RPM Pizza, LLC v. Argonaut Great Central Insurance Company

Filing 347

RULING and ORDER: RPM Pizza, LLC's 219 Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED. Argonaut Great Central Insurance Company's 203 Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Coverage for Claims Administration Costs is DENIED. Signed by Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson on 2/6/2014. (SMG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RPM PIZZA, LLC D/B/A DOMINO’S
PIZZA

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS
ARGONAUT GREAT CENTRAL
INSURANCE COMPANY

NO.: 10-00684-BAJ-SCR

RULING AND ORDER
Before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment, filed by Plaintiff
RPM Pizza, LLC d/b/a Domino’s Pizza (“RPM”) and Defendant Argonaut Great Central
Insurance Company (“Argonaut”). These motions include RPM Pizza, LLC’s CrossMotion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 219)1 and Argonaut Great
Central Insurance Company’s Renewed Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Coverage for Claims Administration Costs (Doc. 203).2 Both
motions request the Court grant summary judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56, regarding Argonaut’s obligation to pay claims administration costs. Oral
argument is not necessary. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

1

Argonaut opposes the motion. (Doc. 236.)

2

RPM opposes the motion. (Doc. 218.)

I.

Background
According to the undisputed facts3:

•

Argonaut issued to RPM Pizza, LLC Commercial General Liability Policy No.
RS9128440-0 (“the Policy”), for the policy period March 31, 2010 to March 31,
2011.

•

The “supplementary payments” section of the Policy states:
SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS – COVERAGES A AND B in the
CGL Form provides in pertinent part:
We will pay, with respect to any claim we investigate or settle, or any
‘suit’ against an insured we defend:
1. All expenses we incur;
***
5. All costs taxed against the insured in the ‘suit.’
6. Pre-judgment interest awarded against the insured on that part of the
judgment we pay. If we make an offer to pay the applicable limit of
insurance, we will not pay any pre-judgment interest based on that period
of time after the offer.

•

On or about May 20, 2010, a class action lawsuit was filed in the United States
District Court, Middle District of Louisiana, entitled Toni Spillman,
Individually and on Behalf of the Class v. RPM Pizza, Inc. and Domino’s Pizza,
LLC, Civil Action No. 10-000349-BAJ-SCR.

•

On or about November 5, 2012, the parties, including the Spillman class,
Argonaut, and RPM, entered into a Settlement Agreement.

3

Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, RPM submitted a statement of undisputed material facts with its
cross motion for partial summary judgment. (Doc. 219-2.) Argonaut filed a response. (Doc. 338.)
Argonaut also attached its own statement of undisputed material facts to its cross motion for summary
judgment. (Doc. 203-2.) RPM responded in its memorandum in opposition. (Doc. 218-2.) Pursuant to
Local Rule 56.2, certain material facts are deemed admitted for purposes of this ruling and order.
2

•

The Settlement Agreement states:
RPM shall be responsible for payment of the claims administration costs,
including all costs of notice and the cost of the Notice Expert. These costs
shall be paid from the Common Fund, but RPM alone is responsible for
these expenses . . .

•

As defined in the Settlement Agreement, “Claims Administration Costs” means
those actual costs incurred to administer claims, and particularly includes the
actual cost of compiling the class member list, obtaining information for
dissemination of notice to the class members, the cost of retaining a person or
firm to prepare a recommended notice plan, the dissemination or publication of
notice, processing claims, and issuing settlement benefits to Participating Class
Members.

•

Accordingly, RPM paid claims administration costs in the amount of
$519,260.63: $329,744.34 to Shannon Wheatman and Kinsella Media to serve
as the “Notice Expert” and $189,516.29 to Rust Consulting to administer the
plaintiff class’s claims.

•

Also included in the Settlement Agreement is RPM’s reservation of rights:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, RPM, [Domino’s
Pizza], and Argonaut reserve any and all claims and rights under the
Policy and any applicable law, including but not limited to claims for
defense, indemnity, legal interest, [and] Claims Administration Costs .
...

•

Subject to RPM’s reservation of rights, the Settlement Agreement provides that
the claims administration costs are part of the Common Fund, which is the
settlement principal amount. (Doc. 95-2, pp. 84-85.) The Settlement Agreement
further states that in “no event shall Argonaut’s financial obligation with
respect to the Common Fund exceed Three Million Dollars ($3,000,000), subject
to RPM’s reservation of rights in Paragraph 10.2 hereof.”

•

The Settlement Agreement makes no reference to “defense expenses” or
prejudgment interest. (Doc. 92-2, pp. 69-111.)

•

The district court adopted and incorporated the parties’ Settlement Agreement
into its judgment and order. Civil Action No. 10-000349-BAJ-SCR, Doc. 243.

