Robinson v. Our Lady of the Lake Regional Medical Center, INC.

Filing 70

ORDER AND OPINION: GRANTING as to 42 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Our Lady of the Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc. Signed by Judge Stanwood Duval, Jr on 11/27/2012. (swd)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SAHRAN WILSON-ROBINSON

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 10-584

OUR LADY OF THE LAKE REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER, INC.

SECTION “K”(2)

ORDER AND OPINION

Before the Court is the “Motion for Summary Judgment” filed on behalf of defendant Our
Lady of the Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc. (“OLOL”) (Doc. 42). Having reviewed the
pleadings, memoranda, and relevant law, the Court, for the reasons assigned, GRANTS the motion.
Background
Sahran Wilson-Robinson, an African-American, began her employment with defendant
OLOL as a “Nurse Tech II” in June 2008, and shortly thereafter she became a “Surgical Tech.”
While employed as a “Surgical Tech” Ms. Wilson Robinson earned $20.00 per hour which included
a $2.00 per hour differential paid in lieu of benefits. In December 2008, Ms. Wilson-Robinson
graduated from Grambling State University with a nursing degree. In January 2009 she began
working in the OLOL “O.R. Internship Program” and earned $21.88 per hour. While working in
the internship program, Ms. Wilson-Robinson took her nursing board examination for the first time
and did not pass. Following plaintiff’s failure to pass that examination, OLOL reclassified Ms.
Wilson-Robinson as a “Surgical Tech.” She continued to be paid the same hourly rate that she was
paid during her participation in the internship program. Ms. Wilson-Robinson never passed the
nursing board examination while employed by OLOL.
Holly Leonard, Nurse Manager, supervised Ms. Wilson-Robinson at all relevant times. On

September 16, 2009, Ms. Leonard counseled plaintiff concerning a number of issues, including: 1)
being late to work a number of times; 2) failing to clock in or out of work; 3) a mix-up involving a
specimen in the operating room; and 4) returning to work after cutting her hand without the
appropriate clearance to return to work. During that counseling session, Ms. Wilson-Robinson
reported, for the first time, that she had previously overheard a conversation between Mandy
Wilson, a white coworker and Jennifer Hebert, a white supervisor, during which Mandy Wilson
referred to Danielle Davis, an African-American employee, as “nigger bitch.” The offensive
comment appears to have been made on either“[a]t the end of August 2009”1 or on August 19, 2009.2
Ms. Wilson-Robinson reported the use of the racial epithet to Michele Bush, a supervisor with
OLOL. At. Ms. Bush’s request, on September 16, 2009, Ms. Wilson-Robinson provided a written
statement concerning the objectionable remark. OLOL initiated an investigation into the incident.
During that investigation both Mandy Wilson and Jennifer Hebert initially denied that a racial
epithet had been used in the conversation. During a later interview Mandy Wilson continued to deny
using the racial epithet, but admitted she may have used the word “bitch.” OLOL terminated Mandy
Wilson on October 13, 2009 for having given a dishonest statement during the investigation..
The following actions occurred after Ms. Wilson-Robinson reported Mandy Wilson’s use
of a racial epithet:
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Holly Leonard again spoke with Ms. Wilson-Robinson about
being late for work and also spoke with her concerning proper
techniques for maintaining sterile conditions.
Holly Leonard completed and reviewed Ms. Wilson-

Doc. 64-2, Affidavit of Sahran Wilson-Robinson, p. 1.

