Oxford House v. City of Baton Rouge

Filing 111

RULING granting in part and denying in part 82 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 88 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court GRANTS Oxford House's motion for summary judgment, except for the Section 1983 claim (Doc. 82). Oxford House is hereby ordered to prepare an order for injunctive relief. Signed by Judge James J. Brady on 03/18/2013. (CGP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
OXFORD HOUSE, INC., ET AL
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 11-391-JJB
CITY OF BATON ROUGE, LOUISIANA
RULING ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment filed by
Plaintiffs Oxford House, Inc., Danjean Causeway LLC, and Raymond and Glenda Roy
(collectively “Oxford House”) (Doc. 82) and Defendant City of Baton Rouge (“City”) (Doc. 88).
Defendants have filed an opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion (Doc. 100), to which Plaintiffs have
filed a reply. (Doc. 108). Plaintiffs have filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion (Doc. 99), to
which Defendants have filed a reply. (Doc. 109). Oral argument is not necessary. For the reasons
herein, the Court GRANTS the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, except for the
Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim (Doc. 82) and DENIES the Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment. (Doc. 88).
I.
Oxford House filed this action, alleging that the City violated the Fair Housing Act, 42
U.S.C. § 3601, et seq. (“FHA”), the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq.
(“ADA”), and Oxford House’s civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Oxford House alleges that
the City violated the FHA by using and enforcing discriminatory zoning ordinances to exclude
Oxford House from operating in an area zoned for single-family use and retaliating against
Oxford House for exercising their rights under the FHA. (Doc. 47). Oxford House further alleges
that the City violated the ADA by discriminating against Oxford House because of a disability.
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Finally, Oxford House alleges violations of their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that the City used its zoning code and ordinances to discriminate against Oxford House
on the basis of a handicap and denying Oxford House due process by applying its code
enforcement provisions in an arbitrary and irrational manner.
Oxford House is a national program that supports the opening of individual Oxford
Houses throughout the United States. Individual Oxford Houses are designed to create a
supportive familial atmosphere to help their residents recover from alcohol and substance
addiction. Each house is financially self-supporting, democratically run, and will evict any
resident who returns to alcohol or substance abuse. The houses do not have state licenses or a
permanent staff. In order to become a resident, prospective residents must complete an
application and interview with the current residents of the House to which the prospective
resident is applying. After the interview, the current residents vote to decide whether to accept
the prospective resident.
Oxford House operates seventeen homes in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.1 Two of these
houses, Oxford House-Drusilla and Oxford House-Shawn, are the subjects of this litigation.
Plaintiff Danjean Causeway, LLC owns Oxford House-Drusilla and Plaintiffs Glenda and
Raymond Roy own Oxford House-Shawn. Both houses are located in an area of Baton Rouge
zoned A-1, which is for single family use. According to the Baton Rouge’s Unified Development
Code (“UDC”), “family” is defined as an individual or two or more related persons living
together or no more than two unrelated people living together, unless the owner lives on the
premises, in which case, four unrelated people may live together. (Pt. Ex. HH).

1

According to Oxford House Louisiana’s website, there are seventeen group homes in Baton Rouge. OXFORD
HOUSE OF LOUISIANA, http://www.ohola.org (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).

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On February 2, 2011, the City sent a letter to Oxford House-Drusilla, notifying Danjean
Causeway that the property was in violation of the UDC because more than two unrelated
persons lived there. On February 4, 2011, counsel for Plaintiffs responded, asking for a
reasonable accommodation, and asking that the Defendants treat the House as if it were a single
family because the residents of the House are the “functional equivalent” of a family and waive
the two-person rule as it applies to the House. In the request, Oxford House notified the City that
the residents are recovering alcoholics and drug addicts, who are considered handicapped under
the FHA. (Pt. Ex. T). In response, the City directed Oxford House to file the request with the
Planning Commission. (Pt. Ex. V). Oxford House submitted the same request to the Planning
Commission as it did to the City. (Pt. Ex. W). The Planning Commission informed Oxford
House to complete a form for a reasonable accommodation located on their website. (Pt. Ex. X).
On March 17, 2011, the City filed suit against Danjean Causeway in state court for violating the
UDC by having more than two unrelated persons living in an A-1 zone.
On March 23, 2011, Oxford House completed the form, identifying the residents as
“handicapped” under the FHA. (Pt. Ex. Z). The form, Reasonable Accommodation for a Group
Home, defines a group home as a building where “developmentally disabled persons are housed
under the direct care of responsible adult persons on a twenty-four hour basis. . . .” (Doc. 47, ¶
32) (hereinafter referred to as the “A-9 form”). On April 7, 2011, the City denied the reasonable
accommodation request, explaining that the form was incomplete because there was no state
license and no 24-hour supervision. (Pt. Ex. CC). Oxford House requested reconsideration,
asking the City to waive the licensing requirement, the 24-hour staffing requirement and to treat
the home not as a Special Home, but as a family. (Pt. Ex. QQQ). There is nothing in the record
indicating that the City responded to this reconsideration.

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On June 2, 2011, the City sent a follow-up letter to Oxford House, stating that “the
unsupported statements of counsel for a party are not evidence of the qualifications for
accommodation under the [FHA], and are not evidence of the reasonableness of a proposed
accommodation.” (Pt. Ex. DD). The City offered suggestions as to how Oxford House could
achieve its goal: (1) placing the residence in an A-3 zoning area; (2) Oxford House could explain
how it intends to confirm the handicapped status; (3) Oxford House could seek spot rezoning
through the UDC; (4) the UDC can designate a building or group of buildings as a PUD, SPUD,
or ISPUD; (5) the Zoning Commission could try to amend the definitions if Oxford House
requested such an amendment; and (6) the Metro Council could vote to waive the provisions. (Pt.
Ex. DD, at 3-4).
A similar pattern transpired with respect to Oxford House-Shawn, with Oxford House
writing a letter to the City and the Planning Commission informing Oxford House to complete
the reasonable accommodation form. However, Oxford House asked the Planning Commission
whether the reasonable accommodation would be rejected because Oxford House-Shawn was not
licensed by the State nor did it provide 24-hour staffing. (Pt. Ex. BB).
II.
Fair Housing Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act
The FHA “is worded as a broad mandate to eliminate discrimination against and equalize
housing opportunities for disabled individuals.” Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425, 428 (7th Cir.
1995). The FHA makes it unlawful to discriminate “against any person in the terms, conditions,
or privileges of sale or rental of dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1).
Discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies,

