Gopalam v. Smith et al

Filing 14

RULING granting 3 Mayor Barney Arceneaux's Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge James J. Brady on 1/2/2013. (JDL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
GOPINATH GOPALAM
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 12-542-JJB
CITY OF GONZALES, THROUGH
MAYOR BARNEY ARCENEAUX, ET AL
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by Defendant Mayor Barney Arceneaux (“Mayor Arceneaux”). (Doc.
3). Plaintiff Gopinath Gopalam (“Gopalam”) has filed an opposition (Doc. 11), to which Mayor
Arceneaux has filed a reply. (Doc. 13). Oral argument is not necessary. The Court’s jurisdiction
exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the reasons herein, the Court GRANTS the motion to
dismiss. (Doc. 3).
I.
This action arises from an incident on or about September 1, 2011, when several of the
named defendants allegedly burglarized Gopalam’s place of business, destroying physical
property and destroying and/or stealing protected health information, computer and electronic
data, financial records, and associated devices, such as computer hardware. (Doc. 1). Gopalam
alleges that during the burglary, members of the City of Gonzales Police Department, acting
under color of law, aided and abetted the burglary and theft. Gopalam has instituted a 42 U.S.C §
1983 action against the defendants, alleging that the defendants were acting in concert to deprive
Gopalam of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments rights. Gopalam has further asserted that the
City of Gonzales and/or the Gonzales Police Department “developed and maintained policies or
customs exhibiting deliberate indifference” to citizens’ constitutional rights, which in turn,
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caused Gopalam’s rights to be violated. (Doc. 1 at 14). Moreover, Gopalam asserts claims for
municipal liability, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In Gopalam’s complaint, Gopalam alleges that Mayor Arceneaux “at all time [sic] times
material and relevant herein, [held] executive authority over the City of Gonzales and/or the
Gonzales City Police Department.” (Doc. 1 at 6-7).
Mayor Arceneaux has filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that pursuant to Louisiana law, he is not the employer of the police
officers of the Gonzales Police Department, and therefore, cannot be held responsible for their
alleged tortious actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior. (Doc. 3). Mayor Arceneaux
asserts that because Gonzales is a Lawrason Act municipality, it is subject to the requirements of
La. R.S. § 33:31, et seq. Under La. R.S. § 33:404(A)(1) and (3), a mayor’s duties are to
“supervise and direct the administration and operation of all municipal departments, offices, and
agencies, other than a police department with an elected chief of police” and “to appoint and
remove municipal employees, other than the employees of a police department with an elected
chief of police.” Because the Lawrason Act expressly excludes police department employees
from the Mayor’s authority, Mayor Arceneaux asserts that he cannot be held liable for the
alleged tortious acts of the defendant police officers.
Mayor Arceneaux points to Clark v. McGee, 625 So.2d 311, 312 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1993),
in which the court found that the plaintiff, a police officer, was an employee of the town, and the
mayor was neither an employee of the town nor the plaintiff’s employer. The court found that the
mayor was an officer of the town and therefore, an officer of the plaintiff’s employer. Id. at 313.
Additionally, Mayor Arceneaux cites Rider v. Ambeau, 07-681 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/21/07); 2007
WL 4465644 *4, in which the court found that the Lawrason Act “neither creates an employment

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cause of action against those officers nor renders them ‘employers’ under Louisiana law.” Mayor
Arceneaux argues that while the City of Gonzales, as the police officers’ employer, can be held
liable for any alleged tortious acts of the officers, he, as the mayor, cannot.
In Gopalam’s opposition, Gopalam argues that Mayor Arceneaux’s assertions are not
supported by Louisiana jurisprudence interpreting the Lawrason Act. (Doc. 11). Although the
Lawrason Act provides that the mayor does not have the power to appoint and remove
employees of a police department, the Act provides that the chief of police “shall make
recommendations to the mayor . . . for appointment of police personnel, for the promotion of
officers, to effect disciplinary action, and for dismissal of police personnel.” La. R.S. 33:423(A).
Gopalam asserts that while on their face, the statutory provisions cited by Mayor
Arceneaux would suggest that he cannot be held liable, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision
in Grant v. Grace, 2003-2021 (La. 4/14/04); 870 So.2d 1011, 1016, leads to an opposite
conclusion. In Grant, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the holdings of two Louisiana
appellate decisions, which previously held that “the specific recommendation of termination or
approval of the police chief is a prerequisite to the municipality’s ability to terminate peace
officers.” Id. (citing Lee v. Grimmer, 99-2196 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/00); 775 So.2d 1223, and
Thibodeaux v. Hernandez, 97-602 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/29/97); 702 So.2d 1157). Gopalam asserts
that the court’s decision in Grant demonstrates that the mayor has the authority to supervise or
direct the operation of the police department.
Gopalam then argues that because the mayor has authority to supervise or direct the
operation of the police department, the mayor has “final policy making authority,” which would
render Mayor Arceneaux liable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. See Gelin v. Housing Authority of
New Orleans, 456 F.3d 525, 527 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that a “single decision by an official can

