Barlow v. Safety National Casualty Corporation et al
Filing
40
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 35 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Martin L.C. Feldman on 5/30/2012. (CAA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CAMILLA BARLOW, individually
and as representative of a class
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 11-236
SAFETY NATIONAL CASUALTY
CORPORATION, ET AL.
SECTION “F”
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the defendants’ motion to dismiss second
amended class action complaint.
For the reasons that follow, the
motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Background
This putative class action lawsuit arises out of alleged
unlawful collection practices engaged in by the defendants in their
efforts to collect on a bail bond obligation after the bond
forfeiture judgment had been set aside.
On September 30, 2007 Camilla Barlow paid AAA Bail Services,
Inc. $475.00 for a bail premium in order to bail her son, Eric
Dougherty, out of jail.
In connection with posting the bond, and
as collateral, Barlow was required to execute a promissory note for
$3,500.00 and an indemnity agreement.
In fact, Barlow executed
various contracts, including a “Contract & Application for Bail
Bond,”
“Indemnitor
Promises.”
Application,”
and
“Bail
Bond
Indemnitor
These agreements include various provisions regarding
indemnification; for example, the application provides:
1
I UNDERSTAND THAT I AM CO-SIGNING WITH AAA BAIL
SERVICES, INC. ON THE BAIL BOND THAT IS BEING POSTED WITH
THE COURT. I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT I WILL BE FINANCIALLY
LIABLE FOR ANY LOSSES, EXPENCES [sic], OR ADDITIONAL
CHARGES THAT OCCUR AS A RESULT OF THE DEFENDANT NOT
MEETING ALL OF THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE BAIL BOND
CONTRACT. I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT I AM RESPONSIBLE FOR
BRINGING THE DEFENDANT BACK TO THE BAIL BOND OFFICE SO
THAT THE PAPER WORK CAN BE COMPLETED, SIGNED AND A
PICTURE OF THE DEFENDANT CAN BE TAKEN.
The application also included this indemnity provision:
To indemnify the Company against all liability,
loss, damages, attorney fees and expenses whatsoever,
including, but not limited to returning prisoner costs,
which the Company may sustain or incur in making such
bond, prosecuting or defending any action brought in
connection therewith, and enforcing any of the agreements
herein contained, and specifically enforcing any
collateral or indemnifying agreement as well as any
expense in locating Defendant and producing him in Court.
If upon failure of the parties to comply with any of the
terms or conditions of this agreement and should it be
necessary for the Company to refer the agreement to an
Attorney for collection, the Parties agree to pay an
attorney fee of 33-1/3% whether or not such action
proceeds to judgment.
Similarly, the Bail Bond Indemnitor’s Promises contract provided:
Indemnification: I, the undersigned hereby agree to
save and hold the surety and its agents and/or assigns
from any loss whatsoever resulting from the failure of
the above named defendant to appear in court as ordered.
I, the undersigned hereby agree to pay all cost (500.00
minimum charge) associated with the failure of the above
named defendant to appear in Court as ordered, in U.S.
currency to surety, its agents and/or assigns upon the
failure of the above named defendant to appear in Court
as ordered.
A copy of a judgment of bond forfeiture
naming the above named defendant shall be prima facie
evidence of loss sustained by surety and against agents
and/or assigns.
On
February
1,
2008
Doughterty
2
failed
to
appear
for
his
arraignment; the court issued a bench warrant and an order of bond
forfeiture.
One week later, on February 8, the court executed a
judgment in favor of the State of Louisiana and against Eric
Dougherty, as principal, and Safety National Casualty Corporation,
as surety, for $3,500.00. On March 4, 2008 Eric Dougherty appeared
in court through counsel, at which time the bench warrant was
recalled and the bond forfeiture judgment was set aside.1
Barlow complains that, beginning on March 11, 2008 Singletary
& Associates, A Professional Law Corporation, initiated collection
efforts against Barlow for the bond amount of $3,500.00, including
by sending letters on several occasions and, on one occasion, a
non-lawyer telephoned Barlow, failed to identify herself as a nonlawyer and threatened litigation to collect the $3,500.00 bond.2
Barlow says that Commercial Surety Consultants, Inc. And
Financial Recovery Agency, Inc. also attempted to collect the
$3,500.00 by correspondence dated February 2, 2010, February 22,
1
According to the defendants, Safety National was not
provided notice, nor was it entitled to notice under Louisiana law,
of the later appearance of the criminal defendant. And, defendants
suggest, even though the bond may have been deemed satisfied,
Safety National still had a judgment recorded against it and was
not provided with notice by the court or sheriff of its
satisfaction.
