Schilling v. Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development
Filing
80
RULING granting in part and denying in part 21 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and granting 22 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Schillings claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, disability-based workplace harassment/ hostile work environment arising under the ADA and LEDL, and retaliation claims arising under the ADA are hereby dismissed with prejudice in favor of DOTD As to DOTDs first Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the motion is GRANTED as to the presc ription of Schillings claims for failure to accommodate arisingout of her April 2008 request for a modified work schedule and failure to engage in theinteractive process; Schillings claim for failure to accommodate her four (4) ten (10)hour schedule request; Schillings claim for punitive damages; and Schillings claim that DOTDs failure to provide her with reasonable accommodations caused her health to worsen. Accordingly, these claims shall be dismissed with prejudice in favor of DOTD. DOTDs f irst Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED as to Schillings qualification as an individual with a disability, and as to Schillings claims for failure to accommodate and failure to engage in the interactive process arising out of her requests for a handicapped parking spot, to wear slipper-like shoes to work, and for the re installation of a door to her office. Signed by Judge Shelly D. Dick on 7/28/2014. (LLH)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JUDY SCHILLING
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT
NO. 12-00661-SDD-SCR
RULING
This matter is before the Court on two separate Motions for Partial Summary
Judgment1
filed by
Defendant, Louisiana Department
of
Transportation
and
Development (“Defendant” or “DOTD”). Plaintiff, Judy Schilling (“Plaintiff” or “Schilling”),
has filed Oppositions2 to both motions, to which Defendant has filed Reply Briefs.3 For
the following reasons, DOTD’s first Motion for Partial Summary Judgment shall be
granted in part and denied in part, and DOTD’s second Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment shall be granted.
I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Schilling began her career with DOTD on October 6, 1997. Within six years she
was promoted to the full time position of Accounting Specialist II at District 62 in
Hammond, Louisiana, where she remained for the duration of her employment.4 It is
undisputed that during her tenure at DOTD Schilling was a model employee, even being
1
Rec. Doc. 21 and 22.
Rec. Doc. 42 and 44.
3
Rec. Doc. 45 and 46. Plaintiff filed a Surreply Memorandum (Rec. Doc. 49) in Response to DOTD’s
Reply Memorandum (Rec. Doc. 45).
4
Rec. Doc. 22-3, pp. 10-11; Rec. Doc. 44-2, pp. 11-12.
2
DM No. 1813
1
named employee of the quarter in October of 2008.5 Schilling remained with DOTD for
approximately 14 years until her termination effective May 16, 2012.6
During her employment with DOTD, specifically 2005 and 2006, Schilling was
diagnosed with several illnesses, including rheumatoid disease, rheumatoid arthritis,
West Nile Virus, and Bell’s Palsy.7
In the latter part of 2011, Schilling was also
diagnosed with degenerative disc disease.8
According to Schilling, these illnesses
interfered with her ability to concentrate, as well as her mobility, and stress further
exacerbates her conditions.
Schilling claims that in 2007 and 2008 she made four initial requests of her
employer for reasonable accommodations while at District 62. In 2007, Schilling made
her initial request for a handicap parking spot near the rear entrance of the building
because she believed it was closer to her office.9 In that same year, Schilling requested
the installation of a door for her office to serve as a sound barrier.10 In March and April
of 2008, Schilling’s rheumatologist, Dr. Sean E. Shannon, sent two letters to DOTD
requesting sound barriers on her behalf.11 In the April letter, Shannon also requested a
change in Schilling’s workweek “to allow her more recover[y] time on the weekends.”12
Schilling specifically requested a schedule change allowing her to work four (4) ten (10)
5
Rec. Doc. 41-13, pp. 4-5. In the recognition, Schilling was described as “one of District 62’s greatest
assets.” Rec. Doc. 41-13, p. 8.
6
Rec. Doc. 22-8. Non-Disciplinary Removal Notice.
7
Rec. Doc. 44-2, pp. 16-21. (Schilling testified she was diagnosed with rheumatoid disease in July of
2005, rheumatoid arthritis in November of 2005, West Nile Virus in September of 2006, and Bell’s Palsy
in September of 2006).
8
Rec. Doc. 44-2, p. 21.
9
Rec. Doc. 41-4, pp. 63-65. Schilling reiterated this request in 2008. Rec. Doc. 41-4, p. 65.
10
Rec. Doc. 41-4, p. 79. Schilling testified that her first request for the reinstallation of a door to her office
was made in August of 2007.
11
Rec. Doc. 44-5, pp. 44-45, and 57. In the March letter he testified that the letter asked “Anything you
[DOTD] could do to provide a less noisy environment for [Schilling] to focus and do her accounting.”
12
Rec. Doc. 44-5, pp. 57-58; Rec. Doc. 21-8, p. 2.
DM No. 1813
2
hour days per week with Mondays or Fridays off.13
In March of 2008, Schilling’s
chiropractor, D.C. Karen Carter, submitted a facsimile to Defendant asking that Schilling
be permitted to wear comfortable or “slipper-like shoes” to work.14
On April 2, 2008, Schilling met with her supervisors, Sharon McKinney, and
McKinney’s supervisor, Ronda Rylatt, to discuss her requests.15 Notably, prior to this
meeting, Schilling had been given a handicap parking spot across the street from her
building.16 During the meeting, Rylatt offered Schilling the option of moving into other
offices in the building that had doors and that she would not have to share with other coworkers.17 In this same meeting, Schilling expressed her desire for a schedule change
of four (4) ten (10) hour days. On May 1, 2008, Schilling received an email from Shelia
Tate, the District 62 Assistant District Administrator of the Business Office,18 offering to
change her work schedule to four (4) ten (10) hour days, Monday, Wednesday thru
Friday (with Tuesdays off).19
Schilling declined the offer and explained she would
continue working her schedule.
Another meeting was held in April of 2008 where Schilling, Rylatt, and McKinney
were once again in attendance, with the addition of Tate and Connie Standige, the
District Administrator.20 At the meeting, these individuals discussed Schilling’s requests
13
Rec. Doc. 41-4, p. 100.
Rec. Doc. 41-4, pp. 71-72.
15
Rec. Doc. 22-10. Rec. Doc. 41-4, p. 69.
16
Rec. Doc. 41-4, p. 68.
17
Rec. Doc. 22-10.
18
Tate was appointed as the District 62 Assistant District Administrator of the Business Office on August
17, 2007.
19
Rec. Doc. 22-10. The change would have been effective as of May 5, 2008.
20
Rec. Doc. 21-2, p. 1; Rec. Doc. 44-1, p. 3.
14
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3
for a handicap parking spot, the installation of a door for her office, the schedule
change, and her request to wear slipper-like shoes.21
Schilling contends that the DOTD failed to timely provide her with the requested
reasonable accommodations, to engage in a good faith interactive process regarding
her requests, or to make any showing that the accommodations would impose undue
hardship on DOTD.
Therefore, on April 15, 2009, Schilling filed an EEOC Charge
against DOTD asserting she had been subject to discrimination based on disability,
retaliation, and harassment.22 On May 17, 2010, Schilling also filed a complaint with the
Compliance Programs Office of DOTD alleging that she had been denied reasonable
accommodations in her work environment, and that she had been subjected to
harassment, retaliation, and a hostile work environment.23 Approximately two years
later, Schilling was terminated from her employment at DOTD.24
Upon receiving her Right to Sue Letter, on September 21, 2012, Schilling filed a
state lawsuit asserting similar disability, harassment, and hostile work environment due
to retaliation claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Louisiana
Employment Discrimination Law (“LEDL”).25
She also alleged that as a result of
DOTD’s failure to accommodate her requests, her conditions have worsened.26 DOTD
timely removed this case to federal court asserting subject matter jurisdiction pursuant
21
Rec. Doc. 41-4, pp. 69; 74-75.
