Lavigne v. Cajun Deep Foundations, LLC et al

Filing 122

RULING AND ORDER: Plaintiff's request for a judgment in his favor, injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and attorneys' fees and costs is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. All parties shall file memoranda regarding the issue of damages , attorney's fees, and costs, including evidence of prevailing wages and all other relevant considerations, in light of this ruling, on or before 3/04/2015. All motions shall comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules. Signed by Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson on 02/04/2014. (BCL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TERRANCE J. LAVIGNE

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS
CAJUN DEEP FOUNDATIONS, LLC, ET AL.

NO.: 12-00441-BAJ-SCR

RULING AND ORDER

I.

INTRODUCTION
This matter involves allegations of unlawful discrimination on the basis of race

by Defendant Cajun Deep Foundations, LLC (“Cajun Deep”).1 On July 14, 2014, this
matter came before the Court for a non-jury trial on the merits. (Docs. 115, 120.)
Having considered the parties post-trial submissions, the evidence introduced at the
trial, and the arguments presented by counsel, the Court finds that Plaintiff Terrance
J. Lavigne’s (“Lavigne”) has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Cajun
Deep paid him less than similarly situated non-African American employees for
substantially the same job responsibilities, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000, et seq. (“Title VII”) and the Louisiana Employment
Discrimination Law, La. R.S. § 23:301, et seq.

As such, Lavigne is entitled to

compensatory and punitive damages, including back pay. The Court further finds that

1

Named Defendant Cajun Industries, LLC was dismissed by the Court on May 19, 2014, at
Lavigne’s request. (Doc. 87.)

Lavigne failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Cajun Deep treated
him worse than similarly situated non-African American employees following the
February 7, 2011 excavator incident. Accordingly, Lavigne’s disparate treatment claim
must be dismissed.

Accordingly, Lavigne’s request for a judgment in his favor,

injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs is GRANTED
IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law
are set forth below, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 52(a).
II.

JURISDICTION
It is uncontested that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

III.

BACKGROUND
This is an employment discrimination action brought by Lavigne against his

former employer, Cajun Deep, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000, et seq. (“Title VII”) and the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law,
La. R.S. § 23:301, et seq. Lavigne initially filed this lawsuit pro se.2 Lavigne’s
Complaint alleges that Cajun Deep unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis
of his race (African American). Specifically, Lavigne alleges that he was denied
promotional opportunities, treated “less favorably than white male employees who
violated the same or similar policies,” and that he was wrongfully terminated for
alleged violations of company policy. (Doc. 1, pp. 2-3.) Accordingly, Lavigne seeks

2

Lavigne filed his Complaint on July 24, 2012. (Doc. 1.) The Court granted counsel’s motion to
enroll on behalf of Lavigne on February 22, 2013. (Doc. 11.)
2

“injunctive relief,” back pay, damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. (Doc. 1, p. 3.) Cajun
Deep denies all liability. (Doc. 6.)
Prior to trial, Cajun Deep filed a motion for summary judgment. (Docs. 46, 86.)
Lavigne opposed the motion. (Docs. 52, 85.) After careful review of the summary
judgment evidence, the Court granted in part and denied in part Cajun Deep’s motion.
(Doc. 102.) Specifically, the Court dismissed all but three of Lavigne’s claims: (1)
Lavigne’s federal and state law disparate treatment claim that Cajun Deep
discriminated against him when it placed him on a one-year operator’s probation and
suspended him for three days after he struck the girder of the southbound Interstate310 bridge with the boom of an excavator; (2) Lavigne’s federal law disparate
compensation claim that Cajun Deep discriminated against him when it failed to
compensate him at the rate of a supervisor for job number 11-500 in October and
November 2010, and job number 11-527 in January 2011; (3) Lavigne’s federal law
disparate compensation claim that Cajun Deep discriminated against him when it
failed to compensate him at the rate of a supervisor for job number 1-527 in January
2011.
IV.

FINDINGS OF FACT
The following findings of fact are uncontroverted or supported by the evidence

in the record. Where a particular fact was controverted, the Court weighed the
evidence and determined that the evidence presented by the party supporting that fact
was more persuasive.
1.