All of which this Court might consider in the
context of future motion practice, once the pleadings are complete,
that might present challenges beyond that of the technical
sufficiency of the plaintiff’s allegations.
2
In particular, the plaintiff contends that Singletary &
Associates sent correspondence on March 11, 2008, March 25, 2008,
May 28, 2010 and June 21, 2010; she says that she received the
telephone call on July 7, 2010.
3
2010, and March 4, 2010. For example, the February 22, 2010 letter
stated:
Re: Judgment of Bond Forfeiture $3,500.00....
Dear CAMILLA BARLOW,
This account
collection.
has
been
listed
with
our
office
for
You are contractually obligated to pay this account
because a judgment of bond forfeiture has been filed
against SAFETY NATIONAL CASUALTY CORP. You may have an
opportunity to reduce this debt by obtaining a
cancellation of the bond forfeiture judgment. We advise
you to seek independent legal advice to inform you of
your rights and responsibilities. If you are unable to
cancel this judgment of bond forfeiture or refuse to do
so, we shall be left with no alternative but to seek the
collection of the entire debt.
This communication is from a debt collector.
attempt to collect a debt....
This is an
Unless you notify this office within 30 days after
receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of
this debt or any portion thereof, this office will assume
this debt is valid....
On July 7, 2010 -- the same day Barlow alleges that she received a
phone call from Singletary & Associates threatening litigation -Safety National Casualty Corporation indeed sued Barlow (and 25
other persons) in Baton Rouge city court for breach of contract
based on the indemnity agreement; the lawsuit was drafted by
Singletary & Associates.
Six days later, the Baton Rouge city
court returned the petition because of “improper cumulation of
defendants”; the court invited counsel for Safety National to refile its petition for damages for breach of contract to indemnify
4
a commercial surety, but Safety National has yet to re-file.
Nonetheless on July 26, 2010 Singletary & Associates, by letter,
informed Barlow that she had been sued.
On December 14, 2010 Barlow, on behalf of a putative class,
sued Safety National Casualty Corporation, Singletary & Associates,
A.P.L.C., Financial Recovery Agency, Inc., and Commercial Surety
Consultants, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Louisiana, alleging three violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act and a claim for abuse of process under
Louisiana law.
defendants’
In response to Barlow’s contentions that the
pursuit
of
Safety
National’s
indemnity
rights
constituted improper collection efforts, the defendants responded
with a motion to dismiss.
Almost one week before her opposition
papers were due, on March 22, 2011, Barlow filed a notice of
dismissal, and the lawsuit was dismissed without prejudice.
Just two weeks later, on April 8, 2011, Barlow re-filed her
complaint, again invoking the U.S. Middle District court’s federal
question jurisdiction under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
and asserting the same claims and factual allegations.
plaintiff seeks to represent a class defined as:
All persons who were required to execute an indemnity
promise in connection with a Safety National Casualty
Corporation bail bond obligation and who were subject to
unlawful collection actions by [the defendants] even
though any underlying bench warrant(s) had been recalled
and any previously rendered Bond Forfeiture judgment(s)
had been set aside.
5
The
Barlow contends that each of the defendants were acting as agents
of Safety National Casualty Corporation in the capacity as “debt
collectors.”
This putative class action was reassigned to this Court from
the Middle District of Louisiana on August 29, 2011. On January 6,
2012 Barlow, with leave of Court, filed a first amended class
action complaint, in which she added Commercial Surety Consultants,
LLC
as
a
defendant.
The
defendants
moved
to
dismiss
the
plaintiff’s amended complaint, contending that the plaintiff’s
claims fall outside the scope of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act and that, even if the Act applies, the plaintiff fails to state
a claim for relief under both the Act and state law principles of
abuse of process.
The Court granted in part and denied in part the
defendants’ motion: in particular the Court determined that the
plaintiff had stated a claim for abuse of process and rejected the
defendants’ argument that the bail bond indemnity obligation did
not constitute a debt; however, the Court determined that the
plaintiff failed to state a claim for FDCPA violations. The
plaintiff was permitted to amend her complaint, which she did. The
defendants now seek to dismiss her recently-amended FDCPA claims.
I.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to
move for dismissal of a complaint when the plaintiff has failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
6
Such a motion “‘is
viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.’”
