Coleman v. Smith et al

Filing 63

RULING granting in part and denying in part 31 and 32 Motions for Summary Judgment. The motions are hereby GRANTED only as to Plaintiff's Section 1983 respondent superior claim, and DENIED as to all other claims. Signed by Judge James J. Brady on 07/16/2013. (SMG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MICHAEL CARROLL COLEMAN
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 11-652-JJB
CITY OF PORT ALLEN CHIEF OF
POLICE INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY, FRED SMITH, CHIEF, AND
OFFICER JASMIONE CLARK
RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter is before the Court on Motions for Summary Judgment by Defendants the
City of Port Allen Chief of Police in his official capacity (“the City of Port Allen”) and Fred
Smith, Chief of Police in his individual capacity (“Chief Smith”) (Doc. 31) and Defendant
Officer Jasmione Clark (“Officer Clark”) (Doc. 32). Plaintiff Michael Carroll Coleman
(“Coleman” or Plaintiff) has filed a combined opposition (Doc. 36), to which the City of Port
Allen and Chief Smith (Doc. 58) and Officer Clark (Doc. 55) have filed replies. For the reasons
herein, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Defendants’ motions for summary
judgment. (Doc. 31-1); (Doc. 32-1).
I.
On September 22, 2010, Coleman, two unidentified passengers, and Coleman’s ninemonth pregnant daughter (“Ms. Coleman”) were en route to a medical clinic because Coleman
was “suffering from a diabetic spell.” (Doc. 2, ¶ 4). It is undisputed that Officer Clark stopped
the truck for a tint violation and that Ms. Coleman was driving with a suspended license.
However, there is a factual dispute as to whether the insurance on the vehicle was current.
Officer Clark ordered the truck to be towed and he waited for the tow truck to arrive. (Doc. 31,
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Ex. C). While Officer Clark was waiting for the tow truck to arrive, the Ms. Coleman walked
across the street to a restaurant, where she called her step-mother to pick her up. (Doc. 31, Ex.
B). Coleman left the scene on foot, while the two other passengers waited nearby for rides of
their own. (Doc. 32-1, Ex. A.) Officer Clark testified that the stop was conducted approximately
400 yards from Coleman’s house. Id.
According to Coleman’s complaint, he allegedly “went into a diabetic shock which
resulted in a diabetic coma wherein [he] ended up lying under a bush in the back of Golden
Corral wherein an employee had to call 911.” (Id., ¶ 6). Coleman was allegedly robbed, left
without identification, and was admitted to Baton Rouge General Hospital Intensive Care Unit in
critical condition. (Id.) The hospital records indicate that he was admitted on later that day, on
September 22, 2010, at 6:33 p.m. (Doc. 31, Ex. D). The records also show that while his blood
work was consistent with diabetic ketoacidosis, he also tested positive for cocaine and
benzodiazepines. Additionally, it is worth noting that the only Golden Corral in the Baton Rouge
metropolitan area is approximately 12.5 miles from where the traffic stop occurred.
II.
Coleman filed this action against the City of Port Allen, Chief Smith, and Officer Clark,
alleging violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a state law
negligence claim against all the defendants on the grounds that Officer Clark “had a duty to
make sure [Plaintiff] was not in danger of dying when he left him on the side of the highway
suffering from a diabetic shock.” (Doc. 2, ¶ 7).
III.
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant, or party seeking summary judgment, bears

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the burden of showing “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s
case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). At the outset, the Court notes that the
face of the complaint does not effectively identify the basis of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim, nor
does the complaint successfully identify present parties as persons to whom the claims are
asserted. Rather, the defendants in their motion for summary judgment, as well as the Court, are
left with the task of extracting claims from the complaint. With effort, the Court can infer from
the complaint a Section 1983 claim for illegal search and seizure based on the allegation that
“defendant Marshall commenced to search the vehicle without consent of complainant,”
although it bears mentioning that there is no party identified as Marshall. (Doc. 2, ¶ 4).
Moreover, the complaint fails to identify what claims are asserted against the City of Port Allen
and Chief Smith. However, because Plaintiff asserts that he has “suffered for many years with
harassment and lack of cooperation from the City of Port Allen Police Department, namely due
to Officer Jasmione Clark and Shane Weems,” the Court presumes that Plaintiff is attempting to
state a claim that the City of Port Allen and Chief Smith negligently hired and failed to train
and/or supervise Officer Clark. There is no indication as to who Shane Weems may be.
IV.
A. Constitutional violations as to Officer Clark
As a threshold matter, the Court will first address whether there was a constitutional
violation as to Officer Clark. The purported violation appears to be an alleged illegal search and
seizure, yet none of the parties fully address this issue in their respective briefings. For a traffic
stop to be constitutionally valid, the officer must have an objectively reasonable suspicion that
some illegal activity, including a traffic violation, has occurred or is about to occur. United States
v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2005). Here, Officer Clark stopped the vehicle for

