Spriggs v. Wiley et al
Filing
14
RULING AND ORDER granting 9 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge James J. Brady on 4/4/2012. (CMM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
TYRONE SPRIGGS
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 11-316-JJB
JEFFREY WILEY, individually and in his
official capacity as Sheriff of Ascension Parish,
ET AL.
RULING AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Jeffrey Wiley
and Sam Caston (Doc. 9) against plaintiff Tyrone Spriggs. Spriggs filed an opposition (Doc. 11),
and defendants filed a reply (Doc. 13). Wiley is the sheriff of Ascension Parish, Louisiana.
Caston serves as a deputy sheriff there. This case involves allegations of false imprisonment 1
arising under the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against both defendants; negligent
hiring, training, supervision and retention of deputy sheriffs by Wiley; and general negligence by
Caston, all arising out of Caston’s investigation of, issuance of a warrant for, and the ultimate
arrest but subsequent release of Spriggs on charges related to attempted first degree murder.
Oral argument is unnecessary. Jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331.
I.
The following facts are undisputed based on the arrest warrant affidavit submitted by
Deputy Caston. (Doc. 9-4). On September 21, 2009, the Ascension Parish Sheriff’s Office
responded to a shootout between two opposing parties occurring in Darrow, Louisiana. As patrol
units arriving on the scene to investigate, two subjects named Brian Russell and Jeremy Davis
were being admitted to a nearby hospital with gunshot wounds.
1
The complaint denominates the cause of action as both false arrest and false imprisonment. However, because “the
former is a species of the latter,” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007), the Court will refer only to false
imprisonment.
1
The next day, Deputy Caston interviewed Russell, who stated two friends—Tyrone
Spriggs and another man later identified as Lee Brown—and he were driving 2 to visit other
friends. Russell pulled the vehicle into a home, in front of which several people were located
when they arrived. Russell encountered a man named Jason Claiborne, with whom he had an
argument. According to Russell, Claiborne drew a gun and began firing at him and his friends,
including Spriggs. This firefight resulted in bullet wounds to his right shoulder.
Caston also interviewed Davis, a member of the opposite party, who stated that he arrived
at the scene in a car with a group of friends, including a man named “Jay.” A white car pulled
up and a skinny black male got out of the car and began arguing with Jay. 3 Davis alleged the
skinny black male was the aggressor and that his bullet eventually struck Davis as he crawled out
of the car he had sat in during the encounter.
Caston subsequently interviewed Russell again, who advised that Spriggs had handed
him the pistol which he used to shoot back at the opposing party once they began firing.
(Transcript of Russell Interview, Doc. 13-1).
Due to the inconsistencies of Russell’s and Davis’s stories, Deputy Caston found it
impossible to know who the aggressor was and sought an arrest warrant for all parties involved,
including Spriggs. The warrant issued on September 23, 2009, based on Spriggs’s alleged
commission of four counts of acting as a principal to attempted first degree murder in violation
of La. R.S. 14:24, 14:27, and 14:30. (Arrest Warrant, Doc. 9-4).
Spriggs was arrested on September 24, 2009, and subsequently charged with three counts
of accessory after the fact to attempted first degree murder via a bill of information submitted by
2
Russell later told police the car they were driving was a white Chevrolet Impala. (Doc. 13-1, at 3).
The reasonable inference to be drawn from Davis’ statement, as recounted by Deputy Caston in the affidavit
supporting the arrest warrant issued for Spriggs, is that the “white car” Davis identified was the Impala driven by
Russell, and his companion “Jay” was Jason Claiborne. (See Warrant Affidavit, Doc. 9-4, at 1-2).
3
2
the district attorney for the 23rd Judicial District on November 20, 2009. (Bill of Information,
Doc. 9-6). Spriggs was formally arraigned as to those charges on January 19, 2010. (Court
Minutes, Doc. 9-7). On May 10, 2010, upon preliminary examination, a judge of the 23rd
Judicial District Court found no probable cause to support the charges and ordered Spriggs
released. (Id.). Spriggs was formally released from custody on May 11, 2010. (Statement of
Material Facts, Doc. 12, ¶ 8).
