Nassri et al v. Inland Dredging Company
Filing
109
ORDER AND OPINION denying 63 Motion for Reconsideration on Judge's Ruling Concerning Vessel Status Ruling. (GEC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
FAYEZ NASSRI AND
JAMES MORRIS
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 11-853
INLAND DREDGING COMPANY
SECTION “K”(1)
ORDER AND OPINION
Before the Court is the “Motion for Reconsideration on Judge’s Ruling Concerning Vessel
Status Ruling” filed on behalf of plaintiffs Fayez Nassri and James Morris. Having reviewed the
pleadings, memoranda, and relevant law, the Court, for the reasons assigned, DENIES the motion.
Background
In the early morning hours of December 10, 2010, James Morris, while driving his pleasure
boat in which Fayez Nassri was a passenger, struck a pipeline pontoon, later identified as the IDC12- owned by Inland Dredging Company (“Inland”). As a result of the accident, both Mr. Nassri
and Mr. Morris allegedly sustained injuries.
Mr. Nassri and Mr. Morris filed suit in state court against Inland and its insurer for their
damages alleging negligence under both Louisiana law and the general maritime law. Inland
removed the suit to federal court. In its answer, Inland asserted, among other defenses, the
protection of the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §30501, et seq, Rule F of the Supplementary
Rules for Certain Admiralty Claims.
Thereafter the parties filed cross motions for partial summary judgment seeking a
determination of whether the IDC 120 qualified as a “vessel” for purposes of limitation of liability.
Relying on Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co., 543 U.S. 481, 497 (2005), the Court concluded that
the IDC-120 qualified as an “artificial contrivance,” that defendant “actually used the IDC-120 “as
a means of transportation,” and that the IDC-120 is “actually capable of maritime transportation
regardless of the primary purpose or state of transit at a particular moment.” Doc. 59, p. 5-6. Based
on those findings, the Court held that the IDC-120 qualified as “a ‘vessel’ for purposes of the
Limitation of Liability Act.” Id. Based on that conclusion, the Court denied plaintiff’s motion for
partial summary judgement and granted defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment.
Plaintiff now urges the Court to reconsider its prior denial of plaintiff’s motion for partial
summary judgment and its grant of defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment contending
that:
the Court should view the pontoon at the actual time this serious
accident occurred. The tank was not maintained as shown by the
photographs and testified to by numerous witnesses, and the pontoon
was broken. This particular tank was not able to be used as a means
of transportation for any purpose.
Doc. 63-1, p. 1.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Because defendant filed this motion within twenty eight (28) days of the Court’s entry of
the November 6, 2012 order, the Court addresses the motion under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. A Rule 59(e) motion “is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal
theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry of judgment.” Templet
v. Hydrochem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004). This Court has recognized four grounds upon
which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted: (1) to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which
judgment is based, (2) the availability of new evidence, (3) the need to prevent manifest injustice,
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(4) or an intervening change in controlling law. In Re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated
Litigation, 2009 WL 5216897 at 1(E.D. La. December 29, 2009). This Court has further recognized
that “[r]econsideration of a judgment is an extraordinary remedy which courts should use sparingly.”
Id. (see Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 2d §2810.1, p. 124, Fields v.
Pool Offshore, Inc., 1998 WL 43217 (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 1998); Bardwell v. Sharp, 1995 WL 517120,
at 1 (E.D. La. Aug. 30, 1995). Rule 59(e) “should not be used to relitigate old matters, raise new
arguments, or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.”
Lafargue v. Jefferson Parish, No. 98-3185, 2000 WL 174899, *1 (E.D. La. 2000). The standard
for Rule 59(e) “favors denial of motion to alter or amend a judgment.” Southern Contractors Group,
Inc. v. Dynalectric Company, 2 F.3d 606, 611 (5th Cir. 1993).
Prior to issuing is Order and Opinion dated November 6, 2012, (Doc. 59) the Court carefully
reviewed the parties’ briefs and the relevant law. Plaintiffs have not offered any new evidence in
support of their motion, nor have they cited any case law supporting their position that the condition
of the IDC-120 at the time of the accident determines its status as a vessel. As the Court noted in
its Order and Opinion:
Stewart requires only that a vessel be “practically capable of
maritime transportation, regardless of its primary purpose or state of
transit at a particular moment.” . . . [T]he court holds that the IDC120 is “actually capable of maritime transportation regardless of its
primary purpose or state of transit at a particular moment” and is
therefore a vessel for purposes of the Limitation of Liability Act.
Doc. 59, p. 5-6. The Court finds no manifest error of law or fact upon which it based its
prior decision. Therefore, the Court denies the motion for reconsideration.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 17th day of December, 2012.
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STANWOOD R. DUVAL, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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