See Lowrey v. Tex.
A & M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d
1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982)).
“‘To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d
600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“A claim
has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1940.
“Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in
the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”
Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotation marks,
citations, and footnote omitted).
The
United
States
Supreme
Court
suggests
a
“two-pronged
approach” to determine whether a complaint states a plausible claim
for relief.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
First, the Court must
identify pleadings that are conclusory and thus not entitled to the
assumption of truth.
supported
by
factual
Id.
A corollary: legal conclusions “must be
allegations.”
Id.
Second,
for
those
pleadings that are more than merely conclusory, the Court assumes
7
the
veracity
of
those
well-pleaded
factual
allegations
and
determines “whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief.”
Id.
This facial plausibility standard is met when the plaintiff
pleads facts that allow the Court to “draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. at
1949. Claims that are merely conceivable will not survive a motion
to dismiss; claims must be plausible.
Twombley, 550 U.S. at 570;
see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct at 1949 (“The plausibility standard is
not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully”).
“Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s
liability,
it
stops
short
of
the
line
between
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.”
Iqbal 129
S.
the
Ct.
at
1949
(internal
quotations
omitted).
In
end,
evaluating a motion to dismiss is a “context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.”
Id. at 1950.
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider
documents that are essentially “part of the pleadings” -- that is,
any documents attached to or incorporated in the plaintiffs’
complaint that are central to the plaintiff’s claim for relief.
Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th
Cir. 2004) (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d
8
496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000)).
Also, the Court is permitted to
consider matters of public records and other matters subject to
judicial notice without converting the motion into one for summary
judgment.
See United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan
of Texas Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 2003).
In her complaint, the plaintiff refers to contracts entered
into by Barlow, demands for payment (so-called dunning letters),
and filed state court pleadings; because these documents are
central to Barlow’s claims and are referred to in the complaint, it
is undisputed that consideration of them does not operate to
convert their motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. The
Court agrees.
II.
The defendants seek dismissal of the plaintiff’s amended and
newly added Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claims on the ground
that the plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for relief.
This Court has already determined, as a matter of law, that the
FDCPA applies to an alleged obligation to pay indemnity arising
from the purchase of bail bond insurance.3
3
To state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff’s
allegations must establish that the money being collected qualifies
as a “debt.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).
The mere obligation to
pay does not constitute a debt; rather, a “debt” is “any obligation
or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a
transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services
which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such
obligation has been reduced to judgment.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).
9
As
this
Court
has
previously
observed,
the
Fair
Debt
Collection Practices Act makes it unlawful for "debt collectors" to
use abusive tactics while collecting a "debt" for others. Perry v.
Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692.
15 U.S.C. § 1692 (e) announces Congress’s purpose in
enacting the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act:
It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate abusive
debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure
that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive
debt
collection
practices
are
not
competitively
disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to
protect consumers against debt collection abuses.
15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).
The defendants challenge the sufficiency of each of the
plaintiff’s four alleged FDCPA violations.
A.
First,
the
defendants
challenge
the
sufficiency
of
the
plaintiff’s Claim I, in which the plaintiff, in addition to
reproducing the text of the invoked statutory provisions alleges:
Claim I–FDCPA 15 U.S.C. 1692(e)(2)(a) and (5)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
interpreted the term “debt” broadly, observing that “Congress...has
legislatively expressed a strong public policy disfavoring
dishonest, abusive, and unfair consumer debt collection practices,
and clearly intended the FDCPA to have a broad remedial scope. See
Hamilton v. United Healthcare of Louisiana, Inc., 310 F.3d 385 (5th
Cir. 2002)(holding that a group health insurer’s contract-based
subrogation claim, for reimbursement of benefits which it had paid
to an injured employee after employee recovered third-party
uninsured motorist benefits, was in the nature of a “debt”, the
collection of which was subject to the FDCPA requirements).
10
[24] The plaintiff reiterates all prior paragraphs 1-23
of the Second Amended Complaint, as if repeated
verbatim.
...
[26] The
Defendants
Singletary
&
Associates,
A
Professional Law Corporation, ...Commercial Surety
Consultants, Inc. and Financial Recovery Agency,
Inc. by the previously identified correspondences
falsely
represented
that
the
Plaintiff
was
obligated to Safety National for the bond amount of
$3,500.00.
The
same
identified
defendants
misrepresented that legal action could be taken on
the $3,500.00 bond despite the setting aside of the
bond forfeiture and judgment.