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practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal
opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). Under the FHA, a handicap
is defined as “(1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such
person’s major life activities, (2) a record of having such impairment, or (3) being regarded as
having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). However, “such term does not include
current, illegal use of or addiction to a controlled substance.” Id.
Similarly, the ADA is a “broad mandate of comprehensive character and sweeping
purpose intended to eliminate discrimination against disabled individuals, and to integrate them
into the economic and social mainstream of American life.” Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d
215, 223 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675 (2001) (quotation
marks omitted)). Under the ADA, a disability is defined in the same way that the FHA defines a
handicap. A disability is “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded
as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Under the ADA, major life activities
“include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing,
eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading,
concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
Oxford House argues that recovering alcoholics and drug addicts are considered disabled
and/or impaired under the statutes, and thus, are entitled to the protections afforded by the FHA
and the ADA. The City argues that alcoholism and drug addiction are not disabilities per se, and
a showing that alcoholism and/or drug addiction substantially limits a major life activity is
required to prove a disability, relying on the now overturned Toyota Motor Manuf., Kentucky,

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Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002)2. Toyota was overturned due to legislative action in U.S.
Pub.L. 110-325 in 2009. Congress explained that the purpose of the amendments, in part, was “to
reject the standards enunciated in [Toyota], that the terms ‘substantially’ and ‘major’ in the
definition of disability under the ADA ‘need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding
standard for qualifying as disabled[.]” U.S. Pub.L. 110-325, Section (b), ¶ 4. Thus, while the
Court finds that the strict standard of Toyota has been overturned, the requirement of a case-bycase evaluation is still necessary. “[A] per se rule is appropriate in these circumstances where the
court’s obligation is to do a case-by-case evaluation to determine if an individual is
handicapped.” Jeffrey O. v. City of Boca Raton, 511 F.Supp.2d 1339, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 2007). See
also Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 316 (5th Cir. 1997) (declining to categorize
“alcoholism as a per se disability”).
Therefore, this Court concludes that there is no per se rule that categorizes recovering
alcoholics and drug addicts as disabled or handicapped, and a case-by-case evaluation is
necessary. Alcoholism and drug addictions are impairments. Regional Economic Community
Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 46 (2d Cir. 2002) (cataloging cases in
which courts have found that alcoholism and drug addiction are impairments). As the Second
Circuit noted, the legislative history of the ADA also indicates that Congress intended for
alcoholism and drug addiction to be impairments under the Act. See H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(II), at
51 (1990).

2

In Toyota, the Supreme Court explained that under the ADA, a disability is a “physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities,” but the ADA did not specify what constituted a substantial
limitation in a major life activity. 534 U.S. at 196. The Supreme Court found that “these terms need to be interpreted
strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled,” and held that “to be substantially limited in
performing manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual
from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives.” Id. at 197-98. The Court also noted
that “the existence of a disability [is] to be determined in such a case-by-case manner.” Id. at 198.

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However, the Second Circuit explained that “mere status as an alcoholic or substance
abuser does not necessarily imply a ‘limitation’ under the second part of that definition.”
RECAP, 294 F.3d at 47. Although the Second Circuit cited the now-overturned Toyota case in
finding that the clients in RECAP were substantially limited, the Second Circuit concluded that
the requirements to enter into a halfway house, the subject of the litigation, were sufficient to
establish that the residents’ impairments substantially limited their lives. See id. See also U.S. v.
Borough of Audubon, N.J., 797 F.Supp. 353 (D. N.J. 1991) (finding that testimony of the
residents demonstrated that their handicap, drug addiction and/or alcoholism, substantially
limited major life activities).
Here, the Court finds that the affidavits of the residents and the testimony presented at the
preliminary injunction hearing establishes that the residents of Oxford Houses have a handicap
and/or a disability that substantially limits their major life activities. One resident testified that
“alcoholics, drug addicts, we do not know how to live,” and that living in Oxford House teaches
them “to become accountable [and] productive members of society.” (Tr., p. 67). She explained
that she is unable to live with her parents because her parents do not trust her, and her parents
drink regularly and take prescription medications. (Tr., p. 69-70). She surmised that if Oxford
House were to close, she “will be on the street” and “then back in jail.” (Tr., p. 71). Thus, the
residents of the Oxford Houses are disabled and/or handicapped for the purposes of the FHA and
ADA, and the protections of the statutes apply.
III.
There are three (3) possible theories of discrimination for an alleged violation of either
the FHA or the ADA: disparate treatment, disparate impact, and failure to make a reasonable
accommodation. See RECAP, 294 F.3d at 48; see also Smith & Lee Associates, Inc. v. City of