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a tint violation in accordance with La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32.361.1. During the stop, Officer Clark
discovered that Ms. Coleman was driving the vehicle with a suspended license. Additionally,
Officer Clark testified that the vehicle did not have proper insurance registration, for which
Officer Clark he had the vehicle impounded. (Doc. 32-1, Ex. A.)
It is disputed whether Officer Clark searched the vehicle. (Doc. 36, Ex. C). In the
interest of arresting officer safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in arrest
situations, the Supreme Court has recognized the permissibility of a search incident to arrest
exception to the constitutional warrant requirement. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338-39
(2009). If, however, there is no arrest, there can be no search incident to the stop excepting the
provision of a warrant. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 114 (1998). Similarly, Officer Clark did
not place Plaintiff, or any other passenger of the vehicle, under arrest on September 22, 2010.
Therefore, he could not have legally searched Plaintiff’s vehicle during the stop in question.
Whether the search occurred remains at issue, and neither party has supplied undisputed material
facts sufficient to prompt summary judgment over the claim that Officer Clark illegally searched
Plaintiff’s vehicle.
Additionally, the complaint appears to allege that Officer Clark illegally seized Plaintiff’s
vehicle. Although the tint of the windows and status of vehicular insurance are disputed, it is
uncontested that Ms. Coleman was driving with a suspended license, in contradiction of La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 32:415. (Doc. 31-1, Ex. B). Officer Clark testified that he had the vehicle
impounded because Plaintiff failed to show valid automobile insurance, presumably in
accordance with La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 863.1. (Doc. 32-1, Ex. A). In support of Officer Clark’s
choice to impound the vehicle, regardless of the status of Plaintiff’s insurance policy, Defense
argues that he validly exercised his discretion because Ms. Coleman was illegally driving with a

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suspended license. (Doc. 58, p. 3). At the time of this incident, Louisiana law prevented law
enforcement officials from impounding a motor vehicle for a first violation, notwithstanding
enforcement of La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 863.1,1 when neither the Louisiana resident operator, nor
the vehicle, present imminent danger to the public. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32:392.1. Repealed by
Acts 2012, No. 512 § 1. This prohibition became effective on August 15, 2010, and continued to
govern the actions of Port Allen law enforcement officers until August 1, 2012. Id. Therefore,
Officer Clark could only have exercised his discretion to impound Plaintiff’s vehicle if Ms.
Coleman, the vehicle, or both presented imminent danger to the public, or perhaps pursuant to
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 863.1. However, neither party has indicated that Ms. Coleman was not
being stopped for a first violation, or that Ms. Coleman or the vehicle posed any imminent
danger to the public. Further, the status of Plaintiff’s insurance policy remains genuinely
disputed. Consequently, the Court cannot grant summary judgment over the claim that Officer
Clark unconstitutionally seized Plaintiff’s property.
B. Liability under respondeat superior
Contrarily, any claims that Plaintiff may be attempting to assert against the City of Port
Allen on the theory of respondeat superior must fail because a municipality cannot be held
vicariously liable under Section 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor. Monell v. Dep’t of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). However, a local government or municipality, such
as the City of Port Allen, may be subject to a Section 1983 action where an “official policy or
governmental custom is responsible for a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution.”

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An officer may not have violated La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 32:392.1 by impounding a violator La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
32:863.1, but it remains disputed whether Plaintiff violated the latter. Additionally, following an inquiry made by
Monroe Police officer, Major James Fried, regarding the relationship between these two statutes, the Office of the
Attorney General responded “…it is the opinion of this office that La. R.S. 32:392.1 prevails. Thus, a police officer
cannot impound a vehicle solely due to the failure of the operator to provide documentation of compliance with the
compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance laws.” La. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 10-0260 (Feb. 10, 2011).

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Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 1984). Thus, in order to maintain an action
against the City of Port Allen, Plaintiff must “connect the policy to the city itself and show that
the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy.” Id. at 767.
The City of Port Allen argues correctly that Plaintiff has not identified any policy that
caused his injury. (Doc. 58, p. 7). Rather, Plaintiff points to the City’s hiring policy and argues
that the City failed to comply with the requirements in the hiring policy, namely not subjecting
Officer Clark to a psychological evaluation. However, there is no evidence that this policy is
unconstitutional, or that this policy caused a violation of his rights. While Plaintiff is likely
arguing that the City failed to follow the policy, this is not what Monell and its progeny require
to prove municipal liability. Thus, on this issue, presuming that Plaintiff made this claim, the
Court will grant summary judgment to the Defendants.
C. Section 1983 liability for failure to train and/or supervise
Turning to a failure to train and/or supervise theory, Defendants argue that there is no
evidence in the record to support this theory of liability. Under Section 1983, an official is liable
for failure to train and/or supervise if the plaintiff shows that (1) the official failed to train or
supervise the officer, (2) “there is a causal connection between the alleged failure to supervise or
train and the alleged violation of the plaintiff’s rights;” and (3) this failure “constituted deliberate
indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Burge v. St. Tammany Parish, 336 F.3d 363,
370 (5th Cir. 2003) (quotations and citation omitted). Plaintiff argues that there is ample
evidence that Officer Clark’s immediate supervisor filed multiple complaints about Officer
Clark’s behavior, notably that Officer Clark was not being properly supervised. Relatedly, in
light of the minimal amount of relevant evidence timely provided in these proceedings, the Court