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be grounds for Section 1983 liability where the decision was rendered by an individual with
‘final policy making authority’”). Gopalam contends that Mayor Arceneaux is arguing that he
cannot be held liable because he lacks “final policy making authority,” but the Louisiana
Supreme Court’s ruling in Grant indicates otherwise. Thus, Gopalam asserts, because Mayor
Arceneaux had the authority to “hire, discipline and terminate municipal police employees,” he
had “final policy making authority,” and should be held liable. (Doc. 11 at 6).
Finally, Gopalam references the legal standard for courts to apply in deciding motions to
dismiss, citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009), and argues that he has provided “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Therefore, Gopalam argues, his well-pled facts have set forth a plausible
claim for relief against Mayor Arceneaux, and Mayor Arceneaux’s motion to dismiss should be
denied.
In Mayor Arceneaux’s reply, he reiterates his argument that Gopalam is unable to assert a
vicarious liability claim against him, because, pursuant to the Lawrason Act, he is not the
employer of the police officers. (Doc. 13). Additionally, Mayor Arceneaux asserts the Act does
not give him any authority to supervise or direct the administration or operation of the police
department. Rather, La R.S. § 33:423 allows for the mayor, upon recommendation by the chief
of police, to promote, discipline, or terminate officers, which Mayor Arceneaux argues is not the
same as having direct supervisory authority over the officers.
Mayor Arceneaux also argues that Gopalam’s reliance on Grant is misplaced for his
argument that Mayor Arceneaux is an employer of the Gonzales police officers. In Grant, the
Louisiana Supreme Court was determining whether “the city council exceeded its authority when
it ignored the recommendation of the chief of police and terminated a police officer.” (Doc. 13 at

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3). In Grant, the plaintiff police officer failed to meet statutory requirements, and the chief of
police recommended to the city council that the plaintiff “be placed in an ‘administrative’
position until he successfully completed” the required training. Grant, 870 So.2d at 1012.
However, the city council rejected this recommendation and terminated the plaintiff. Id.
The Louisiana Supreme Court found that while La. R.S. § 33:423 mandates that a police
chief make “recommendations with respect to any of the employment actions therein to the
municipality . . . the municipality need not adopt such recommendation and may, after the
recommendation, take its own action as relates to the peace officer training and certification
requirements . . . .” Id. at 107. Mayor Arceneaux contends that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s
decision in Grant does not make him an employer of the Gonzales police officers, and therefore,
he cannot be held liable for any actions (or inactions) of the police.
Additionally, Mayor Arceneaux argues that Gopalam failed to assert a supervisory
liability claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against him in Gopalam’s complaint. “Supervisory
officials cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for the actions of subordinates . . . on any
theory of vicarious or respondeat superior liability.” Estate of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of
North Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005). However, a supervisory official can be
held liable if the official was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or there is a
“sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional
violation.” Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987). In order to hold a supervisory
official liable under Section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) the supervisor either
failed to supervise or train the subordinate official; (2) a causal link exists between the failure to
train or supervise and the violation of the plaintiff’s rights; and (3) the failure to train or

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supervise amounts to deliberate indifference.” Smith v. Brenoettsy, 158 F.3d 908, 911-912 (5th
Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
Mayor Arceneaux argues that Gopalam has failed to assert a Section 1983 cause of action
against him directly “for his alleged failure to supervise, train or discipline any of the officers in
question.” (Doc. 13 at 5). Rather, the complaint only alleges that it was the general policy and/or
custom for the City of Gonzales and/or the Gonzales Police Department to inadequately train,
supervise, or discipline the officers. (Doc. 1). Moreover, Mayor Arceneaux argues that Gopalam
has failed to allege that Mayor Arceneaux was personally involved, nor that Mayor Arceneaux
had a duty to train or supervise the officers. Finally, Mayor Arceneaux points out that Gopalam
has not alleged “deliberate indifference to the known or obvious fact that such constitutional
violations would result.” Johnson v. Deep East Texas Regional Narcotics Trafficking Task
Force, 379 F.3d 293, 209 (5th Cir. 2004). A showing of “deliberate indifference” typically
“requires that a plaintiff demonstrate at least a pattern of similar violations.” Id. (citations and
quotations omitted). Mayor Arceneaux asserts that the complaint does not allege any facts that
would show that there was a pattern of similar violations; nor does the complaint allege any facts
that would suggest Mayor Arceneaux was deliberately indifferent. Therefore, Mayor Arceneaux
urges this Court to grant his motion to dismiss.
II.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of a complaint for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When
reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true.
C.C. Port, Ltd. v. Davis-Penn Mortg. Co., 61 F.3d 288, 289 (5th Cir. 1995). In order to survive a

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motion to dismiss, the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
On the face of the complaint, Gopalam has not alleged sufficient facts to show that
Mayor Arceneaux had the requisite authority over the City of Gonzales police officers to give
rise to Section 1983 liability. The only reference to Mayor Arceneaux in the complaint is
paragraph 34, which states that the Mayor had “executive authority over the City of Gonzales
and/or the Gonzales City Police Department.” (Doc. 1). While Twombly does not create a
heightened pleading standard, Twombly does require that a plaintiff provide factual allegations
that are “more than labels and conclusions,” and that these factual allegations are “enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s
allegations are true.” 550 U.S. at 555. Gopalam’s allegation that the Mayor had executive
authority over the City of Gonzales and/or the Gonzales City Police Department is a conclusion
that does not support a claim for relief above the speculative level in light of the applicable law.
Pursuant to the applicable law, Mayor Arceneaux does not have control and authority
over the police officers in question that would give rise to liability. Moreover, Gopalam has not
asserted sufficient facts to suggest that Mayor Arceneaux should be held personally liable under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mayor Arceneaux cannot be held liable under Section 1983 on a theory of
respondeat superior. Estate of Davis, 406 F.3d at 381. Although a supervisory official can be
held liable under Section 1983, Gopalam would have to show that Mayor Arceneaux failed to
supervise or train the official(s), that this failure was causally linked to the violation of
Gopalam’s rights, and that Mayor Arceneaux’s failure amounted to “deliberate indifference.”
Smith, 158 F.3d at 911-912. However, Gopalam has not alleged any facts that support a finding
of liability under Section 1983 with respect to the Mayor.

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III.
Accordingly, Mayor Barney Arceneaux’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 3) is GRANTED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on January 2, 2013.

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

JAMES J. BRADY, DISTRICT JUDGE

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