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Taylor, Mich., 102 F.3d 781, 790 (6th Cir. 1996). Oxford House seeks summary judgment on the
theories of failure to make a reasonable accommodation and disparate treatment. Oxford House
also seeks summary judgment on the grounds that the “Special Homes” ordinance is facially
discriminatory and violates the FHA and ADA on its face and that the City retaliated against it
for filing a complaint with HUD and this suit. The City seeks summary judgment on the theory
that the City was not on notice of the disability status of the residents of Oxford House, Oxford
House is unable to prove discriminatory animus, the requested accommodation was not
reasonable, Oxford House is unable to prove discriminatory effect of the “Special Homes”
provision, any arbitrary decisions by the City, and retaliation. Moreover, the City raises an
affirmative defense of reliance on prior rulings, which the City asserts would bar recovery by
Oxford House. The Court will address these arguments under the appropriate theories of
recovery.
Reasonable Accommodation
Under the UDC, reasonable accommodations are encompassed in the definition of
“Special Homes. The definition of “Special Homes” is bifurcated. The first portion of the
definition defines “Special Homes” as:
buildings, other than institutions, operated by a person or persons,
society, agency, corporation, institution or group licensed by the
State wherein developmentally disabled persons are housed under
the direct care of responsible adult persons on a twenty-four-hour
basis to assure that a responsible adult is on premises at all times in
case of emergency; and such buildings and premises shall meet all
city-parish building codes, fire codes and zoning ordinance
requirements and state fire marshal requirements prior to the
issuance of any State permits for occupancy and/or operation.
(Pt. Ex. HH. at 25). The second portion of the definition provides that:
Special homes for the handicapped (within the federal Fair
Housing Act definition of "handicapped") are permitted uses in all
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residential zones where they are not permitted as of right,
notwithstanding any zoning requirements inconsistent therewith, in
all cases where granting permission for such use would be a
"reasonable accommodation under the federal Fair Housing Act. A
permit for such use will be granted by the City-Parish along with
any provisions of the zoning ordinance that would otherwise
prohibit such use will not be enforced, provided that the requested
accommodation is reasonable. In determining whether a request for
such a permit is reasonable, the City-Parish will consider the
following:
A. Whether the proposed special home for the handicapped would
cause a "fundamental change," as interpreted by applicable
decisions construing the federal Fair Housing Act in the CityParish's zoning;
B. Whether the proposed facility's violation of otherwise
applicable zoning rules is "necessary," because of:
1. The economics of its operation,
2. The need for residential opportunities for handicapped
persons, or
3. Any other reason constituting "necessity" under
applicable federal law; and
C. Whether the proposed facility would cause any undue financial
or administrative burden on the City-Parish.
Parties seeking a reasonable accommodation must submit to the
City-Parish Planning Commission staff information addressing
these issues on forms supplied by the City-Parish.
(Id.)
Oxford House asserts that the City violated the ADA and FHA by refusing to grant its
reasonable accommodation request. The FHA defines discrimination as a “refusal to make
reasonable accommodations . . ., when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such
person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). The Court
finds that the best approach to determine whether the City failed to make a reasonable
accommodation is to adopt the approach utilized by the Eleventh Circuit in Schwarz v. City of
Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2008). There, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed a
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reasonable accommodation by addressing the three elements of the FHA statute: refusal,
reasonableness, and necessity. Id. at 1218-19.
Refusal
Refusal requires a showing that a plaintiff requested an accommodation and the
defendant refused it. Id. at 1219. A plaintiff “must first provide the governmental entity an
opportunity to accommodate them through the entity’s established procedures used.”
Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 578 (2d Cir. 2003). Failing to make a
request “is fatal to [a] reasonable accommodation claim.” Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis,
77 F.3d 249, 253 (8th Cir. 1996). However, if making a request would be clearly futile or
“foredoomed,” then the plaintiff is not required to make such a request. United States v. Village
of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230, 1234 (7th Cir. 1994).
Here, the evidence in the record is conflicting as to what the City’s established
procedures actually are. Lea Anne Batson, Special Assistant Parish Attorney, testified that there
is “no other specified procedure” other than completing the A-9 form, but “we would entertain
other reasonable accommodation requests.” (Df. Ex. R. at 38-39). For a group home that is
unlicensed, Ms. Batson explained that while there may not be a specific form, “[t]hat doesn’t
mean they wouldn’t be entitled to request one. They can write it on a napkin and submit it. There
are no formality requirements under the Fair Housing Act.” (Df. Ex. R. at 68).
The Court finds that the record overwhelmingly shows that Oxford House made multiple
reasonable accommodation requests, both directed to the Parish Attorney’s Office and the
Planning Commission, and upon advice of the City, Oxford House completed the A-9 form for
Oxford House-Drusilla. The City denied the request, stating that the form was incomplete
because there was no evidence of a license or 24-hour supervision. Oxford House requested that

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the City reconsider, explaining that it was not attempting to run a Special Home, but that it was
attempting to be treated as a family. While the City did not respond to this request, the City did
send a follow-up letter, explaining that “the unsupported statements of counsel for a party are not
evidence of the qualifications for accommodation under the [FHA], and are not evidence of the
reasonableness of a proposed accommodation.” (Pt. Ex. DD). The City offered alternative
suggestions as to how Oxford House could achieve its goal by other means, such as relocating to
a different zoning area.
Although Oxford House did not complete the A-9 form for Oxford House-Shawn, it did
send the same letters explaining its request for reasonable accommodation as it did for Oxford
House-Drusilla. Oxford House did ask the Planning Commission whether the reasonable
accommodation request would be rejected because Oxford House-Shawn was not licensed nor
did it provide 24-hour staffing. (Pt. Ex. BB). Because the City refused its request for a reasonable
accommodation for Oxford House-Drusilla, and the reasonable accommodation request for
Oxford House-Shawn was identical, it would have been futile to complete the A-9 form. See
Palatine, 37 F.3d at 1234 (finding that a plaintiff “need not resort to [the City’s procedures] if
such resort is manifestly futile” and the City “must be afforded an opportunity to make such an
accommodation pursuant to its own lawful procedures – unless it is clear that the result of such
procedures is foredoomed.”).
The City incorrectly asserts that Oxford House was required by law to continue seeking
accommodation and that Oxford House chose to ignore the alternatives that the City presented,
which the City asserts would allow the two Houses to “operate legally in the current zoning by
means other than ‘reasonable accommodation.’” (Doc. 100 at 12). The City cites Oxford HouseC, noting that the Eighth Circuit stated that the “Oxford Houses must give the City a chance to

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accommodate them through the City’s established procedures for adjusting the zoning code.”
Oxford House-C, 77 F.3d at 253. Presumably, the City is suggesting that Oxford House should
give the City the same chance to accommodate them by availing themselves of one of the
suggested legal alternatives, including adjusting the zoning code. However, in Oxford House-C,
the only established procedure available was to apply for a variance, and the Oxford House
refused to do so. Here, while the established procedure available is unclear, because it could
range from filling out the request on a napkin to completing the A-9 form, it is clear that Oxford
House requested the reasonable accommodation multiple times and completed the A-9 form for
Oxford House-Drusilla at the direction of the City.
Thus, the City refused the reasonable accommodation requests for both Oxford HouseDrusilla and Oxford House-Shawn.
Reasonableness
An accommodation is reasonable if it “does not cause any undue hardship or fiscal or
administrative burdens on the municipality, or does not undermine the basic purpose that the
zoning ordinance seeks to achieve.” Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp 1179,
1186 (E.D. N.Y. 1993). See also Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp.
450, 461 (D.N.J. 1992) (noting that an accommodation is unreasonable if it “either imposes
undue financial and administrative burdens . . . or requires a fundamental alteration in the nature
of the program[.]” (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
Oxford House argues that there is no evidence showing that either Oxford House
fundamentally alters the zoning scheme or causes an undue financial or administrative burden on
the City. Oxford House contends that there were no noise, traffic, or crime related complaints
made about either house. The City argues that Oxford House’s proposed accommodations impact