Lavigne is an African American male.
3

2.

On August 18, 2005, non-party Cajun Constructors, Inc. hired Lavigne as a
Laborer.

3.

In October 2005, Lavigne was promoted to Driller Helper and received a pay
increase to $12.00 per hour.

4.

On October 26, 2006, Lavigne received a promotion to Leadman and received a
pay increase to $16.00 per hour.

5.

In 2007, Lavigne began working for Cajun Deep, was promoted to Drill Shaft
Operator, and received a pay increase to $19.00 per hour.

6.

On June 7, 2009, Lavigne was promoted to Drill Shaft Foreman and received a
pay increase to $20.00 per hour.

7.

Lavigne was promoted four times and received six pay raises in less than four
years of employment with Cajun Deep, and went from working on crews to
supervising employees and drill-only jobs as a Drill Shaft Foreman.

8.

Lavigne was qualified for the position of Drill Shaft Foreman.

9.

Lavigne performed duties above and beyond the position of Drill Shaft Foreman,
including duties assigned to Superintendents.

10.

Shortly after his promotion to Drill Shaft Foreman, Lavigne was given a
company cell phone, an item reserved for Superintendents.

11.

Lavigne used the company cell phone numerous times while performing the
duties of a Job Site or Project Superintendent, including during job numbers 11500 and 11-527.

4

12.

Lavigne was also given a Superintendent’s manual, which contained all of the
duties of a Superintendent.

13.

Lavigne referred to the Superintendent’s manual several times while performing
the duties of a Superintendent, including during job numbers 11-500 and 11527.

14.

On October 11, 2010, Cajun Deep designated Lavigne as the Project
Superintendent for job number 11-500 in Austin, Texas.

15.

Lavigne was notified at the pre-construction meeting with Chris Jacob (“Jacob”),
Drill Shaft Manager, and Gene Landry (“Landry”), General Superintendent,
that he would be the Project Superintendent for job number 11-500.

16.

Job number 11-500 was a large job that lasted approximately thirty days and
involved numerous drill shafts, two work sites, two drilling rigs, and four crew
members.

17.

In addition, Lavigne and his crew were sub-contracted to James Construction,
a Cajun Deep client.

18.

The Pre-Task Forms for job number 11-500 identify Lavigne as Project
Superintendent.

19.

The Work Tickets for job number 11-500 identify Lavigne as Project
Superintendent.

20.

The Final Completion Acceptance form for job number 11-500 identifies Lavigne
as the Project Superintendent.

5

21.

Lavigne performed the duties of a Project Superintendent while working job
number 11-500.

22.

Lavigne’s Project Superintendent duties on job number 11-500 included:
coordinating work tasks and employees; coordinating vendors; maintaining
relationships with contractors; keeping track of employee time and completing
payroll forms; completing expense reports; completing work tickets; completing
and/or reviewing pre-task forms; ensuring employee safety; completing
supervisor investigation reports; operating equipment; maintaining qualitycontrol; and ensuring the job was completed.

23.

The duties that Lavigne performed while working job number 11-500 were the
same or similar to the duties performed by Project Superintendents Seth Gillen
(“Gillen”), Will Rome (“Rome”), Paul Ladner (“Ladner”), Jimmy Boland
(“Boland”), Sharp, and Landry.

24.

Lavigne worked approximately fifty to sixty hours per week on job number 11500.

25.

Despite his designation as the Project Superintendent, and the fact that he
performed duties of a Project Superintendent, Lavigne was paid at the rate of
a Drill-Shaft Foreman ($20.00) for his work on job number 11-500.

26.

Lavigne also worked in the capacity of Project Superintendent on job number
11-527 in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

27.

Lavigne was notified at the pre-construction meeting with Jacob and Landry
that he would be the Project Superintendent for job number 11-527.
6

28.

Job number 11-527 was a drill-and-pour job in which Lavigne was required to
coordinate with concrete vendors.

29.

Job number 11-527 lasted approximately two to three days.

30.

Lavigne performed the duties of a Project Superintendent while working job
number 11-527.

