Bailey v. E.B.R. Parish Prison et al

Filing 175

RULING: The 169 Motion for Summary Judgment of the remaining defendant in this case, Dr. Vincent Leggio, be and it is hereby GRANTED, dismissing the plaintiff's claims asserted against this defendant, with prejudice, and that this action be dismissed. Judgement shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge James J. Brady on 8/18/2015. (BCL)

UN ITED STATES DISTRI CT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRI CT OF LOUISI ANA

CIVIL ACTION

GREGORY BAILEY (#2 1886)
VERSUS

NO. 12-0224-JJB-RLB

E.B.R. PARISH PRISON, ET AL.

RULI NG
T his matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment of the remaining
defendant in this case, Dr. V incent Leggio (R. Doc. 169). This motion is not opposcd. 1
The prose plaintiff, an inmate previously confined at the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison
("EBRPP"), Baton Rouge, Louisiana, tiled this proceed ing pursuant to 42 U.S .C . § 1983 against
EBRPP, Warden Dennis Grimes, the Nineteenth Judicial District CoUlt for the Parish of East Baton
Rouge, Judge Tony Marabella and Dr. Vincent Leggio, complaining that the defendants violated his
constitutional rights through deliberate ind ifference to his serious medi ca l needs while he was
confined at that facility, specifica lly through a fa ilure to provide him w ith appropriate dental care.
Pursuant to previous Rulings in this case (R. Docs. S I and 11 7), the Court has dismissed the
plaintiffs claims asserted against EBRPP, the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison, the N ineteenth
Judicial District Court, Judge Tony Marabell a and Warden Dennis Grimes, and has declined the

I. Pursuant to Order dated July 17, 20 IS (R. Doc. 172), the Court directed the plaintiff to
file any opposition he might have to the defendant's motion for summary judgment within ten (1 0)
days of the date of the Order. A second Order entered on the same date ( R. Doc. 173) specifically
advised the plaintiff that he should attach any suppotting exhibits, affidavits or other evidence to his
opposition and should refer with particularity to the evidence supporting his claim or refuting the
defendant's assertions. The latter Order fUJther advised the plaintiff that the Court would not scour
the record for evidence beneficial to his contentions in this case.

exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs state law claims.
Defendant Dr. Leggio now moves for summary judgment relying upon the pleadings, a
Statement ofU ncontested Material Facts, a copy of a transcript of the plaintiffs deposition testimony
given on August 8, 20 13, copi es of the plaintiff's medica l records at EPRPP, the Pine Prairie
Correctional Center, and the Hood Dental C linic, a copy of de fendant Leggio's certification as an
Enro llee w ith the Lou isiana Patient's Compensation Fund, a copy of the Professional Services
Agreement entered into between defendant Leggio and the C ity ofBaton Rouge/ Parish ofEast Baton
Rouge, and the affidavits of EBRPP Health Care Manager Linda Ottesen and defendant Vincent
Leggio.
Pursuant to well-establi shed legal principles, summary judgment is appropriate where there
is no genuine disputed issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civi l Procedure. Celotex Corp. v. Catrell, 477 U.S. 317
( 1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). A party moving for summary
judgment must inform the Court of the basis for the motion and identify those portio ns of the
pleadings, deposi tions, answers to interrogatories and admissions o n file, together with affidavits,
if any, that show that there is no such genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Carrell, supra,
477 U.S. at 323. lfthe moving patty carries its burden of proof under Rul e 56, the opposi ng party
must direct the Court's attention to speci fic evidence in the record which demonstrates that the nonmoving party can satisfy a reasonabl e jury that it is entitled to a verd ict in its favor. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, 477 U.S . at 248. This burden is not satisfied by some metaphysical doubt
as to alleged material facts, by unsworn and unsubstanti ated asset1ions, by conclusory allegations,
or by a mere sc intilla of evidence. Lillie v. Liquid Air Corp. , 37 F.3d 1069, l 075 (5 1h Cir. 1994).