Spriggs filed this action on May 11, 2011 (see Doc. 1), exactly one year following his
release from custody. He asserts false imprisonment claims against both Wiley and Caston in
their individual and official capacities, as well as a claim for negligent operation and oversight
against Sheriff Wiley and general negligence against Deputy Caston. The complaint seeks
compensatory damages of $50,000 and punitive damages of $100,000.
II.
Defendants move for summary judgment based primarily on prescription. They argue the
one year limitations period Louisiana law provides for in La. C.C. art. 3492 began to run once
judicial process was afforded Spriggs. Spriggs argues the prescriptive period did not begin
running until he was released from custody on May 11, 2010, making his action proper.
Alternatively, defendants contend the warrant was based on probable cause and obtained
in good faith, making the false arrest actions improper as a matter of law. Spriggs contends
Deputy Caston knowingly made a false statement to the magistrate who approved the arrest
warrant.
Defendants also argue for qualified immunity for Deputy Caston and point out the lack of
proof regarding an established policy or custom which served as the cause in fact for the false
arrest or for Deputy Caston’s wrongful behavior in securing the arrest, such that the negligence
3
claim against Sheriff Wiley must fail. Spriggs argues that Caston’s affidavit facially shows a
lack of probable cause due to Caston’s acknowledgement that everyone involved in the gunfight
was being arrested due to the conflicting stories of Russell and Davis. Further, Spriggs again
argues that Caston’s alleged falsification of Spriggs’ role, based on Russell’s interview, defeats
qualified immunity. Finally, Spriggs argues the allegations in the complaint fairly make out a
negligence claim against Wiley such that summary judgment for him would be unwarranted.
III.
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact.” Fed. Rule Civ. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment
carries the burden of demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). When the burden at
trial rests on the non-moving party, the moving party need only demonstrate that the record lacks
sufficient evidentiary support for the non-moving party’s case. Id. The moving party may do
this by showing that the evidence is insufficient to prove the existence of one or more essential
elements of the non-moving party’s case. Id. A party must support its summary judgment
position by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or “showing that the materials
cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute.” Fed. Rule Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
Although the Court considers evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party,
the non-moving party must show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). Conclusory allegations and unsubstantiated assertions
will not satisfy the non-moving party’s burden. Grimes v. Tex. Dep’t of Mental Health, 102 F.3d
137, 139-40 (5th Cir. 1996). Similarly, “[u]nsworn pleadings, memoranda or the like are not, of
course, competent summary judgment evidence.” Larry v. White, 929 F.2d 206, 211 n.12 (5th
4
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1051. If, once the non-moving party has been given the
opportunity to raise a genuine fact issue, no reasonable juror could find for the non-moving
party, summary judgment will be granted for the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
IV.
A.
Spriggs’s false imprisonment claims against defendants arise by virtue of the Fourth
Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which holds state officers acting under color of state law
liable for constitutional violations. Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action, but it looks
to state law to determine the limitations period applicable for personal injury torts. Wallace v.
Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). The parties agree that Louisiana’s one year prescriptive period
for personal injuries applies. See La. C.C. art. 3492 (“Delictual actions are subject to a liberative
prescription of one year. This prescription commences to run from the day injury or damage is
sustained.”).
However, Spriggs believes the continuing tort doctrine and the contra non
valentem exception to prescription delayed the running of the one year period until he was
released or at least until the preliminary examination established the lack of probable cause. In
support, he cites Corsey v. State Dep’t of Corrections, 375 So.2d 1319 (La. 1979), for the
sweeping proposition that incarceration suspends prescription.
Corsey recounted the familiar exceptions for prescription based upon the ancient civilian
doctrine of contra non valentem. Four exceptions exist: (1) where a legal cause prevented the
courts or their officers from accepting a plaintiff’s action; (2) where a contractual condition or a
condition in the proceedings prevented a creditor from acting; (3) where the debtor or wrongdoer
himself performed some act effectively preventing the plaintiff from pursuing the cause of
action; and (4) where the cause of action is not known or reasonably knowable to the plaintiff.