31.

Lavigne’s Project Superintendent duties on job number 11-527 included:
coordinating work tasks and employees; coordinating vendors; maintaining
relationships with contractors; keeping track of employee time and completing
payroll forms; completing expense reports; completing work tickets; completing
and/or reviewing pre-task forms; ensuring employee safety; completing
supervisor investigation reports; operating equipment; maintaining qualitycontrol; and ensuring the job was completed.

32.

The duties that Lavigne performed on job number 11-527 were the same or
similar to those of Gillen, Rome, Ladner, Boland, Sharp, and Landry.

33.

Despite his designation as Project Superintendent, and the fact that he
performed the duties of a Project Superintendent, Lavigne was paid at the rate
of a Drill-Shaft Foreman ($20.00) for his work on job number 11-527.

34.

Lavigne trained Gillen on Cajun Deep’s practices and procedures for Project
Superintendents.

35.

Gillen was paid $1,350.00 per week, or $33.75 per hour, for his work as a Project
Superintendent.

36.

Lavigne performed the same or similar duties as Rome.
7

37.

Rome did not operate equipment or have experience in the field of construction.
Thus, Lavigne supervised the work of Rome during projects to which they were
both assigned.

38.

Lavigne performed the same or similar duties as Ladner.

39.

Lavigne trained Ladner on Cajun Deep’s practices and procedures for Project
Superintendents.

40.

Ladner was paid $1,200.00 per week, or $30 per hour, for his work as a Project
Superintendent.

41.

Lavigne performed the same or similar duties as Boland, who, like Lavigne,
predominantly worked drill-only jobs.

42.

Boland was paid $1,350.00 per week, or $33.75 per hour, for his work as a
Project Superintendent on drill-only jobs.

43.

Lavigne performed the same or similar duties as Sharp.

44.

During the trial, Sharp testified that Lavigne had more responsibilities than
him, and that Lavigne performed more Project Superintendent duties than him.

45.

Sharp was paid $1,650.00 per week, or $41.25 per hour, for his work as a Project
Superintendent.

46.

Lavigne was never promoted to the position of Superintendent.

47.

Cajun Deep benefitted financially from designating Lavigne as the Job Site or
Project Superintendent and compensating him at the rate of $20.00 per hour,
while it received a contract rate well above $20.00 per hour for his work.

8

48.

On or around December 2010, Lavigne and his brother, Romell Lavigne, held a
meeting with Landry to discuss the discriminatory treatment they believed they
had been subjected to because of their race.

49.

At the meeting, Lavigne reported that he and his brother had been subjected to
discriminatory treatment by Gillen when he referred to Lavigne and his brother
in a derogatory manner. Specifically, Lavigne alleged that Gillen called him
and his brother “boys”.

50.

At the meeting, Lavigne and his brother also complained that they were not
being compensated at a rate reflecting their skill and experience.

51.

The December 2010 meeting with Landry occurred two months prior to
Lavigne’s February 2011 disciplinary action.

52.

On February 7, 2011, while navigating (i.e., tracking) an excavator from the
opposite side of the Interstate-310 overpass, Lavigne struck the underside of the
overpass.

53.

Lavigne navigated the excavator with the boom in an elevated position, and
struck the underside of the overpass when he became distracted and forgot to
lower the boom on the excavator..

54.

Even though Lavigne was navigating the excavator at night, in limited light,
with the boom extended, and in a low clearance area, he did not have a flagman
assisting him.

55.

Navigating an excavator without a flagman is against Cajun Deep’s policies and
procedures.
9

56.

Cajun Deep’s policies and procedures prohibit employees from navigating an
excavator unless a flag man is present and assigned.

57.

Lavigne acknowledged this fact and testified that he violated Cajun Deep’s
policies and procedures when he navigated the excavator without a flagman.

58.

Lavigne immediately reported the February 7, 2011 incident to his immediate
supervisor, Johnny White (“White”).

59.

Following an investigation, it was determined that the cause of this incident
was operator error and violation of company policy.

60.

Only minor damage to the bridge occurred as a result of the incident.

61.

