging liability under Tex. Prop. Code § 162.001, et
seq., and alternatively under LSA-R.S. 9:4814, for breach of fiduciary duty
regarding unpaid invoices. Plaintiff asserts that defendant, Samuel Eakin, as an
agent for Beaird Company, Ltd., is personally liable to plaintiff under the
aforementioned statutes for the balance of unpaid invoices along with appropriate
civil penalties.
On November 10, 2010, defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss For Lack Of
Personal Jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2). Plaintiff subsequently filed a timely

opposition to defendant’s motion, which was followed by further memoranda by
each party.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
This Court has the authority to assert personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant if doing so comports with state law and constitutional due
process. Interfirst Bank Clifton v. Fernandez, 844 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1988).
The burden of proof on a 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss lies with the plaintiff. Stuart v.
Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985). Without an evidentiary hearing,
the plaintiff satisfies the burden of proof by showing a prima facie case for
personal jurisdiction. Latshaw v. Johnston, 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1999).
Factual conflicts presented in the opposing affidavits are resolved in favor of the
plaintiff in determining whether personal jurisdiction is appropriate. Id.
The two basic elements involved in asserting personal jurisdiction are: (1)
whether the defendant is amenable to service of process under the law of the
forum state, and (2) whether exercising jurisdiction comports with due process.
Spademan, 772 F.2d at 1189. The Louisiana long-arm statute allows the Court to
assert jurisdiction to the extent permitted by due process, therefore the inquiries
merge into whether exercising jurisdiction would comport with due process. Dalton
v. R & W Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d 1359, 1361 (5th Cir. 1990).
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the Supreme Court set forth a twopart constitutional test for personal jurisdiction, holding that the defendant must
engage in “certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance
2 

of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940));
Interfirst, 844 F.2d at 282. In Hanson v. Denckla, the Supreme Court concluded
that the defendant must have purposefully availed himself of the benefits and
protections of the forum’s laws in order to be subject to suit there. 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958). The Court later held that personal jurisdiction is proper when “the
defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); Luv N’ Care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438
F.3d 465, 470 (5th Cir. 2006).
A nonresident defendant’s contacts may support either specific or general
jurisdiction. Interfirst, 844 F.2d at 283. Specific jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant is present where the “suit arises out of or [is] related to the defendant’s
contacts with the forum….” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984); see also, Clemens v. McNamee, 615 F.3d 374, 378379 (5th Cir. 2010) (stating that “[s]pecific jurisdiction … requires a sufficient nexus
between the nonresident’s contacts with the forum and the cause of action”).
Alternatively, general jurisdiction exists “when a nonresident defendant’s contacts
with the forum are substantial, continuous, and systematic” Johnston v. Multidata
Systems Intern. Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. at 414-419 (1984)).

3 

In determining whether a court has general jurisdiction over a defendant, the
court may consider the defendant’s contacts with the forum “over a reasonable
number of years up to the date the suit was filed.” Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI
Telecommunications Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 717 (5th Cir. 1999). The defendant’s
contact with the forum must be extensive and cannot be “random, fortuitous, or
attenuated…” to meet the test of personal jurisdiction. Moncrief Oil Intern., Inc. v.
OAO Gazprom, 481 F.3d 309, 312 (5th Cir. 2007). The Court must also consider
whether it is fair to require the defendant to defend himself here in light of the
state’s interest in providing a forum for the litigation and the convenience to the
parties. Brown v. Flowers Industries, Inc., 688 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1982). Asserting
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant cannot offend “traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.” See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra.
The threshold issue before the Court is whether the defendant had sufficient
minimum contacts with Louisiana to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction in
this matter.

The Court notes that the cause of action is based on alleged

representations made by the defendant in his role as the corporate representative
of a Louisiana corporation. The Fiduciary Shield Doctrine, however, provides that
“an individual’s transaction of business within a state solely as a corporate officer
does not create personal jurisdiction over that individual though the state has in
personam jurisdiction over the corporation.” Spademan, 772 F.2d at 1197. “[T]he
general rule is that jurisdiction over an individual cannot be predicated upon

4 

jurisdiction over a corporation…” Id. Thus, the Fiduciary Shield Doctrine precludes
a finding of specific jurisdiction based solely upon that particular contact.
The Court, however, notes that defendant’s other contacts with the forum
support a finding of general jurisdiction. The Court may consider contacts over a
reasonable time prior to the filing of the suit, and, in doing so, the Court finds that
defendant’s contacts were substantial and continuous, and that they extend well
beyond the scope of the Fiduciary Shield Doctrine. The defendant does not
dispute that he maintained a residence in Louisiana until 2003, or that he paid
Louisiana income taxes, registered a vehicle in the state, and served as the
director, member, officer, and/or agent for numerous Louisiana businesses. All of
these connections to Louisiana demonstrate that the defendant purposefully
availed himself of the privileges and protection of Louisiana’s laws. Moreover,
these contacts were not arbitrary, random, or intermittent, but demonstrate a
continuous and systematic relationship with Louisiana sufficient to establish
grounds for general jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION
For all the above reasons, defendant’s Motion to Dismiss For Lack Of
Personal Jurisdiction (doc. 15) is hereby DENIED.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, August 5, 2011.

JUDGE BRIAN A. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

5