Rec. Doc. 13-2, p. 6; Rec. Doc. 41-5, p. 41. Specifically she claimed to have been “discriminated
against, harassed, and retaliated against in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act for requesting
reasonable accommodations.” Rec. Doc. 41-5, p. 41.
23
Rec. Doc. 22-7. After completing their investigation, the Compliance Programs Office issued a
response to Schilling’s complaint.
24
Rec. Doc. 22-8. Schilling was non-disciplinarily removed from her position effective May 16, 2012.
25
Rec. Doc. 1-1, pp., 3-5. Schilling v. Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, 19th
Judicial District Court, No. 615639, Section 23.
26
Rec. Doc. 1-1, p. 3.
22
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to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and filed an Answer.27 Thereafter, Schilling filed an Amended
Complaint in which she asserted claims of disability discrimination arising out of her
second charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC on October 2, 2012.28 In particular,
Schilling alleges that the no-fault leave policies that allow employers, such as DOTD, to
terminate employees after exhaustion of leave is in violation of the ADA.29
DOTD
subsequently answered her Amended Complaint.30
Pending before the Court are two separate motions for partial summary judgment
filed by DOTD. In its first motion, DOTD contends that it is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on Schilling’s claims of failure to accommodate or failure to engage in the
interactive process regarding her four initial requests made pursuant to the ADA.31
DOTD further argues that Plaintiff cannot prove the alleged failure to accommodate
caused her health conditions to worsen, and that, as a matter of law, Schilling is not
entitled to punitive damages.32 As for its second motion, DOTD asserts that it is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law on Schillings’ claims of harassment, retaliation, and
emotional distress.33 Schilling has opposed both motions.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Motion for Summary Judgment Standard
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
27
Rec. Doc. 1. The state court petition was removed on October 19, 2012.
Rec. Doc. 55. Schilling attached her Right to Sue letter dated April 9, 2014 to her Amended Complaint.
Rec. Doc. 55-1.
29
Rec. Doc. 55, p. 3.
30
Rec. Doc. 56 (Answer).
31
Rec. Doc. 21-1.
32
Rec. Doc. 21-1.
33
Rec. Doc. 22-1.
28
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5
matter of law.”34 “When assessing whether a dispute to any material fact exists, we
consider all of the evidence in the record but refrain from making credibility
determinations or weighing the evidence.”35 A party moving for summary judgment
“must ‘demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,’ but need not
negate the elements of the nonmovant’s case.”36
If the moving party satisfies its
burden, “the non-moving party must show that summary judgment is inappropriate by
setting ‘forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue concerning every
essential component of its case.’”37 However, the non-moving party’s burden “is not
satisfied with some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory
allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.”38
Notably, “[a] genuine issue of material fact exists, ‘if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’”39 All reasonable factual
inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.40 However, “[t]he Court has no
duty to search the record for material fact issues. Rather, the party opposing the
summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to
articulate precisely how this evidence supports his claim.”41 “Conclusory allegations
unsupported by specific facts … will not prevent the award of summary judgment; ‘the
34
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008).
36
Guerin v. Pointe Coupee Parish Nursing Home, 246 F.Supp.2d 488, 494 (5th Cir. 2003)(quoting Little v.
Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)(en banc)(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323-25, 106 S.Ct. at 2552)).
37
Rivera v. Houston Independent School Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003)(quoting Morris v. Covan
World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998)).
38
Willis v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995)(quoting Little v. Liquid Air
Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
39
Pylant v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company, 497 F.3d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 2007)(quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
40
Galindo v. Precision American Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985).
41
RSR Corp. v. International Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 2010).
35
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6
plaintiff [can]not rest on his allegations … to get to a jury without any “significant
probative evidence tending to support the complaint.”’”42
B. Admissibility of Schilling’s EEOC File
In an effort to defeat both of DOTD’s summary judgment motions, Schilling has
relied upon various documents including the EEOC file. In response, DOTD contends
that the entire file, particularly the underlying material collected during an EEOC
investigation,43 is inadmissible to the extent it consists of inadmissible hearsay and
unauthenticated documents. DOTD takes particular issue with the content of Schilling’s
eighteen-page EEOC Charge of Discrimination.44 In contrast, Schilling contends the file
is admissible under the public records exception to the hearsay rule and points out that
DOTD has failed to identify any information or circumstances that would suggest a lack
of trustworthiness under Rule 803(8)(c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Schilling also
argues that the content of the EEOC file have been verified by other evidence in this
case through her own deposition testimony and those documents produced by DOTD
during discovery.
Relying on Smith v. Universal Services, Inc., the Court finds that it is required to
take the EEOC investigative report into consideration when deciding a Title VII claim,
because failure to do so would be “wasteful and unnecessary.”45 In Smith, the Fifth
Circuit explained that the EEOC investigative report, which consisted of “a summary of
the charges, a brief review of the facts developed in its investigation, and [the EEOC’s]
42
Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, Tex., 40 F.3d 698, 713 (5th Cir.
1994)(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).
43
DOTD challenges the admissibility of several documents that appear to have been submitted to the
EEOC investigator, Tanya Darensbourg, by Schilling regarding her EEOC charge of discrimination and
internal email correspondence between Schilling and other DOTD employees/supervisors.
44
Rec. Doc. 41-5, pp. 41-58.
45
454 F.2d 154, 157 (5th Cir. 1972).
DM No. 1813
7
finding,” would be admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.
As a word of caution, however, the decision of the EEOC is non-binding on this Court.46
As for Schilling’s Charge of Discrimination, the Court finds that because Schilling signed
said document, it is admissible as a sworn statement.
However, to the extent the
Charge of Discrimination contains inadmissible summary judgment evidence, the Court
shall disregard those portions.47 The fact that certain documents within the EEOC file
were produced as part of the discovery process by DOTD does not deem them per se
admissible for evidentiary purposes.48 Nonetheless, the Court finds that to the extent
the contested documents, specifically email correspondence, have been authenticated
by deposition testimony they shall be considered for summary judgment purposes.49
1. Analysis of DOTD’s First Partial Summary Judgment
In its first motion, DOTD contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
because the evidence fails to establish a prima facie case for failure to accommodate
under the ADA. Specifically, DOTD argues that Schilling cannot show that it failed to
accommodate or to engage in the interactive process regarding her four initial requests
for accommodations made pursuant to the ADA.50 DOTD further argues that Plaintiff
cannot prove the alleged failure to accommodate caused her health conditions to
worsen, and that, as a matter of law, Schilling is not entitled to punitive damages.
a. Prescription
46
Id.
Akin v. Q-L Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 530-31 (5th Cir. 1992)(“On a motion for summary
judgment, the district court should disregard only those portions of than affidavit that are inadequate and
consider the rest.”).
48
Railroad Management Co., L.L.C. v. CFS Louisiana Midstream Co., 428 F.3d 214, 221 (“Not all
discoverable material is admissible.”).
49
The Court notes that some of the email correspondences were actually produced by DOTD in support
of their own motions for partial summary judgment.
50
Rec. Doc. 21-1.
47
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8
DOTD argues that Schilling’s ADA claims for failure to accommodate her work
schedule and failure to engage in the interactive process prior to June 19, 2008 are
time-barred by the statute of limitations.
Schilling counters that, under the continuing
violation doctrine, her claims are still viable.
