Offord v. Lane et al
Filing
98
RULING and ORDER granting in part and denying in part 66 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Offords request that the Court preclude Defendants from asserting the Faragher/Ellerth defense in an attempt to avoid liability for Gerald R. Lanes acts i s GRANTED. Defendants are PRECLUDED from asserting the Faragher/Ellerth defense in response to Offords allegations regarding the acts of Gerald R. Lane. Offords request that the Court preclude Defendants from asserting the Faragher/Ellerth defense in an attempt to avoid liability for the acts of other employees is DENIED. Signed by Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson on 9/15/2014. (SMG)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JUSTIN OFFORD
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
GERALD LANE, ET AL.
NO.: 12-00524-BAJ-SCR
RULING AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Justin Offord’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (Doc. 66), filed by Plaintiff Justin Offord (“Offord”), seeking an order from
this Court granting him summary judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56, and precluding Defendants Gerry Lane Enterprises, Inc. and Eric Lane1
(collectively “Defendants”) from asserting the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense.2
Defendants oppose the motion.
(Doc. 69.)
Oral argument is not necessary.
Jurisdiction is proper, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the reasons stated herein,
Offord’s motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I.
Background
Offord filed this employment discrimination lawsuit pursuant to Title VII of the
Civil rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000, et seq. (“Title VII”), the Louisiana
Employment Discrimination Law, La. R.S. § 23:301, et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
1
Following Defendant Gerald R. Lane’s May 2013 death, Defendant Eric Lane was named as a
Defendant in his capacity as the Representative of the Succession of Gerald R. Lane. (Doc. 48.)
2
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742 (1998).
Offord alleges that Defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his race,
national origin, and sex and constructively discharged him from his sales
representative position at Gerry Lane Chevrolet in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
Specifically, Offord alleges that dealership owner, Gerald R. Lane, and others created
a hostile work environment in which Offord was subjected to discriminatory comments,
name-calling, abusive language, intimidation, lewd comments and advances, and
unwelcome physical contact. Offord further alleges that Defendants are liable for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault and battery. According to
Offord, Defendants also retaliated against him in response to his complaints of
unlawful discrimination.
As to the instant motion, Offord seeks an order from this Court precluding
Defendants from asserting the Faragher/Ellerth defense in an attempt to avoid
vicarious liability for the alleged bad acts of its supervisors who acted as the
Company’s proxy. Offord also contends that Defendants cannot point to sufficient
evidence to establish either prong of the two-prong Faragher/Ellerth defense. Thus,
Offord argues that Defendants must be precluded from asserting the defense.
Defendants contend that Offord’s motion was filed after the deadline for
dispositive motions. Thus, Defendants argue that it must be dismissed as untimely.
Alternatively, Defendants concede that they are precluded from asserting the
Faragher/Ellerth defense in response to Offord’s allegations regarding the acts of
Gerald R. Lane. Defendants argue, however, that the Faragher/Ellerth defense does
not apply to the only other bad actor identified by Offord, Wayne Garafola (“Garafola”),
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because Garafolo was not a supervisor. Accordingly, Defendants argue that the
Faragher/Ellerth defense is inapplicable, and Offord’s motion for partial summary
judgment must be denied.
II.
Standard of Review
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56, “[t]he court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). A party moving for summary judgment must inform the Court of the basis
for the motion and identify those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, that show that
there is no such genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323 (1986).
If the moving party carries its burden of proof under Rule 56, the opposing party
must direct the court’s attention to specific evidence in the record which demonstrates
that the non-moving party can satisfy a reasonable jury that it is entitled to a verdict
in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). This burden is
not satisfied by some metaphysical doubt as to alleged material facts, by unsworn and
unsubstantiated assertions, by conclusory allegations, or by a mere scintilla of
evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). Rather, Rule
56 mandates that summary judgment be entered against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323;
3
Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d at 1075.
In determining whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment, the court
views facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draws all reasonable
inferences in the non-movant’s favor. Coleman v. Houston Independent School District,
113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997). The court may not evaluate the credibility of
witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes. International Shortstop,
Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1059
(1992). However, if the evidence in the record is such that a reasonable jury, drawing
all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, could arrive at a verdict in that party’s
favor, the court must deny the motion for summary judgment. International Shortstop,
Inc., 939 F.2d at 1263.
III.
Analysis
A.
