picard v. State of Louisiana, Department of Justice

Filing 61

ORDER denying 58 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge James J. Brady on 5/15/2013. (LLH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAURA PICARD
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 10-868-JJB
STATE OF LOUISIANA, THROUGH
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE
OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
RULING ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 58) by the
Defendant, the State of Louisiana, through Department of Justice, Office of Attorney
General. The Motion is opposed (Doc. 60). Jurisdiction exists pursuant to Title 28 §§
1331, 1343. Oral argument is not necessary.
This is a lawsuit by Laura Picard, an attorney formerly employed as an Assistant
Attorney General by the Louisiana Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney
General, in its Alexandria office.1 On January 8, 2010, the Plaintiff’s employment with
the Attorney General’s office was terminated. The Plaintiff brought claims of pregnancy
discrimination under Title VII, denial of reasonable accommodation under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), interference and retaliation under the Family
and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), and intentional infliction of emotional distress under
Louisiana law.2 The case was removed to this Court on December 30, 2010.

On

January 4, 2013, the Defendant moved for summary judgment on all claims except
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court granted the motion in part, and

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A full recitation of the facts can be found in the Court’s prior summary judgment ruling. Doc. 54.
The Plaintiff also at least attempted to bring a disability-based harassment claim; however, that claim
has now been voluntarily withdrawn. Doc. 47, at 5.
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denied it in part, dismissing the Plaintiff’s ADA claims, her disability-based harassment
claim, and her FMLA interference claim.

Doc. 54.

The Defendant now asks for

reconsideration of that ruling.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides that courts may reconsider
interlocutory orders or decisions.3 A Court retains jurisdiction over all the claims in a
suit and may alter its earlier decisions until final judgment has been issued. Livingston
Downs Racing Ass’n, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 475. Final judgment has not been issued in
this case, so the instant motion is properly considered under Rule 54(b).
District courts have considerable discretion in deciding whether to reconsider an
interlocutory order.

Kemp v. CTL Distribution, Inc., No. 09-1109, 2012 U.S. Dist.

860404, at *3 (M.D. La. March 13, 2012). Although courts are concerned with principles
of finality and judicial economy, “the ultimate responsibility of the federal courts, at all
levels, is to reach the correct judgment under law.” Georgia Pacific, LLC v. Heavy
Machines, Inc., No. 07-944, 2010 U.S. Dist. WL 2026670, at *2 (M.D. La. May 20,
2010). However, a motion for reconsideration based upon the same arguments only
serves to waste the valuable resources of the court. Id. “[R]ulings should only be
reconsidered where the moving party has presented substantial reasons for
reconsideration.” State of La. v. Sprint Communications Co., 899 F. Supp. 282, 284
(M.D. La. Sept. 8, 1995).

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The Defendant asserts Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), or alternatively, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b), governs this Motion. However, “where, as here, a motion to reconsider concerns only
interlocutory rulings, the appropriate vehicle for making the motion is [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure]
54(b).” Livingston Downs Racing Ass’n v. Jefferson Downs Corp., 259 F. Supp. 2d 471, 474–75 (M.D.
La. 2002). Furthermore, the Defendant does not satisfy any of the grounds for relief under Rule 60(b).

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The Defendant does not present substantial reasons for reconsideration, and for
the most part, it makes the same arguments it made in its summary judgment motion.
The Court’s reasoning is clear as to why it denied summary judgment for certain claims,
and the Defendant’s reasons in support of its argument that the Court erred are without
merit. While the Court’s decisions involving facts were based on competent summary
judgment evidence, the Defendant appears throughout its Motion to forget that when
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court considers evidence in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–
49 (1986). Although all of the Defendant’s arguments in the instant Motion are without
merit, the Court offers further explanation as to a few of them.
The Defendant does not disagree with the burden-shifting scheme enunciated by
the Court in its ruling on the Plaintiff’s Title VII pregnancy/gender discrimination claim,
only its application.

Specifically, the Defendant focuses on arguing it presented

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the reassignment of the Byrd-Starr case. As
stated in the Court’s ruling, once the employer articulates such a reason, “the scheme of
shifting burdens and presumptions simply drops out of the picture, and the trier of fact
proceeds to decide the ultimate question: whether plaintiff has proved that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against her because of her sex.”

Urbano v.

Continental Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1998). By successfully arguing
the reassignment of the Byrd-Starr case is not precluded from being an adverse
employment action as a matter of law, and presenting competent summary judgment
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether reassignment
occurred “because of” the Plaintiff’s pregnancy, the Plaintiff established everything she
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needed to survive summary judgment on this claim. Since the Plaintiff satisfied her
burden as the non-movant, and presentation of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for reassignment of the Byrd-Starr case by the Defendant would just allow the issue to
be decided by the trier of fact, rather than affecting the granting or denying of summary
judgment, the Court did not need to come to a conclusion on the issue.
The Defendant also argues the Court confused the chronology of events
preceding the reassignment of the Byrd-Starr case, and the Court’s recitation of the
facts, and findings based upon those facts, are not supported by law. First, it must be
pointed out that the Defendant’s original motion for summary judgment, as well as the
ruling, listed the events relevant to this issue as occurring in September and October of
2009, while the Defendant’s instant Motion states the events occurred in August,
September, and October of 2008. And though the Defendant states the Court fused
together the conference call and reassignment of the case that occurred during this time
period, the Defendant does not state which findings of the Court are incorrect as a
result. Regardless, a review of the ruling shows these facts were not fused together,
and the Court reached no conclusions as a result of any such fusing.
Accordingly, the Defendant, the State of Louisiana, through Department of
Justice, Office of Attorney General’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 58) is DENIED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on May 15, 2013.





JAMES J. BRADY, DISTRICT JUDGE

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