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The EEOC “Charge of Discrimination” filed by Ms. Wilson-Robinson with the EEOC
indicates that Mandy Wilson made the offensive remark on August 19, 2009.
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Robinson’s competency rating with her several weeks after
completing Ms. Wilson’s performance evaluation.
Mandy Lowery, an OLOL employee, deviated from her usual
practice by failing to call Ms. Wilson-Robinson to verify the
time she worked on two days when Ms. Wilson- Robinson
failed to clock out.
While working in an operating room, Ms. Wilson-Robinson
asked a member of the staff to call the surgery desk to request
that a relief technician be sent to the operating room to allow
Ms. Wilson-Robinson to go to the bathroom. When the relief
did not arrive within approximately seven minutes, Ms.
Wilson-Robinson defecated on herself and had to “break
scrub.”
On October 1, 2009, Ms. Wilson-Robinson’s work schedule
changed to move her from a day shift to an evening shift on
certain days;
On October 1, 2009, Ms. Wilson-Robinson emailed Holly
Leonard with a request to be 30 minutes late to work on
October 7, 2009, and rather than approve the request Ms.
Leonard by email, Ms. Leonard spoke with Ms. WilsonRobinson and told her to swap with another employee or call
someone else to work during the time Ms. Wilson-Robinson
wanted to miss.
On October 5, 2009, Ms. Wilson-Robinson sent Holly
Leonard another request to be late to work on October 7,
2009 and copied Lisa Boston, an OLOL compliance officer
on that email.
On October 6, 2009, Holly Leonard granted Ms. WilsonRobinson’s request to be 30 minutes late to work on October
7, 2009.
On October 19, 2009, both Ms. Wilson-Robinson’s
supervisor and manager watched her set up the instruments
for surgery.
On October 20, 2009, in an email to Monica Fjeldsjo, an
OLOL employee, Ms. Wilson-Robinson stated that her hire
date was June 23, 2008, and she asked Ms. Fjeldsjo to follow
up on that “[s]o I’m aware of where I stand for as seniority.”
Doc. 42-16, Exhibit O. Ms. Fjeldsjo responded that same
date advising Ms. Wilson-Robinson that based on the June
23, 2008 date she had seniority over one additional employee.
On November 24, 2009, Ms. Wilson-Robinson again wrote to
Ms. Fjeldsjo requesting information concerning the 2010
holiday schedule
On October 21, 2009, Ms. Wilson-Robinson sent an email to
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Jennifer Hebert, Holly Leonard, Mandy Lowery, and
Michelle Bush advising them that she is no longer receiving
post-“huddle” emails;
Ms. Wilson-Robinson was required to “scrub in” at a time
that she thought she had an open wound.
On November 6, 2009, additional changes were made to Ms.
Wilson-Robinson’s future work schedule.
On November 30, 2009, Cathy Poche, a nurse in the operating
room, reported to Ms. Wilson-Robinson’s manager, that
prior to surgery Ms. Wilson-Robinson’s ear had been
exposed; and
December 1, 2009, Stephanie Strickland, a co-employee, told
another employee that she did not want to take a lunch break
but then changed her mind“after she realized that [Ms.
Wilson-Robinson] was to be working with her during the
lunch she could have taken.” Doc. 64-2, Affidavit of Sahran
Wilson-Robinson, p. 9-10.

On December 16, 2009, Ms. Wilson Robinson filed an EEOC “Charge of Discrimination”
alleging racial discrimination based on retaliation for having reported the racial epithet.
On January 15, 2010, several months after being terminated by OLOL, Mandy Wilson,
returned to the hospital, entered a restricted area of the surgical department, and was greeted by
Michelle Bush and Jennifer Hebert. Ms. Wilson-Robinson reported Mandy Wilson’s visit to Lisa
Boston. Shortly thereafter Ms. Wilson-Robinson saw Mandy Wilson at the hospital again and
reported Mandy Wilson’s presence at the hospital to Terrie Sterling, OLOL’s Chief Operating
Officer. Ms. Wilson-Robinson saw Mandy Wilson at the hospital a third time after Ms. Wilson’s
termination.
Stephanie Strickland reported to Holly Leonard that Ms. Wilson-Robinson had failed failure
to properly labeled certain drugs that were being used in an operating room. Following that report
Ms. Leonard spoke with Ms. Wilson-Robinson concerning the labeling of the drugs in question. Ms.

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Strickland also reported to Ms. Leonard that Ms. Wilson-Robinson used the internet at work, and
apparently told Ms. Leonard that Ms. Wilson-Robinson was not proficient during nephrectomies.