Before a plaintiff may file a civil action under the ADA, she must exhaust
administrative remedies, which includes filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC
within 300 days after the alleged violations occurred and filing a suit within 90 days after
receiving a Right to Sue Letter from the EEOC. However, “a continuous and ongoing
violation tolls the statute of limitations; statutes of limitations are meant to prevent ‘stale
claims,’ and if the violation is a continuing one ‘the staleness concern disappears.’”51
Under the “continuing violation doctrine, a plaintiff is relieved of establishing that all of
the alleged discriminatory conduct occurred within the actionable period if the plaintiff
can show a series of related acts, one or more of which falls within the limitations
period.”52 Notably, the Fifth Circuit has echoed the Supreme Court’s message, “that
discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are
related to acts complained of in timely filed charges.”53
Whether a continuing violation has occurred “turns on the facts and context of
each particular case.”54 In order to reach a determination, the Fifth Circuit has instructed
that the following three factors are relevant for the Court’s consideration: subject matter
51
Pagan-Negron v. Seguin Independent School Dist., 974 F.Supp.2d 1020, 1033 (W.D. Tx. 2013)(quoting
McGregor v. Louisiana State Univ. Bd. of Sup’rs., 3 F.3d 850, 867 (5th Cir. 1993)(quoting Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982)).
52
Henson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 128 Fed.Appx. 387, 391 (5th Cir. 2005)(citing Felton v. Polles,
315 F.3d 470, 487 (5th Cir. 2002)).
53
Id. (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002)).
54
Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 475 (5th Cir. 1989)(quoting Berry v. Bd. of
Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ., 715 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1983), cert denied 479 U.S. 868, 981
(1986)).
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9
(“Do the alleged acts involve the same type of discrimination?”); frequency (“Are the
alleged acts recurring (e.g., a biweekly paycheck) or more in the nature of an isolated
work assignment or employment decision?”); and degree of permanence (“Does the act
have the degree of permanence which should trigger an employee’s awareness of and
duty to assert his or her rights, or which should indicate to the employee that the
continued existence of the adverse consequences of the act is to be expected without
being dependent on a continuing intent to discriminate?”).55
Considering these factors, the Court finds that in the case at bar the facts do not
support a finding of a continuing violation. In her deposition testimony, Schilling stated
that the last time she requested an accommodation of working four (4) ten (10) hour
days with either Monday or Friday off was in April of 2008.56 In response to her request,
on May 1, 2008, Tate offered Schilling a work schedule of four (4) ten (10) hour days
with Tuesday being her day off.57 Schilling declined DOTD’s offer, and expressed that
she would keep her schedule as is; her schedule consisted of four nine hour days and
half of a day on Friday.58
Based on the evidence, Schilling did not request another schedule change until
another six months had lapsed, when Tate decided to change all employees’ schedules
in the business section to five (5) eight (8) hour days effective November 3, 2008. 59 At
this time, Schilling contacted Cindy Cardwell, DOTD’s Human Resources Analyst,
directly to request a return to her four nine hour days with half a day on Friday schedule,
55
Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ., 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir. 1983), cert denied 479
U.S. 868, 981 (1986) “The focus is on what event, in fairness and logic, should have alerted the average
lay person to act to protect his rights.” Messer v. Meno, 130 F,3d 134-35 (5th Cir. 1997)(quoting Glass v.
Petro-Tex Chem. Corp., 757 F.2d 1554, 1560-61 (5th Cir. 1985)).
56
Rec. Doc. 21-3, pp. 21-22.
57
Rec. Doc. 21-3, pp. 13-14; Rec. Doc. 22-10, p. 2; Rec. Doc. 41-4, p. 182.
58
Rec. Doc. 41-4, pp. 106-107.
59
Rec. Doc. 21-6, pp. 2-3; Rec. Doc. 21-17, p. 2; Rec. Doc. 41-4, p. 183; Rec. Doc. 41-4, p. 219.
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which Schilling reiterated in December of 2008.60 Moreover, according to Schilling, she
explained to Cardwell that she did not think she could handle working ten hour days at
this point.61 Schilling’s second request was granted, albeit, not until May of 2009.62 The
Court finds that based on the evidence, Schilling’s infrequent requests for
accommodations in her work schedule “[are] the sort of discrete and salient event[s] that
should put an employee on notice that a cause of action has accrued.”63
The Court
therefore, finds the continuing violation doctrine inapplicable to Schilling’s failure to
accommodate and to engage in the interactive process claims arising out of her April
2008 request for a schedule change. Thus, DOTD’s first Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment will be granted on this claim.
b. Remaining Failure to Accommodate Claims under the ADA64
DOTD contends that Schilling’s remaining failure to accommodate claims—
requests for the installation of a door for her office, the ability to wear slipper-like shoes
or footwear to work, a handicap parking space, and her second requested schedule
change—must be dismissed due to an absence of genuine issue of material fact.
Schilling counters that she has identified admissible evidence that raises a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether she was denied reasonable or adequate
accommodations based upon her requests.
“[A] plaintiff must prove the following statutory elements to prevail in a failure-toaccommodate claim: (1) the plaintiff is a ‘qualified individual with a disability;’ (2) the
60
Rec. Doc. 21-16, p.2; Rec. Doc. 41-4, pp. 201-202.
Rec. Doc. 41-4, p. 201.
62
Rec. Doc. 21-18, pp. 2-3.
63
Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 240 (5th Cir. 1998).
64
The Court notes that failure to accommodate claims under the ADA are distinct from claims of disparate
treatment. 42 U.S.C. Sections 12112(a), (b)(5)(A).
61
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disability and its consequential limitations were ‘known’ by the covered employer; and
(3) the employer failed to make ‘reasonable accommodations’ for such known
limitations.”65 Pursuant to the ADA, a qualified individual with a disability means “an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires.”66 “The ADA further defines an actionable disability, in relevant part, as ‘a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual.”67
In general, it is the employee’s burden to make his need for an accommodation
known to his employer.68 Under the ADA, reasonable accommodations may include the
following:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and
usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a
vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices,
appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials
or policies, the provision of qualified readers and interpreters, and other
similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.69
Notably, the plaintiff “bears the initial burden of proof on the issue of
reasonableness, but need only show that the proposed accommodation is reasonable
‘in the run of cases.’”70
65
Feist v. Louisiana, Dept. of Justice, Office of the Atty. Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 2013).
Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 315 (5th Cir. 1997)(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)).
67
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)).
68
Cutrera v. Bd. of Sup’rs of Louisiana State Univ., 429 F.3d 108, 112 (5th Cir. 2005).
69
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
70
Windhauser v. Bd. of Supervisors, for LSU A & M, 360 Fed.Appx. 562, 567 (5th Cir.
2010)(unpublished)(quoting Riel v. Elec. Data Syst. Corp., 99 F.3d 678, 683 (5th Cir. 1996)). However,
an employer may defend its failure to implement a reasonable accommodation by showing business
necessity or undue burden. Riel v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 99 F.3d 678, 682 (5th Cir. 1996).
66
DM No. 1813
12
“Once the employee presents a request for an accommodation, the employer is
required to engage in the interactive process so that together they can determine what
reasonable accommodations might be available.”71 The interactive process has been
defined as “a meaningful dialogue with the employee to the find the best means of
accommodating that disability.”72 Such a process requires “communication and goodfaith exploration.”73 Ultimately, the precise ‘contours of the interactive process must be
determined on a case-by-case basis.”74 However, “[w]hen an employer’s unwillingness
to engage in a good faith interactive process leads to a failure to reasonably
accommodate an employee, the employer violates the ADA.”75 “But if the breakdown of
the interactive process is traceable to the employee rather than the employer, there is
no violation of the ADA.”76
i. Does Schilling Have an Actual Disability Under the ADA?
In its Reply Brief, DOTD contends for the first time that Schilling cannot satisfy
the first element necessary to establish her prima facie case because she is not
disabled under the ADA.77 While DOTD does not dispute Schilling’s diagnoses, it does
contend that her illnesses do not substantially limit one or more major life activity.
