Delouise v. Iberville Parish School Board et al

Filing 55

ORDER the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the City of St. Gabriel and George Grace (Doc. 34) is GRANTED. All claims against George Grace, in his individual and official capacities, and the City of St. Gabriel are dismissed. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Strike filed by the City of St. Gabriel and George Grace (Doc. 43) is DENIED as moot. Signed by Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson on 9/30/2013. (PJH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MARIA S. DELOUISE

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS
IBERVILLE PARISH SCHOOL
BOARD, DR. EDWARD CANCIENNE,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY, MELVIN
LODGE, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, AND
GEORGE GRACE, INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY

NO.: 11-00587-BAJ-RLB

RULING AND ORDER
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 34), filed by
the City of St. Gabriel and George Grace, seeking dismissal of all claims against
them pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, the Louisiana Reprisal Law under Louisiana Revised
Statutes 23:967, and Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.

The motion is opposed

(Doc. 42). Oral argument is not necessary. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. §
1331.
Also before the Court is a Motion to Strike (Doc. 43), filed by the City of St.
Gabriel and George Grace, seeking to exclude certain statements offered by Plaintiff
Maria Delouise (“Plaintiff”) in her Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 42). The motion is unopposed. Oral argument is not necessary.

I.

Background
Plaintiff, a Caucasian female, began her employment with the Iberville Parish

School Board (“IPSB”) as a Librarian in August 2006 (Doc.1, ¶ 4). Beginning in July
2008, Plaintiff was assigned to the position of Assistant Principal of East Iberville
School located in St. Gabriel, Louisiana. She was then promoted to Acting Principal
at the same school in August 2008. In March 2010, Plaintiff alleges that she was
approached by Dr. Edward Cancienne, Superintendent of Iberville Parish Schools,
and told that she was being “demoted” and transferred to Plaquemine High School
because of her race (Doc. 1, ¶ 9). Plaintiff asserts that Ms. Chris Weaver,
Educational Consultant hired by IPSB, witnessed the conversation, and that
Cancienne told her such a transfer and demotion had nothing to do with her job
performance but that “[t]hey want a [B]lack principal.” Id.
Plaintiff claims to have learned that Mr. Melvin Lodge, IPSB President, and
George Grace, former Mayor of St. Gabriel, pressured Cancienne to recommend the
change to the IPSB (Doc 1, ¶ 9).

Cancienne denies Plaintiff’s allegation. Further,

Cancienne asserts that no such conversation occurred with Plaintiff, Lodge, or Grace
(Doc. 34, Exhibit A). Nevertheless, on April 12, 2010, IPSB voted to reassign Plaintiff
to “Principal of Special Projects” before the school year concluded, and to transfer
her to Plaquemine High School when the school year ended (Doc. 1, ¶ 10). Plaintiff’s
transfer took place on June 1,2010 (Doc. 1, ¶ 11). Michael Eskridge, an African
American male, was selected to serve as principal of East Iberville School (Doc. 16-1,
¶ 10).
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Plaintiff asserts that the position she held at Plaquemine High School was in
name only and was far inferior to her position as Principal. Also, Plaintiff claims
that, after the IPSB voted for her transfer, she was unfairly placed on an Intensive
Assistance Plan (“the Plan”) as the result of an unsatisfactory performance
evaluation conducted for the 2009-2010 school year. Plaintiff refutes the reasons for
being placed on the Plan, and asserts that the proper policies pertaining to her
duties were not followed and that she was not given the opportunity to rectify any
alleged performance deficiencies (Doc. 1, ¶ 12). In December 2010, Plaintiff took a
temporary position as “Acting Principal” of Plaquemine High School because of a
requested transfer by the former Principal (Id. ¶ 13).
On March 22, 2011, during her time as Acting Principal at Plaquemine High
School, Plaintiff filed a charge against IPSB with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging race discrimination. Thereafter, on May
3, 2011, Plaintiff was informed that she would be demoted to Librarian as a result of
a reduction in force. She inquired of the reason for the demotion, but alleges she was
told that IPSB was not required to give her a reason. 1 Plaintiff also interviewed for
the position of Executive Master Teacher in May 2011, a position which she alleges
was promised to her by Cancienne and others. However she was denied the position,
and asserts that the position was given to a less qualified applicant (Doc. 1, ¶ 15).