The following additional facts are also relevant:
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In January 26, 2010, Ms. Wilson-Robinson was assigned to work in the operating
room with Dr. Froelich and later that same day was reassigned to work with Dr.
Perkowski.
In February 2010, Jennifer Hebert went to the operating room where Ms. WilsonRobinson was assigned and examined the “prep tray” to determine if it was labeled.
After Ms. Wilson-Robinson timely called in to report that she would be late to work
on February 2, 2010, Ms. Leonard and Gail Trammel, an OLOL employee, met with
her to discuss her reason for being late.
On February 10, 2010, Melissa Guerin, Holly Leonard and Bonnie Williams, met
with Ms. Wilson-Robinson and advised her that during the budgeting process it had
been discovered that when Ms. Wilson-Robinson was reclassified as a “Surgical
Tech” after she failed to pass her nursing board examination, that her salary had not
been reduced to that of a “Surgical Tech” and that beginning February 14, 2010, her
pay would be reduced to the appropriate level for a “Surgical Tech.”
Ms. Leonard told Ms. Wilson-Robinson that she needed to remain in the sterile field
after she had scrubbed.
From November 2009 through February 2010, Holly Leonard met frequently,
sometimes weekly, with Ms. Wilson-Robinson to discuss her progress and any
concerns about her work.

On March 16, 2010, OLOL terminated Danielle Davis. The next day Mandy Wilson was
again present at the hospital. That same day Ms. Wilson-Robinson called Lisa Boston to report that
Mandy Wilson was in the OR department, outside the women’s locker room. Danielle Davis called
Lisa Boston and reported that she had received a call and a text from a friend employed at OLOL
stating that Mandy Wilson was “back working in the OR” at OLOL. Doc. 42-2, Exhibit A-7. Ms.
Davis would not disclose who had called and texted her to report that Mandy Wilson was “back
working in the OR.” Id. Lisa Boston thought that Ms. Wilson-Robinson had called and texted the
information to Danielle Davis, and thought that the communication of such information violated

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OLOL’s policy of confidentiality with respect to the disclosure of employee and business
information.
On March 18, 2010, Lisa Boston and Bonnie Williams met with Ms. Wilson-Robinson.
During that meeting Ms. Boston asked Ms. Wilson Robinson if she had called or texted two phone
numbers, identified as Danielle Davis’s telephone numbers on March 17, 2010. Apparently in
response to Ms. Boston’s request that Ms. Wilson-Robinson get her phone so that Ms. WilsonRobinson could check her phone log to see if she had called the identified numbers, Ms. WilsonRobinson declined to cooperate. Thereafter Ms. Boston recommended to personnel in the Human
Resources department that Ms. Wilson-Robinson be terminated for refusing to participate in a
compliance investigation.
On March 19, 2010, Melissa Guerin called Ms. Wilson-Robinson and advised her that she
would not be terminated as recommended by Ms. Boston. Because Ms. Wilson-Robinson was
apparently unable to talk at that time, Ms. Wilson-Robinson told Ms. Guerin that she would call her
later. During the later call, Ms. Guerin told Ms. Wilson Robinson that rather than being terminated
she was being given an unpaid “Decision Day” to consider whether she wanted to return to work
and commit to being a team player or whether she wanted to submit her resignation. At Ms. WilsonRobinson’s request, Ms. Guerin explained the concept of a “Decision Day.” Later that day in
another phone call, Ms. Guerin again explained the concept of a “Decision Day.” On March 22,
2012, Holly Leonard and Melissa Guerin met with Ms. Wilson-Robinson. During that meeting, Ms.
Wilson-Robinson indicated that she wanted to pursue the “Decision Day” option and put together
an action plan.
Later that same day, Ms. Robinson went to Lisa Boston’s office to discuss the compliance