No damage to the excavator occurred as a result of the incident.

62.

As a result of this incident, Cajun Deep issued Lavigne a written reprimand and
placed him on one year’s operator probation.

63.

Lavigne alleges that Cajun Deep also suspended him from work for three days,
and that he was not allowed to return to the Job Site during those three days.

64.

However, during the trial, Lavigne testified that he was allowed on the Job Site
the day after his incident.

65.

It is unclear from the record evidence whether Lavigne was prohibited from
working during those three days.

66.

At the time of the incident, Landry was the General Superintendent for Cajun
Deep’s Division. Accordingly, Landry was Lavigne’s General Superintendent at
the time of the incident.

67.

Tom Lehmann (“Lehmann”) was Lavigne’s Project Superintendent on job 1010

596.
68.

Lavigne had been involved in two equipment incidents in the previous twentyfour months at the time of the incident.

69.

On November 10, 2010, Coty Smiley (white male) struck the Interstate-310
overpass bridge with a piece of heavy-equipment while working job 10-596.

70.

Smiley was not subjected to disciplinary action.

71.

Lehmann was also Smiley’s Project Superintendent on job 10-596.

72.

Smiley had been involved in two equipment incidents in the previous twenty
months at the time of the incident.

73.

Smiley continued operating heavy-equipment following the November 10, 2010
incident and was not suspended.

74.

On an unknown date, Lynn Ficklin (“Ficklin”) (white male), scraped a column
of the Interstate-310 overpass bridge with the counterweight of an excavator.

75.

Ficklin was not disciplined for his actions and continued to operate machinery
on job 10-596.

76.

Lehmann was Ficklin’s Project Superintendent on job 10-596.

77.

Ficklin had been involved in one equipment incident in the previous twenty-four
months at the time of the incident.

78.

On January 5, 2011, John Cagle (“Cagle”) (white male) caused damage to a manlift by becoming “complacent during operation” while working job 10-600.

79.

Cagle was not subjected to disciplinary action.

80.

Like Lavigne, Cagle operated the equipment without a flagman.
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81.

Lehmann was one of Cagle’s Project Superintendents within the Pile Driving
Division.

82.

It is unclear from the record evidence whether Lehmann was Cagle’s Project
Superintendent on the date of the incident despite the fact that Cajun Deep
concluded that a proper pre-task plan would have prevented the incident.

83.

On June 4, 2011, Ficklin struck a westbound Interstate-10 overpass with a piece
of heavy-equipment.

84.

Ficklin was not subjected to disciplinary action.

85.

White was Ficklin’s immediate supervisor at the time the incident.

86.

Lehmann was Ficklin’s Project Superintendent at the time the incident.

87.

Ficklin had been involved in two equipment incidents in the previous twentyfour months at the time of the incident.

88.

The damage caused by Ficklin’s June 4, 2011 equipment incident was similar
to the damage caused by Lavigne’s February 7, 2011 equipment incident.

89.

Ficklin continued to operate machinery following this June 4, 2011 equipment
incident and was not subjected to any written discipline or a three-day
suspension.

V.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Title VII prohibits discrimination by employers “against any individual with

respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a).

Under Title VII, an employee can prove discrimination through direct or
12

circumstantial evidence.3 Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F. 3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003),
Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 2000).
A.

LAVIGNE’S DISPARATE COMPENSATION CLAIMS
CONCERNING JOB NUMBER 11-500 IN OCTOBER AND
NOVEMBER 2010, AND JOB NUMBER 11-527 IN JANUARY
2011

To state a prima facie claim for disparate compensation, Lavigne must show that
he was paid less than similarly situated non-African American employees for
substantially the same job responsibilities. Goring v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State
Univ. & Agric. & Mech. College, 414 Fed. Appx. 630, 633 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Taylor
v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 522 (5th Cir. 2008)). Where, as here, a case
has been fully tried on the merits, the Court does not employ the McDonell Douglas
burden shifting framework or whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case.
Smith v. Berry, 165 F.3d 390, 394 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Vaughn v. Sabine County,
104 Fed. Appx. 980, 982 (5th Cir. 2004). Rather, the Court determines whether the
record as a whole contains sufficient evidence to support a finding of unlawful
discrimination against the plaintiff. Id. At all times, the burden of proof rests with the
plaintiff. See Ray v. Iuka Special Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 51 F.3d 1246, 1249 (5th
Cir. 1995).
Here, the Court finds that Lavigne has met his burden of proof. The record
evidence shows that, despite performing the duties of a Project Superintendent for job
3