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the City’s zoning scheme and that the City has received complaints concerning noise and traffic.
The City asserts that the structure of Oxford Houses defeat the purpose of zoning an area for
single family residences because Oxford Houses do not impose time limits on a resident’s stay,
and a resident can be evicted at any time, which demonstrates the transient nature of Oxford
Houses. The City asserts that the purpose of zoning an area for single family residence is to
provide stability and permanence and to preserve “the character of neighborhoods, securing
‘zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make
the area a sanctuary for people.’” City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 732-33
(1994) (quoting Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974)).
Because neither party argues that the accommodation would impose an undue financial
burden or an administrative hardship on the City, and the Court does not find anything in the
record that would support such a finding, the Court will not address this prong. Turning to the
second prong, which is whether the requested accommodation would fundamentally alter the
zoning scheme, the Court finds that the complaints that have been made about the Oxford
Houses do not rise to the level of fundamentally altering the zoning scheme.
According to deposition testimony, with respect to Oxford House-Drusilla, there were
complaints about too many people living there (Pt. Ex. EE at 58; Pt. Ex. FF at 18) and
complaints about increased traffic and vehicles in the area. (Pt. Ex. FF at 18, 54). Moreover,
there were general complaints about the house being “illegal” and “ruin[ing] the older
neighborhoods of Baton Rouge[.]” (Pt. Ex. FF at 45). Additionally, the City put forth evidence of
select e-mails from citizens complaining about the number of cars parked on the street, illegal
parking concerns, and dangerous traffic conditions at Oxford House-Drusilla. (Df. Ex. AA).
However, the Court notes that the property next door to Oxford House-Drusilla houses college

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students and the neighbors also complained about the cars and parking problems associated with
that property. (Df. Ex. AA).
With respect to Oxford House-Shawn, there was a complaint by a neighbor about the
presence of a “halfway house” in the neighborhood and “people coming and going from the
house.” (Pt. Ex. EE. at 80). However, there is no evidence in the record that there were
complaints about noise or traffic at Oxford House-Shawn. Because the only objection in the
record about Oxford House-Shawn is that it was a “halfway house,” the Court finds that this
should not be considered in determining whether the requested accommodation would “effect a
fundamental change in the neighborhood.” Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799
F.Supp. 450, 462 (D.N.J. 1992)3.
Here, the Court finds that the proposed use of the Oxford Houses is similar to the uses
already permitted by the zoning code. See Schwarz, 544 F.3d at 1221 (explaining that “if the
proposed use is quite similar to surrounding uses expressly permitted by the zoning code, it will
be more difficult to show that a waiver of the rule would cause a ‘fundamental alteration’ of the
zoning scheme.”). The goal of the Oxford Houses is to create a supportive, family environment
and to treat the residents of the Oxford House as a functional family. There is no evidence,
absent a few e-mails and testimony concerning increased traffic and parking concerns relating to
Oxford House-Drusilla, that either Oxford House would fundamentally alter the zoning scheme
of the neighborhood. Thus, the requested accommodation was reasonable.

In Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, the court explained that “the fact that citizens
may vociferously oppose the establishment of a home for handicapped people in their
neighborhood can hardly be cited as a legitimate justification for discriminatory treatment of the
handicapped.” 799 F.Supp. 450 at 463, n. 26.
3

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Necessity
The final prong to consider is whether the requested accommodation “may be necessary
to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
This requirement is divided into two considerations: is the accommodation necessary and will
the accommodation afford equal opportunity to the disabled? In order for a requested
accommodation to be necessary, the plaintiff must show “a direct linkage between the proposed
accommodation and the ‘equal opportunity’ to be provided to the handicapped person.” Bryant
Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, Md., 124 F.3d 597, 604 (4th Cir. 1997). If the requested
accommodation “provides no direct amelioration of a disability’s effect,” it is not necessary. Id.
With respect to the “equal opportunity” requirement, the FHA “does not require
accommodations that increase a benefit to a handicapped person above that provided to a
nonhandicapped person with respect to matters unrelated to the handicap.” Id.
Here, Oxford House asserts that the requested accommodation is necessary because the
residents of Oxford Houses benefit from living with other people who are recovering from
alcoholism and drug addiction. The City contends that the suggested ameliorative effects of this
accommodation request were too vague. The Court finds that there is sufficient evidence in the
record to show that this type of living arrangement has an ameliorative effect on the residents’
disability/handicap. The affidavits of the residents show that prior to living in Oxford House,
their prospects for recovery were bleak and the residents were unable to function. However, after
moving into Oxford House, the residents are able to care for themselves, hold employment, and
pay bills. The residents all stated that the supportive structure of Oxford House has enabled them
to turn their lives around. (Pt. Ex. P, Q, and R). Thus, the requested accommodation “may be
necessary” under the FHA.

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Oxford House has also shown that the requested accommodation may be necessary for
equal opportunity because “a modification of the definition of a ‘family’ . . . is warranted so that
[Oxford house] may have the same opportunity to rent a house as do persons without handicaps.”
Babylon, 819 F. Supp. at 1185. In Babylon, the court explained that the city’s zoning ordinance
would not permit Oxford House to rent a house in “any residential neighborhood,” and thus,
there was no other option for Oxford House. Id. at n. 10. However, the court explained that “even
if this were not the case, defendant would nevertheless be required to make an accommodation in
its Code permitting plaintiffs to occupy this house.” Id. (emphasis in original). The law “dictates
that a handicapped individual must be allowed to enjoy a particular dwelling, not just some
dwelling somewhere in the town.” Id. (emphasis in original). The Court finds that reasoning
instructive and concludes that this requested accommodation “may be necessary” to afford
“equal opportunity.”
The City Violated the FHA by Refusing to Grant a Reasonable Accommodation
Thus, the Court finds that the City violated the FHA by refusing to grant a reasonable
accommodation. The City’s letter explained that the accommodation was not granted because the
Oxford House was not licensed and did not have 24-hour staffing. (Pt. Ex. CC). However, as Ms.
Batson explained, and the Court agrees, that the definition of “Special Homes” is bifurcated. The
first portion of the definition encompasses facilities that provide services to the developmentally
disabled and that are licensed and staffed on a 24-hour basis. (Pt. Ex. HH). It is clear from the
record that Oxford Houses do not meet this definition. However, Ms. Batson explained that
homes “that require reasonable accommodation” are the ones “that doesn’t necessarily meet this
definition of special home.” (Df. Ex. R. at 37).