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investigation in which she had refused to participate. Ms. Boston declined to discuss that
investigation. On March 25, 2010, Holly Leonard, Bonnie Williams, and Melissa Guerin met with
Ms. Wilson-Robinson and terminated her employment with OLOL. Details of that conversation will
be set forth herein after in the Court’s discussion of defendant’s contention that it had a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff’s employment.
Plaintiff filed suit alleging race discrimination under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq, and Louisiana law. She also alleged a state law claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ms. WilsonRobinson later amended her complaint to allege additional facts, apparently substituting a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim for the previously alleged claim under § 1983. OLOL filed a motion
seeking dismissal of each of plaintiff’s claims, except her claim for retaliation under Title VII, which
the Court granted. Doc. 32. OLOL now seeks summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for
retaliation.
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment should
be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The party moving for summary judgment bears
the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying
those portions of the record "which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact." Stults v. Conoco, 76 F.3d 651 (5th Cir.1996), citing Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc.,
953 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir.), quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct.
2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule

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56, its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts. The nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588,
106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th
Cir.1995).
“A genuine issue of material fact exists ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ ” Pylant v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company, 497
F.3d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 2007) quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct.
2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment evidence must be “viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant, with all factual inferences made in the nonmovant’s favor.” Bazan ex
rel Bazan v. Hildago County, 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001), citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513.
[C]onclusory statements, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions
cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment. The Court has no
duty to search the record for material fact issues. Rather, the party
opposing the summary judgment is required to identify specific
evidence in the record and to articulate precisely how this evidence
supports his claim.
RSR Corporation v. International Insurance Company, 612 F.3rd 851,857 (5th Cir. 2010). In
deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must avoid a “trial on affidavits.” Credibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the
facts” are matters to be determined by the trier-of-fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S.
at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513.

Law and Analysis
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Plaintiff asserts that after she reported to Holly Leonard that Mandy Wilson uttered a racially
discriminatory epithet about Danielle Davis, to Jennifer Hebert, an OLOL supervisor, OLOL
retaliated against Ms. Wilson-Robinson in a gallimaufry of ways, including:
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changing her work schedule;
having Holly Leonard speak with her about being tardy to
work;
Holly Leonard giving her a “poor” competency evaluation
and Ms. Leonard reviewing Ms. Wilson-Robinson’s
competency evaluation with her two weeks after Ms.
Leonard had reviewed plaintiff’s performance evaluation with
her;
failing to provide Ms. Wilson-Robinson with “relief” while
she was in a surgical procedure thereby forcing her to
defecate on herself and “break scrub”;
failing to prevent Mandy Wilson from returning to the OLOL
campus following her termination;
having Holly Leonard speak with her concerning her failure
to maintain the sterility of supplies;
failing to telephone Ms. Wilson-Robinson to obtain accurate
time records when she failed to “clock-out”;
failing to timely respond to Ms. Wilson-Robinson’s request
to report late to work on October 7, 2009, and failing to place
her in “Resource” on that day;
failing to timely respond to Ms. Wilson-Robinson’s email
concerning her holiday schedule for 2010;
reporting Ms. Wilson-Robinson for breach of operating room
procedure by having an exposed earring;
frequent reporting of Ms. Wilson-Robinson for minor
infractions;
allowing Monica Fjeldso “to take call while on leave for
surgery”;
being assigned to work with Dr. Perkowski on January 26,
2010 rather than Dr. Froelich when Ms. Wilson-Robinson
had already been working with Dr. Froelich on that day;
Holly Leonard speaking with Ms. Wilson-Robinson
concerning whether the drugs in the operating room were
labeled;
Holly Leonard confirming with Ms. Wilson-Robinson the
reason she had to leave work early;
instructing Ms. Wilson-Robinson to remain in the sterile field
once she had scrubbed;
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requiring Ms. Wilson-Robinson to scrub with an open wound;
having supervisors observe her performance in setting up her
instruments prior to surgery and in the surgical rooms;
failing to send Ms. Wilson-Robinson emails following the
morning “huddle” meetings;
having Ms. Wilson-Robinson meet with Holly Leonard on a
weekly basis from November 2009 through February 2010;
reducing Ms. Wilson-Robinson’s pay; and
terminating Ms. Wilson-Robinson’s employment.

