Young v. Shaw-Sunland Fabricators, Inc. et al

Filing 26

RULING granting 4 Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff's Title VII claim is dismissed without prejudice. Insofar as the claim relates to Defendant David Chapman in his individual capacity, it is dismissed with prejudice. Defendants' motion for attorneys' fees and costs is dismissed without prejudice. Defendants may re-urge this claim at the appropriate time. Signed by Judge James J. Brady on 8/13/12. (DCB) Modified on 8/15/2012 to edit document type(DCB).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ADAM YOUNG
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 12-164-JJB-SCR
SHAW SUNLAND FABRICATORS, INC.
AND DAVID CHAPMAN
RULING
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss (doc. 4).
In a prior ruling (doc. 16), the Court granted the motion in part, dismissing
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim and LEDL claims but holding his Title VII claim open
pending further briefing. Specifically, the Court ordered a surreply from Plaintiff
regarding 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19(b) and whether the notice of revocation sent by
the EEOC to Plaintiff had the effect of either resetting or stopping the 90-day right
to sue clock. In the event that it did not, the Court ordered both parties to brief
whether equitable tolling should apply to this situation. Plaintiff (doc. 25) and
Defendants (doc. 24) filed the requested briefs. For the following reasons, the
Court finds the Title VII claim was timely filed, thus the question of equitable
tolling is moot.
The first issue is whether Plaintiff’s suit was timely filed. After reviewing
Plaintiff’s surreply brief on this issue, the Court agrees that the letter sent to
Plaintiff was not in fact a notice of reconsideration such as to invoke the clockstopping procedures of 29 C.F.R. 1601.19(b). The letter was titled “notice of

revocation” and, as Plaintiff notes, the word reconsider does not appear in any
form in the letter. Although the letter does point to the governing statute, the
Court finds this is not enough to properly alert a recipient that the EEOC will
reconsider its finding. Stating the investigation will continue is not the same as
stating the decision will be reconsidered—the former suggests an ongoing
process while the latter suggests a final decision that may be changed. Where a
single letter can have such serious consequences for a party, the EEOC must be
clear about its action. As the statute clearly states that a “notice of intent to
reconsider” shall vacate a right to sue letter and the letter sent to Plaintiff does
not express—either expressly or impliedly—the EEOC’s intent to reconsider, the
effect of the revocation provision of the statute does not apply. As such, the
effect of the revocation letter was to revoke Plaintiff’s right to sue. To rule that a
letter revoking a right to sue does not in fact revoke the right to sue would be
ridiculous. As the letter was not a notice of intent to reconsider as demanded by
29 C.F.R. § 1601.19(b), the right to sue was revoked and the current suit is
timely filed.
Defendants also claim that the Title VII claim is not properly alleged and
should be dismissed. (Docs. 4-1 at 4, 10 at 4). The Court agrees that the
Complaint does no more than state the kind of conclusory accusations and
formulaic recitation of the elements that Iqbal and Twombly are intended to
prevent. The complaint is not only “far from baroque” as Plaintiff suggests, it is in

2

fact nothing more than conclusory statements that set forth no facts to support
them. As such, the Title VII claim is dismissed. This dismissal will be without
prejudice in order to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint to
properly state a claim under Title VII. The Court notes that the in forma pauperis
designation does not factor into this determination in any way. Further, the Title
VII claim against Chapman in his individual capacity is dismissed with prejudice.
Title VII does not provide a cause of action against a supervisor. Grant v. Lone
Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 651-53 (5th Cir. 1994).
Finally, the Court will dismiss the motion for attorneys’ fees and costs
under the LEDL claim without prejudice. Defendants may re-urge this claim at
the appropriate time.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Defendants’ motion (doc. 4) is GRANTED and
Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is dismissed without prejudice.

Insofar as the claim

relates to Defendant David Chapman in his individual capacity, it is dismissed
with prejudice. Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs is dismissed
without prejudice. Defendants may re-urge this claim at the appropriate time.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on August 13, 2012.





JUDGE JAMES J. BRADY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE3DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

4