71
Molina v. DSI Renal, Inc., 840 F.Supp.2d 984, 1002 (W.D.Tx. 2012)(quoting EEOC v. Chevron Phillips
Chem. Co., LP, 570 F.3d at 622 (5th Cir. 2009)(emphasis added)(citation omitted)). See also, Cutrera,
429 F.3d at 112 (5th Cir. 2005).
72
E.E.O.C. v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., LP, 570 F.3d 606, 621 (5th 2009)(quoting Tobin v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 100, 108 (1st Cir. 2005)) (hereinafter “Chevron Phillips”).
73
Id. (quoting Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., 485 F.3d 862, 871 (6th Cir. 2007)).
74
Suggs v. Central Oil of Baton Rouge, LLC, 2014 WL 3037213, *13 (M.D.La. July 3, 2014)(quoting
Picard v. St. Tammany Hosp.,611 F.Supp.2d 608, 621(E.D.La. 2009)).
75
Loulseged v. Azko Nobel Inc., 178 F.3d 731, 736 (5th Cir. 1999).
76
Suggs v. Central Oil of Baton Rouge, LLC, 2014 WL 3037213, *13 (M.D.La. July 3, 2014)(quoting
Loulseged v. Azko Nobel Inc., 178 F.3d 731, 736 (5th Cir. 1999)).
77
In its original motion, DOTD did not challenge Schilling’s status as being disabled under the ADA.
Instead, DOTD provided in footnote 16 that it “reserves the right to raise the issue of whether Plaintiff has
a disability at the trial of this matter and, solely for the purposes of this motion, assumes arguendo that
Plaintiff has a disability.” Nevertheless, in its Reply Brief, DOTD argued this very point. Because
Schilling was permitted to file a Sur-Reply in which she addressed this argument, the Court will consider
the merits.
DM No. 1813
13
DOTD rests its argument on the EEOC investigator’s report wherein he concluded that
Schilling was not substantially limited in the major life activities during the period in
question.78 As the Court previously explained, the EEOC’s investigative report will be
considered, although it is non-binding.79
The ADA prohibits discrimination against a “qualified individual with a disability,”
and discrimination includes “not making reasonable accommodations to known physical
or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified” individual with a disability.80 Although
Schilling’s claims occurred before the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 went into effect,
the fundamental definition of disability under the ADA has remained unchanged and is
defined as:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.81
A “physical impairment” under the EEOC regulations was defined as “any physiological
disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more
of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs;
respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-
78
Rec. Doc. 44-3, JTS EEOC 000019; Rec. Doc. 45, p. 3.
Smith v. Universal Services, Inc., 454 F.2d 154, 157 (5th Cir. 1972)(“It is not to be denied that under
Title VII, the action of the EEOC is not an agency action of a quasi-judicial nature which determines the
rights of the parties subject only to the possibility that the reviewing courts might conclude that the
EEOC’s actions are arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. Instead, the civil litigation at the
district court level clearly takes on the character of a trial de novo, completely separate from the actions of
the EEOC. It is thus clear that the [investigation report] is in no sense binding on the district court and is
to be given no more weight than any other testimony given at trial.”)
80
42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12112(b)(5)(A).
81
Under pre-amendments, proper citation 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). It is now codified in 42 U.S.C. §
12102(1).
79
DM No. 1813
14
urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine.”82 Nevertheless, as the Fifth Circuit
has explained, “[m]erely having an impairment … does not make one disabled for the
purposes of the ADA.
Plaintiffs also need to demonstrate that the impairment
substantially limits a major life activity.”83
“The implementing regulations in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) provide a non-exhaustive
list of major life activities, which include ‘caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working.”84 In E.E.O.C. v.
Chevron Phillips Chemical Co., L.P., a pre-amendment case, the Fifth Circuit further
found that sleeping and thinking were also major life activities because these activities
were of central importance to daily life.85 In reaching its decision, the Chevron Phillips
court sought guidance from the 2008 EEOC compliance manual which provided that
“mental and emotional processes such as thinking, concentrating, and interacting with
others are other examples of major life activities.”86
In order to qualify as a “substantial limitation” a person must either “be unable to
perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can
perform or be significantly restricted in the ability to perform it.”87 The EEOC advises
courts to weigh the following factors when determining whether an individual is
substantially limited in a major life activity: “(i) the nature and severity of the impairment,
82
E.E.O.C. v. Chevron Phillips Chemical, 570 F.3d 606, 614 (5th Cir. 2009)(quoting 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(h)(1)).
83
Id.
84
Williamson v. American National Ins. Co., 695 F.Supp.2d 431, 449 (S.D.Tx. 2010)(quoting 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(i); Id.)
85
Chevron Phillips, 570 F.3d at 616.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 614 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)).
DM No. 1813
15
(ii) its duration or expected duration, and (iii) its permanent or expected permanent longterm impact.”88
Schilling was diagnosed with rheumatoid disease in July of 2005, rheumatoid
arthritis in November of 2006,89 and West Nile Virus and Bell’s Palsy in September of
2006.90
Schilling testified that in 2006, the rheumatoid arthritis caused her pain,
stiffness, and swelling in her hands (up to her elbows) and in her feet (up to her knees),
which only worsened over time affecting other parts of her body (i.e., shoulders and
hips).91 Schilling’s rheumatologist, Dr. Sean Shannon, testified that rheumatoid arthritis
will not improve over time.92 Dr. Shannon also testified that in September of 2008, he
diagnosed Schilling with fibromyalgia.93 He further explained that the requested the
sound barrier for her office and the change in her work schedule in an effort to manage
the fibromyalgia by reducing stress in Schilling’s work environment.94 According to Dr.
Shannon by managing the fibromyalgia, Schilling’s rheumatoid arthritis would, in effect,
be managed as well.95
Schilling’s treating chiropractor, Karen Carter, D.C., explained that she too began
treating Schilling initially in 2006 for her lower back and hip pain, as well as neck and
shoulder pain associated with her rheumatoid arthritis and West Nile.96 D.C. Carter also
88
Id.
Rec. Doc. 44-5, pp. 10-11.
90
Rec. Doc. 44-2, pp. 20-21; Rec. Doc. 44-5, p. 14.
91
Rec. Doc. 44-2, pp16-17; 34.
92
Rec. Doc. 44-5, pp. 16-17. Schilling’s rheumatologist also diagnosed her with fibromyalgia but this was
not included in her Petition. Her doctor specifically requested sound barrier for her fibromyalgia to help
Schilling be more productive at work. According to Dr. Shannon, by managing Schilling’s fibromyalgia,
her arthritis (discomfort) and stress level would also be managed. Rec. Doc. 44-5, p. 48-50.
93
Rec. Doc. 44-5, p. 24.
94
Rec. Doc. 21-8.
95
Rec. Doc. 44-5, p. 50. He also stated, “if there’s a level of rheumatoid arthritis activity, fibromyalgia is
going to make it a lot more unbearable.” Id.
96
Rec. Doc. 41-6, pp. 16-17; Rec. Doc. 41-6, p. 27. Dr. Carter stated that she saw Schilling every other
week from 2007 to 2012. Rec. Doc. 41-6, p. 36.