It is axiomatic that McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-805, 93 S.Ct.
1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), establishes the procedural framework for analyzing motions for
summary judgment in cases involving claims under Title VII for retaliation. Under the McDonnell
Douglas framework, plaintiff must prove a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance
of the evidence. Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, a presumption of
discrimination arises and the burden shifts to the defendant employer to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. After the defendant employer satisfies its burden
of producing a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged actions, the plaintiff must
present admissible evidence that the reasons offered by the defendant employer are a pretext for
intentional discrimination. Price v. Federal Express, 283 F.3d 715, 720, (5th Cir. 2002), citing St.
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-08, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). “At
this stage, a plaintiff must show that the adverse employment action would not have occurred ‘but
for’ the protected activity in order to prove unlawful retaliation.” Pennington v. Texas Department
of Family and Protective Services, 469 Fed. Appx. 332, 337 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation and
citation omitted).
“To establish a prima facia case of retaliation a plaintiff must show that (1) that she
participated in a protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action by her employer,

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and (3) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment
action. Stewart v. Mississippi Transportation Commission, 586 F.3d 321, 331 (5th Cir. 2009).
“Protected activity” is defined as opposition to any practice rendered unlawful by Title VII.”
Williams v. Taco Bell Corporation, 46 Fed. Appx. 732, 2002 WL 1973807 at *8 (August 2, 2002),
citing 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a). OLOL does not contest that Ms. Wilson-Robinson’s report to Holly
Leonard of the racial epithet allegedly made by Mandy Wilson constitutes “protected activity,” and
the Court construes plaintiff’s report of the racial epithet to be protected activity.” Thus, plaintiff
has satisfied the first prong of her prima facie case.
Defendant concedes that plaintiff’s decrease in pay and her termination constitute adverse
employment actions; however, OLOL denies that plaintiff’s other alleged acts of retaliation satisfy
the second requirement of plaintiff’s prima facie case. To qualify as prohibited retaliation, “an
employment action must be materially adverse.” Stewart v. Mississippi Transportation Commission,
586 F.3d at 331. To recover for retaliation “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would
have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2415, 165 L.Ed.2d 345
(2006) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
The purpose of this objective standard is “to separate significant
from trivial harms” and “filter out complaints attacking the ordinary
tribulations of the workplace . . ..” [Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. at 2415] Even when
an adverse action is intended by the employer as retaliation, it must
still satisfy this materiality standard. Id. at 67-68, 128 S.Ct. at 2414
(explaining that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision “protects an
individual from not all retaliation”).
Stewart v. Mississippi Transportation Commission, 586 F.2d at 331. The Supreme Court made clear
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that Title VII “does not set forth a ‘general civility code for the American workplace.’” Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. at 2415 quoting Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 l.Ed.2d 201 (1998). “An
employee’s decision to report discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee from those
petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience.”
Id.
The Court need not analyze each alleged act of retaliation identified by Ms. WilsonRobinson. Suffice it to say that only the reduction of plaintiff’s pay and her termination constitute
materially adverse employment actions sufficient to satisfy the second prong of her prima facia case
of retaliation. The remaining alleged acts of retaliation while unfortunate and unpleasant are
properly classified as normal irritations and tribulations of the work place and are not acts which
might dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.3
Because the reduction of plaintiff’s pay and the termination of her employment constitute
the only materially adverse employment actions alleged by plaintiff, the Court’s evaluation of the
third prong of the prima facia case analysis will be restricted to whether plaintiff has shown a causal
connection between the her protected activity and the reduction of her pay/and or the termination