5
Corsey, 375 So.2d at 1321-22. Corsey recognized that Louisiana jurisprudence distinguishes
between personal disabilities of the plaintiff (which do not suspend prescription) and an inability
to bring suit caused by something foreign to the plaintiff (which does suspend prescription). Id.
at 1322-23. Corsey simply held that contra non valentem applied when a defendant’s wrongful
conduct caused an inmate-plaintiff’s mental incompetency such that he could not know he had a
cause of action, even though traditionally mental incompetency (absent interdiction) did not
support a contra non valentem exception. Id. at 1323-24. Thus, contrary to plaintiff’s broad
contention, Corsey provides no special shelter for persons hampered from filing suit simply by
virtue of their confinement alone.
Moreover, whatever Louisiana’s continuing tort doctrine may otherwise hold, Wallace
has clearly spoken on the issue. While state law provides the applicable limitations period,
federal law resolves the accrual date. Wallace confirms that although causes of action normally
accrue “as soon as the allegedly wrongful arrest occurred, subjecting [plaintiff] to the harm of
involuntary detention,” 549 U.S. at 388, a special rule governs the running of false imprisonment
actions. Perhaps because victims may not be able to sue while still imprisoned, the limitations
period begins to run “when the allegedly false imprisonment ends.”
Id. at 389 (internal
quotations and citation omitted). However, because false imprisonment theory is premised on
“detention without legal process, a false imprisonment ends once the victim becomes held
pursuant to such process….” Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
Legal process
generally begins, and thus the false imprisonment tolling begins, at arraignment. Id. At that
point, the tort of false imprisonment ends, and the entirely distinct torts of malicious prosecution
6
and/or wrongful use of judicial process provide the available remedy. Id. at 390 (citations
omitted). 4
Therefore, Spriggs’s suit is untimely. It is undisputed he was formally arraigned on
January 19, 2010, meaning his suit must have been brought within one year of that date to fit
within the limitations period. Suit commenced on May 15, 2011, making the false imprisonment
claims untimely.
Summary judgment on these claims is therefore warranted based on
prescription.
B.
The remaining negligence claims must also fall. Even assuming the prescriptive period
for the negligence claim against Deputy Caston could conceivably begin running only once the
probable cause determination was made and Spriggs’s release ordered under the continuing tort
doctrine or contra non valentem, Spriggs has not alleged such wide-ranging negligence by
Caston. Rather, Spriggs alleges the lack of thorough investigation and alleged falsification of the
warrant affidavit caused his injury through the arrest. 5
In that regard, this claim may be
indistinguishable from and subsumed within the false imprisonment claim. In any event, though,
prescription has run on this claim since Caston’s investigation, the issuance of the affidavit, and
Spriggs’s arrest all occurred more than one year before suit. 6
4
Spriggs’s attempt to distinguish Wallace falls short. While Spriggs claims that, unlike in Wallace, the legal
process holding Tyrone Spriggs was based on the tortious conduct of the defendant, it is enough to say that such
tortious conduct could be redressed through a separate claim for malicious prosecution or wrongful use of judicial
process, as Wallace explicitly noted.
5
Spriggs’s only other “evidence” consists of pure argument and unsupported assertions regarding what took place at
the preliminary examination that resulted in Spriggs’s release. (See Memo. in Opp. Doc. 11, at 8-9 (describing
alleged testimony at preliminary examination without introducing transcripts or other documents verifying these
statements)). This is simply not competent evidence on a summary judgment motion. See Larry v. White, 929 F.2d
206, 211 n.12 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1051.
6
Indeed, Spriggs’s only argument against prescription of the negligence claims was based on the same arguments of
contra non valemtem—presumably, that Spriggs was confined and could not file suit—rejected above. (See Memo.
in Opp., Doc. 11, § E, at 12).
7
The negligence claim against Sheriff Wiley fares no better.
Spriggs identifies no
evidence to support his claim, relying only on the assertions contained in his complaint. (See
Memo. in Opp., Doc. 11, § D, at 11-12).
Because unsworn pleadings do not constitute
competent summary judgment evidence, Larry v. White, 929 F.2d at 211, n. 12, Spriggs cannot
defeat summary judgment on this claim either.
V.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 9) is
hereby GRANTED in full.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on April 4, 2012.
JAMES J. BRADY, DISTRICT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
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