Peppers v. Graves

Filing 35

RULING granting the dft's 24 Motion to Dismiss in part, dismissing as moot the pltf's demand for release from confinement.. Signed by Magistrate Judge Christine Noland on 5/10/2011. (CMM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JOHN N. PEPPERS

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

BY CONSENT

SHERIFF WILLIE GRAVES

NO. 10-0623-CN

RULING ON MOTION
This matter comes before the Court on the defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss, rec.doc.no. 24.
The

pro

se

This motion is opposed.

plaintiff,

an

inmate

previously

confined

at

the

Livingston Parish Detention Center, Livingston, Louisiana, brought this
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sheriff Willie Graves,
complaining

that

his

constitutional

rights

were

violated

at

the

referenced facility because he was housed with convicted criminals
notwithstanding that he was a pretrial detainee, that he was subjected
to strip searches in the presence of other inmates, that he was held in
a small space (12' x 21') with more than 70 co-inmates for a period of
1½ or 2 hours while his dormitory was searched, that he was subjected to
excessive force in the form of pepper-ball projectiles, that he sometimes
had to wait in line to use the toilet, that he was made to sleep on a
metal cot without a mat or mattress, that his medications were not
provided on time and sometimes were not provided at all, that prison
officials disseminated a rumor that he was a “rat”, and that the
recreation yard was too small and had no ventilation.

In his original

Complaint, the plaintiff prayed only for injunctive and declaratory
relief.

However, he has since amended his Complaint to include a prayer

for monetary damages.

See rec.doc.nos. 26 and 29.

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
a Complaint is subject to dismissal if a plaintiff fails “to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.”

In Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and more recently,
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

U.S.

, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868

(2009), the Supreme Court clarified the standard of pleading that a
plaintiff must meet in order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6).

The Court noted that “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)

requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair
notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, supra, quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).

See also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.

89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007).

Notwithstanding, although

“detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must furnish “more than labels
and conclusions” or the“ formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action” in order to provide the “grounds” of “entitle[ment] to
relief.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, supra.

See also Papasan v. Allain,

478 U.S. 265, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986).

The Court stated

that there is no “probability requirement at the pleading stage,” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, supra, but “something beyond ... mere possibility
... must be alleged.”

Id.

The facts alleged in the Complaint “must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” or must
be sufficient “to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face,” Id. (abandoning the “no set of facts” language set forth in Conley
v. Gibson, supra).

A claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff

“pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, supra.

Where a Complaint pleads facts that are

“merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id.
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6), the Court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the Complaint.”

Erickson v. Pardus, supra.

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, supra.

Further, “[a] document filed pro se is to

See also Bell

be liberally construed ... and a pro se Complaint, however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.”
In

the

instant

Erickson v. Pardus, supra (citations omitted).
motion,

filed

prior

to

the

amendment

of

the

plaintiff’s Complaint, the defendant asserts that, inasmuch as the sole
claim for relief asserted in the original Complaint is for a release from
the custody of the Livingston Parish jail, and inasmuch as the plaintiff
has since been released from such custody, his claim is subject to
dismissal as moot.

In this regard, the defendant is correct that, with

regard to the plaintiff’s original claim for release from confinement,
this claim has now become moot.
(5th

Cir.

2011)

(“[W]e

find

See, e.g., DeMoss v. Crain, 636 F.3d 145
it

beyond

dispute

that

a

request

for

injunctive relief generally becomes moot upon the happening of the event
sought to be enjoined.”) (Quoting Harris v. City of Houston, 151 F.3d 186
(5th Cir. 1998).

Notwithstanding, inasmuch as the defendant has not

addressed in the instant motion the plaintiff’s Amended Complaint,
wherein he requests monetary damages as a result of the defendant’s
alleged wrongful conduct, it is appropriate that the plaintiff’s claim
for monetary damages be retained at the present time.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, rec.doc.no.
24, be granted in part, dismissing as moot the plaintiff’s demand for

release from confinement.
Signed in chambers in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, May 10, 2011.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE CHRISTINE NOLAND