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Disciplinary write ups and micro managing an employee’s performance are not
materially adverse employment actions. Earle v. Aramark Corporation, 247 Fed. Appx. 519,
524 (5th Cir. 2007), see also Grice v. FMU Techs, Inc., 216 Fed. Appx. 401, 404, 407 (5th Cir.
2007) (plaintiff’s allegation that he was watched more closely than other employees not sort of
action that would dissuade a reasonable employee from reporting discrimination); DeHart v.
Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, 214 Fed. Appx. 437, 442 (5th Cir. 2007)(alleged retaliatory
written warning would not have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
charge of discrimination); Muse v. Jazz Casino Co., No. 09-0066, 2010 WL 254278, at *3 (E.D.
La. June 16, 2010) (supervisor’s close scrutiny of employee’s work not materially adverse
employment action).
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of her employment.
Causal connection may be established by demonstrating the temporal proximity of the
protected activity and the adverse employment action. Swanson v. General Services Administration,
110 F.3d 1180, 1188 (5th Cir. 1997). Nevertheless, “the mere fact that some adverse action is taken
after an employee engages in some protected activity will not always be enough for a prima facie
case.” Roberson v. Alltel Info. Servs., 373 F.3d 647, 655 (5th Cir. 200) (internal quotation and
citation omitted). “The cases that accept mere temporal proximity between an employer’s
knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence of
causality to establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that the temporal proximity must be ‘very
close.’” Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 1511, 149
L.Ed.2d 509 (2001). The Fifth Circuit has not provided absolute boundaries regarding proximity,
noting, “a time lapse of up to four months has been found sufficient to satisfy the causal connection
for summary judgment purposes.” Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.2d 344, 354 (5th Cir. 2004)
(citations omitted). However, in Rags v. Mississippi Power & Light Company, 278 F.3d 463, 472
(5th Cir. 2002), a five-month period between the protected activity and the adverse employment
action did not establish prima facie retaliation claim.
More than four months elapsed between the protected activity and each adverse employment
action. The protected activity occurred on September 16, 2009. The first adverse employment
action, i.e., plaintiff’s reduction in pay occurred almost five months later on February 10, 2010, and
more than six months elapsed between the protected activity and plaintiff’s termination on March
25, 2010. Neither of the adverse employment actions are “very close in time” to plaintiff’s protected
activity. Therefore, the necessary temporal proximity is lacking. Consequently the Court finds that

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plaintiff has failed established the causal connection requirement based solely on temporal
proximity. Moreover, plaintiff has not offered any other evidence that establishes the requisite
causal connection. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie
case of retaliation. Therefore, defendant is entitled to summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s
retaliation claims.
For the reasons stated herein above, the Court is convinced that the temporal proximity
between plaintiff’s protected activity and the reduction of her pay and/or termination is insufficient,
standing alone, to establish the causal connection necessary to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation. However, in the interest of judicial economy, the Court concludes that even if plaintiff
established the necessary temporal proximity to satisfy her burden of proving a causal connection
between her protected activity and the reduction of her pay and/or termination, and thereby satisfied
the requirements to establish a prima facie case of retaliation for reduction of her pay and/or
termination, OLOL is nonetheless entitled to summary judgment. Once plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case of retaliation based on the reduction of her pay and/or her termination, the burden shifts
to OLOL to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. With
respect to plaintiff’s claim of retaliation based on her reduction in pay, OLOL asserts that it reduced
Ms. Wilson-Robinson’s pay after discovering that she was being overpaid as a “surgical tech.” In
February 2010 during the budget review process, OLOL noted that although it had changed Ms.
Wilson-Robinson’s employment classification from “Nurse Applicant” to “surgical tech” after she
failed to pass her nursing board examination, it had not reduced her pay from the higher rate paid
to employees classified as a “Nurse Applicant” to the lesser pay rate applicable to “surgical techs.”
Doc. 59-2, Ex. A. Affidavit of Lulu Ford. This reason would support a conclusion that plaintiff’s

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termination was non-retaliatory. Therefore, OLOL’s stated reason for reducing Ms. WilsonRobinson’s pay qualifies as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the reduction in pay.
Because OLOL satisfied its burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the reducing Ms. Wilson-Robinson’s pay, the burden shifts to plaintiff to produce evidence raising
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether OLOL’s stated reason is pretextual. Plaintiff must
show that her termination “would not have occurred ‘but for’ the protected activity . . ..” Pennington
v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, 469 Fed. Appx. at 337. “[A] plaintiff may
avoid summary judgment on ‘but for’ causation by demonstrating a ‘conflict in substantial evidence
on this ultimate issue.’” Hernandez v. Yellow Transportation, Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 660 (5th Cir. 2012)
quoting Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 308 (5th Cir. 1996). “Evidence is ‘substantial’ if it
is of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial
judgment might reach different conclusions.” Long v. Eastfield College., 88 F.2d at 308 (internal
quotation and citation omitted). Plaintiff has failed to do so. Plaintiff has not submitted substantial
competent summary judgment evidence in support of her contention that OLOL’s stated reason for
reducing her salary, constitutes a pretext. Plaintiff submitted evidence addressing the budgeting
process; however, there is no competent summary judgment evidence that at the time OLOL
reclassified plaintiff as a “surgical tech” it agreed to allow her to retain the pay of a nurse intern, that
she was otherwise qualified to be paid at the higher rate, or that her new rate of pay was not the
proper rate for the “surgical tech” position. Considering the lack of substantial evidence that
OLOL’s stated reason for reducing plaintiff’s pay is a pretext, OLOL is entitled to summary
judgment on this claim.
With respect to plaintiff’s retaliation claim based on her termination, defendant asserts that