Employment discrimination claims under Title VII and the Louisiana Employment
Discrimination Law are analyzed under the same standard. Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 383
F.3d 309, 316 (5th Cir. 2004); Turner v. Kan. City Southern Ry. Co., 675 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 2012);
Knapper v. Hibernia Nat’l Bank, 49 So. 3d 898, 902 n.11 (La. Ct. App. 2010).
13

numbers 11-500 and 11-527, Lavigne was paid at the rate of a Drill Shaft Foreman,
and not at the rate of a Superintendent. Indeed, Cajun Deeps’s internal documents,
including Pre-Task Forms, Work Tickets, and Final Completion Acceptance Forms, all
identify Lavigne as the “Project Superintendent” for job numbers 11-500 and 11-527.
Yet, unlike white employees who served at the “Project Superintendent,” Lavigne was
paid at the rate of a Drill Shaft Foreman, and not at the rate of a Superintendent.
According to Lavigne’s unrefutted testimony, Lavigne received both a
Superintendent’s manual and a company cell phone, equipment that was only issued
to Superintendents. Lavigne also performed all of the duties of Project Superintendent
while working job numbers 11-500 and 11-527, including coordinating work tasks and
employees; coordinating vendors; maintaining relationships with contractors; keeping
track of employee time and completing payroll forms; completing expense reports;
completing work tickets; completing and/or reviewing pre-task forms; ensuring
employee safety; completing supervisor investigation reports; operating equipment;
maintaining quality-control; and ensuring the job was completed. Based on the
evidence presented at trial, the Court concludes that Lavigne’s job responsibilities
during job numbers 11-500 and 11-527 were substantially the same job responsibilities
as Superintendents who were compensated at a higher rate.
Further, the Court rejects Cajun Deep’s contention that Lavigne is not similarly
situated to non-African American Superintendents who were paid more because he
worked drill-only jobs, and not drill-and-pour jobs. However, the Fifth Circuit has
noted that “nearly identical” is not synonymous with “identical” because total identity
14

would be essentially insurmountable. Lee v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co., 574
F.3d 253, 259-61 (5th Cir. 2009). Instead, the employment actions being compared will
be deemed to have been taken under nearly identical circumstances when the
employees being compared: (1) held the same job or responsibilities; (2) shared the
same supervisor or had their employment status determined by the same person; and
(3) have essentially comparable violation histories. Id. at 260 (internal citations
omitted).
Further, the Fifth Circuit has made clear that “there is no precise formula to
determine whether an individual is similarly situated to comparators.” Lindquist v.
City of Pasadena, 669 F.3d 225, 233 (5th Cir. 2012). Rather, the “similarly situated”
inquiry “depend[s] substantially on the facts and context of the case,” “is case-specific,”
and “requires [the court] to consider ‘the full variety of factors that an objectively
reasonable . . . decisionmaker would have found relevant in making the challenged
decision.’” Id. at 233-34 (quoting Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1203 (11th
Cir. 2007)). See also Jennings, 383 F.3d at 1214 (“the degree to which others are
viewed as similarly situated depends substantially on the facts and context of the
case.”).
Given the facts and context of this case, including the job responsibilities of
Superintendents on drill-only versus drill-and-pour jobs, the Court finds that Lavigne
is similarly situated to non-African American Superintendents who were paid more for
their work on drill-only and drill-and-pour jobs. Indeed, the evidence shows that
Lavigne held the same job or responsibilities as his comparators, shared the same
15

immediate supervisor or General Superintendent with many, if not all, of his
comparators, and had demonstrated the same if not additional skills and experience
as his comparators, as demonstrated by the unrefutted fact that he trained at least two
of them.
In sum, the Court concludes that Lavigne has proven by a preponderance of the
evidence that he was paid less than similarly situated non-African American
employees for substantially the same job responsibilities. Accordingly, judgment in his
favor as to this claim is warranted.
B.