Plaintiff makes this claim in her Complaint; however, she does not specifically state who gave her
this information (Doc. 1, ¶ 14).

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On May 9, 2011, IPSB voted to demote Plaintiff to Librarian. Plaintiff alleges
that Cancienne, Lodge, Grace, the City, and the IPSB knew that Plaintiff had filed a
charge with the EEOC and that the EEOC filing formed the basis of her demotion.
Id. ¶ 14.

Plaintiff was subsequently transferred to White Castle High School.

Plaintiff filed the instant suit on August 24, 2011, alleging various claims of
discrimination and retaliation against her.
In the instant Motion, the City of St. Gabriel (“the City”) and Grace seek
dismissal of all Plaintiff’s claims against them on the grounds that the allegations
against them are hearsay and that they are not the proper parties to be sued, given
that they did not employ Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff claims that these Defendants
are liable because of the substantial influence they exercised over the IPSB’s
decisions, and because Grace abused the power of his office by acting in his
individual and official capacities to have her removed from the Principal position at
East Iberville School.
II.

Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether the

movant is entitled to summary judgment, a court views facts in the light most
favorable to the non-movant and draws all reasonable inferences in her favor.
Coleman v. Houston Independent School District, 113, F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 1997).
After a proper motion for summary judgment is made, the non-movant must set
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forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). The non-movant's burden, however, is not
satisfied by some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, or by conclusory
allegations, unsubstantiated assertions or a scintilla of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air
Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is appropriate if the
non-movant “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324
(1986).
III.

Analysis
A. Section 1981 Claim
The City and Grace assert that Plaintiff cannot meet the requisite elements to

establish a Section 1981 claim, as she (1) is not a member of a racial majority, and (2)
Plaintiff cannot put forth evidence to show that Grace participated in the alleged
discriminatory act. They also assert that because Plaintiff fails to show that Grace
directly participated in the supervision of the Plaintiff, her claim against them must
fail. 2 Plaintiff, however, contends that she can be a member of a racial majority and
still be protected by the statute. Further, she contends that her claims are
sufficiently plead to defeat the motion for summary judgment.
Section 1981 “is designed to include a federal remedy against discrimination
in employment on the basis of race.” Adams v. McDougal, 695 F.2d 104, 108 (5th Cir.
2

The Defendants direct the Court to Whidbee v. Garzarilli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62
(2d Cir. 2000) and to Brown v. City of Oncola, 221 F.3d 329, 339 (2d Cir. 2000).

