Gooden v. Regions Bank et al

Filing 28

RULING granting 17 Motion for Summary Judgment and judgment shall issue separately, dismissing this matter. Signed by Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson on 1/31/2012. (PJH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAURA GOODEN
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 10-299-BAJ-SCR
REGIONS BANK, BRANDY ASHLEY
AND A-Z INSURANCE COMPANY

RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on a motion by defendant, Regions Bank, for
summary judgment (doc. 17).

Plaintiff, Laura Gooden, has filed an untimely

opposition (docs. 21, 22) and defendant has replied to the opposition (doc. 27).
Jurisdiction is alleged under 28 U.S.C. 1331.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was a head teller at Regions Bank until her employment was
terminated in 2007. On April 27, 2010, she filed the complaint in this matter alleging
that her supervisor at Regions Bank, Brandy Ashley, discriminated against her on
the basis of race and that her employment was terminated because of racial
discrimination (doc. 3). On October 29, 2010, plaintiff’s state law claim of race
discrimination was dismissed as prescribed (doc. 11). On December 8, 2010, all
claims asserted against defendant, Brandy Ashley, were dismissed pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) (doc. 15).
Regions Bank filed the present motion for summary judgment on June 30,
2011, asserting that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination
because she cannot show that she was treated differently from similarly situated

individuals.

Regions Bank further asserts that plaintiff cannot show that the

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons articulated by Regions Bank for the
employment decision are pretextual. Plaintiff failed to oppose the motion within the
time set forth by Local Rule 7.4,1 but filed an opposition in two separate filings on
August 1, 2011 (doc. 21) and on August 3, 2011 (doc. 22).2
As is required by Local Rule 56.1, defendant has submitted a separate
document stating facts which it claims are undisputed and material to the claim
asserted by plaintiff. Having thoroughly reviewed the opposition to the motion, the
Court notes that the only document submitted by plaintiff that even remotely
addresses the facts submitted by defendant pursuant to Local Rule 56.1 is a
document captioned, Plaintiff Statement of Facts for Her Motion in Opposition of
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 22-1). That document, however,
provides only conclusory argument and cites no evidentiary basis upon which
plaintiff might controvert defendant’s statement of undisputed facts.

Because

plaintiff has not controverted defendant’s statement of undisputed material facts, the

1

Local Rule 7.4 provides, in pertinent part, that “[e]ach respondent opposing a motion shall
file a response, including opposing affidavits, memorandum and such supporting documents as are
then available within 21 days after service of the motion.”
2

Though the opposition documents were filed out of time and without leave of Court, the
Court, in the interest of justice, has considered the documents in this ruling.

2

following facts submitted by defendant pursuant to Local Rule 56.1 are deemed
admitted for purposes of the present motion3:
1.

Plaintiff’s supervisor at the Brownsfield branch of Regions Bank
was the branch manager, Brandy Ashley. Within a year of
moving to the Brownsfield branch, Brandy Ashley promoted
plaintiff to teller supervisor, or “head teller,” at the Brownsfield
branch. Ex, A, Pl. Dep., at pp. 24-26.

2.

As head teller, plaintiff was responsible for “lead[ing] and
direct[ing] teller staff and teller operations.” Ex. B-1, Head Teller
Job Description.

3.

Plaintiff was also responsible for providing input on personnel
actions concerning tellers and supervising all teller-related
personnel tasks. Id.; see also, Ex. A., at p. 23.

4.

As head teller plaintiff was also responsible for the vault and for
“buying and selling money” from the vault to other tellers. Id. at
pp. 26-27.

5.

Plaintiff was also responsible for ordering money for the branch,
for counting money once it was delivered, and for ensuring that
the vault totals balanced in the computer. Id. at p. 32.

6.

As head teller, plaintiff was responsible for auditing the drawers
of the tellers she supervised to ensure that they were in balance.
Id. at 37.

7.

One of a teller’s fundamental tasks is to ensure that cash is
handled properly. Ex. B, Rome Decl.

8.

Each year, Regions Bank tellers attend Mandatory Annualized
Compliance training that emphasizes Regions Bank’s cashhandling/security policies. Id.

3

Local Rule 56.2 provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement
required to be served by the moving party will be deemed admitted, for purposes of the motion,
unless controverted as required by this rule.” Only facts material to the present ruling are recited
herein.

3

9.

One of the most important cash-handling requirements at
Regions Bank is that money and teller, or branch, keys should
never be left unattended. Id.

10.

A teller should never leave cash in a teller window, where it is
accessible–and could be taken–by customers or other tellers. Id.

11.

Regions Bank requires that all vaults and teller drawers be
locked and secured when not attended; they should never be left
open. Id.

12.

Even one violation of Regions Bank’s cash-handling policy is
sufficient for termination. Id.

13.

Regions Teller Manual provides that tellers are required to keep
their cash under tight control at all times. Id.

14.

The decision to terminate a teller or a head teller at Regions
Bank rests with the Human Resources and/or the Associate
Relations Dept. Ex. B. Rome Decl.

15.

Branch managers do not have the authority to terminate tellers
or head tellers. Id.

16.

The Human Resources Manager looks at a number of issues in
determining whether termination is appropriate, including the
status of the employee, previous performance issues, and the
frequency of the performance issues. Id.

17.

On August 29, 2006, while plaintiff was head teller at the
Brownsfield branch, she was issued a “Memo to File” for leaving
a coin vault open when she left work; the open vault was
discovered that night by the cleaning crew.

18.