•

RPM alleges in its Third Amended Complaint that it has paid “Claims
Administration Costs” in the Spillman action. RPM describes claims
3

administration costs as items “paid to anyone appointed by the Court in
Spillman to assist in the notice and administration of the claims process.” RPM
argues that Argonaut is obligated to pay the “Claims Administration Costs”
pursuant to, inter alia, the Supplementary Payments provision in the Policy.
•

On or about December 20, 2011, three of RPM’s attorneys (Taylor Carroll,
Dennis Blunt, and Eugene Groves), two representatives of RPM (Glenn Mueller,
Sr. and Glenn Mueller, Jr.), and one senior representative of Argonaut (Byron
LeFlore) collectively participated in a conversation at the offices of the Phelps
Dunbar law firm in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

•

The general subject of the meeting was various issues relating to the Spillman
class action litigation. One of the items specifically discussed at this meeting
was the payment of claims administration costs.

•

According to Blunt, on or about May 16, 2012, Blunt had a conversation with
Wade Vandiver, a representative of Argonaut, who represented that Argonaut
would not let $300,000 and $500,000 in administrative costs prevent a
settlement with the Spillman class.

•

Argonaut has received a reimbursement from the Common Fund in the amount
of $486,205.

II.

Standard of Review
Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). In determining whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment, the
court views facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draws all
reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor. Coleman v. Houston Independent
School District, 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997).
After a proper motion for summary judgment is made, the non-movant must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty

4

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). If the moving party carries its burden of proof
under Rule 56, the opposing party must direct the court’s attention to specific evidence
in the record which demonstrates that the non-moving party can satisfy a reasonable
jury that it is entitled to a verdict in its favor. Id. The court may not evaluate the
credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes. International
Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 1059 (1992). However, if the evidence in the record is such that a reasonable jury,
drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, could arrive at a verdict in
that party’s favor, the court must deny the motion for summary judgment.
International Shortstop, Inc., 939 F.2d at 1263.
On the other hand, the non-movant’s burden is not satisfied by some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, or by conclusory allegations,
unsubstantiated assertions, or a scintilla of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37
F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-movant
“fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). In other words,
summary judgment will lie only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Sherman v. Hallbauer, 455 F.2d 1236, 1241 (5th Cir.
1972).

5

III.

Analysis
A.

Prior Rulings on Argonaut’s Alleged Obligation to Pay
Claims Administration Costs

As a preliminary issue, the Court notes that it has already ruled on the issue of
Argonaut’s obligation to pay claims administration costs. (Doc. 133.) In considering
the parties’ previous motions for partial summary judgment, the Court analyzed and
ruled on four of the seven issues raised by RPM in its current motion for partial
summary judgment.4 Accordingly, the Court will not revisit those issues and that it
has previously analyzed and ruled on.
B.

New Issues Raised in the Parties’ Cross-Motions for Partial
Summary Judgement

In support of its motion, RPM argues that Argonaut has a contractual duty to
pay the claims administration costs as a cost “taxed” against RPM. In support of its
argument, RPM points to the Supplementary Payments provision of its Policy, which
states that Argonaut “will pay, with respect to any claim or ‘suit’ we defend . . .[a]ll
costs taxed against the insured in the ‘suit.’” (Doc. 219-4, p. 17.) RPM also points to
the Court’s Final Judgment in the Spillman matter, in which the Court incorporated
the parties’ Settlement Agreement into the Final Judgment. (Civil Action No. 10000349-BAJ-SCR, Doc. 243.) According to RPM, the claims administration costs are

4

Specifically, the Court analyzed and ruled on RPM’s argument that: (1) Argonaut is required
to pay the claims administration costs under Louisiana law (Docs. 95-3, p. 7; 133, pp. 8-9); (2) Argonaut
has a contractual to pay the claims administration costs under the terms of the Policy (Docs. 95-3, p. 5;
133, pp. 8-9); (3) Argonaut is obligated to pay the claims administration costs under the terms of the
Policy “as an expense incurred” by RPM (Docs. 95-3, p. 8; 133, pp. 8-9); and (4) even if the claims
administration costs are treated as damages, Argonaut has a contractual duty to pay the damages within
the Policy limits (Docs. 95-3, p. 6; 133, pp. 8-9).
6

a “cost” that was “taxed” against RPM when the Court incorporated the parties’
Settlement Agreement into the Final Judgment. RPM also contends that expenses
incurred by it in retaining the notice expert and claims administrator are
“compensation of court appointed experts” costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.5
In opposition, Argonaut argues that the Final Judgment did not access or
determine the amount of claims administration costs. Rather, the Final Judgment
merely approved the terms of the Spillman Settlement Agreement, under which RPM
voluntarily agreed to pay the claims administration costs under its claimed reservation
of rights. Argonaut contends that because the Final Judgment did not expressly
mention the claims administration costs, indicate that the claims administration costs
were taxable, or enter an award of costs, the claims administration costs were not
“costs” taxed against the insured in the “suit” under the plain meaning of the term “to
tax.” Finally, Argonaut argues that the expenses incurred by RPM in retaining the
notice expert and claims administrator are not “compensation of court appointed
experts” costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.
RPM has failed to cite to any statute, binding case law, provision of the Final