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Thus, the letters that counsel for Oxford House sent to the Parish Attorney’s office
clearly constitute a request for reasonable accommodation as envisioned by the second portion of
the definition of “Special Homes.” The City asserts that “Oxford House applies for a reasonable
accommodation, was told that it was not a Special Home, and that it had not provided enough
information to justify a reasonable accommodation under the second clause.” (Doc. 100 at 17).
In the letter denying the request, there was no evidence that the City told Oxford House that the
reason it denied the request was because it did not have enough information to justify an
accommodation under the second clause. Rather, the only information that the City provided in
support of its denial is that Oxford House did not have enough information to justify an
accommodation under the first clause. Therefore, it appears that the City not only violated the
FHA by refusing the grant the reasonable accommodation, the City also did not explain
adequately why the reasonable accommodation was denied.
As a final matter, although an agency’s findings are not binding, they are persuasive. The
Court finds it instructive and persuasive that the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(“HUD”) found that the City violated the FHA by denying Oxford House’s reasonable
accommodation request. HUD explained that:
The evidence collected during the course of the subject
investigation indicates that the City of Baton Rouge, East Baton
Rouge Parish has violated the Fair Housing Act by denying Oxford
House Inc.’s request for reasonable accommodation. The evidence
shows that the Complainant’s reasonable accommodation request
did not receive any substantive consideration by Respondent. The
evidence shows that the requested accommodation does not
constitute an undue financial or administrative burden or a
fundamental alteration to the nature of City-Parish programs, and
therefore should have been granted.

17

(Doc. 99-18, Letter from HUD, June 26, 2012). The Court agrees with the HUD’s assessment
and concludes that the City violated the FHA by denying the request for reasonable
accommodation.
IV.
Disparate Treatment
Oxford House asserts that the City intentionally discriminated against it and that the
“Special Homes” ordinance is facially discriminatory. To prove intentional discrimination,
Oxford House must demonstrate “that a motivating factor behind the City’s refusal to classify
[Oxford House] as a single family household was the residents’ status as recovering drug addicts
and alcoholics.” Tsombanidis v. W. Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 579-80 (2d Cir. 2003)
(citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265-66 (1977)). When examining a claim of intentional discrimination, courts consider: (1) the
discriminatory impact of the decision; (2) the decision’s historical background; (3) the sequence
of events leading up to the decision; (4) any departures from the normal procedure; and (5) the
legislative or administrative history. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68.
Oxford House asserts that the City has a history of discriminating against persons with
disabilities, as evidenced by the Middle District of Louisiana’s decision in Allied Health Care,
Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge. There, the plaintiffs were operating a group home for
developmentally disabled individuals in an A-1 zoning area, and the home had a license and 24hour staff. (Pt. Ex. GG). There was opposition to the home, which was motivated, in part, by the
fact that the residents were disabled. The court found that there was intentional discrimination
by the city because the “city officials responded to the presence of the Home based on
stereotypical fears, and carried out their enforcement efforts in response to neighborhood and

18

community fears.” (Pt. Ex. GG at 9). The court further found that the zoning ordinance at the
time had a discriminatory impact on the disabled because the ordinance only permitted
community homes in high-density residential areas, but not single-family zones. Oxford House
argues that this is evidence of legislative or administrative history that would support a finding of
discriminatory intent under the Arlington Heights factors.
Additionally, Oxford House asserts that the “Special Home” definition and the City’s
reasonable accommodation process are facially discriminatory. Oxford House focuses on the first
portion of the definition, which provides that special homes are buildings where developmentally
disabled individuals live under the “direct care of a responsible persons on a twenty-four-hour
basis to assure that a responsible adult is on premises at all times in case of emergency.” (Pt. Ex.
HH). Oxford House argues that this is facially discriminatory because (1) it classifies based on
disability; (2) it imposes burdensome and illegal conditions that are not “tailored towards the
individual needs of the inhabitants” (Doc. 82-1 at 23); and (3) it only applies to developmentally
disabled individuals. Oxford House contends that this ordinance has a discriminatory impact on
disabled individuals who are recovering from alcoholism and/or drug addiction.
The City argues that the “Special Home” provision is not facially discriminatory, and
Oxford House only focuses on the first portion of the definition, and ignores the second portion,
which mirrors the requirements under the FHA. The City argues that the first paragraph of the
“Special Homes” provision is a “streamlined mechanism for group homes and facilities,” but
anybody can request a reasonable accommodation even if the proposed accommodation does not
have a license or a 24-hour staff.
The City further argues that a facially discriminatory ordinance “imposes a burden on a
protected group which is not imposed on a non-protected group.” (Doc. 100 at 18). The City

19

asserts that while the first portion of the definition “appears to grant a special privilege to the
developmentally disabled,” there is no evidence that this provision has been limited to just the
developmentally disabled and there is no evidence that this provision has been enforced in a
discriminatory fashion. According to the deposition testimony of Collin Magee, the land use and
zoning coordinator with the City Parish Planning Commission, although the form for reasonable
accommodations requires applicants to list the developmental disability of the residents, the
Commission does not require that the residents have a developmental disability. (Df. Ex. W). If
there are no developmental disabilities listed, the application is still sent the Parish Attorney’s
office for review and the Commission “would inform the applicant that this information needs to
be furnished in order for the reasonable accommodation request to be granted.” (Df. Ex. W. at
21-22). However, Ms. Batson testified that “[a]nyone can request a reasonable accommodation
for any reason which will be evaluated under the requirements of the ADA and the FHA . . . to
determine whether or not it should be granted.” (Pt. Ex. U. at 45-46).
The Court finds that the first portion of the ordinance defining “Special Homes” is
facially discriminatory for the reasons that Oxford House states. In Marbrunak, Inc. v. City of
Stow, Ohio, the Sixth Circuit found that an ordinance which imposed “onerous safety and permit
requirements on single-family residences occupied by developmentally disabled persons,” when
these requirements were not imposed on any other single-family residences violated the FHA.
Marbrunak, Inc. v. City of Stow, Ohio, 974 F.2d 43, 46-47 (6th Cir. 1992). While a city is
permitted to “impose standards which are different from those to which it subjects the general
population,” the city must show that the “protection is demonstrated to be warranted by the
unique and specific needs and abilities of those handicapped persons.” Id. at 47. The City’s
argument that this provision is merely a “streamlined provision” for a reasonable accommodation