89
DM No. 1813
16
diagnosed and treated Schilling for sciatic neuralgia—“irritation and inflammation of the
sciatic nerve which comes off the lumbar spine, branches out, goes down the buttock,
can go down the lateral side of the leg, all the way down into the calf into the foot and it
also has a branch that comes across the top of the hip and can come across the groin
area into the front area…[it is] the largest nerve of the body.”97
D.C. Carter testified
that in treating West Nile cases, stress would aggravate the condition.98 D.C. Carter
further explained that she “kn[e]w for a fact in clinically treating [her] patients with
chronic pain, they mentally are not as sharp and wear down. Their concentration is
less.”99 She also testified that at times Schilling’s health conditions could have affected
her ability to work and her quality of life outside of her job.100 According to Carter, West
Nile, rheumatoid arthritis, and sciatic neuralgia or neuritis will never go away.101
In 2006 through 2007, Schilling testified that, when she experienced swelling in
her feet, she could not walk.102
Schilling further testified that, as a result of the West
Nile Virus in 2008, she suffered problems with her ability to concentrate, motor skills
(e.g., ability to walk and type), and standing, as well as sciatic nerve damage.103 Due to
her inability to concentrate and her loss of motor skills, Schilling further testified that she
had trouble working.104
However, in an effort to improve her mobility, Schilling also
97
Rec. Doc. 44-2, pp. 22-23; Rec. Doc. 41-6, pp. 17-18
Rec. Doc. 41-6, p. 17.
99
Rec. Doc. 41-6, p. 58. Although D.C. Carter did not make the request, she explained that Schilling
expressed her desire for a door to her office to avoid constant interruptions.
100
Rec. Doc. 41-6, pp. 72.
101
Rec. Doc. 41-6, p. 35.
102
Rec. Doc. 44-2, p. 18.
103
Rec. Doc. 44-2, pp. 17-18.
104
Rec. Doc. 44-2, p. 22. (“I suffered great concentration problems during and after the West Nile virus. I
was under a lot of stress at work with noise. I had lost, also, motor skills. I had also suffered with my
sciatic nerve. I had trouble walking. I had trouble – and – I – I – that would – I means, I suffered with
these things to the point – we had a lot of noise in the office. That created a lot of stress on me trying to
concentrate on my job and making sure that my T’s were crossed and my I’s were dotted. And in my
case, that the decimal points was in the right position. I had trouble doing my work because of it.”)
98
DM No. 1813
17
testified that she used a cane to assist her with her balance.105 It is also in 2008 when
Schilling testified to have great difficulty sleeping due to the extreme pain she was in as
a result of the rheumatoid disease, rheumatoid arthritis, and West Nile.106 Additional
evidence shows that DOTD was aware of Schilling’s health conditions and
acknowledged receiving reports from her physicians documenting her health
conditions.107
The Court finds that, based on the summary judgment evidence, Schilling has
created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was substantially limited in
the major life activities including thinking or concentrating, sleeping, walking, and
working. Accordingly, DOTD’s motion shall be denied as to whether Schilling qualifies
as being disabled under the ADA.108
ii. Did DOTD Provide Reasonable Accommodations to Schilling?
DOTD argues that summary judgment is appropriate as to Schilling’s failure to
accommodate claims. DOTD contends that it accommodated Schilling’s requests for a
second schedule modification request, to wear slipper-like shoes, for the installation of a
door for her office, and a handicapped parking space. DOTD further argues that based
on the evidence, Schilling’s claim for failure to engage in the interactive process must
also be dismissed. Additionally, DOTD argues that, as a matter of law, Schilling is not
entitled to punitive damages for her ADA claims.
105
Rec. Doc. 44-2, p. 23.
Rec. Doc. 44-2, p. 23.
107
Rec. Doc. 44-9. Ronda Rylett, Administrative Program Manager III who supervised the business
section of DOTD, testified that Schilling turned in reports from her physicians documenting her health
conditions. Rec. Doc. 44-9, p. 16. She testified that Schilling had been diagnosed with West Nile and
had problems concentrating, back pain, and rheumatoid arthritis.
108
DOTD, the moving party, has not argued or satisfied its burden of showing there is no genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Schilling was qualified for her position. In other words, DOTD has not argued
that Schilling was unable to perform her job duties or that she was discharged for performance-based
reasons. DOTD’s argument is focused solely on whether Schilling has a disability.
106
DM No. 1813
18
a. Schilling’s Request for Schedule Modification109
In her opposition memorandum, Schilling contends that in October of 2008 she
contacted Candy Cardwell at DOTD headquarters about her request to work four (4) ten
(10) hour days with either Monday or Friday off.110 The Court finds that the evidence
does not support Schilling’s contention. In fact, in her deposition, Schilling testified that
the last time she ever requested such a work schedule was in April of 2008.111 The
evidence does show, however, that after Schilling’s supervisor, Shelia Tate, changed all
business section employees’ work schedules to five (5) eight (8) hour work days
(effective November 3, 2008),112 Schilling then requested that her schedule revert back
to four (4) nine (9) hour days with half a day on Friday.113 An email sent by Cardwell on
Schilling’s behalf on December 5, 2008 includes Schilling’s December 1, 2008 request
for a modified work schedule: “I would like to request that my old schedule be returned
to me. The schedule I am requesting is to work Monday thru Thursday from 7:00 am to
4:30 pm, and on Friday from 7:00 am to 11:00 am.”114 Cardwell also testified that a few
109
As previously found by the Court, Schilling’s April of 2008 request for a schedule modification of four
(4) ten (10) hour work days with Monday or Friday off has prescribed.
110
Rec. Doc. 44. Cardwell worked as a labor management consultant for DOTD, whereby she would
serve as a liaison between DOTD and the Department of Labor. Rec. Doc. 41-9, pp. 8-9.
111
Rec. Doc. 41-4, pp. 113-114.
112
Rec. Doc. 41-4, p. 219. Email dated October 23, 2008 from Shelia Tate regarding work schedules.
“Effective pay period beginning on November 3, 2008, all employees in the business section will work 5,
eight hour days, alternating times, 7:00am -3:30pm, one week and 7:45am-4:15pm the other week.”
113
Rec. Doc. 41-9, pp. 48 and 52. (Copies of email from Cardwell to her supervisor Linda Peloquin are
attached to Cardwell’s deposition).
114
Rec. Doc. 41-9, pp. 48 and 52. (Copies of email from Cardwell to her supervisor Linda Peloquin are
attached to Cardwell’s deposition).
DM No. 1813
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weeks prior to sending this email she also spoke directly with Tate and recommended
that Schilling’s request be granted.115
While the evidence shows that in February of 2009 a decision was made allowing
all employees to return to their four ten hour day work weeks, Schilling has offered no
evidence to support her position that she “persistently requested again the ten-hour
workweek with her off day either being Monday or Friday.”
116
The Court further finds
that the evidence shows that all employees in the business section were allowed to
return to their four (4) ten (10) hour day requests in the spring of 2009; however, none
of the evidence shows that Schilling sought such a schedule change at that time.
Instead, in May of 2009, Schilling was allowed to revert back to her four (4) nine (9)
hour days with one half day as she had requested in December of 2008.117
Alternatively, DOTD’s summary judgment evidence establishes that the Plaintiff
declined an offer of four (4) ten (10) hour work days. Hence, any alleged failure of a
meaningful interactive process is traceable to the Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court finds
that Schilling has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether DOTD
reasonably accommodated her four (4) ten (10) hour work day schedule request.
b. Schilling’s Remaining Accommodation and Interaction Claims
DOTD contends that, even though it did not provide Schilling with a handicapped
parking spot at the rear of the building when she initially requested it in July of 2007, it
accommodated her because she was provided with a designated handicapped parking
space eight months later. Schilling testified that she sought a handicapped parking spot
115
Rec. Doc. 41-9, pp. 26-27. Cardwell testified that she was not a decision-maker as to request for
reasonable accommodations; instead, she was to explain the law and make suggestions to the DOTD
supervisors. Rec. Doc. 41-9, p. 25.
116
Rec. Doc. 41-4, pp. 213 and 200; Rec. Doc. 41-5, pp. 98-99.
117
Rec. Doc. 41-13, pp. 9-10.