Rather, Rule 56 mandates that summary judgment be entered against a parry who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence ofan element essential to that party's case and on which
that party w ill bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catre/1, supra, 477 U.S. at 323.
Summary judgment is appropriate in any case where the evidence is so weak or tenuous on essential
facts that the evidence could not support a judgment in favor of the non-moving party. Lillie v.

Liquid Air Corp., supra, 37 F.3d at 1075. In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the Court
must review the facts and inferences in the light most favorab le to the non-moving party, and the
Court may not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes.

International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally 's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5'h C ir. 1991).
As pertinent to the claim and defendant remaining before the Court, the plaintiff alleges in
his Complaint, as amended, that in October, 2010, he was a pretrial detainee confined at the Pine
Prairie Correctional Center ("PPCC''), a facility to which he had been temporarily transferred fro m
EBRPP while awaiting trial on criminal charges pending in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court
for the Parish of East Baton Rouge. He alleges that on October 20, 20 I 0, he broke one of his teeth
at PPCC and that two adjacent teeth became abscessed. The plaintiff requested dental treatment at
the Pine Prairie faci lity but was allegedly made to wait nine months by EBRPP officials before being
transported back to EBRPP, and he was then allegedly made to wait two additional months at
EBRPP before being seen by the EBRPP dentist, defendant Dr. Leggio. The plaintiff further asserts
that Dr. Leggio thereafter attempted, on at least two occasio ns, to extract some oft he plaintiff's teeth
but was unable to do so. According to the plaintiff, Dr. Leggio provided the plaintiff with penicillin,
ibuprofen and antibiotics and informed the plaintiff that a referral would be made for treatment by
a dental surgeon and that the plaintiff would be placed on a list to be taken to an outside facility. The

plaintiff complains, however, that the medication provided by Dr. Leggio did not work, was
improperly prescribed and caused adverse side effects, and that the outside facilities to which the
plaintiff was referred were either unavailable or did not offer the services needed. When the plaintiff
asked Dr. Leggio about the delay in treatment, defendant Leggio allegedly responded that the EB RPP
Warden needed to authorize any outside treatment. It appears from documentation filed into the
record that in August, 2013, the plaintiff was provided with a referral to an outside facility, and
several of the plaintiff's teeth were extracted by the Hood Dental Clinic on August 9, 2013. SeeR.
Doc. 169-8 at p. 3 .
A claim by a pretrial detainee that jail officials have violated his constitutional rights is
governed by the substantive protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which provision protects the detainee ' s right to be free from punishment prior to an adj udication of
gu ilt. See Bell v. Wolfish , 441 U.S. 520, 535-36 (1979). In this context, the violation of a detainee's
interest in bodily integrity, through the denial ofa basic human need such as reasonable medical care,
can amount to punishment under the Due Process Clause. Partridge v. Two Unknown Police

Officers ofthe City of Houston, 791 F.2d 1182, 11 86-87 (5 1h Cir. 1986). The appropriate standard
to apply in anal yzing a constitutional challenge by a pretrial detainee depends upon whether the
constitutional challenge is seen to be an attack on a condition of confinement or a complaint about
an episodic act or omission. Hare v. City ofCorinth, 74 F.3d 633, 643 (5 111 Cir. 1996). A conditions
of confinement case is a constitutional attack on the "general conditions, practices, rules, or
restrictions of pretrial confinement," id., and in such cases, the harm is seen to be caused by the
policy or practice itself. This is true, for example, where inadequate medical care, as a whole, results
in deplorable conditions of confinement. See Scoll v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51, 53 (5 1h Cir. 1997). The

