Bell v Hercules Liftboat, LLC

Filing 115

PARTIAL RULING on 112 Second MOTION to Compel Discovery filed by pltf is denied insofar as she sought an order compelling the defts to provide deposition dates, as stated. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger on 2/22/2012. (JDL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SUE BELL
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NUMBER 11-332–JJB-SCR
HERCULES LIFTBOAT COMPANY, L.L.C.
PARTIAL RULING ON SECOND MOTION TO COMPEL
Before the court is the plaintiff’s Second Motion to Compel.
Record document number 112.
Because

this

partial

ruling

denies

one

aspect

of

the

plaintiff’s motion, the defendants are not prejudiced by ruling on
it before they file a response.

As the motion notes, the current

deadline to complete fact discovery is March 30, 2012. The court’s
local rules give a party 21 days to file a response to a motion.
Therefore, this partial ruling is being issued so as to avoid
delaying ruling on one aspect of the motion.
Along

with

other

relief,

the

plaintiff

seeks

an

order

requiring defendant Hercules Liftboat Company, L.L.C. to give her
dates to take the depositions of ten of its employees, including
company president John Rynd.1

Rule 30, Fed.R.Civ.P., does not

require either a party or a party’s attorney to provide convenient
deposition dates.

1

Agreeing on depositions dates is commonly done

These are individual depositions.
The motion does not
indicate that the plaintiff is seeking a Rule 30(b)(6),
Fed.R.Civ.P., deposition.

and always a good idea.

Doing so facilitates scheduling and

usually reduces costs and the burden on the parties and their
attorneys.

But an agreement is not always reached.

Rule 30 only

requires giving reasonable notice and serving a subpoena on a nonparty.2

The motion does not indicate that Rynd or any other

employee failed to appear for a properly noticed deposition.
Having

apparently

exhausted

efforts

to

schedule

Rynd’s

deposition and those of the other employees on convenient dates,
and with the time for discovery running out, the plaintiff is left
with unilaterally scheduling them herself, issuing timely notices,
and serving each deponent with a subpoena.3

If she does so and

Rynd or another employee has good cause to object, he or she may
seek a protective order or move to quash the deposition subpoena.
Absent a timely motion to quash or for a protective order and a

2

See
subpoenas.

Rule

45,

Fed.R.Civ.P.,

3

regarding

restrictions

on

Emails filed with the motion indicate that Rynd is located
in Houston, Texas. Defendants’s attorney advised that Rynd would
not be produced for a deposition in Lafayette. Record document
number
112-6, Exhibit D, October 11, 2011 email from legal
secretary Becky Verdin to the plaintiff’s attorney. An officer of
a party can be required to travel more than 100 miles from where he
resides, is employed or regularly transacts business in person, for
his deposition.
See Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii)(grounds for quashing
subpoena).
Therefore, if Rynd is an officer of a defendant and he
regularly conducts business in Lafayette, he can be required to
appear for his deposition in Baton Rouge because it is less than
100 miles from Lafayette. Similarly, if the other employees are
employed in Lafayette, or regularly conduct business in Lafayette,
they too can be required to appear for their depositions in Baton
Rouge.
2

favorable ruling from the court, the deponent is expected to appear
for the deposition.
Neither Rynd nor any other employee failed to appear for a
properly noticed deposition after being timely served with a
subpoena, and Rule 30 does not provide for the relief sought by the
plaintiff.
Accordingly, the plaintiff’s Second Motion to Compel is denied
insofar as she sought an order compelling the defendants to provide
deposition dates.
The parties and their attorneys are strongly encouraged to
immediately renew their efforts to schedule the depositions of John
Rynd and the other nine employees on convenient dates well before
March 30, 2012.

The alternatives - unilateral setting of the

depositions by the plaintiff, or by a court order in response to a
motion for protective order or to quash - will undoubtedly be more
costly to all parties.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, February 22, 2012.

STEPHEN C. RIEDLINGER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

3