DM No. 1813
20
in the back of the building because “it helped [her] get into the building with less
difficulty.”118 As previously discussed, she has offered additional testimony that her
health conditions impaired her mobility. Nevertheless, the parking spot DOTD provided
to Schilling was located across the street from the main building. DOTD is correct in its
position that, while the ADA provides a right to reasonable accommodation, the
accommodation does not have to be the employee’s preferred accommodation.119
However, the Court finds that Schilling has presented evidence that creates a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the handicapped parking spot provided to her in
March of 2008 was a reasonable accommodation.120 The Court further finds that a
reasonable trier of fact could conclude that DOTD failed to engage in the interactive
process with Schilling as to her initial request for a handicapped parking spot.121
As
previously discussed, once an employee makes a request for an accommodation, the
employer is required to engage in the interactive process, and “[a] party that obstructs
or delays the interactive process is not acting in good faith.”122 Schilling has produced
evidence that shows that at least eight months lapsed before she received a handicap
parking spot and, during this time, there is no evidence showing that DOTD engaged in
118
Rec. Doc. 41-4, p. 71.
E.E.O.C. v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 914 F.2d 71, 73 (5th Cir. 1990)(If accommodation offered is
reasonable, employee cannot insist upon specific or more beneficial accommodation.)
120
In particular, Schilling has offered evidence showing that after suffering a broken knee, she was
ultimately given a handicapped parking spot near the rear of the building in 2009.
121
Rec. Doc. 41-4, p. 71. Aside from Schilling’s own request for a handicapped spot in the back of the
building, Schilling testified that no one at District 62 or at DOTD Headquarters made any other
suggestions about how she could get into the building at District 62 with less difficulty. Rec. Doc. 41-4,
pp. 65-68.
122
Manthos v. Jefferson Parish, 2008 WL 3914988, at *6 (E.D.La. Aug. 21, 2008)(quoting Beck v. Univ. of
Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996)). See also, Louiseged v. Akzo Nobel Inc., 178
F.3d 731, n. 6 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The panel in Beck noted that a party ‘that obstructs or delays the
interactive process’ may be charged with its breakdown. In Beck and many employment cases, the
employee continues working in a capacity arguably needing accommodation while the interactive process
is ongoing. An employer that dragged its feet in that situation could force the employee to work under
suboptimal conditions, ‘simply document the employee’s failures,’ and use the employee’s difficulties as
an excuse to terminate her.”(internal citations omitted)).
119
DM No. 1813
21
the interactive process in the intervening eight months.123 Accordingly, the Court finds
that DOTD’s motion shall be denied as to Schilling’s claims for reasonable
accommodation and failure to engage in the interactive process based on her request
for a handicapped parking space.
DOTD also contends that Schilling cannot prove that it failed to accommodate
her request to wear slipper-like shoes. The evidence shows that Schilling’s treating
chiropractor recommended that she be permitted to “wear lightweight, non-binding
footwear, something slipper-like … to keep compression off of her legs and feet, while
seated at a desk.”124 D.C. Carpenter made this suggestion because loose-fitting shoes
provided Schilling’s legs relief while working in her sedentary job position.125 DOTD
argues that it granted this request, and Schilling was allowed to wear slipper-like shoes
at her desk and in her office at all times.126 Schilling has provided admissible evidence
that directly contradicts DOTD’s position.127 Because “[c]redibility determinations, the
weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are
jury functions, and not those of a judge,” the Court finds that whether DOTD
accommodated Schilling’s request to wear slipper-like footwear cannot be resolved at
the summary judgment stage.128 The Court further finds that the evidence submitted by
Schilling could lead a reasonable juror to conclude that DOTD did not engage in the
interactive process regarding Schilling’s request to wear slipper like shoes.129
123
Rec. Doc. 44-2, pp. 63-65.
Rec. Doc. 41-6, p. 145.
125
Rec. Doc. 41-6 p. 86.
126
Rec. Doc. 21-10, p. 2; Rec. Doc. 21-5, pp. 52-53.
127
Rec. Doc. 41-4, p. 184. Schilling testified that she was never granted the requested accommodation
to wear slipper-like footwear. Rec. Doc. 41-1. Ronda Rylatt also testified that Schilling’s request to wear
slipper-like shoes when she left her particular office area was not granted. Rec. Doc. 41-11, p. 24.
128
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
129
Rec. Doc. 41-11, p. 35.
124
DM No. 1813
22
Accordingly, DOTD’s motion shall be denied to the extent it argues that it provided
reasonable accommodations and engaged in the interactive process regarding
Schilling’s request to wear slipper-like shoes in the workplace.
Additionally, DOTD asserts that Schilling’s failure to accommodate claims arising
out of her request for the re-installation of a door to her office warrant dismissal on
summary judgment. In early August of 2007, Schilling made her initial request to Ronda
Rylatt, Business Office Manager, for the reinstallation of the door to her office; Rylatt
approved Schilling’s request at that time.130
Schilling explained that she needed this
accommodation to facilitate her ability to concentrate and eliminate or reduce distracting
noises from within the outer business offices and hallway areas.131
In her deposition,
Rylatt explained that Schilling’s office previously had a door on it that had been
removed several years before, and had been destroyed.132
In December of 2007,
DOTD carpenters informed Rylatt that they had found another door and were ready to
install it, but they needed a new request.
Therefore, Rylatt sought approval from Tate
who had been selected to serve as the District 62 Assistant District Administrator of
Business on August 17, 2007. According to Rylatt, Tate refused to sign the request
because “she was not going to segregate one employee out from the rest of the
employees.”133 In her December 6, 2007 email to both Rylatt and McKinney, Tate
further explained that “[s]eparating two employees from the rest of the office goes
against what I am trying to accomplish. And, as I stated to Ronda, it is not fair to give
130
Rec. Doc. 41-14, pp. 74 and 76.
Rec. Doc. 41-14, p. 74.
132
Rec. Doc. 41-11, p. 7.
133
Rec. Doc. 41-11, p. 9.
131
DM No. 1813
23
some employees an isolated office, while the rest are in cubicles.”134
Tate further
suggested that if there is noise in the main hallway, the door to the business office could
be closed, or a sign could be posted on the main door which stated “something to the
effect of ‘Quiet, please—employees working.”135 In her affidavit, Tate also attested to
advising Rylatt that Schilling “could be given some ear plugs.”136
Upon learning of Tate’s denial of her request, Schilling submitted an email to
Rylatt and McKinney seeking reconsideration of this decision, further explaining her
medical conditions and need for concentration in her job position.137
According to
Schilling, she received no response to her reconsideration request.138 However, Connie
Standige testified that she did have a conversation with Schilling about the noise
concerns in response to her reconsideration request.139
Standige testified that she
instructed other DOTD employees using Nextel two way radios not to talk on their
radios in the office anymore to reduce the noise in the business office.140
In March and April of 2008, Schilling’s rheumatologist, Dr. Shannon, also
submitted two written requests to DOTD for the installation of a “sound barrier between
her and a noise filled environment” to assist her with ability to concentrate and increase
her productivity; in the latter letter, Dr. Shannon specifically referenced a door as one
such sound barrier.141 On April 2, 2008, Rylatt attested to the fact that she, Schilling,
and McKinney met where she offered several different offices with doors for Schilling to
use, but Schilling “was not capable of making a decision that day” so she told Schilling
134
Rec. Doc. 41-14, pp. 74-75.
Rec. Doc. 41-14, p. 74.
136
Rec. Doc. 21-6, p. 2.
137
Rec. Doc. 41-14, p. 76.
138
Rec. Doc. 44-3, p. 71.
139
Rec. Doc. 21-5, p. 35.
140
Rec. Doc. 21-5, p. 36.
141
Rec. Doc. 21-7 and 21-8.