LAVIGNE’S DISPARATE TREATMENT CLAIM BASED ON
EMPLOYMENT ACTIONS TAKEN AFTER HE STRUCK THE
GIRDER OF THE SOUTHBOUND INTERSTATE-310
BRIDGE WITH THE BOOM OF AN EXCAVATOR

Disparate treatment discrimination addresses employment actions that treat an
employee worse than others based on the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. See Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 787 (internal citations omitted). In such
disparate treatment cases, proof and finding of discriminatory motive is required. Id.
It is well established that Lavigne’s burden of proof in disparate treatment cases is to
identify similarly situated employees whose circumstances, including their misconduct,
was “nearly identical” to Lavigne. See Perez v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, Inst.
Div., 395 F.3d 206, 213 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Little v. Republic Ref. Co., 924 F.2d 93,
97 (5th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, 891 F.2d 1177, 1180 (5th Cir. 1990)).
First, the Court concludes that Lavigne failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that he was suspended for three days following the February 7, 2011 incident.

16

Indeed, according to Lavigne’s testimony at trial, he was permitted on the Job Site the
day after the incident. Thus, Lavigne failed to introduce evidence that he was
prohibited from working for three days. Accordingly, Lavigne’s claim shall be limited
to his allegation that similarly situated non-African American employees were not
placed on operator’s probation following nearly identical situations.
Based on the evidence in the record, the Court concludes that Lavigne failed to
identify similarly situated employees whose conduct was nearly identical to his.
Indeed, the evidence shows that Smiley’s November 10, 2010 incident was the result
of mechanical failure, and not his violation of company policy or operator fault.
Moreover, Lavigne’s self-serving testimony that Smiley’s incident was not the result
of mechanical failure, but rather the result of operator fault, is insufficient. Lavigne
failed to produce any tangible countervailing evidence of operator error. Further, the
evidence shows that Smiley had a different immediate supervisor (i.e., Lehmann) than
Lavigne (i.e., White) at the time of the incident.
Additionally, the record evidence fails to establish that Lavigne is similarly
situated to Ficklin or Cagle. Indeed, it is undisputed that Ficklin’s incident occurred
on a different job (11-519 versus 10-596), that Ficklin worked for a different division
of Cajun Deep (i.e., Pile Driving Division versus Drilling Division). Moreover, it is not
clear that Ficklin was at fault for the incident (i.e., failure to prepare a pre-task plan)
as Lavigne failed to produce such evidence. As it relates to Cagle, Lavigne did present
evidence that Cagle caused damage to machinery while working job 10-600, but he
failed to introduce sufficient evidence that he and Cagle had the same or similar
17

responsibilities at the time of the accident. Lavigne also failed to demonstrate that
he and Cagle were under the supervision of the same Project Superintendent when
their respective accidents occurred (i.e., Dennis Dozier versus Tom Lehmann).
Moreover, Cagle and Lavigne did not have the same accident or violation history.
Cagle’s accident on January 5, 2011, was his only accident during the previous twentyfour months, while Lavigne’s accident on February 7, 2011, was his second accident
during the previous twenty-four months. Accordingly, Lavigne has failed to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that he is similarly situated to Smiley, Ficklin, or
Cagle.
In sum, the Court finds that Lavigne has failed to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that Cajun Deep treated him worse than similarly situated non-African
American employees.

Accordingly, judgment in Lavigne’s favor on this basis is

unwarranted.
D.

DAMAGES

The Court notes that despite presenting evidence to support a request for
emotional damages, Lavigne failed to include such request in his Complaint; nor did
Lavigne amend his amend his Complaint to request such once he retained counsel.
See Doc. 1, p. 3. Accordingly, Lavigne’s request for emotional damages must be denied.
V.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the Court finds that Lavigne has proven by a preponderance of the

evidence that he was paid less than a similarly situated non-African American
employees for substantially the same job responsibilities during job numbers 11-500
18