assumption in such cases is that the policy or practice is intentional , and the pertinent inquiry is
whether the policy or practice in question is " reasonably related to a legitimate governmental
purpose." Hare v. City ofCorinth, supra, 74 F. 3d at 640, 644-45 . In contrast to the foregoing, if the
prisoner is compla ining of one or more particular acts or omissions by prison health care providers,
the claim is characterized as an "episodic act or omission" case. Hare v. City ofCorinth, supra, 74
F.3d at 645. An episodic case is presented when an independent actor or actors has been interposed
between the detainee and a poli cy or practice of the local governmental entity that permitted the
harm. Scoll v. Moore. supra, 114 F. 3d at 53. In an episodic act or omission case, the detainee must
establish that the prison health care provider responsible for the alleged w rongdo ing had actual ,
subjective knowledge of a substantial ri sk of serious harm to the p laintiffs health or well-being but
responded with deliberate indifference to the known or perceived risk. Hare v. City of Corinth,

supra, 74 F.Jd at 636.
As pertinent to the instant motion, the plaintiff is complaining of the actions of a pa11icular
health care provider at EBRPP, Or. Vincent Leggio. As such, the Court has previously concluded
that this claim is properly analyzed as an episodic act or omission claim and is eva luated under a
del iberate indifference s tandard. See R. Docs. 133 and 135. U nder this standard, in order for a
pri soner-plaintiff to prevail o n a claim that hi s constitutional rights have been vio lated by the
provision of improper or inadequate medical care, he must allege and show that appropriate care has
been denied and that the denial has constituted "deliberate indifference to serio us medica l needs."

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, I 06 (1976) ; Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1237 (5'h Cir. 1985).
Whether the plaintiff has received the treatment or accommodation that he believes he should have
is not the issue. Estelle v. Gamble, supra, 429 U.S. at I 07. Nor do negligence, neglect, medical

malpractice or unsuccessful medical treatment give rise to a § 1983 cause of action. Varnado v.

Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 32 1 (5'h Cir. 1991 ); Johnson v. Treen, supra, 759 F.2d at 1238. Rather,
"subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law" is the appropriate definition of "deliberate
indifference," Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839-40 (1994), and in order to be liable on a claim
of deliberate indifference, an official " must both be aware of facts from which the inference could
be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm ex ists, and he must also draw the inference." ld. at
83 7. The deli berate indi fference standard sets a very high bar: the plaintiff must establish that the
defendant "refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or
engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical
needs." Domino v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice , 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5 1h Ci r. 200 I), quoting

Johnson v. Treen supra, 759 F.2d at 1238. Further, a mere delay in treatment does not constitute an
Eighth A mendment violatio n without both deliberate indi fference and a resulting s ubstantial harm.

Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191 , 195 (5'h Cir. 1993).
Applying the forego ing standard, the Court finds that the plaintiffs claim of deliberate
medical indifference asserted against Dr. Leggio should be rejected. Specifically, the Court finds
that the plaintiff has failed to present evidence sufficient to overcome the defendant's evidentiary
showing in connection w ith the instan t motion. Although the Court initially expressed concern in
thi s case regarding the p laintiffs alleged long-term confinement at a transferee faci lity in Pine
Prairie, Louisiana in 20 II , w ithout access to appropriate dental care, see R . Doc. 51 at p. 7, it is clear
that the defendant dentist had no control over the plaintiffs housing location. which was detennined
by the warden or his designee at EBRPP, not by the defendant. Further, and in any event, the Court's
initial concern has since been alleviated by the presentation of credible un-refuted evidence

contradicting the plaintiff's assertions and reflecting that the plaintiff was routinel y transported back
to EBRPP in 20 II when dental treatment was requested or scheduled. Specifically, the pertinent
prison medical and administrative records reflect that, whereas the plaintiff asserted in his Complaint
that he sustained injury to a tooth at PPCC in October, 2010, he in fact made no request for dental
treatment at PPCC until several months later, in January, 20 II , at wh ich time he complained of a
toothache of only one week's duration. See R. Doc. 169-10 at p. 20. In addi ti on, the medical records
reflect that the plaintiff underwent a routine physical examination at PPCC in December, 20 I 0, and
was noted at that time to be in good general health with no noted need for any medical or dental
referrals. See id. at pp. 12-14. Upon making his initial request for dental treatment on January 6,