135
DM No. 1813
24
to think about it.142 In contrast, Schilling testified that, although McKinney told her that
DOTD was “thinking about offering [her] an office across the hallway,” this thought
never materialized.143 The evidence shows that Schilling spoke with Cardwell about her
request for a door later that year, which triggered Cardwell emailing both Tate and Linda
Peloquin, Headquarters Human Resources Employee Relations Manager,144 about
Schilling’s requests, including reinstallation of her office door.145
In 2010, Schilling
along with other DOTD employees contacted the DOTD compliance office in Baton
Rouge to discuss their individual complaints and had at least one meeting with them.146
Inevitably, in February of 2011, DOTD sent Schilling a letter stating “[w]e are installing a
door leading to your work area to minimize outside noise.”147 The door was reinstalled
on March 10, 2011, approximately one month before the EEOC site inspection was
initially scheduled.148
DOTD argues that because it made other suggestions in response to Schilling’s
request for the reinstallation of a door to her office (i.e., posting of a sign on the main
door stating “Quiet Please—Employees Working”; moving Schilling to an office across
the hallway with a door; relocating other employees so Schilling could have an office
with a door), it provided her with reasonable accommodations as required by the
ADA.149 Hence, DOTD submits that it not only offered reasonable accommodations to
142
Rec. Doc. 21-20.
Rec. Doc. 41-4, p. 89. She further testified that no one else offered her another office.
144
Susan Pellegrin testified that Linda Peloquin supervised Cardwell and was responsible for “the
employee grievance process and served as a discipline specialist also, and she also supervised the
trainer.” Rec. Doc. 41-10, p. 19.
145
Rec. Doc. 44-12, p. 90.
146
Rec. Doc. 41-12, pp. 4-6; Rec. Doc. 41-5, p. 72.
147
Rec. Doc. 44-10, pp. 10 and 15.
148
Rec. Doc. 41-5, p. 27.
149
Rec. Doc. 21-5, pp. 39 and 90; Rec. Doc. 21-6, p. 2; Rec. Doc. 41-5, p. 249; Rec. Doc. 41-11, pp. 5960.
143
DM No. 1813
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Schilling’s
request,
but
that
Schilling’s
refusal
to
accept
these
reasonable
accommodations was unjustified and demonstrated her refusal to engage in the
interactive process.
As previously noted, all inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to
the non-movant. The Court finds that Schilling has provided evidentiary support that
creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether DOTD did, in fact, offer any
alternative accommodations and whether these accommodations were reasonable.
The Court further finds that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that DOTD failed to
engage in the interactive process regarding Schilling’s requests for the reinstallation of a
door to her office in 2007 and 2008. Accordingly, DOTD’s motion shall be denied as to
Schilling’s claims of failure to provide reasonable accommodations and engage in the
interactive process as to her request for the reinstallation of an office door.
c. Recovery of Punitive Damages from Government Agency Under
the ADA
As a governmental agency, DOTD correctly argues that, as a matter of law,
Schilling is unable to recover punitive damages under the ADA. The law is clear that
punitive damages “are unavailable in an ADA action where the defendant is a
‘government, government agency or political subdivision.’”150 The Court further notes,
however, that after reviewing the Complaints, Schilling does not appear to be seeking to
recover said damages.
Nevertheless, to the extent Schilling is seeking punitive
damages for her ADA claims, the Court finds that as a matter of law punitive damages
are unavailable.
150
Appleberry v. Fort Worth Independent School Dist., 2012 WL 5076039, at *4 (N.D.Tx. Oct. 17,
2012)(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1)).
DM No. 1813
26
d. Worsening Health
DOTD contends that, because Schilling’s treating physicians have not been
designated as experts, they cannot testify as to causation or offer an opinion as to
whether DOTD’s alleged failure to accommodate caused Schilling’s health condition to
worsen. Putting this argument aside, DOTD further argues that even if the Court were
to consider the testimony of Schilling’s physicians, D.C. Carter testified that any number
of things could have caused Plaintiff’s condition to worsen. Schilling does not dispute
the fact that D.C. Carter listed other possible causes for Schilling’s worsening
conditions. However, Schilling argues that D.C. Carter’s testimony that DOTD’s failure
and/or delay in providing her accommodations had a “snowballing effect” on her health,
such that she experienced greater stress which exacerbated her inflammation. The
Court finds, however, that D.C. Carter’s testimony as to causation is speculative as she
has not been designated as an expert. Furthermore, while D.C. Carter testified that
Schilling’s job may have been a factor, she plainly stated that she could not “blame”
Schilling’s worsening condition “on any one thing.”151
When the Court turns its attention to the testimony of Schilling’s rheumatologist, it
becomes more evident that Schilling cannot defeat DOTD’s motion on this issue. In
particular, Dr. Shannon testified that he did not see an overall change in Schilling’s
condition from the time he began treating her in 2006 through 2012.152 He further
testified that a person with fibromyalgia “will have good and bad days, depending on
multiple factors, and it’s not necessarily isolated to a work-related event that’s going to
affect her overall state of health. It will – it will come into the factors, but there’s also
151
152
Rec. Doc. 41-6, pp. 68-69.
Rec. Doc. 44-6, p. 20.
DM No. 1813
27
family situations, there’s lifestyle situations, there’s socioeconomic situations.”153
Therefore, considering the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds
that no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that DOTD’s failure to provide reasonable
accommodations to Schilling caused her medical conditions to worsen. Hence, DOTD’s
first Motion for Partial Summary Judgment shall be granted as to this issue.
2. Analysis of DOTD’s Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
In its second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, DOTD argues that there are
no genuine issues of material fact on Schilling’s claims of harassment, retaliation, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. In response, Schilling has filed an opposition
in which she counters and addresses each of DOTD’s arguments except for one:
Schilling’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The law is clear that “[i]f a
party fails to assert a legal reason why summary judgment should not be granted, that
ground is waived and cannot be considered on appeal.”154 Considering the arguments
and evidentiary support provided by DOTD, the motion for partial summary judgment is
granted in favor of DOTD as to Schilling’s intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim.
a. Disability-Based Harassment/Hostile Work Environment Claim
Shilling has alleged that she was harassed and subjected to a hostile work
environment in retaliation for requesting reasonable accommodations in violation of the
ADA and the LEDL.
“In interpreting Louisiana’s employment discrimination laws,
[Louisiana’s state] courts have relied upon federal statutes and the interpreting federal
153
154
Rec. Doc. 44-6, p. 19.
Kennan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 262 (5th Cir. 2002).
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jurisprudence.”155 Therefore, Plaintiff’s workplace harassment claims will be analyzed
under the ADA framework.
Disability-based workplace harassment claims under the ADA have been
recognized by the Fifth Circuit since 2001.156 In order to succeed on such a claim under
both the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate the following:
(1) that she belongs to a protected group; (2) that she was subjected to
unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment complained of was
based on her disability or disabilities; (4) that the harassment
complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment;
and (5) that the employer knew or should have known of the
harassment and failed to take prompt, remedial action.157
Within the Fifth Circuit, the legal standard for workplace harassment is high.158 “For
workplace abuse to rise to the level of an actionable offense the ‘disability-based
harassment must be sufficiently pervasive or severe to alter the conditions of
employment and create an abusive working environment.’”159 In determining whether a
work environment is abusive, the court must consider the totality of circumstances
including such factors as “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity,
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and
whether it unreasonably interferes with the employee’s work performance.”160
“The
environment must be deemed ‘both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a
155
Conine ex rel. Estate of Addie v. Universal Oil Products Co., 966 So.2d 763, 767 (La.App. 2 Cir.
9/26/07).
156
Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001)(hereinafter Flowers).
157
Id., at 235-36.
158
Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Systems, 321 F.3d 503, 509 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Flowers v. S.
Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc., 321 F.3d at 236 (citations omitted)).
159
Id.
160
Flowers, 321 F.3d at 236.