[27] The Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. 1692 e 2 (a) and
5 by the identified false representations.
Claim I actually presents two claims: one under § 1692e(2)(A) and
one under § 1692e(5).
The defendants contend that the plaintiff
again has failed to add any factual support for her claim under §
1692e(2)(A).
The plaintiff counters that her allegation, that the
defendants’ correspondence falsely stated the amount she owed when
they sought to collect the full bond amount, after the bond
forfeiture judgment had been set aside, states a plausible claim
for relief.
The Court agrees.
15 U.S.C. § 1692e governs false or misleading representations;
it provides:
A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or
misleading representation or means in connection with the
collection of any debt. Without limiting the general
application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a
violation of this section:
...
(2) The false representation of–
(A) the character, amount, or legal status of
11
any debt...
(5) The threat to take any action that cannot
legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.
The plaintiff alleges that the defendants sought $3,500.00 when
they
were
not
defendants
entitled
falsely
to
that
represented
amount.
the
amount
If
true,
of
the
then
debt
the
owed.4
Accordingly, Barlow has stated a claim that the defendants falsely
represented the amount of the debt under 1692e(2)(A).
As to the plaintiff’s second part of Claim I -- her allegation
that the defendant debt collectors threatened to take action that
could not legally be taken or that they did not intend to take -the plaintiff fails to state a claim.
her
own
pleaded
facts,
the
debt
As Barlow acknowledges in
collectors
did
not
simply
“threaten” to take legal action; suit was actually filed.5
“As
several other courts have recognized, § 1692e(5) applies only to
‘threats’ of action, not actions actually taken.”
See Meroney v.
4
The defendants insist that, under the terms of the
indemnity agreement, they were entitled to recover the full $3,500,
notwithstanding the fact that the bond forfeiture judgment was set
aside upon the appearance of Barlow’s son within the statedesignated window. Neither side has satisfied the Court as to
whether or not the defendants could, in fact, recover the full the
amount of the debt, the $3,500.00. At this time, the Court makes
no determination as to whether the defendant could properly recover
$3,500 or any amount but, rather, takes as true the plaintiff’s
factual allegations that the bond forfeiture was satisfied and,
therefore, seeking to recover the full $3,500 was a false
representation of the amount of her debt.
5
Barlow points out that the debt collection suit was
dismissed not on the merits but for improper cumulation of
defendants; she fails to suggest how this saves her claim from
dismissal under the circumstances.
12
Pharia, LLC, 688 F. Supp. 2d 550 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2009)(citation
omitted).
Accordingly, Barlow fails to state a claim under §
1692e(5).
B.
Second,
the
defendants
challenge
the
sufficiency
of
the
plaintiff’s Claim II which, in addition to reproducing the text of
the invoked statutory provision, states:
Claim II FDCPA 15 U.S.C. 1692(f)(1)
...
...
[31] The
Defendants
Singletary
&
Associates,
A
Professional Law Corporation,...Commercial Surety
Consultants, Inc. and Financial Recovery Agency,
Inc. through the correspondence identified herein
have attempted to collect an amount ($3,500) which
is not permitted by law, in violation of 15 USC
1692(f)(1).
In this allegation, the plaintiff invokes 15 U.S.C. § 1692f,
which governs “unfair practices”:
A
debt
collector
may
not
use
unfair
or
unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any
debt. Without limiting the general application of the
foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this
section:
(1) The collection of any amount (including any
interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the
principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly
authorized by the agreement creating the debt or
permitted by law.
The defendants contend that the plaintiff’s claim suffers from the
defect of circular pleading.
They also suggest that, as a matter
of law, they were entitled to recover the full $3,500 under the
indemnity contract and Louisiana law.
13
As this Court has already
noted, however, the briefing on this issue is inadequate. However,
as this Court’s review of the case literature makes clear, “[a]
complaint will be deemed deficient under [§ 1692f] if it ‘does not
identify any misconduct beyond that which Plaintiff[] assert[s]
violate[s] other provisions of the FDCPA.”
Taylor v. Heath W.
Williams, L.L.C., 510 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1217 (Feb. 26, 2007)(citing
cases).
Here, Barlow’s failure to specifically identify how the
defendants’ conduct is also unfair or unconscionable under this
section warrants dismissal of this claim.6
See id.
C.
Third,
the
defendants
challenge
the
sufficiency
of
the
plaintiff’s third claim, which states:
Claim III FDCPA 15 USC 1692e 10
...
