Jones v. State of Louisiana et al

Filing 22

RULING granting 16 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge James J. Brady on 6/5/12. (DCB) Modified on 6/5/2012 to edit docket entry title (DCB).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ROSALYNN JONES
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 10-CV-00842
LOUISIANA WORKFORCE COMMISSION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment (doc.
16) by Defendants Louisiana Workforce Commission (“LWC”) and the State of
Louisiana (“State”). Plaintiff Rosalynn Jones (“Jones”) filed an opposition (doc.
20) to which Defendants replied (doc. 21). This Court’s jurisdiction exists
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s motion
is GRANTED.
Background
The Plaintiff, Rosalynn Jones, worked for the LWC, a state agency, from
October 24, 2005 until August 12, 2008. Initially, Jones, an African-American,
was a reintegration counselor at Renaissance Park (“RP”), providing assistance
to individuals in need of jobs, permanent housing, and other necessities. Jones
conducted various activities with these individuals, interviews and resumebuilding sessions among them. On October 1st, 2007, Jones applied for, and
gained, a position within the Trade Adjustment Assistance unit (“TAA”), a
subdivision of the LWC. Subsequently, Jones was reclassified as an employee of
the TAA. Her employment was conditioned on a six month probationary period,

during which her performance would be evaluated. Delores McCrory (“McCrory”),
a TAA employee nearing retirement, trained Jones. McCrory gave Jones one-onone training, shared manuals and workbooks, and conducted an orientation
training session with Jones for displaced workers. McCrory retired after about a
week and a half, ending the one-on-one training.
Jones
(“McKneely”).

was

dissatisfied

McKneely,

who

with
is

her
also

supervisor,

Bonnie

African-American,

McKneely

extended

the

probationary period for an additional three months in order to further evaluate the
performance of Jones. Jones then came under the tutelage of a new supervisor,
Lydia Crockett (“Crockett”), in May of 2008. Jones conducted a worker
orientation session under Crockett’s supervision, and Crockett, who is white, was
satisfied with the performance of Jones. The following events are in dispute:
Crockett claims to have discovered that Jones 1) failed to perform one orientation
session by unceremoniously ending correspondence with a client and 2) spoke
unfavorably of her job at another orientation session. Though not mentioned in
the initial complaint, an issue of retaliation has emerged among the parties.
Jones filed a grievance with her employer alleging that she received inadequate
training, and the LWC fired Jones seven days later. Jones was replaced by
another African-American, Lakeisha Johnson. After being terminated, Jones
sought a right to sue from the EEOC, received it, and filed suit against the State
of Louisiana and the Louisiana Workforce Commission for employment

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discrimination based on her race. After discovery closed, Defendants filed this
Motion for Summary Judgment.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment should be granted when the pleadings depositions,
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
show that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If the moving party
demonstrates that nonmovant has insufficient proof of an element that the
nonmovant bears the burden of proving at trial, the moving party has met its
burden. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). The burden then
shifts to the nonmovant to put forth evidence or identify facts establishing the
existence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Allen v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd.,
204 F.3d 619, 621 (5th Cir. 2000). Reasonable inferences are to be made in
favor of the nonmovant. Evans v. City of Bishop, 238 F.3d 586, 589 (5th Cir.
2000).
Discussion
A. Discrimination Claim
The standard for an employment discrimination claim requires a Plaintiff to
demonstrate that she: 1) is in a protected class, 2) is sufficiently qualified, 3)
suffered an adverse employment action, and 4) was treated less favorably than
similarly situated persons not in the protected class. McCoy v. City of Shreveport,
492 F.3d 551, 556-57 (5th Cir. 2007). If Plaintiff establishes these elements, the
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burden shifts to the Defendant, who must demonstrate a non-discriminatory
reason for the action taken. Id. Here, the Defendant must merely produce
evidence of a legitimate reason, not convince the Court that this reason was the
actual reason for the action. Id. If Defendant can meet this burden, the Plaintiff
must show that this reason is merely a pretext for a discriminatory action. Id.
Plaintiff’s responsibility is to make this showing for each legitimate reason offered
by Defendant. Id.
Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff meets elements 1) and 3) of the
prima facie case. Jones is African-American, a protected class, and as she was
fired, she suffered an adverse employment action. Defendants do claim Plaintiff
fails to meet her burden on elements 2) and 4). As the Court finds that no
genuine dispute of material fact exists concerning element 4), it will pretermit
discussion of element 2).
Plaintiff has produced no evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to
infer that the LWC treated her less favorably than similarly situated employees
outside of the protected class. Neither white employee presented by Plaintiff,
Louise Harrell (“Harrell”) nor McCrory, is similarly situated to Jones. Most
significantly, neither Harrell nor McCrory was terminated for alleged rules
violations. As this was the reason Plaintiff was terminated, the burden is on her to
show the Defendant has not terminated other, non-African American employees
who broke rules. As Plaintiff has not introduced any such evidence, she cannot
meet her burden of establishing a prima facie case for racial discrimination. As
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there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to element 4), summary Judgment
is granted in favor of Defendant on this claim.
B. Retaliation
Though not mentioned in the initial complaint, the briefs raise the issue of
retaliation. Specifically, Plaintiff now claims she was fired for filing an in-house
grievance. The parties focus on whether or not retaliation arises out of the
discrimination claim. However, the Court finds no evidence a claim of retaliation
was raised in the complaint. Therefore, the question is moot. Further, the Court
finds no basis for granting leave to amend the complaint.
Conclusion
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 16) is
GRANTED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on June 5, 2012.





JUDGE JAMES J. BRADY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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