20 II, the plaintiff was seen by Pine Prairie medical personnel the next day, was noted to have a
dental abscess, was provided with a prescription fo r pain med ication and antibiotics, and was issued
a referral for a dental appoi ntm ent. See id. at p. 20. The only other medical request made by the
plaintiff at PPCC around that time was on January 25.20 II , when he requested only medication for
athletes foot and made no mention of any dental complaints. See id. at p. 21. Although the plaintiff
alleges in his Complaint that he then did not receive any treatment for his dental complaints for many
months, the records reflect that, in fact, on January 3 1, 20 II , approx imately three weeks after his
initial re port of injury, he was transferred back to EBRP P where he received medical and de ntal
attention over the course of the next month, including an evaluation of his dental complaints by a
nurse on February 6. 20 I I , see R. Doc. 169-5 at pp. 249-250, and at least two appointments with Dr.
Leggio, on Fe bruary 15 and 28,20 II , respectively. See id. at p. 125. During that period, an attempt
was made by Dr. Leggio to extract the plaintiff's broken tooth, but this attempt, according to the
plaintiff, was unsuccessful, allegedly because Dr. Leggio was unable to sufficiently deaden the

plaintiffs gums. SeeR. Doc. 169-4 at p. 23-4. At any rate, it appears that Dr. Leggio prescribed
pain medication and antibiotics for the plaintiff in an attempt to reduce and contro l swelling, entered
orders for follow-up care, and recommended that the plainti ff undergo tooth extractio n prior to a
transfer to another facil ity. See R. Doc. 169-5 at p. 125.
Notwithstanding Dr. Leggio 's recommendation, the plaintiff was returned to the Pine Prairie
faci lity on March I, 20 I l , where he was held for a period of approximately 2 Yz months, until May
I3, 2011. During that interval, he was provided w ith pain medication, antibiotics and penicillin by
Pine Prairie personnel. Although the EBRPP Transfer Form indicates that the plainti ff had a dental
appointment scheduled at EBRPP for March 22, 20 II , see R. Doc. 169-10 at p. 23, this appointment
did not take place, apparently because Or. Leggio was ill.

See R. Doc. 169-5 at p. I II.

Notwi thstanding, the pia inti ff did not submit any requests for dental treatment at PPCC until April
28 , 20 1 I, approximately one month after his scheduled appoi ntment and approximately two months
after his arrival at PPCC . See R. Doc. I69-l 0 at p. 19. The pertinent medical record from that date
reflects that the plainti ff reported that he was "awaiting dental eva![uation]." See id. at p. I 0. The
plaintiff was then seen by a physician's assistant at Pine Prairie o n that date who conferred with a
physician by telephone, ordered a prescripti on for pain medication and antibiotics, and ordered a
"dental eval[ uation] soon at EBRP." See id. (emphasis in ori ginal). The plaintiff was thereafter seen
by a physician at Pine Prairie on May 5. 20 II , an EKG was undertaken due to unrelated complaints
of chest pain, and he was noted to have an "improving" dental abscess. See id. at p. 9. An order was
made at that time to "assure dental follow-up." See id. Finally, on May 12, 20 II, the plaintiff was
seen agai n by a physician's assistant at Pine Prairie and was noted to be " awaiting denta l" fo llow-up
at EBRPP. See id. at p. 8. T he no ted plan for dental treatment at that time was to "call EBRP, again

.... [and) ask if we can have him seen here if they can not see him soon." Jd. The plaintiff was
transported back to EBRPP the next day, on May 13, 20 11 , and the records reflect that he received
medical and dental attention at the Baton Rouge facility. Thus, the plaintiff was again transported
to EBRPP within approximately two weeks ofhis April 28, 2011 , written req uest at PPCC for dental
attention.
The plaintiff thereafter remained at EBRPP except for two brief periods, the first for
approximately one week in July, 20 11. and the second for approximately one month in August, 2011.
The medical records generated at EBRPP during the remaining period of the plaintiffs confinement
at that facility reflect that he was provided with substantial and continuing medical and dental
attention and treatment by Dr. Leggio and other physicians and hea lth care providers. See generally

