Harmason v. Lane et al

Filing 67

RULING AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 53 Motion for Summary Judgment. Counsel for Plaintiff Tonya Harmason is admonished for her failure to comply with the Local Rules of this Court. Counsel is reminded of her obligation to familiarize herself with the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, and to file pleadings that comply with such Rules. See L.R. 83.2.8. Signed by Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson on 11/03/2014. (NLT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TONYA HARMASON

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS
GERALD LANE, ET AL.

NO.: 12-00530-BAJ-SCR

RULING AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 53),
filed by Defendants Gerry Lane Enterprises, Inc. and Eric Lane1 (collectively
“Defendants”), seeking an order from this Court granting summary judgment, pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and dismissing Plaintiff Tonya Harmason’s
claims.2

Harmason opposes the motion.

(Doc. 56.)

Defendants filed a reply

memorandum. (Doc. 65.) Oral argument is not necessary. Jurisdiction is proper,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
In support of the motion, Defendants argue that Harmason is precluded from
alleging federal or state law discrimination claims against individual supervisors, i.e.
Gerald R. Lane. Defendants further argue that Harmason cannot point to sufficient

1

Defendant Eric Lane is named as a Defendant in his capacity as the Representative of the
Succession of Gerald R. Lane. (Doc. 50.)
2

Defendants Chubb Insurance Company and Federal Insurance Company did not join
Defendants Gerry Lane Enterprises, Inc. and Eric Lane; nor did Defendants Chubb Insurance Company
and Federal Insurance Company file a separate motion for summary judgment.

evidence to establish her discrimination claims on the basis of her national origin, race,
or sex. Defendants also contend that Harmason cannot point to sufficient evidence to
establish her state law intentional infliction of emotional distress, battery, or unpaid
wages claims.
The Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Louisiana require a party opposing a motion to file a memorandum in opposition within
twenty-one days of the motion. L.R. 7.4. Here, Defendants filed their motion for
summary judgment on March 3, 2014. (Doc. 53.) Thus, Harmason’s deadline to file a
memorandum in opposition was March 24, 2014.
Harmason did not file a memorandum in opposition by the deadline. Instead, she
filed a one-page opposition on June 23, 2014, ninety-one days after the deadline. (Doc.
56.) Harmason did not seek leave of Court to file an out-of-time opposition; nor did she
attempt to explain why she failed to file her opposition by the deadline. As such,
Harmason’s opposition is untimely and shall not be considered by the Court.
Further, even if the Court were to consider Harmason’s grossly untimely
opposition, such opposition does not meet the requirements set out in the Local Rules
of this Court. As noted, in opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
Harmason filed a one-page document entitled, “Plaintiff Tonya Harmason[’s] Opposition
to Defendants[’] Motion for Summary Judgement.”

(Doc. 56.)

In her one-page

opposition, Harmason contends that Defendants motion should be denied because:
1.

Plaintiff has established a hostile work environment [sic];

2

2.

Plaintiff was unlawfully discriminated against because of her sex,
female, and race, African American [sic];

3.

Plaintiff was assaulted, battered and emotionally distressed by
Defendants; [and]

4.

Plaintiff was denied the opportunity to earn wages.

Doc. 56. However, Harmason failed to submit a memorandum in support of her
opposition, in contravention of the Local Rules of this Court. See L.R. 7.4. Further,
Harmason failed to submit a statement of the material facts as to which there exits a
genuine issue to be tried, in contravention of the Local Rules of this Court. See L.R.
56.2.
Additionally, Harmason failed to point to any evidence in the record to establish
genuine disputes of material fact as to her claims. As a result of her failure, the Court
is left to conduct its analysis based solely on the general allegations made in
Harmason’s complaint and the conclusory statements made in her one-page opposition
to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
It is axiomatic that general allegations and conclusory statements are insufficient
to defeat summary judgment. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.
1994) (holding that even at the summary judgment stage, the court will not “in the
absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the
necessary facts”); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986)
(requiring the nonmoving party to present affirmative evidence to defeat a properly
supported motion for summary judgment). Indeed, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56
mandates that summary judgment be entered against a party who fails to make a
3

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d at 1075.
In sum, Harmason’s opposition is grossly untimely, and thus, shall not be
considered by the Court. Further, even if the Court were to consider Harmason’s
untimely opposition, such opposition is wholly inadequate to defeat summary judgment.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants Gerry Lane Enterprises, Inc. and Eric Lane’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 53) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
IN PART.3
•

Defendants’ request that the Court dismiss Harmason’s federal and state
law discrimination claims against Gerald R. Lane, or any other individual
supervisor or fellow employee, is GRANTED.4 Accordingly, Harmason’s
federal and state law discrimination claims against Gerald R. Lane, or any
other individual supervisor or fellow employee, are DISMISSED.

3

Employment discrimination claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Louisiana
Employment Discrimination Law are analyzed under the same standard. Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid
Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 316 (5th Cir. 2004); Turner v. Kan. City Southern Ry. Co., 675 F.3d 887, 891 (5th
Cir. 2012); Knapper v. Hibernia Nat’l Bank, 49 So. 3d 898, 902 n.11 (La. Ct. App. 2010). Accordingly, the
Court’s ruling and order shall apply to Harmason’s claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the
Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law.
4

The Court notes that Harmason failed to present any argument or point to any evidence in
opposition to Defendants’ request. Further, it is well established that relief under federal and state law
discrimination law is only available against an employer, and not against an individual supervisor or
fellow employee. Umoren v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 457 F. Appx. 422, 425 (5th Cir. 2012); Mitchell v.
Tracer Construction Co., et al., 256 F. Supp. 2d 520, 525 (M.D. La. 2003); see also La. R.S. 23:303(A).
4

•

Defendants’ request that the Court dismiss Harmason’s claim that she
was subjected to a hostile work environment on the basis of her national
origin is GRANTED.5 Accordingly, Harmason’s hostile work environment
claim on the basis of her national origin is DISMISSED.

•

Defendants’ request that the Court dismiss Harmason’s claim that she
was subjected to a hostile work environment on the basis of her race is
GRANTED. Accordingly, Harmason’s hostile work environment claim on
the basis of her race is DISMISSED.

•

Defendants’ request that the Court dismiss Harmason’s claim that she
was subjected to a hostile work environment on the basis of her sex is
GRANTED. Accordingly, Harmason’s hostile work environment claim on
the basis of her sex is DISMISSED.

•

Defendants’ request that the Court dismiss Harmason’s claim that she
was unlawfully terminated on the basis of her race is GRANTED.
Accordingly, Harmason’s discriminatory discharge claim on the basis of
her race is DISMISSED.

•

Defendants’ request that the Court dismiss Harmason’s claim that she
was unlawfully terminated on the basis of her sex is GRANTED.
Accordingly, Harmason’s discriminatory discharge claim on the basis of
her sex is DISMISSED.

5

The Court notes that Harmason failed to present any argument or point to any evidence in
opposition to Defendants’ request.
5