5

28 U.S.C. § 1920 states:

A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the following: (1) Fees
of the clerk and marshal; (2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts
necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) Fees and disbursements for printing and
witnesses; (4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials
where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case; (5) Docket fees under
section 1923 of this title [28 USCS § 1923]; (6) Compensation of court appointed experts,
compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special
interpretation services under section 1828 of this title. A bill of costs shall be filed in the
case and, upon allowance, included in the judgment or decree.
7

Judgment, or provision of the Settlement Agreement to support its argument that
claims administration costs were “costs” associated with the defense of the Spillman
litigation that were “taxed” against it by the Court. Further, RPM has failed to cite to
any statute, binding case law, provision of the Final Judgment, or provision of the
Settlement Agreement to support its argument that a notice expert or claims
administrator is an “expert,” as contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6). Contrary to
RPM’s assertions, notice experts and claims administrators are not the equivalent of
a guardian ad litem or Special Master. Further, neither the notice expert nor the
claims administrator were appointed by the Court under Federal Rule of Evidence 706.
Thus, RPM’s argument that the $519,260.63 paid by it to the notice expert and claims
administrator are “compensation of court appointed experts” costs is unavailing.
The parties’ Settlement Agreement defines “Claims Administration Costs” as
“those actual costs incurred to administer claims, and particularly includes the actual
cost of compiling the class member list, obtaining information for dissemination of
notice to the class members, the cost of retaining a person or firm to prepare a
recommended notice plan, the dissemination or publication of notice, processing claims,
and issuing settlement benefits to Participating Class Members.” (Doc. 219-3, p. 3.)
Based on the parties’ definition, claims administration costs are not the type of costs
taxed by Courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920.
The Settlement Agreement further states that “RPM shall be responsible for
payment of the claims administration costs, including all costs of notice and the cost
of the Notice Expert. These costs shall be paid from the Common Fund, but RPM alone
8

is responsible for these expenses. Any Claims Administration Costs actually incurred
shall be paid by RPM even if the Court does not enter a Final Judgment and Order of
Dismissal. . . .” (Doc. 219-3, p. 20.) Indeed, RPM does not contest that it voluntarily
agreed to pay the claims administration costs “even if the Court does not enter a Final
Judgment.” Thus, even if the Court were to accept the argument that when it entered
the Final Judgment in the Spillman matter, it incorporated the parties’ Settlement
Agreement into the Final Judgment, under the legal meaning of the terms “costs” and
“taxed” and the clear terms of the parties’ Settlement Agreement, it does not follow
that the claims administration costs are a “cost” that was “taxed” against RPM by the
Court.
In sum, the Court concludes that RPM has failed to point to sufficient evidence
to support its argument that Argonaut has a contractual duty to pay the claims
administration costs as a “cost” that was “taxed” against RPM by the Court.
Accordingly, RPM’s request for summary judgment on this basis is DENIED.
In the alternative, RPM argues that the Court may award nontaxable costs
when authorized by the parties’ settlement agreement to do so in a certified class
action. In support of its argument, RPM points to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
which states:
(h)

Attorney’s Fees and Nontaxable Costs. In a certified class action,
the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable
costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement. The
following procedures apply:
(1)

A claim for an award must be made by motion under Rule
54(d)(2), subject to the provisions of this subdivision (h), at
9

a time the court sets. Notice of the motion must be served
on all parties and, for motions by class counsel, directed to
class members in a reasonable manner.
(2)

A class member, or a party from whom payment is sought,
may object to the motion.

(3)

The court may hold a hearing and must find the facts and
state its legal conclusions under Rule 52(a).

(4)

The court may refer issues related to the amount of the
award to a special master or a magistrate judge, as provided
in Rule 54(d)(2)(D).

Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(h).
In opposition, Argonaut argues that Rule 23(h) merely provides that in a
certified class action, a court may award non-taxable costs that are “authorized by law
or by the parties’ agreement.” According to Argonaut, such non-taxable costs do not
implicate 28 U.S.C. § 1920 or paragraph 5 of the “SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS
– COVERAGES A AND B” provision of the Policy.
A review of the record in this matter and the Spillman matter indicate that a
motion for class certification was never filed nor granted by the Court in the Spillman
matter. Further, RPM has failed to point to any evidence in the record to establish
that there was a simultaneous proposal for class certification and settlement in the
Spillman matter. Additionally, RPM has failed to point to any evidence in the record
to establish that the parties followed the procedures set out in Rule 23(h). In sum, the
Court finds that Rule 23(h) does not apply here. Accordingly, RPM’s request for
summary judgment on this basis is DENIED.
In the alternative, RPM argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact
10

that Argonaut promised to pay the claims administration costs. In support of its
argument, RPM points to the signed declarations of Glenn Mueller, Sr. and Glenn
Mueller, Jr., who both assert that Byron LeFlore, a representative of Argonaut,
promised to pay the administrative costs associated with settling the Spillman lawsuit
in a December 20, 2011 settlement meeting. RPM further points to correspondence
from Dennis Blunt of the law firm of Phelps Dunbar to Argonaut representatives
allegedly reducing the parties’ agreement to writing.
In opposition, Argonaut argues that Blunt’s letter does not constitute a written
agreement between the parties. According to Argonaut, there was never a meeting of
the minds between the parties on this matter; nor did the parties sign a written
agreement. Argonaut further contends that the December 20, 2011 meeting was not
a settlement, but rather, was a meeting to develop a settlement proposal to offer to the
plaintiff in Spillman. According to Argonaut, any evidence shared during settlement
negotiations is confidential, and any attempt to contradict the terms of the parties’
Settlement Agreement or Policy with extrinsic evidence violates the parol evidence
rule. In support of its argument, Argonaut points to Louisiana contract law, Mueller,
Sr.’s deposition, Mueller, Jr.’s deposition, LeFlore’s deposition, and correspondence
between attorneys at Phelps Dunbar and Argonaut representatives.
Here, RPM does not argue that the parties entered into a written agreement
regarding Argonaut’s alleged promise to pay the claims administration costs. Indeed,
RPM has failed to point to any evidence of a written agreement between the parties.
Rather, RPM essentially argues that the parties had a verbal agreement that Argonaut
11

would pay the claims administration costs as evidenced by Blunt’s letter. However,
Blunt’s deposition testimony indicates that Argonaut never agreed to his summary of
the parties’ alleged oral agreement:
Q:

You were discussing the proposals?

A:

Settlement proposals to be made to the plaintiff in Spillman.

Q:

Subsequent to that meeting, you had some discussions with Mr.
Vandiver about Argonaut’s position on whether Argonaut would
provide coverage for or fund the class administration costs in an
ultimate settlement, did you not?

A:

I think I did.

Q:

Did you recall what Argonaut’s position was?

A:

I don’t want to misspeak. It seems as though when I put together
the settlement letter that outlined what we had talked about in the
meeting, Argonaut’s position changed. And there were comments
to a proposal that were not in accordance with that we had talked
about in the meeting.

Q:

Mr. LeFlore’s words were, we won’t let the payment of the class
administration cost kill the settlement, is that what he said?

A:

Something to that effect.

Q:

Something to that effect. In other words, he didn’t say listen, I
agree, my policy provides coverage for it, he didn’t say that, did he?

A:

No.

Q:

Was there ever any writing and it was this, I won’t let the
administrative costs the settlements? Was that ever reduced to
writing? Did anybody ever sign off on anything after that meeting,
RPM and Mr. LeFlore?

A:

RPM redacted, changed the settlement proposal - actually, not
RPM - did I say RPM?

12

...
I apologize. I think Argonaut, Mr. Vandiver in particular changed
my draft letter that was a proposal to come out that meeting. And
if I saw the document, I could tell you what he changed. But I there were several things that he changed. And I think the
administrative costs was one. . . .
(Doc. 236-1, p. 35.)
Under Louisiana law, no contract can arise where both parties thereto have not
agreed to its terms. Colgin v. Security Storage & Van Co., 208 La. 173, 23 So.2d 36
(1945). LeFlore’s deposition testimony, along with the other evidence submitted by
Argonaut, supports the conclusion that there was no meeting of the minds. In other
words, RPM has failed to point to sufficient evidence to show that the parties entered
into or intended that there should be a binding contract. Mueller, Sr.’s deposition
testimony supports this conclusion:
Q:

. . . Are you aware of any writing signed by RPM [and] Argonaut
where there was an agreement about the handling of the
administrative expenses in the context of the settlement of the
Spillman case, other than the actual settlement agreement?