R. Doc. 169-5. The plaintiff further conceded in his deposition that he has no basis to dispute the
accuracy of the EBRPP medical records, see R. Doc. 169-4 at p. 17, which show that he was
provided with "mu ltiple medical appointments and dental appointments" at that fac ility. See id. at
pp. 41-42 . The p lainti ff asserts , however, that for the duration of his confinement at EBRPP, he
continued to complain to defendant Leggio and other providers, both in person and through written
grievances and correspondence, of pain and of a need for appropriate attention to his dental needs,
including the extraction of broken and/or abscessed teeth . According to the plaintiff, defendant
Leggio failed to take appropriate action to treat the plaintiff's condition. extract the broken/abscessed
teeth, provide appropriate medication, or ensure that a referral was made to an outside facil ity that
could provide the necessary treatment.

Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that the prescribed

medication did not work or had adverse consequences and that he experienced pain and discomfort
for a substantial period of time. Whereas the plaintiff acknowledges that Dr. Leggio advised that a

referral had been made for the plaintiff to be seen at an outside facility, see id. at 33, the plaintiff
complains that this referral did not take place and that he continued to suffer pain and discomfort.
Notwithstanding the plaintiff's contentions, the Court finds, upon a review of the evidence
presented by the defendant in support of the instant motion, and in the absence of any argument or
contrary showing by the plaintiff, that the plaintiffhas failed to show the existence of a genuine issue
of disputed fact regarding the liability of defendant Leggio in connection with the plaintiffs dental
treatment at EBRPP.

To the contrary, the evidence presented by the defendant, including

voluminous EBRPP medical records, affidavits and other documentation, supports a finding that the
plaintiffs complaints were not ignored and that the defendant did not exhibit del iberate indifference
to the plaintiffs serious medical needs. As noted above, the plainti ffs first report of a need for
dental treatment was in January, 201 1, at PPCC, when he reported an injury to one of his teeth. The
plaintiff was then transported back to EBRPP on January 3 1, 2011, where he was seen and evaluated
by Dr. Leggio and provided with medication and appointments for follow-up care. The medical
records reflect that, for the duration of the plaintiffs confinement at EBRPP, he made numerous
requests for medical and dental treatment and filed numerous administrative grievances relative to
the care that he was receiving. These records also reflect, however, that the plaintiff was in fact seen
and treated on many occasions by health care providers at that fac ility, including nurses, physicians
and the defendant dentist, Dr. Leggio. In addition to treatment for his dental complaints. the plaintiff
sought and obtained treatment for other ai lments, including chest pain, heartburn, and persistent
itchiness.

The records reflect that defendant Leggio routinely prescribed medication for the

plaintiffs dental complaints, including medication for pain and antibiotics to reduce and control
persistent soreness, swelling and abscesses. On multiple occasions, Dr. Leggio attempted to extract

one or more of the plaintifrs teeth, but the plaintiff resis ted these attempts and was unwilling to
accept " regular dental inj ection for giving anesthesia," complaining that the defendant had not
sufficiently numbed the plaintiff s mouth and that he still felt pain. See R. Docs. 169-5 at p. 120 and
169-7. Finally, in response to the plaintiff s requests for the use of a stronger anaesthetic that was
not available at EBRPP, defendant Leggio made a referral for an outside prov ider to undertake
s urgical ex traction of severa l of the plaintiff's teeth.