...
[34] The Defendants by the previously identified
correspondences
falsely
represented
to
the
plaintiff she owed $3,500.00 which was the amount
of the bond, when the Judgment of forfeiture was
previously set aside.
[35] The Defendants attempts to collect $3,500.00
violated 15 USC 1692 e (10).
Again, the plaintiff challenges the amount sought to be collected
6
Furthermore, it is generally recognized that, to
establish a violation of § 1692f(1), the plaintiff must show that
the money demanded from him was “incidental” to a claimed debt and
that the claimed obligation to pay it arose neither by agreement
nor by operation of law. See Shula v. Lawent, 359 F.3d 489, 492-93
(7th Cir. 2004)(citation omitted). Barlow’s claim fails equally
under this standard: she does not allege that the $3,500 amount was
incidental to the claimed debt; rather, she disputes she could have
owed the full amount of the $3,500 debt sought by the defendants.
14
by the defendants.
15 U.S.C. § 1692e governs false or misleading representations:
A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive,
or misleading representation or means in connection with
the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general
application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a
violation of this section:
...
(10) The use of any false or deceptive means to
collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain
information concerning a consumer.
A representation is considered false if “it would mislead the
unsophisticated
or
least
sophisticated
consumer.”
Toomer
v.
Alliance Receivables Mgmt., Inc., No. 08-467, 2010 WL 5071778, at
*3 (Dec. 9, 2010)(citing Goswami v. Am. Collections Enter., Inc.,
377 F.3d 488, 495 (5th Cir. 2004)). An amount misstated by the debt
collector “need not be deliberate, reckless, or even negligent to
trigger
liability
–
it
need
only
be
false.”
Id.
(citation
omitted).
In other words, the FDCPA recognizes a strict liability
approach.
See id. (citing Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726,
729 (7th Cir. 2004)).
For the same reason that this Court held that Barlow stated a
claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A), the Court holds that Barlow
has stated a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10).
Simply put, the
plaintiff alleges that the defendant debt collectors were pursuing
an amount of money that was not owed because the bond forfeiture
judgment had been set aside.
If, in fact, it is later determined
that the defendants were not entitled to collect the entire $3,500
15
amount (which they indisputably would have been entitled to collect
had the judgment of bond forfeiture not been set aside), then the
plaintiff plausibly could recover from the defendants based on
their attempts to recover the full amount.
The plaintiff has
stated a claim for violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10).
D.
Fourth and finally, the defendants challenge the sufficiency
of the plaintiff’s third claim which, in addition to reproducing
the text of the invoked statutory provision, states:
Claim IV FDCPA 15 USC 1692d(6)
...
[37] ...
[38] The unknown telephone caller from Singletary &
Associates failed to identify herself as a nonlawyer on July 7, 2010.
[39] The failure of Singletary & Associates employee to
identify herself violated 15 USC 1692d(6).
The defendants contend that this allegation fails to state claim
because the plaintiff has not alleged that she did not know the
call came from a debt collector and, in any event, Barlow fails to
allege facts to support any determination that she did not receive
meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity.
The Court agrees.
15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6) governs harassment or abuse:
A debt collector may not engage in any conduct the
natural consequence of is to harass, oppress, or abuse
any person in connection with the collection of a debt.
Without limiting the general application of the
foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this
section:
...
(6) Except as provided in section 1692b of this
title, the placement of telephone calls without
16
meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity.
Not only does Barlow’s allegation lack any suggestion that the
telephone caller used abusive or harassing language, but her
allegation that defendants violated § 1692d(6) fails to state a
plausible claim for relief because, even if true, it appears that
Barlow received meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity as
a debt collector.7
Accordingly, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in
part
(insofar
as
the
plaintiff’s
claims
under
§§§
1692e(5),
1692f(1), 1692d(6) fail to state a claim) and DENIED in part
(insofar as the plaintiff has stated a claim under §§ 1692e(2)(A)
and
1692e(10)).
The
following
claims
remain
pending
for
resolution: the plaintiff’s claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A)
that the defendants falsely represented the amount of the debt owed
and the plaintiff’s claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) that the
defendants employed false means to collect the debt in that they
falsely represented the amount of the debt owed.
New Orleans, Louisiana, May 30, 2012.
______________________________
MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
7
The plaintiff has not invoked any legal support for her
suggestion that the FDCPA is offended when a caller fails to
identify herself as a lawyer or non-lawyer.
17
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?