Dominick v. Barrere et al

Filing 163

RULING denying 154 MOTION for New Trial and Alternative Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. Signed by Judge James J. Brady on 6/23/2015. (LLH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DONALD DOMINICK
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 12-497-JJB
TODD BARRERE, ET AL.
RULING
The Motion for a New Trial and, in the alternative, a Renewed Motion for Judgment as a
Matter of Law (doc. 154) was filed with this Court on behalf of Defendants, Todd Barrere and
Patrick Cochran. All responsive briefs have been considered.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Motion for New Trial
It is within the “sound discretion of the trial court” to determine whether to grant or deny
a motion for new trial. Pryor v. Trane Co., 138 F.3d 1024, 1026 (5th Cir.1998). Although the
rule does not specify the exact grounds for granting a new trial, Rule 59(a) allows a court to
grant a new trial if it “finds the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the damages
awarded are excessive, the trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was committed in its course.” See
Smith v. Transworld Co., 773 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir.1985) (citing Reed Bros., Inc. v. Monsato
Co., 525 F.2d 486, 499–50 (8th Cir.1975)).
Ultimately, the court must view the evidence in “a light most favorable to the jury's
verdict, and the verdict must be affirmed unless the evidence points so strongly and
overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the court believes that reasonable persons could not
arrive at a contrary conclusion.” Dawson v. Wal–Mart Stores, 978 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir.1992)
(citing Jones v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 870 F.2d 982, 987 (5th Cir.1989)).

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B. Application
Defendants cite two grounds in support of their motion for new trial: (1) legal error
during trial and (2) jury passion and error (doc. 154-1, at 1).
As to the legal error, Defendants urge that the Court erred in refusing to give the
Defendants’ affirmative defense of qualified immunity in the jury charges and verdict form. Id.
Once the qualified immunity defense is pled, the Plaintiff’s burden is to rebut the defense in a
two-step process. First, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff must
show that Defendants’ conduct violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Whether there was
excessive force used in violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights was presented to the
jury, who found that Defendants did use excessive force. Second, the Plaintiff must show that the
Defendants’ actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time
of the violation. Defendants agree about the clarity of the law as it relates to the second factor in
that the use of excessive force violates the Eight Amendment if it is applied maliciously or
sadistically. Id. at 2-3.
The jury found that there was a constitutional violation due to the use of excessive force,
and all parties agree that the law was clearly established at the time of the incident. If the issue of
qualified immunity is not resolved before the trial, the Court may submit the defense to the jury
to determine the objective legal reasonableness of official’s conduct by construing facts in
dispute. Porter v. Epps, 659 F. 3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. Sept. 28, 2011). In light of the clearly
established law and the fact that the jury was presented with the question of whether there was a
constitutional violation by use of excessive force, the Court did not commit legal error in
choosing not to include additional instruction on the defense of qualified immunity. Defendants
cite to Waganfeald v. Gusman, 674 F.3d 475, 483-84 (5th Cir. 2012) as standing for the

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proposition that the trial court must send the question of qualified immunity to jury if the matter
is not decided before trial. However, this argument is unconvincing. The case is not only
factually distinct from that before this Court, but the information about necessarily sending the
qualified immunity issue to the jury is simply dicta.
As to jury passion and error, Defendants assert the following: (1) the $2,500
compensatory damages award was excessive; (2) the jury’s verdict resulted from passion and
prejudice; (3) the jury’s verdict concerning the use of force is fatally inconsistent; (4) the verdict
on liability is against the weight of the evidence; (5) the punitive damages award is clearly
excessive (doc. 154-1, at 1-2). As Defendants note, a number of Plaintiff’s witnesses changed
their testimony in trial from what they had previously asserted in various formats to the Plaintiff.
The anticipated testimony before trial was in favor of Plaintiff. The Defendants do not make a
clear argument for how Plaintiff’s witnesses changing their testimony to no longer support the
Plaintiff’s allegations somehow caused prejudice to the Defendants. The Defendant has not
supported its argument and therefore not satisfied its burden for a new trial with regard to the
following asserted grounds for a new trial: jury passion and prejudice, inconsistent verdict
concerning the use of force, and verdict of liability is against the weight of the evidence. The
Court denied granting a new trial on these grounds.
As to jury passion and error, the two remaining arguments asserted by Defendant
surround the amount of damages, both compensatory and punitive, found by the jury.
Defendants argue that the award of $2,500 for compensatory damages is legally excessive, as in
it “shocks the conscience.” Defendants note that compensatory damages cannot be awarded for a
violation of a right absent proof of actual injuries (doc. 154-1, at 9). Defendants continue by
restating the injuries complained of and observed when Plaintiff was taken to the Assessment

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and Triage Unit on the day of the incident. After stating the injuries, Defendants simply conclude
that the injuries resulted from a prior fight with a Corrections Officer. Id. at 10. The jury is the
finder of facts and they were left with the question of whether Defendants used excessive force.
Additionally, after finding excessive force was used, the jury was left to define the amount of
damages that would compensate Plaintiff’s injuries. Defendants’ argument falls far below its
burden to show that the evidence points so strongly in favor of one party that the court finds the
jury’s verdict or damages unreasonable. The Defendants argument for a new trial based on
excessive compensatory damages is denied.
With regard to awarding actual damages, the jury need not consider actual damages.
Instead, as the Defendants notes, the jury may award punitive damages for a violation of a
plaintiff’s constitutional rights only when a defendant’s conduct is motivated by evil intent or
demonstrates reckless or callous indifference to a person’s constitutional rights. In considering
whether the punitive damages are excessive, the Court is to consider (1) the degree of
reprehensibility, (2) the disparity between harm suffered (compensatory damages) and the
punitive damages awarded, and (3) the possible sanctions comparable conduct. BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (1996).
Reprehensibility is the factor that is the strongest to consider. Defendants argue that there
was no evidence of reckless indifference toward Plaintiff’s constitutional rights because there
was no evidence of deceit or a cover-up, but instead they were simply doing their duty as
Correctional Officers (doc. 154-1, at 11). This argument is simply an attempt to argue with the
jury’s finding that excessive force, beyond the duty of a Correctional Officer was used. The lack
of evidence of a cover-up does not mean the jury was unable to find that actions reprehensible.
With regard to the ratio between compensatory damages of $2,500 and punitive damages of

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$2,500, the Defendants argue that the punitive damages were excessive based on the Defendants’
actions having been taken in good faith (doc. 154-1, at 12). The jury has already considered and
disregarded this argument in finding that the Defendants used excessive force in violation of
Plaintiff’s Eight Amendment right. Third, Defendants point this Court’s attention to state laws
imposing civil and criminal penalties as indicative of what amount of damages would not have
been excessive (doc. 154-1, at 14). Defendants cite to Louisiana law on simple assault and
simple battery where the civil penalties range from $200-$1,000. What state law permits as a
civil penalty for the offense of simple battery and simple assault does not define what is or is not
excessive for punitive damages with regard to a violation of one’s Eighth Amendment right
protecting from excessive force. Again, Defendants’ arguments do not satisfy the high burden for
this Court granting a new trial on the matter of punitive damages awarded.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that Defendants did not carry their burden in demonstrating why a new
trial should be granted. Similarly, for the reasons stated above, the Court also does not find that
Defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion (doc.
154) for a New Trial, or alternatively for a Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law is DENIED.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on June 23, 2015.

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JUDGE JAMES J. BRADY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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