20

and that this provision is available for any disabled person who meets the criteria does not help
overcome the fact that there is a lack of tailoring to the individual needs. Rather, this provision
grants a blanket reasonable accommodation for group homes that are licensed and staffed on a
24-hour basis, regardless of the needs of the individuals in the group home. Applicants wishing
to operate a group home that is not licensed or staffed on a 24-hour basis must take an additional
step, which is to comply with the second half of the provision, by showing that the requested
accommodation is reasonable and necessary. This is not to say that this should not be required
because the second portion of the ordinance is what federal law requires. However, group homes
that are licensed and staffed on a 24-hour basis do not need to show that the requested
accommodation is reasonable and necessary, which the Court finds impermissible.
Moreover, the Court finds the evidence in the record to be conflicting as to the City’s
position that anybody can get a reasonable accommodation regardless of the disability. On one
hand, Ms. Batson testified that anybody can request a reasonable accommodation and that a
particular format is not necessary. Oxford House did just that. It submitted a request for a
reasonable accommodation to both the Parish Attorney’s office and to the Planning Commission.
Both offices were on notice that the Oxford House would not meet the requirements for a Special
Home, yet the Planning Commission directed Oxford House to complete the A-9 form anyway,
which requires a showing of licensing and 24-hour staffing. Additionally, Mr. Magee from the
Planning Commission testified that an applicant would need to furnish information about the
type of developmental disability the residents in the proposed group home have in order for the
reasonable accommodation request to be granted. It is unclear how a group home like Oxford
House could ever request and receive a reasonable accommodation under the City’s formula in

21

the absence of showing licensing or a 24-hour staff. Thus, the Court finds that the first portion of
the ordinance is discriminatory, both facially and as applied.
Returning to Oxford House’s argument that the City intentionally discriminated against it
on the basis of disability status, Oxford House further argues that (1) the City knew that the
ordinance was discriminatory, (2) the City was aware of potential FHA violations, (3) the
decision makers were influenced by discriminatory animus, and (4) the respective council
members for the districts where the Oxford Houses were located influenced the decision makers
to deny the reasonable accommodation applications. Oxford House points to a memo written in
20034, in which Ms. Batson explained that federal courts have found that allowing “eight or nine
disabled persons to reside in a single family district is a reasonable accommodation.” (Pt. Ex.
NN. At 1). Additionally, the memo explained that imposing special conditions, such as a 24-hour
staffing requirements, has been found to be potentially discriminatory by at least one circuit. In
2005, Ms. Batson wrote an additional memo, in which she explained that “recovering alcoholics
and drug addicts are considered disabled.” (Pt. Ex. OO at 2). Oxford House asserts that this is
evidence that the City is aware that reasonable accommodations for recovering drug addicts and
alcoholics may be necessary under the FHA and the ADA, yet the City chose to ignore its own
advice.
The City argues that Oxford House’s references to these memoranda only show that the
City is aware of its responsibilities under the FHA and the ADA, and that the City has made
every effort to prevent discriminatory practices and to comply with the statutes. The City asserts
that these memoranda do not show that the City ignored its own legal advice.

4

Although the memo is dated January 27, 2012, the memo is actually from December 12, 2003. See Pt. Ex. LLL. at
5.

22

Oxford House contends that the City denied the reasonable accommodation requests
because there was “organized community opposition to the two Oxford Houses,” and the
respective council members were influenced by discriminatory animus. In support, Oxford
House provided copies of e-mails showing that when neighbors found out about Oxford House’s
intention to open Oxford House-Drusilla, they requested that the city council member shut it
down. (Pt. Ex. VV). Cyndi Bohrer, Senior Special Assistant Parish Attorney, explained that until
the residents moved in, nothing could be done because there was no actual violation to prosecute.
She further explained that any request for a reasonable accommodation would be sent to them,
and she would let Councilwoman Alison Gary (formerly Cascio) know if they received one.
However, she advised that “when it becomes apparent that a single family use violation is
present, my suggestion would be to immediately bring it to Neal’s attention so that enforcement
proceedings can be instituted without any delay.” (Pt. Ex. VV).
Oxford House asserts that Councilwoman Gary became involved in the City’s decision to
shut down the Houses and deny the reasonable accommodation requests, despite the fact that
council members are not supposed to be involved in the reasonable accommodation process. (Pt.
Ex. U (first deposition of Councilwoman Gary) & Pt. Ex. EE (second deposition of
Councilwoman Gary)). Oxford House contends that this is a departure from the City’s normal
process of evaluating reasonable accommodation requests, which is evidence of discrimination
under the Arlington Heights factors. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68. In response to an
email from a constituent, on January 3, 2011, Councilwoman Gary inquired as to whether
Oxford House-Drusilla had applied for a reasonable accommodation, and upon learning that it
had not, asked if an inspection could be initiated to get the house into compliance. (Pt. Ex. WW).
On March 1, 2011, Councilwoman Gary followed up with the parish attorney’s office for an

23

update. (Pt. Ex. FFF). The assistant Parish attorney, Maimuna Magee stated that she had received
a letter from Oxford House’s counsel, which was “really a request for reasonable
accommodation,” and explained that she had advised him to contact the Planning Commission.
Ms. Magee had heard from the Planning Commission, who informed her that Oxford House’s
counsel intended to complete the application. Ms. Magee explained that she would give Oxford
House two weeks to submit an application before going forward with a violation. (Id.) On March
5, 2011, a resident emailed Councilwoman Gary to complain that the city was being “so lenient
on this ILLEGAL operation” and inquired as to whether the city was “going to sit back and
allow unlicensed homes to ruin the older neighborhoods of Baton Rouge?” (Pt. Ex. ZZ). On
March 9, 2011, Councilwoman Gary asked whether Oxford House-Drusilla had filed a
reasonable accommodation request. (Id.). Ms. Magee advised that Oxford House had not filed its
application yet, and she would begin working on filing a suit against them. (Id.). Oxford House
argues that Ms. Magee had originally intended to give Oxford House two weeks to file the
application, but shortened it upon further communications from Councilwoman Gary.
Oxford House further asserts that Councilwoman Gary, through her administrative
assistant Rebecca DeLaughter, influenced the City’s decision to institute proceedings against
Oxford House-Shawn. Although the Department of Public Works, through Neal Bezet, stated
that the pictures “we have taken do not indicate a violation,” Ms. DeLaughter explained that
there were constituent complaints about too many people in the house, and Mr. Bezet advised her
to send a violation letter. (Pt. Ex. UU). Oxford House asserts that the Department of Public
Works would never have cited Oxford House-Shawn but for the involvement of Councilwoman
Gary because as Mr. Bezet explained, there was no evidence of a violation at the house.