Plaintiff acknowledged the above security violation and that
discipline for having committed the security violation would have
been appropriate. Ex. A, at pp. 86-87.

19.

One week later, on September 5, 2006, plaintiff was issued a
Memorandum of Understanding for leaving cash unattended in
her teller window. Ex. A-4; Ex. A, at p. 87.
4

20.

On January 23, 2007, plaintiff was given an Official Warning for
violating cash-handling procedures again. E. A-5; Ex. A, at pp.
89-90.

21.

Plaintiff was written up by her branch manager and the branch
manager’s supervisor for leaving money unsecured in the vault,
for letting other tellers get coins from the coin vault without her
assistance and for falsifying bank documentation to show that
the vault was in balance when it was actually not in balance. Ex.
A-5; Ex. A, at p. 105.

22.

The Official Warning put plaintiff on a “180-day improvement
period and informed her that “any other misuse of cash handling
could result in termination.” Ex. A-5.

23.

Less than a week later, on February 1, 2007, plaintiff again left
a night deposit envelope with cash in her teller window. Plaintiff
also left a $300,000 cash shipment in her coin vault unlocked,
and thus accessible to anyone in the branch. The following day,
plaintiff walked away from her teller window, leaving a night drop
bag filled with $4,800 in cash unsecured. Plaintiff also left an
order of cash for a small-business customer, which she had
forgotten to give to the customer that day, in the vault,
unsecured. Ex. A-7; Ex. B-3.

24.

Because of the violations of February 1 and 2, 2007, the branch
manager and the branch manager’s supervisor reported the
cash-handling issues to Human Resources. Ex. A-7.

25.

Cindy Rome, Human Resources Manager, made the decision to
terminate plaintiff’s employment. Ex. B, Rome Decl.

26.

Kathy Griffin, plaintiff’s alleged comparator, was not a head teller
but a teller. Ex. D, Griffin Dep., at p. 8.

27.

Griffin’s first write-up for leaving cash unattended occurred on
February 2, 2007, the same day that plaintiff had the cashhandling violation that led to her termination; Griffin received a
Memorandum of Understanding that day for leaving the coin
vault open. Ex. B-4.

5

28.

Griffin received a second write-up–and Official Warning–on
February 28, 2007, for leaving her keys in her teller window. Ex.
B-4.

29.

Griffin did not receive a write-up after the Official Warning. Ex.
B, Rome Decl.

30.

A few weeks before plaintiff’s employment was terminated,
Rome made the decision to terminate a teller at the Brownsfield
branch, Ms. Sheila Saniford. Ms. Saniford is white. Id.

31.

Ms. Saniford was terminated after five violations of Regions Bank
policy during a six-month period. She was terminated on
January 24, 2007, for a cash-handling violation. Id.

(Doc. 17-1).
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
In determining whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment, the Court
views facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draws all reasonable
inferences in her favor. Coleman v. Houston Independent School District, 113, F.3d
528 (5th Cir. 1997). After a proper motion for summary judgment is made, the nonmovant must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2411, 91
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The non-movant’s burden, however, is not satisfied by some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, or by conclusory allegations,

6

unsubstantiated assertions or a scintilla of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37
F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-movant
“fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party’s case.” Celotex Corp. V. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548,
91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
To survive summary judgment on a claim of unlawful employment
discrimination, a plaintiff must prove that there is a genuine dispute of material fact
concerning his prima facie case. Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312
(5th Cir. 2004) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793 (1973)).
“In order to show a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, a plaintiff must first
establish that she (1) is a member of a protected class, (2) was subjected to an
adverse employment action, (3) was qualified for her position, and (4) was replaced
by someone outside of the protected class.” Turner v. Baylor Richardson Medical
Center, 476 F.3d 337, 345 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing, Rutherford v. Harris County, 197
F.3d 173, 179-80 (5th Cir. 1999). A plaintiff’s establishment of a prima facie case
gives rise to an inference of discrimination which shifts the burden of proof to the
defendant who must then articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
challenged employment action. Texas Dept. of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-803, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Once the
defendant asserts such a reason, the inference of discrimination raised by the prima
7

facie case drops from the case. At that point, summary judgment is appropriate
unless the plaintiff can prove that the defendant’s rationale is pretextual. Id.
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff repeats the
conclusory allegations set forth in the complaint without setting forth any factual
support. In concluding the two page opposition memorandum, plaintiff also asserts:
The defendants have failed to establish all elements of
cause of action which would, under law, entitle mover to a
summary judgment. And their instructing a potential
witness not to discuss the case with plaintiff’s attorney
prevents plaintiff proving her case.
(Doc. 22-1, p. 2).
As is noted supra, upon the filing of a proper motion for summary judgment,
it is the non-movant who bears the burden of setting forth specific facts to show that
there is a genuine dispute for trial. The record demonstrates that plaintiff has failed
to do so. Plaintiff’s allegation that defendant has instructed a potential witness not
to discuss the case fails to justify plaintiff’s absolute failure to set forth any evidence
to establish a genuine issue of fact as to any element of the case.
Even if the Court were to assume that plaintiff had established a prima facie
case of discrimination (a finding the Court does not make herein) the Court notes
that defendant has articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the
challenged employment action. Therefore, plaintiff bears the burden of setting forth
evidence to establish that plaintiff’s reasons for the decision are pretextual.
As is noted supra, plaintiff has not met that burden.
8

CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the motion by defendant, Regions Bank, for
summary judgment (doc. 17) is GRANTED, and judgment shall issue separately,
dismissing this matter.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, January 31, 2012.

BRIAN A. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

9