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1983) (citing Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975)). To prevail
on a claim under Section 1981, a plaintiff must make an initial prima facie showing
that: “(1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position at
issue, (3) he was the subject of an adverse employment action, and (4) he was treated
less favorably because of his membership [in] the protected class than were other
similarly situated employees who were not members of the protected class, under
nearly identical circumstances.” Scott v. J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc., 2012 WL
1711616, at *3 (M.D. La. 2012), (citing Brooks v. Lubbock Cty. Hosp. Dist., 373 Fed.
Appx. 434, 436–37, 2010 WL 1439109, *2–3 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, –– U.S. ––,
131 S.Ct. 228, 178 L.Ed.2d 151 (2010) (citing Lee v. Kansas City Southern Railway
Co., 574 F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 2009)).
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then “the defendant bears the
burden of producing evidence that its employment decision was based on a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason.” Turner v. Kansas City Southern Railway
Co., 675 F.3d 887,892 (5th Cir. 2012). “This burden is one of production, not
persuasion; it ‘can involve no credibility assessment.’” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 342 (2000). If the defendant carries its burden, “[t]he
burden ... shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's proffered reasons
were a pretext for discrimination.” Turner, 675 F.3d at 892. The plaintiff may prove
pretext “either through evidence of disparate treatment or by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is false or unworthy of credence.” See Laxton v.
Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 579 (5th Cir. 2003). On a motion for summary judgment, a
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plaintiff must demonstrate that an issue of material fact exists and that the
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant are not its true reasons, but instead are
a pretext for discrimination. Okoye v. University of Texas Houston Health Science
Center, 245 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff is able to meet two of the prongs necessary to establish a prima facie
case under Section 1981. The Supreme Court has already held that Section 1981 “is
applicable to racial discrimination in private employment against white persons.”
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 287 (1976). As such, the
Defendants argument that Plaintiff does not qualify as a racial minority because she
is a Caucasian female lacks merit. Further, based on the evidence presented,
Plaintiff was at least initially qualified for the position of Principal, because she was
appointed by IPSB (Doc 1, ¶ 4). She was also later appointed to fill the role of Acting
Principal at a different high school. Moreover, Plaintiff has submitted proof that she
was certified in Louisiana to hold the position of Principal. Thus, the Court
concludes, in relation to the claims against these Defendants, Plaintiff has met this
prong of the Section 1981 analysis.
Plaintiff, however, does not meet the third and fourth prongs necessary to
establish a prima facie case against these Defendants. As established by other
circuits, the Court recognizes that Plaintiff “must demonstrate some affirmative link
to causally connect the actor with the discriminatory action.” Whidbee, 223 F.3d at
75 (citing Allen v. Denver Pub. Sch. Bd., 928 F.2d 978, 983 (10th Cir. 1991)). “A claim
seeking personal liability under [S]ection 1981 must be predicated on the actor's
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personal involvement.” Id. Personal involvement is “not only direct participation in
the alleged violation but also gross negligence in the supervision of subordinates who
committed the wrongful acts and failure to take action upon receiving information
that constitutional violations are occurring.” Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d
206, 229 (2d Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to the Court establishing that she was
hired, controlled, connected, directed, or instructed by the City or Grace. Indeed, the
Defendants firmly assert that Plaintiff is not an employee of St. Gabriel and/or
Grace (Doc. 34-1, at 4). Moreover, although in response to another claim made by the
Defendants, Plaintiff states, “The fact that Mrs. Delouise did not work for the city or
its former mayor is undisputed” (Doc. 42, at 19). Finally, and most importantly,
Plaintiff has not shown evidence that the City and/or Grace had any influence or
control over the hiring decisions of the IPSB. In her own deposition, Plaintiff
testified that the IPSB voted for her transfer, and that it was the board’s decision to
make based on recommendations from the Superintendent (Doc. 42-2, at 22). Thus,
it is unnecessary to analyze the other two prongs of a Section 1981 claim because
Plaintiff has failed to put forth evidence to show that she could have been the subject
of adverse employment action by these Defendants. There exists no convincing
connection between the actions taken by IPSB and the alleged involvement of Grace
that would support a finding of a genuine dispute of material fact. The Motion for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED on the Section 1981 claim against the City of St.
Gabriel and Mayor Grace.
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B. Section 1983 Claim
Section 1983 imposes liability upon any person who, acting under color of
state law, deprives another of federally protected rights. Alone, § 1983 does not
create any federally protected right, but it provides a cause of action for individuals
to enforce federal rights created elsewhere, such as other federal statutes or the
Constitution. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979)
(Section 1983 “creates no substantive rights; it merely provides remedies for
deprivations of rights established elsewhere.”). To prevail on a Section 1983 claim, it
must be proven that a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of
a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. American Mfrs.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49 (1999). Such constitutional violations
should be outlined by the plaintiff, and plaintiff is required to file a short and plain
statement of his complaint, a statement that rests on more than conclusions alone.
Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995).
A plaintiff must also prove that the alleged constitutional or statutory
deprivation was intentional or due to deliberate indifference and not the result of
mere negligence. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). Moreover, in a
claim asserted pursuant to section 1983 “[a] plaintiff must establish that the
defendant was either personally involved in the deprivation or that his wrongful
actions were causally connected to the deprivation.” James v. Texas Collin County,
535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Anderson v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 184
F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1999).
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The Court must conclude that Plaintiff has provided no evidence to sustain a
Section 1983 claim against the City or Grace. Plaintiff has already admitted that
neither the City nor Grace employed her, thus she has failed to put forth specific
facts to demonstrate that the City and/or Grace had control over her employment.
Defendants assert, and the Court agrees, that Plaintiff has provided no evidence to
establish that the City provided compensation or benefits to Plaintiff, or that
Plaintiff was subject to supervision by either of these Defendants (Doc. 34-1, at 4.)
Nevertheless, Plaintiff contends that she has met the standard necessary to succeed
on this claim. Plaintiff asserts that genuine issues of material facts exist concerning
whether Grace, in his official and individual capacity, acted under color of state law
when he “conspired” with Cancienne and Lodge to transfer her from East Iberville
School to Plaquemine High School because of her race, and whether such acts
deprived her of rights under Section 1981 (Doc. 42, at 16-17).
Plaintiff has not provided any direct evidence, outside of general speculation
and unsubstantiated assertions, to support this claim. All of the deposition
testimony provided by both parties shows that Grace’s alleged statements about
wanting a Black principal are, at best, unsubstantiated hearsay. The Court has
reviewed all of the testimony provided with this Motion. None of the witnesses
admitted that they specifically heard Grace say he wanted a Black principal, nor did
any of the witnesses admit that Plaintiff was ever even a topic of discussion with
Grace. Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence that Grace told anyone he wanted a
Black principal at East Iberville School.
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Further, Plaintiff has not presented evidence to show that Grace, in his
individual or official capacity, owed a duty to her. It is not unconstitutional to
express an opinion. To the extent that Grace did in fact make statements regarding
the desire for a Black principal at the school, Plaintiff has not convincingly shown
that Mayor Grace could have influenced the IPSB to effectuate her transfer. All that
has been provided in connection with this Motion are depositions of witnesses who
speculate on rumors that were circulating about Plaintiff’s transfer.
Plaintiff asserts that, “cloaked in the official power that comes with running
City Hall, the mayor used his political power to influence the School Board and local
legislators, and that there is no need to ‘prove any city policy or knowledge relating
to the rights violation independent of Mayor Grace’s own actions’” (Doc. 42, at 17). 3
Yet, the only evidence that Plaintiff provides of Grace’s alleged improper use of
political power is through the testimony of Janet Marrioneaux, the former executive
director of personnel and curriculum. In her testimony, she speculated that Grace
threatened to break away from the Iberville Parish School Board System and form a
separate school district if Plaintiff was not replaced with a Black principal (Doc. 42,
at 4). 4 Yet, Ms. Marrioneaux admitted that she had no personal information about