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will consider Plaintiff’s documents filed between June 15 and June 17, 2013, in order to
effectuate a precise and equitable assessment of the motions.
With respect to Chief Smith, Defendants point out that there were no specific allegations
made against him. To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to raise a Section 1983 supervisory
liability claim against Chief Smith, Plaintiff must show that chief Smith was either “personally
involved in the acts causing the deprivation of an individual's constitutional rights” or that there
was a “causal connection between [Chief Smith’s act] and the constitutional violation sought to
be redressed.” Harvey v. Andrist, 754 F.2d 569, 572 (5th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff does not allege
that Chief Smith personally acted to deprive him of his constitutional rights. Some causal
connection may be shown, however, between Chief Smith’s training or supervision of Officer
Clark and the two fourth amendment claims against him which the Court did not dismiss, as
discussed above. If Plaintiff can show that Officer Clark illegally searched and seized his
vehicle, it is reasonable to surmise that a causal connection could be shown between the training
and/or supervision of Officer Clark and his choice to search and seize the property. The lacuna
of facts which permeates these proceedings, once again, prohibits the Court from granting
summary judgment over the section 1983 claim that Chief Smith failed to train and/or supervise
Officer Clark to Plaintiff’s detriment.
D. Negligence as to Officer Clark
Plaintiff also alleges that Officer Clark negligently breached his duty of care when he
failed to provide transportation or similar assistance to Plaintiff, and is therefore the legal cause
of numerous ills which subsequently befell him. The Court recognizes that Officer Clark had a
duty to treat Plaintiff as would a reasonably prudent police officer. Mathieu v. Imperial Toy
Corp., 94-0952, p. 6 (La. 11/30/94), 646 So.2d 318, 323 (La. 1994). Defendants repeatedly

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contend that the damages alleged are too temporally attenuated to Plaintiff’s interaction with
Officer Clark on September 22, 2010, because Plaintiff’s hospitalization occurred “two days
later.” (Doc. 31-1, p. 14); See also (Doc. 31-1, p. 4), (Doc. 58, p. 4). Defendants are blatantly
incorrect in this representation. Plaintiff was hospitalized on September 22, 2010, as provided
by the hospital records submitted with defendants’ own motion. (Doc. 31-1, Ex. D). It was
following the traffic stop when Plaintiff allegedly suffered complications from diabetes, was
robbed, and hospitalized. (Doc. 2, ¶ 6); (Doc. 36, p. 2). Notably, the incident which constitutes
Plaintiff’s alleged damages occurred more than twelve-and-one-half miles away from the traffic
stop, at which time Plaintiff tested positive for cocaine and benzodiazepines. Neither party has
addressed, however, whether Plaintiff was intoxicated at the time of his diabetic episode or if his
twelve-and-one-half mile trek, and alleged ills, were purely the consequence of a mind
beleaguered by diabetic ketoacidosis. Numerous facts of Plaintiff’s experiences following
Officer Clark’s seizure of his vehicle on September 22 remain at genuine issue, a predicament
which has hardly been assisted by Defendants’ factual misrepresentations or Plaintiff’s inability
to correct or rebut such blatant errors. The factual circumstances of Plaintiff’s state law
negligence allegations stem from his interaction with Officer Clark on September 22, 2010, and
are very likely to form the same case or controversy. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Service, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 588 (2005) citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715, 725 (1966) (“The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative
fact.”). Further, there are no exceptional circumstances present which persuade the Court that
dismissal of supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claim would balance the relevant
factors. Enochs v. Lampasas County, 641 F.3d 155, 159-60 (5th Cir. 2011).

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III. Conclusion
City of Port Allen Chief of Police individually, and in his official capacity, Fred Smith’s,
and Officer Jasmione Clark’s motions for summary judgment are hereby GRANTED only as to
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 respondeat superior claim, (Doc. 31), and DENIED at to all other
claims. (Docs. 32 & 31).
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on the 16th of July, 2013.





JAMES J. BRADY, DISTRICT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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