A:

So you’re saying: Are there any documents outside of the
settlement agreement?

Q:

I am, yes.

A:

That talk about the administrative fees?

Q:

That are signed by RPM and Argonaut.

A:

This affidavit.

Q:

Well, this is signed by you. I’m talking about an agreement
reduced to writing and signed by Argonaut and RPM.

13

A:

A specific agreement where we both agree on how the settlement
costs work?

Q:

Right.

A:

No.

(Doc. 236-2, p. 54.)
Further, Mueller, Sr.’s and Mueller, Jr.’s self-serving declarations are
insufficient to establish a binding agreement between the parties. It is beyond dispute
that self-serving affidavits, without more, cannot defeat a properly supported motion
for summary judgment. See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Budden, 420 F.3d 521, 531 (5th
Cir.2005); United States v. Lawrence, 276 F.3d 193, 197 (5th Cir.2001). In sum, the
Court concludes that RPM has failed to point to sufficient evidence to establish that
Argonaut promised to pay the claims administration costs. Accordingly, RPM’s request
for summary judgment on this basis is DENIED.
In support of its motion, Argonaut argues that there are no genuine issues of
material fact that the Policy does not require it to pay the claims administration costs.
In support of its motion, Argonaut cites to a case decided by the Appeals Court of
Massachusetts, in which the Court held that the supplementary payments provision
of an insurance policy did not cover the claims administration costs awarded in a class
action. See Titeflex Corp. V. Liberty Mutual fire Insur. Co., 990 N.E.2d 1072 (Mass. Ct.
App. July 29, 2013).
As noted above, the Court previously ruled that there are genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the claims administration costs are an “expense” or “cost”

14

that is covered by the “SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS – COVERAGES A AND
B” provision of the Policy. (Doc. 133, p. 9.) Beyond citing to a non-binding state court
decision, Argonaut has failed to present any new evidence or issues of material fact.
Further, in Titeflex Corp., the trial court had conducted a full trial on the merits.
Thus, there were no issues of material fact remaining. In sum, the Court declines to
enter summary judgment as a matter of law regarding Argonaut’s obligation to pay
claims administration costs.

Accordingly, Argonaut’s cross-motion for summary

judgment is DENIED.
C.

Counsel for Argonaut’s Request that the Court Analyze, for
the First Time, Legal Issues or Revisit Previously Ruled-On
Legal Issues

During the parties’ final pretrial conference on February 4, 2013, counsel for
Argonaut requested that the Court analyze, for the first time, or re-analyze the
following “pure legal issues”:
(1)

Whether or not, as a matter of law, the Policy covered the type of
advertising injury at issue in Spillman?

(2)

Whether or not, as a matter of law, the Policy covered the claims
administration costs?

(3)

Whether RPM, or any company, can collect a penalty under federal
or state statute for monies allegedly untimely paid to a third
party?

(4)

Is Argonaut liable under Louisiana law for reserving its rights?

First the Court notes that it has already considered and ruled on issue number
2.

See Doc. 133.

A review of the record indicates that neither party sough

reconsideration of the ruling, nor filed an interlocutory appeal with the United States
15

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Further, issue number 2 is the subject of the
instant cross-motions for summary judgment.
As it relates to issue number 4, counsel for Argonaut conceded on the record that
the Court has already ruled that there are genuine issues of material fact as to
whether Argonaut is liable under Louisiana law. See Doc. 110. A review of the record
indicates that RPM sought reconsideration of that ruling (Doc. 112), but when RPM’s
motion for reconsideration was denied (Doc. 126), neither party sought an interlocutory
appeal with the Fifth Circuit. The Court further notes that with the exception of the
instant cross-motions for summary judgment, the parties failed to renew any
previously filed motions setting forth any new evidence or issues for the Court’s
consideration.
As it relates to issues numbers 1 and 3, a review of the record indicates that, to
this date, neither party has attempted to raise either issue via motion. The Court is
not amenable to entertaining such oral requests one week before trial, and at the
conclusion of a final pretrial conference. The parties’ failure to file dispositive motions
regarding these issues is just that - the parties’ failure. Accordingly, Argonaut’s
request that the Court consider, for the first time, legal issues that have not been
raised by the parties via a dispositive motion or that the Court sua sponte revisit issues
that it has previously analyzed and ruled on is DENIED.

16

IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that RPM Pizza, LLC’s Cross-Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment (Doc. 219) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Argonaut Great Central Insurance
Company’s Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Coverage for
Claims Administration Costs (Doc. 203) is DENIED.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 6th day of February, 2014.

______________________________________
BRIAN A. JACKSON, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

17