3

Plaintiff directs the Court to Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York,
436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 2003); Morfin v. City
of East Chicago, 349 F.3d 989, 1001 (7th Cir. 2003).
4 It is uncontested that, in 2010, a bill was introduced to the Louisiana State Senate by Ms.
Marrioneaux’s relative, former State Senator Rob Marrionneaux, which would have created a
separate school district in St. Gabriel. See Doc. 34-1, at 7, Doc. 42, at 11. However, the bill was
withdrawn.

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the bill, and she could not recall if Grace had ever approached the IPSB about the
bill (Doc. 42-7, at 11-12). Therefore, because of the lack of evidence supporting this
claim, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED on the Section 1983 claim
against the City of St. Gabriel and Mayor Grace.
C. Section 1985 Claim
To prevail on a Section 1985 claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a conspiracy
involving two or more persons; (2) for the purpose of depriving, directly or indirectly,
a person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws; (3) an act in
furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) which causes injury to a person or property, or a
deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. Hilliard v.
Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1994). Like a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff
must establish that there exists an underlying violation of constitutional rights or
privileges secured elsewhere. See United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of
America, Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983).
Plaintiff concludes that there is ample evidence to support this claim against
the City and Grace before the trier of fact at trial (Doc. 42, at 18). However, Plaintiff
has not met her burden of proof in establishing that there was a conspiracy to have
her transferred by either of these Defendants. Plaintiff fails to provide evidence to
show that the City or Grace had a role in the decision to transfer her. Thus, the
Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED on the Section 1985 claim against the
City of St. Gabriel and Mayor Grace.

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D. Title VII and Louisiana State Law Claims
Plaintiff admits that no Title VII claims or Louisiana State Law claims are
asserted against the City or Grace, and the Motion for Summary Judgment on these
claims is unopposed. Thus, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, in so
far as Plaintiff seeks relief against the City and Grace under Louisiana Revised
Statutes 23:967, and under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.
IV.

Motion to Strike
The Defendants seek to strike certain statements introduced by Plaintiff in

her Opposition (Doc. 42) to the current Motion for Summary Judgment. Because all
claims against the Defendants the City and Grace are dismissed, the Motion to
Strike (Doc. 43), is now rendered moot.

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V.

Conclusion
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the

City of St. Gabriel and George Grace (Doc. 34) is GRANTED. All claims against
George Grace, in his individual and official capacities, and the City of St. Gabriel are
dismissed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Strike filed by the City of
St. Gabriel and George Grace (Doc. 43) is DENIED as moot.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 30th day of September, 2013.

______________________________________
BRIAN A. JACKSON, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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