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it terminated plaintiff as a result of her insubordinate and “inappropriate interactions” with Lisa
Boston, LOL’s Compliance Officer during plaintiff’s last meeting with Ms. Boston. Lulu Ford
stated in her affidavit that “Ms. Robinson was terminated as a result of her inappropriate interactions
with the Chief Compliance Officer, Lisa Boston, as reported to me by Ms. Boston. OLOL relied on
Ms. Boston’s reports in reaching the decision to terminate Ms. Wilson-Robinson.” Doc. 59-2,
Exhibit A, Affidavit of LuLu Ford, p.2. In a “Memo” to LuLu Ford and Melissa Guerin, Lisa
Boston reported that in her last meeting with plaintiff, Ms. Boston opined that “Sahran was hostile
and argumentative throughout the conversation” and that “[t]he intent of her visit did not appear to
be a step towards an action plan to continue her employment.” Doc. 42-2, Exhibit A-10, p.1.
Additionally, in her deposition Ms. Ford states that the reason for Ms. Wilson-Robinson’s
termination was “[h]er inappropriate interaction in the compliance office.” Doc. 42-7, Exhibit F,
p. 95. During Ms. Ford’s deposition, when counsel for plaintiff asked her “[w]as Sahran Robinson
terminated for any other reason other than unprofessional behavior,” Ms. Ford responded “[n]ot that
I know of. That is the reason she was terminated.” Id. at 171. The evidence offered in Ms. Ford’s
affidavit and deposition, if accepted as true, would permit a conclusion that plaintiff’s termination
was not retaliatory and that the defendant’s explanation for her termination constitutes a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory explanation for defendant’s termination of plaintiff’s employment. As noted
previously, at this point the burden shifts to plaintiff to demonstrate that the she would not have been
terminated “but for” her protected activity. Plaintiff has not carried her burden of revealing “‘a
conflict in substantial evidence on the ultimate issue of retaliation in order to withstand a motion for
summary judgment’” Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., Inc., 238 F.3d 674, 685 (5th Cir. 2001) quoting
Sherrod v. American Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1122 (5th Cir. 1998).

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In attacking defendant’s position with respect to why Ms. Wilson-Robinson was terminated,
plaintiff submitted proof which she contends supports a conclusion that she was not insubordinate
in her final conversation with Ms. Boston. Specifically, plaintiff cites the following colloquy from
Melissa Guerin’s deposition:
Q. Do you think that [Lisa Boston] was being polite and kind back
to Sahran in that conversation, the one you heard recorded today? Do
you think she was being polite and kind to Sahran?
A. I mean it sounded like a mutual discussion.
Doc. 64, Exhibit AX, pgs. 126-127. That excerpt does not undermine defendant’s articulated reason
for terminating plaintiff. Plaintiff also offers the transcript of the “termination meeting” (Doc. 6622, Exhibit AW) to help establish that OLOL’s stated reason for her termination is pretextual;
however, nothing in that transcript supports a conclusion that “ reasonable and fair-minded men in
the exercise of impartial judgment” might reach a conclusion as to the reason for Ms. WilsonRobinson’s termination other than the reason offered by defendant. Therefore, defendant is entitled
to summary judgment.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 27th day of November, 2012.

STANWOOD R. DUVAL, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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