Timeliness
Defendants argue that Offord’s motion must be dismissed as untimely because
it was filed after the dispositive motion deadline. Pursuant to the Court’s Corrected
Amended Scheduling Order, dispositive motions were required to be “filed by January
20, 2014.” (Doc. 61, p. 2) (emphasis in original). Offord filed the instant motion on
January 21, 2014 - one day after the deadline. Offord did not request nor obtain an
extension of time in which to file the instant motion.
Rule 6 specifies the method for computing time when a deadline is stated in
terms of hours, days, or a longer unit of time. The rule provides that if the last day of
the time period falls on “a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period continues to
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run until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C). January 20, 2014 was a federal holiday (Birthday of Martin
Luther King, Jr.). However, as pointed out in the advisory committee notes to the 2009
amendments to Rule 6, “[t]he time-computation provisions of subdivision (a) apply only
when a time period must be computed. They do not apply when a fixed time to act is
set. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), advisory committee notes. Thus, Rule 6(a) is inapplicable here
because the Court specified a date certain for the filing of dispositive motions. Miller
v. City of Ithaca, No. 3:10-cv-597, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63433, at *4-5 (N.D.N.Y May
4, 2012); Murphy v. Auto Advantage, Inc., No. 1:11cv11, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2396,
at * (W.D.N.C. Jan. 6, 2012).
Nevertheless, the Court finds that Offord’s motion was timely.
It is the
longstanding policy of this Court to set dates certain that do not fall on weekends or
legal holidays. See, e.g., Doc. 61, p. 2 (resetting a trial date because the original date
fell on a federal holiday). As such, the Court concludes that the setting of the
dispositive motion deadline on January 20, 2014, a legal holiday as defined by Rule
6(a)(6), was an oversight. Accordingly, the undersigned hereby amends the scheduling
order to set January 21, 2014 as the final day for filing dispositive motions. Under the
revised scheduling order, Offord’s motion is timely. JLM Advanced Tech. Servs. v. Int’l
Paper Co., No. CV410-218, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36695, at *2-3 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 4,
2011).
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B.
Whether Defendants Are Precluded From Asserting the
Faragher/Ellerth Defense
Upon review of Offord’s motion, the Court finds that the motion, as well as the
arguments made in support of and in opposition to the motion, are substantially
similar to the motion for partial summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Eric Angeletti
(“Angeletti”) in Civil Action No. 12-00503-BAJ-SCR, as well as the arguments made in
support of and in opposition to Angeletti’s motion.3 Indeed, Defendants concede that
they are precluded from asserting the Faragher/Ellerth defense in response to
Angeletti’s allegations regarding the acts of Gerald R. Lane because he was a proxy for
the Company. (Doc. Doc. 69, pp. 7-8.) Further, both Offord and Defendants point the
Court to evidence that is substantially similar to the evidence presented in support of
and in opposition to Angeletti’s argument that Defendants cannot point to sufficient
evidence to establish either prong of the two-prong Faragher/Ellerth defense.4
IV.
Conclusion
Accordingly,
For the reasons stated in the Court’s Ruling and Order5 granting in part and
denying in part Angeletti’s motion for partial summary judgment ;
3
See Civil Action No. 12-00503-BAJ-SCR, Eric Angeletti v. Gerald Lane, et al., R. Docs. 57, 61,
79.
4
In opposition to the instant motion, Defendants also argue that the instant motion must be
denied because the Faragher/Ellerth defense is inapplicable to Garafolo, who lacks supervisory status.
Without considering whether Garafolo was a supervisory employee, the Court notes that such dispute
is an additional dispute of material fact that precludes summary judgment in favor of Offord.
5
See Civil Action No. 12-00503-BAJ-SCR, Eric Angeletti v. Gerald Lane, et al., R. Doc. 102.
6
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff Justin Offord’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (Doc. 66) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
•
Offord’s request that the Court preclude Defendants from asserting the
Faragher/Ellerth defense in an attempt to avoid liability for Gerald R.
Lane’s acts is GRANTED. Accordingly, Defendants are PRECLUDED
from asserting the Faragher/Ellerth defense in response to Offord’s
allegations regarding the acts of Gerald R. Lane.
•
Offord’s request that the Court preclude Defendants from asserting the
Faragher/Ellerth defense in an attempt to avoid liability for the acts of
other employees is DENIED.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 15th day of September, 2014.
______________________________________
BRIAN A. JACKSON, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
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