Nassri et al v. Inland Dredging Company

Filing 59

ORDER AND OPINION GRANTING 40 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Defendant; DENYING 19 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs'. Signed by Judge Stanwood Duval, Jr on 11/6/2012. (swd)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

FAYEZ NASSRI & JAMES MORRIS

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 11-853

INLAND DREDGING COMPANY

SECTION “K”

ORDER AND OPINION
Before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment filed on behalf of Plaintiffs
Fayez Nassri and James Morris and Defendant Inland Dredging Company (“Inland”). Parties
seek a determination of the IDC-120’s vessel status. Having reviewed the pleadings,
memoranda, and relevant law, the Court, for the reasons assigned, denies Plaintiffs’ “Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment” (Doc. 19) and grants Defendant’s “Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment” (Doc. 40).
I.

Background
In the early morning hours of December 8, 2010, James Morris, while driving his

pleasure boat in which Fayez Nassir was a passenger, struck a pipeline pontoon, later identified
as the IDC-120 owned by Inland. As a result of the accident, both Mr. Nassri and Mr. Morris
allegedly sustained injuries.
Mr. Nassri and Mr. Morris filed suit in state court against Inland and its insurer for their
damages alleging negligence under both Louisiana law and the general maritime law. Inland

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removed the suit to federal court. In its answer, Inland asserted, among other defenses, the
protection of the Limitation of Liability Act.1
II.

Law and Analysis
Pivotal to both motions for partial summary judgment is whether the IDC-120 is a

“vessel” for purposes of the Limitation of Liability Act.2
a. What is the Definition of a “Vessel?”
Historically, the term “vessel” lacked a uniform definition. Confusion existed as to
whether the definition of a “vessel,” for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction, differed between
statutory liability regimes, such as, the Jones Act,3 the Limitation of Liability Act,4 and the
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA).5 In part, this ambiguity
stemmed from a lack of incorporating a definition of “vessel” into those statutes. Furthermore,
case law developed that provided conflicting definitions of “vessel” under the different statutory
schemes.6
In Stewart v. Dutra, the United States Supreme Court adopted a uniformly broad
definition of “vessel.”7 There, a marine engineer “was seriously injured while repairing a scow’s
engine” that was tied to a dredge, the Super Scoop. The Super Scoop had certain characteristics
common to seagoing vessels, but lacked others. The Supreme Court addressed whether the

1

46 U.S.C. § 30501, et seq, Rule F of the Supplementary Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims.
Id.
3
46 U.S.C.A. § 30104.
4
Id. §30501-12.
5
33 U.S.C. §§901-944, 948-950.
6
Evansville & Bowling Green Packet Co. v. Chero Cola Bottling Co., 271 U.S. 19, 20 (1926) (discussing the
Limitation of Liability Act); Richendollar v. Diamond M Drilling Co., Inc., 819 F.2d 124, 125 (5th Cir. 1987)
(discussing the Jones Act and LHWCA).
7
See Stewart v. Dutra Const. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 497 (2005).
2

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Super Scoop qualified as a “vessel” for purposes of the LHWCA. Clearly, determining vessel
status required a definition of the term “vessel.”
The Supreme Court noted that Congress “did not define the term ‘vessel’ in the
LHWCA” or Jones Act.8 However, Congress had provided a statutory definition of “vessel” in
section 3 of the Revised Statues of 1873.9 Specifically, 1 U.S.C. § 3 states: “a vessel includes
every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a
means of transportation on water.”10 Moreover, the Supreme Court observed that “[section] 3
continued to supply the default definition of ‘vessel’ throughout the U.S. Code, ‘unless the
context indicates otherwise.’”11 Thus, the Supreme Court held that “[section] 3 defines the term
‘vessel’ for purposes of the LHWCA.”12
Stewart replaced the “primary purpose” and “in navigation” requirements implemented
by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in favor of a “practically capable” requirement.13 The
Supreme Court made clear that section 3 only requires “that a watercraft be ‘used, or capable of
being used, as a means of transportation on water’ to qualify as a vessel.”14 Furthermore, the
Court “stated that a watercraft need not be in motion to qualify as a vessel under [section] 3.”15
Thus, in Stewart the focus of section 3 shifted to answering the inquiry of “whether the