24

In opposition, the City asserts that Councilwoman Gary is not a decision maker5, and
thus, she could not have influenced the actions taken in this litigation. The City contends that the
only way that Councilwoman Gary could have influenced the decision with respect to the
reasonable accommodation is by speaking at a public hearing, which she did not do. The City
acknowledged that a “decisionmaker has a duty not to allow illegal prejudices of the majority to
influence the decisionmaking process,” but argues that there is no evidence that the “panicky
emails of constituents” had any impact on the process by the Planning Commission and the
Parish Attorney’s Office. Association of Relatives & Friends of AIDS Patients v. Regulations &
Permits Admin., 740 F. Supp. 95, 104 (D.P.R. 1990). Moreover, the City argues that
Councilwoman Gary was not influenced by discriminatory pressure from her constituents, but
even if she had been, she still was unable to influence the process as a whole. Additionally, in the
City’s own motion for summary judgment, the City argues that there is no discriminatory intent
because there was (1) no discriminatory impact, (2) the City was unaware as to what an Oxford
House was; (3) the City did not know the residents were disabled; (4) the deposition testimony
shows that the representatives of the City denied having any discriminatory intent; and (5) there
were no departures from procedure.
The Court finds that the City’s protestations unconvincing. The City’s arguments with
respect to the memoranda and Councilwoman Gary both have the same logical fallacies. The
City presumes that just because the City is aware of its responsibilities, it is unable to
discriminate and just because Councilwoman Gary is not a decision maker, she is unable to
influence the actions of the decision makers. The City has not put forth any evidence to the
contrary. Moreover, the City’s arguments in support of its own motion also are unsupported by
5

Although the City argues that Councilwoman Gary is not a decision maker in its opposition to Oxford House’s
motion for summary judgment, the City refers to her as a decision maker in its own motion for summary judgment.
“[T]he only decision maker question was Ms. Gary[.]” (Doc. 88-1 at 16).

25

the evidence. The City was aware, or should have been aware, from the multiple letters that
counsel for Oxford House sent prior to filling out the A-9 form, what an Oxford House was and
that the residents were considered disabled. Moreover, when Oxford House used the A-9 form,
Oxford House repeated what the disabilities were and what an Oxford House was. Finally, there
is evidence in the record to show that there was a departure from procedure because (1)
Councilwoman Gary was involved in finding out what was happening with the reasonable
accommodation request and (2) while each reasonable accommodation request is supposed to be
evaluated on an individual basis according to the requirements of the second part of the
definition of the Special Homes if the home does not meet the criteria for the first portion, there
is no evidence that this was done here. Thus, the Court finds that there is sufficient evidence to
find discriminatory intent.
IV.
Retaliation
Oxford House asserts that the City retaliated against the plaintiffs by citing Plaintiff
Danjean Causeway LLC for failing to obtain a certificate of occupancy for Oxford HouseDrusilla after Oxford House had filed a complaint with HUD and again after Oxford House filed
this suit. Oxford House asserts that under the FHA, it is unlawful “to coerce, intimidate, threaten,
or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having
exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the
exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by [section 3604].” 42 U.S.C. § 36176.
The ADA also contains a similar provision. 42 U.S.C. § 12203.7
6

Section 3604 refers to 42 U.S.C. § 3604, which makes it unlawful to discriminate because of a handicap.
“ No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made
unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner
in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).
7

26

Retaliation claims brought pursuant to the FHA and the ADA are analyzed under the
same standards used for analyzing retaliation claims brought pursuant to Title VII. See Stewart v.
Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Texas v.
Crest Asset Management, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 733 (S.D. Tex. 2000). To assert a prima facie case
of retaliation, a plaintiff must show “(1) he engaged in an activity that [the FHA and ADA]
protects; (2) he was subjected to an adverse [action by the defendant]; and (3) a causal
connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse . . . action.” LeMaire v.
Louisiana Department of Transportation & Development, 480 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 2007).
Once a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to “articulate
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged . . . action.” Grimes v. Texas Dept. of
Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 102 F.3d 137, 140 (5th Cir. 1996).
A protected activity includes “oppos[ition] [to] any act or practice made unlawful by this
chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.”42 U.S.C § 12203(a).
Here, Oxford House engaged in two protected activities and the City does not dispute that these
activities were protected. First, Oxford House filed a complaint with HUD on May 4, 2011. (Pt.
Ex. RRR). Filing an administrative complaint constitutes a protected activity. See Drake v.
Nicholson, 324 F. App’x 328, 331 (5th Cir. 1009). Second, Oxford House filed this suit on June
10, 2011. (Doc. 1). Filing a lawsuit also constitutes a protected activity. See Gonzalez v. City of
New York, 354 F. Supp. 2d 327, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
Oxford House asserts that the City took adverse action against Oxford House after
Oxford House filed its HUD complaint, and again after Oxford House initiated this lawsuit. After
Oxford House filed its complaint with HUD on May 4, 2011, the Department of Public Works

27

sent a letter on May 25, 2011, explaining that Oxford House-Drusilla lacked a certificate of
occupancy, in violation of the UDC. (Pt. Ex. BBB). The letter provided that the “violation must
be removed by June 8, 2011.” (Id.). Similarly, after Oxford House filed this suit on June 10,
2011, the Parish Attorney’s office sent a letter on June 24, 2011, explaining that Oxford HouseDrusilla was in violation of the UDC for failure to obtain a certificate of occupancy. (Pt. Ex.
AAA). The letter advised that Oxford House had ten days to remedy the violation, or the City
would take legal action. (Id.).
Oxford House argues that there is a causal connection between engaging in the protected
activities of filing an administrative complaint and filing a lawsuit and the sending of the two
letters. Oxford House points to a Second Circuit opinion, in which the court found that “[t]he
causal connection needed for proof of a retaliation claim can be established indirectly by
showing that the protected activity was closely followed in time by the adverse action.” Cifra v.
General Electric Co., 252 F.3d 205, 217 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). See also DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 421 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that “where the
temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse . . . action is acutely near in
time, that close proximity is deemed indirect evidence such as to permit an inference of
retaliation to arise.”).
In opposition, the City first reiterates its position that the City was unaware of the
disability status of the residents to support its conclusion that without knowledge of this
disability status, “there can be no violation to form the predicate.” (Doc. 100 at 25). However,
courts have found that it is not necessary for a plaintiff to establish an underlying claim of
discrimination to prevail on a retaliation claim. See Reyes v. Fairfield Properties, 661 F.Supp. 2d
249, 265, n.6 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); see also United States v. Pospisil, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1063

