Cox v. Columbia Casualty Company et al

Filing 68

RULING: The Court finds that bifurcation under Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is warranted and in the interests of justice and judicial economy to reduce the risk of prejudice and confusion. Defendants 53 and 56 Motions for Se parate Trial are GRANTED. Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Arnold will be tried first. If the jury finds that any of Plaintiffs constitutional rights have been violated or state law intentional torts have been committed against Plaintiff, the tria l will proceed before the same jury with respect to the liability of the municipal Defendants. Plaintiffs 61 Motion to Strike Defense is DENIED. A separate notice will be issued setting this trial for 3/23/2015 through 4/2/2015, with the claims against Defendant Arnold to be decided first in accordance with this opinion. Signed by Judge Shelly D. Dick on 10/28/2014. (SMG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JOHN PAUL COX, JR.
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 12-306-SDD-SCR

VERSUS

COLUMBIA CASUALTY
COMPANY, ET AL.
RULING
This matter is before the Court on the Motions for Separate Trials1 by the
Defendants, Willie Graves, former Sheriff of Livingston Parish, State of Louisiana, Jason
Ard, Sheriff of Livingston Parish, Joel Arnold, and Columbia Casualty Company
(“Defendants”). Plaintiff, John Paul Cox, Jr. (“Plaintiff”), opposes this motion.2 After
consideration of the arguments presented by the parties in this matter, the Court finds that
bifurcation of the trial of Defendant Arnold from the trial of the remaining Defendants would
promote justice and judicial economy under the facts of this case.3
A court may bifurcate a trial “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and
economize” the proceedings.4 “[W]hether to bifurcate a trial ... is always a question
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the court is expected to exercise

1

Rec. Doc. Nos. 53 & 56.

2

Rec. Doc. No. 57.

3

The factual background of this case is well-stated in the Court’s Ruling granting in part and denying in
part the Motions for Summary Judgment filed previously and will not be re-stated in this opinion. Rec.
Doc. No. 42.
4

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 42(b).

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its discretion on a case-by-case basis.5 “[S]eparate trials should be the exception, not the
rule.”6
The primary argument by Defendants in favor of bifurcation is that trying Plaintiff’s
claims against the municipal Defendants with his claims against Defendant Arnold may
result in unfair prejudice against Arnold because evidence that may be admissible against
the municipal Defendants, but may not be admissible against Arnold, would be heard by
the jury in the same trial. Defendants further contend that, if the jury finds Arnold not liable
for the federal claims, the municipal Defendants cannot be liable for those claims as a
matter of law. Defendants also argue that, because the legal standards to be applied by the
jury in the case against Arnold and the municipal Defendants are different, there is a high
risk of jury confusion.
Plaintiff opposes the bifurcation primarily arguing that Defendants ignore the state
law claims against Arnold and the municipal Defendants.

Plaintiff also points to

jurisprudence which disfavors the piecemeal resolution of claims through multiple trials and
contends that bifurcation would be inefficient and uneconomical.
The Court has carefully considered the arguments by all parties in this matter and
has reviewed decisions involving bifurcation with similar fact patterns as this case.
Although the Court is not making any evidentiary rulings in this opinion, it stands to reason
that some evidence might be admitted during the case against the municipal Defendants
that might not be admissible as to Defendant Arnold and would thus be prejudicial to

5

Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett–Packard Co., 791 F.Supp. 113, 114 (E.D.La. 1992).

6

Id.

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Defendant Arnold. The Court also agrees with Defendants that, if the jury finds no liability
as to Arnold for the Section 1983 claims, the municipal Defendants cannot be held liable
under Section 1983 under the facts of this case. “The Supreme Court has explained that
a municipality cannot be liable ‘[i]f a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the
hands of the individual police officer.’”7

While other courts have cautioned that a

municipality may still be liable if the alleged injuries are not “solely attributable to the actions
of named individual defendants,” the Court finds that Plaintiff’s alleged injuries from his
failure-to-train and negligent hiring/retention claims stem solely from the alleged conduct
of Defendant Arnold on the night in question. Nothing in Plaintiff’s Opposition disputes this
contention.
Indeed, Plaintiff is correct that, should the jury find Defendant Arnold liable for the
state law intentional tort claims, the jury may also find the municipal Defendants vicariously
liable for those intentional torts under Louisiana Revised Statute 9:2789.1. However, if the
jury finds that Defendant Arnold is not liable for the state law intentional torts, the immunity
available to the municipal Defendants under La. R.S. 9:2789.1 would preclude a jury finding
to the contrary. For this reason, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defense8 is denied.
The Court believes that bifurcation is appropriate in this case to protect Defendant
Arnold from the potential prejudice that might result if a jury heard evidence regarding the
municipal Defendants’ allegedly unconstitutional policies and/or actions that might be

7

Bustos v. Martini Club, Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 467 (5th Cir. 2010), quoting City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475
U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986). But see Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185, 191 n. 18
(5th Cir.2001) (explaining that a municipality may be liable if a plaintiff states a claim against an official but
the official is protected by qualified immunity).

8

Rec. Doc. No. 61. The Court has considered all arguments relating to this motion.

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inadmissible as to Defendant Arnold. The Court also finds, given the various state and
federal claims asserted and the differing standards associated therewith, that bifurcation
would serve to avoid a strong likelihood of jury confusion.
Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that bifurcation under
Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is warranted and in the interests of
justice and judicial economy to reduce the risk of prejudice and confusion. Defendants’
Motions for Separate Trial9 are GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Arnold will
be tried first. If the jury finds that any of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights have been violated
or state law intentional torts have been committed against Plaintiff, the trial will proceed
before the same jury with respect to the liability of the municipal Defendants.10 Plaintiff’s
Motion to Strike Defense11 is DENIED.

A separate notice will be issued setting this trial

for March 23, 2015 through April 2, 2015, with the claims against Defendant Arnold to be
decided first in accordance with this opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on October 28, 2014.

S
JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

9

Rec. Doc. Nos. 53 & 56.

10

The Court makes no ruling with respect to whether any potential Rule 404(b) evidence may or may not
be admissible at trial against any party. The parties will have the opportunity to file the appropriate
motions at the appropriate time.
11

Rec. Doc. No. 61.

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