8

Id. at 488-89.
Id. at 489. (“Section 3’s definition, repealed and recodified in 1947 as part of the Rules of Construction Act, 1
U.S.C. § 3, has remained virtually unchanged from 1873 to the present.”).
10
Id. at 489-90 (citing 1 U.S.C. § 3).
11
Id. at 490 (citing 1 U.S.C. §1).
12
Id. at 497.
13
Id. at 487-88. The “primary purpose” requirement stated that the primary purpose of the vessel must be navigation
or commerce. The “in navigation” requirement stated that a vessel is only a vessel, for purposed of LHWCA, when
the vessel is in actual transit. Id.
14
Id. at 496.
15
Id.
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watercraft’s use ‘as a means of transportation on water’ is a practical possibility or merely a
theoretical one.”16
Stewart imposed an important caveat to section 3’s definition by concluding that the
Super Scoop was a “vessel,” as defined under section 3, because it “was not only ‘capable of
being used’ to transport equipment and workers over water- it was used to transport those things”
at the time of the engineer’s injury.17 Accordingly, Stewart “significantly enlarged the set of
unconventional watercraft that are vessels.”18
b. Is the IDC-120 a “Vessel” for Purposes of the Limitation of Liability Act?
Congress failed to define “vessel” in the Limitation of Liability Act.19 Like in Stewart,
this statutory ambiguity must be resolved.20 Historically the Supreme Court relies on section 3 to
define the term “vessel” under the Limitation of Liability Act.21 Although Stewart did not
address “vessel” status under the Limitation of Liability Act, it furnished a framework for
interpreting section 3 that applies in analyzing whether the IDC-120 qualifies as a “vessel”
subject to the Limitation of Liability Act. Thus, for purposes of the Limitation of Liability Act,
“vessel” is defined by section 3 as interpreted by Stewart.

16

Id.
Id. at 495.
18
Holmes v. Atl. Sounding Co., Inc., 437 F.3d 441, 448 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding a floating dormitory to be a vessel).
See also Uzdavines v. Weeks Marine, Inc., 418 F.3d 138, 144 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding a bucket dredge to be a vessel
under section 3); Bunch v. Canton Marine Towing Co., Inc., 419 F.3d 868, 869 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that “a
cleaning barge moored to the bed of the Missouri River” was a vessel); City of Riviera Beach v. That Certain
Unnamed Gray, Two Story Vessel Approximately Fifty-Seven Feet In Length, 649 F.3d 1259, 1269 (11th Cir. 2011)
cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1543, 182 L. Ed. 2d 160 (U.S. 2012) (holding that a houseboat with no engine, raked bows,
cleats for towing, or a history of transportation was a vessel under section 3 because it was “practically capable of
transportation over water by means of a tow, despite having no motive or steering power of its own”).
19
46 U.S.C.A. § 30505.
20
See Stewart v. Dutra Const. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 489 (2005).
21
Evansville & Bowling Green Packet Co. v. Chero Cola Bottling Co., 271 U.S. 19(1926).
17

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As discussed above, section 3 mandates two essential characteristics of a “vessel:” first, it
must be a “watercraft or other artificial contrivance;” second, it must be “used, or capable of
being used, as a means of transportation on water.” Furthermore, Stewart puts forth the primary
test for determining vessel status under section 3: “whether the watercraft’s use ‘as a means of
transportation on water’ is a practical possibility or merely a theoretical one.”22
The IDC-120 was a hollow metal pontoon tank constructed to float dredge pipe.23 Thus,
it obviously qualifies as an “artificial contrivance,” thereby satisfying the first prong of section 3.
The IDC-120 also fulfills the second prong of section 3 as construed by the Supreme Court in
Stewart; it can actually be used “as a means of transportation on water.” Defendant actually used
the IDC-120 to transport pipe. While floating, the IDC-120 oscillated from side to side due to
changing tides and the lack of a permanent mooring. Furthermore, tender boats moved it short
distances around worksites. The Court regards these movements as evidence of actual
transportation. Moreover, the IDC-120 could practically be used as a “floating dock or
landing.”24 Thus, the Court concludes that Defendant actually used the IDC-120 “as a means of
transportation.”
Plaintiffs point to the IDC-120’s lack of objective characteristics typical of a vessel in
asserting that the IDC-120 is not a vessel. Stewart preempted this historic approach to
determining vessel status. Stewart requires only that a vessel be “practically capable of maritime
transportation, regardless of its primary purpose or state of transit at a particular moment.”25 For
these reasons, the Court holds that the IDC-120 is “actually capable of maritime transportation,

22

Stewart v. Dutra Const. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 496 (2005).
Doc. 40, Ex. A.
24
Doc. 40, Ex. A.
25
Stewart, 543 U.S. at 497.
23

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regardless of its primary purpose or state of transit at a particular moment” and is therefore a
“vessel” for purposes of the Limitation of Liability Act. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary
judgment;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for partial
summary judgment.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 6th day of November, 2012.

STANWOOD R. DUVAL, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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