28

(W.D. Mo. 2000) (finding that section 3617 is not solely “limited to violations of sections 3603,
3604, 3605, or 3606.”).
Additionally, as Oxford House points out, HUD’s regulations indicate that section 3617
is an independent cause of action. Oxford House urges this Court to apply Chevron deference
and defer to HUD’s regulations as a “permissible construction” of the statute. Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).8 The HUD
regulations, in defining what conduct is unlawful under section 3617, prohibit“[t]hreatening,
intimidating or interfering with persons in their enjoyment of a dwelling because of the race,
color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin of such persons, or of visitors or
associates of such persons.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2). Additionally, the regulations also
prohibit “[i]ntimidating or threatening any person because that person is engaging in activities
designed to make other persons aware of, or encouraging such other persons to exercise, rights
granted or protected by this part,” as well as “[r]etaliating against any person because that person
has made a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in a proceeding under the
Fair Housing Act.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(4)-(5). Because the regulations indicate that
retaliation for making a complaint under the FHA is unlawful conduct in itself, and there is no
requirement that the complainant prove underlying discrimination, the Court finds the City’s
position is incorrect.
Turning the City’s second argument, the City asserts that Oxford House has failed to
show the causal connection between the protected activity and the sending of the letters. The city
8

While Oxford House does not explicitly refer to the two pronged analysis under Chevron, the Court presumes that
Oxford House is arguing that section 3617 is ambiguous, and thus, this Court should defer to HUD’s construction of
it. Chevron provides that reviewing courts have to answer two questions. First, has “Congress directly spoken to the
precise question at issue”? Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. If yes, then that is the end of the analysis because the agency
and the court “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 842-43. However, if the
“statute is silent or ambiguous,” the question becomes whether the agency’s interpretation is a “permissible
construction of the statute.” Id. at 843.

29

argues that the letters are attempts to get Plaintiff Danjean Causeway, the owner of Oxford
House-Drusilla, in compliance with the UDC’s requirement for an occupancy permit. Even if
Oxford House-Drusilla had met the licensing and 24-hour supervision requirements for a
“Special Home,” it still would have been required to obtain an occupancy permit. (Pt. Ex. U. at
39, testimony of Ms. Batson). According to Ms. Bohrer, all residences are required to have a
certificate of occupancy. (Df. Ex. P at 129).
The Court finds that the City’s argument that Oxford House failed to show the causal
connection is unpersuasive. As Oxford House correctly points out, the causal connection can be
“established indirectly by showing that the protected activity was closely followed in time by the
adverse action.” Cifra, 252 F.3d at 217 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the
City took adverse action within two to three weeks after Oxford House engaged in the protected
activities of filing the complaint and this suit. The timing of these letters supports finding a
causal connection. Thus, Oxford House has established a prima facie case, and the City has not
argued that it had a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged . . . action.” Grimes,
102 F.3d at 140.
The Court does recognize that all residences need a certificate of occupancy, which the
City could have argued was its legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for sending the letters
instead of arguing that Oxford House failed to establish the causal connection. However, even if
the City had argued this, the Court still does not find that this is a legitimate and
nondiscriminatory reason given the history of this suit. The City notified Danjean Causeway that
Oxford House-Drusilla was in violation of the UDC because more than two unrelated persons
lived there on February 2, 2011. The City could have also sent the letter concerning the
certificate of occupancy at that time or at any time prior to the filing of the administrative

30

complaint and this suit. The City has not offered any explanation as to why the letters needed to
be sent within two to three weeks after Oxford House engaged in its protected activities.
Thus, the Court will grant summary judgment on the retaliation claim for the Plaintiffs.
VI.
Affirmative Defense of Reliance
The City argues that it has an affirmative defense of reliance on three (3) previous
determinations issued by the Louisiana Department of Justice (“LADOJ”), which would bar
recovery in this suit. (Df. Ex. T, U, V). In these determinations, the LADOJ investigated
complaints that had been filed with HUD, and determined that there were no violations of the
Louisiana Equal Housing Opportunity Act or Sections 804f3B of Title VIII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968 as amended by the Fair Housing Act of 1988. In all three of the determinations, the
complaints alleged that the City discriminated against the complainants by failing to grant a
reasonable accommodation request.
The City argues that the scenarios are factually similar in that the applicants requesting a
reasonable accommodation failed to provide sufficient information about the disability/handicap
and information about why the requested accommodation was necessary. The City asserts that
this demonstrates that the City has not treated the residents of the Oxford Houses any differently
from any other group of “allegedly disabled people.” (Doc. 88-1 at 20). However, the City also
argues that even if this Court finds discrimination, the City “was conducting business in
accordance with the instructions of the HUD approved enforcement agency.” (Id.).
The Court is not persuaded by these findings for a multitude of reasons. First, as Oxford
House correctly points out, the City does not cite any law to support this proposition that it was
“just following orders,” and this justified their conduct in this case. Second, even if the City had

31

cited something to support its reliance theory, it would conflict with the principle that a request
for a reasonable accommodation must be assessed individually. “Whether a requested
accommodation is required by law is ‘highly fact-specific, requiring case-by-case
determination.’” Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1302 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). The
highly fact-specific determination of this case shows that the City should have granted the
reasonable accommodation request, regardless of what the City has done in the past. That was
both HUD’s conclusion and the conclusion of this Court.
42 U.S.C. § 1983
The City argues that Oxford House has failed to show that the City’s decision to deny a
reasonable accommodation request constitutes a cognizable section 1983 violation. The City
asserts that Oxford House has not demonstrated a property interest of which it has been denied
and that the City has a “genuine and rational basis” for restricting the number of unrelated people
living in an area zoned for single-family use. In opposition, Oxford House asserts that the
manner in which the City enforced its code prevented it from operating a group home. Moreover,
Oxford House argues that group homes for non-disabled individuals without 24-hour staffing and
state licenses are permitted to build a group home in any area of Baton Rouge9, a classification
that Oxford House contends is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. In response, the
City argues that Oxford House’s position that only group homes with 24-hour staffing and state
licenses are permitted to operate is incorrect. The City contends that had Oxford House provided
sufficient information, it could have obtained a reasonable accommodation.
The Court finds that this claim has not been adequately briefed and the Court will deny
summary judgment on this claim.

9

Oxford House does not give any support for this argument and the record does not show that a group home for
non-disabled individuals would be permitted in any area of Baton Rouge.

32

VII.
For the aforementioned reasons, the Court GRANTS Oxford House’s motion for
summary judgment, except for the Section 1983 claim (Doc. 82) and DENIES the City’s motion
for summary judgment. (Doc. 88). Oxford House is hereby ordered to prepare an order for
injunctive relief.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on March 18th, 2013.





JAMES J. BRADY, DISTRICT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA


33