See R . Doc. 169-7. A lthough the referral

appo intment did not immediate ly occur, it does not appear that the resulting delay is attributable to
Dr. Leggio. To the contrary, according to the affidavits of the defendant and the EBRPP Health Care
Manager, Linda Ottesen, R. Docs. 169-6 and 169-7, once the referral was made, the defendant was
"not invol ved in the procurement, contracting, scheduling, transporting, or acceptance of the off-site
referral, and ha[d] no contro l over such. " Thus, fault does not lie w ith the defendant merely because
the referral was delayed or because it was, at least initially, denied by the referral facility. See R.
Doc. 169-5 at pp. 3 1 and 132-33 (reflecting that on October 8, 20 12, medical prov iders w ith the LSU
Health System rejected the referral req uest by Dr. Leggio and EBRPP because it did not ''meet
internal guidelines"). According to the affidavit of Linda Ottesen (R. Doc. 169-6), Prison Medical
Services "ha[d) no control over whether an outside clinic accept[ed) a referral or when or how many
patients they choose to see." Fm1her, when the Earl K. Long Hospital in Baton Rouge, Louis iana,
stopped accepting dental referral s for complex extractions for inmates in 20 I I, " Prison Medical
Services contacted multiple providers in attempts to contract for outs ide care for dental referrals and
complex extractions. " !d. Finally, "[i]n Jul y of20 13, Prison Medical Services was able to contract
with denti st, Dr. Andrew l.;lood to see inmate referrals twice a month" and, pursuant to that contract,
was able to schedule the plaintiff for tooth extractions on August 9, 20 13. !d. While awaiting this

referral, health care providers at EBRPP continued to provide the plaintiff with medication and
attention to hi s complaints. See R. Docs. 169-5, in toto, and 169-7. These facts do not support a
finding that Dr. Leggio or any other prison personnel at that facility "refused to treat (the plaintiffJ ,
ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any sim ilar conduct that
would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious med ical needs." Domino v. Texas Dept. of

Criminal Justice, supra, 239 F.3d at 756. Accordingly, there is an insuffi cient factual basis fo r
concluding that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's serious medical needs.
In addition to the fo regoing, and as noted above, the plaintiff has not submitted any
opposition in response to the instant motion, has not presented any argument or authority, and has
not directed the Court's attention to documentary evidence on fil e and in the record that refutes the
defendant's assertions or shows that there is a genuine disputed issue of fact regard ing whether the
defendant was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs serious medical needs. Specifically, whereas
the Court entered an Order directing the plaintiff to fil e an opposition to the defendant's motion
w ithin ten days and further directed him to attach documentary exh ibits to his oppos ition and to refer
thereto with specificity and particularity (R. Docs. 172 and 173), the plainti ff has not come forward
and done so within the time allowed. In the context of a mo tion for summary judgment, it is
well-settled that a plaintiff may not rest upon mere allegations or assertions contained in hi s
pleadings in opposing a properly supported motion. Celotex Corp. v. Catrell, supra, 477 U.S. at 324.
In response to such a motion, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [hi s] own
affidavits, or by the ' depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate
'specific fact s showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."' kl. Stated another way, in order to
meet hi s burden of proof, the party opposing a motion for summary judgment "may not sit on its

hands, complacently relying" on conclusory assertions contained in his pleadings.

Weyant v.

Acceptance Insurance Co., 917 F.2d 2 09, 212 (5th C ir. 1990). When a party does not fil e an
opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the Court is permitted to consider the facts presented
in support of the motion as undisputed and may grant summary judgment if the facts s how that the
movant is entitled to judgment in his favor. See Jegart v. Roman Catholic Church Diocese of

Houma- Thibodaux, 384 Fed. Appx. 398, *2 (5th C ir. 201 0). Further, pursuant to Local Rul e 56(b)
of this Court, the plainti ffs failure to oppose the defendant's motion for summary judgment allows
the Court to conclude that all of the facts contained in the defendant's Statement of Uncontested
Material Facts are deemed to be admitted. Accordingly, based upon the foregoing and upon the
plaintiff s fai lure in this case to designate specific evidence in the record of sufficient caliber and
quantity to create a genuine issue for trial, the Court concludes that the defendant's motion is welltaken and that the defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter o f law.

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment of the rema ining defendant in this
case, Dr. Vincent Leggio (R. Doc. 169), be and it is hereby GRANTED, dismi ssing the plaintiff's
claims asserted against thi s defendant, with prejudice, and that this action be dis missed. Judgement
shall be entered accord ingl y.

JAMESJ.BRA
UN ITED STATES DISTRJ CT .JUDGE