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reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did
perceive to be so.’”161
The bulk of DOTD’s argument turns on whether Schilling was subjected to
unwelcome harassment. Specifically, DOTD argues that the alleged harassing behavior
does not rise to the necessary severe and pervasive nature to create a hostile working
environment. DOTD further argues that Shilling does not contest that her complaints
were responded to or investigated. In response, Schilling submits that her case is much
stronger than the disability-based harassment in Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs.
Inc.162 The Court disagrees.
In Flowers, the Fifth Circuit upheld a jury finding that the evidence demonstrated
that the conduct to which the plaintiff (Flowers) had been subjected was sufficiently
severe and pervasive to constitute harassment. Flowers worked primarily as a doctor’s
medical assistant at Southern Regional Physician Services, Inc., from September 1,
1993 until November 13, 1995. In early March of 1995, Flowers’ immediate supervisor
learned of her HIV infection; eight months later, Flowers was terminated. Notably, at
the time plaintiff learned of her HIV status, she and her immediate supervisor “were
close friends, often going to lunch, drinks, and movies together and once even taking a
trip to Mardi Gras in New Orleans.”163 The evidence revealed that almost immediately
after Flowers’ supervisor learned of her condition, she would no longer go to lunch with
her and ceased socializing with her.
Flowers’ supervisor “began intercepting [her]
telephone calls, eavesdropping on her conversations, and hovering around [her]
161
Aryain v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex. LP, 534 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2008)(quoting Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998)).
162
Flowers, 321 F.3d at 236.
163
Id.
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desk.”164 The evidence also showed that Southern Regionals’ president “became very
distant [from Flowers], when the two used to get along very well.”165 He “refused to
shake Flowers’ hand and would go to great pains to circumvent her office to get to other
parts of the hospital.”166 After revealing her HIV-status to her supervisor, “Flowers was
required to undergo four random drug tests within a one-week period;” whereas in the
past, she had only been required to submit to one random drug test.167 Prior to being
informed of Flowers’ condition, her immediate supervisor “appeared more than satisfied
with Flowers’ work performance…However, within the month after revealing her HIVpositive condition to [her supervisor], Flowers was written up for the first time” in
approximately one and one-half years.168 Thereafter, Flowers was written up two more
times and on each instance, placed on a ninety day probation period. Prior to the
second probationary period, Flowers “was lured into a meeting under false pretenses”
where the hospital president was in attendance and uttered vulgar sexual
accusations.169 Within eight months of her immediate supervisor learning of her HIVstatus, Flowers was fired.
Unlike Flowers, the Court finds after considering the evidence presented by
Schilling in a light most favorable to her, no reasonable juror could find that she
experienced sufficiently pervasive or severe treatment that altered the conditions of her
employment to create a hostile working environment.
164
The vast amount of evidence
Id.
Id. at 236-37.
166
Id. at 237.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id. Flowers was terminated from her position on November 13, 1995.
165
DM No. 1813
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produced by Schilling in support of her harassment claim does not rise to the level of
frequency or offensiveness as the plaintiff in Flowers.
For instance, Schilling focuses on two specific comments made by Connie
Standige during the April 22, 2008 meeting with various supervisors to discuss her
accommodation requests.
During this meeting Schilling testified that Standige
commented that she did not like ten hour workdays and then began to “bombard Ms.
Schilling with questions that embarrassed her and made her feel humiliated, intimidated,
scared, and threatened.”170 Schilling claims Standige also asked her about her leave
time, specifically inquiring as follows: “You don’t have much leave time. And, you don’t
have much paid leave time left. Then what are you going to do?”171 Schilling testified
that this made her feel like her job had been threatened.
During this same meeting,
Shilling also testified that Ms. Standige “sarcastically” asked her if she could go
barefoot, and then told Schilling she could go barefoot as long as she could not see her
feet. Schilling “found this to be very insulting, degrading, and belittling.”
Even if the Court assumes that everything Schilling claims of Standige is true,
her actions, while insensitive and rude, would not be sufficient as a matter of law to
state a claim of hostile environment harassment.172 Moreover, the Court finds that,
based on the evidence, these isolated comments occurred on only one occasion--during
the April 2008 meeting. Schilling testified that outside of this one meeting, Standige
never asked her about the amount of leave she had left again or talked to her about
170
Rec. Doc. 42, p. 6.
Rec. Doc. 22-3, p. 123.
172
See, McConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Corp., 131 F.3d 558, 560, 564 (5th Cir. 1998). The Fifth
Circuit found no actionable disability-based workplace harassment where an employer made “insensitive
and rude” comments to an employee “that she ‘better get well this time,’ and that he would ‘no longer
tolerate her health problems.’”
171
DM No. 1813
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“going barefoot” again.173 In fact, based on her recollection, Schilling testified that these
specific issues were never discussed again with her while at District 62.174
Such
infrequent and isolated statements cannot give rise to a severe and perverse
environment necessary for a hostile work environment.
“[A] court must be mindful of
the fact that ‘simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless
extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions
of employment.’”175 For similar reasons, Schilling’s contention that she was being
harassed as a result of Tate sharing information about her health conditions on two
occasions, or looked at by Standige and Tate two or three times per month, does not
create a genuine issue of material fact that she was subjected to a hostile work
environment.176 Such behavior fails to rise to the level of being severe or pervasive due
to the limited occurrences and the nature of the behavior.177
Schilling also contends that statements made by Tate and Standige about
contacting “legal” amounted to harassment. However, Schilling testified that she did not
know the motive behind the comments. Schilling testified that she “never could get the
gist on what – why they were contacting legal.”178
Further, Tate testified that she
contacted legal when Schilling made her requests under the ADA so she could receive
173
Rec. Doc. 22-3, p. 124.
Rec. Doc. 22-3, pp. 117-18.
175
Ballard v. Healthsouth Corp., 147 F.Supp.2d 529, 536 (N.D. Tx. 2001)(quoting Shepherd v.
Comptroller of Public Accounts of State of Texas, 168 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1999)).
176
Schilling admitted that she could not recall Tate making any other such statements. Schilling further
testified that Tate discussed her need for accommodations with her secretary, and with another employee
who had requested an accommodation in her schedule. According to Schilling’s testimony, Tate denied
one of her co-worker’s requested schedule changes because she had denied the same request made by
Schilling. Rec. Doc. 22-3, pp. 130-31.
177
Rec. Doc. 22-3, pp. 125-127. Schilling further described this behavior as looking her up and down
“like they were checking her out.”
178
Rec. Doc. 41-4, pp. 121-22.
174
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guidance as to her responsibilities.179 Based on the evidence in the record, it is clear
that Schilling cannot show that such statements were directed at her because of her
health conditions to amount to harassment.
For similar reasons, Schilling cannot show that an email sent by Standige to all
District 62 employees regarding the Dress Code amounts to harassing behavior. On
March 13, 2008, Standige sent her email as a “routine safety policy email” on specific
safety policies in effect.180 In the email, certain prohibited practices were highlighted,
including the requirement that employees must wear DOTD approved safety vests and
hard hats or soft caps when exposed to moving roadway traffic, construction equipment,
or in work zones.181 The email further explained that t-shirts are no longer acceptable,
and that slippers and thongs are prohibited for all employees.182 Three days later,
Schilling’s chiropractor sent a request that she be allowed to wear slipper-like shoes to
work.183
Based on the chronology of events, Schilling simply cannot show that
Standige’s email was sent because of her request for accommodations to wear slipperlike shoes.
Schilling further testified that she felt she had been harassed because “nothing
that she asked for was given to her. [She] felt like [she] was being made fun of.184 She
stated that Standige and Tate made a “mockery of [her]” based on the statements made
by Standige during the April 2008 meeting and by denying her the schedule change she
had requested. Schilling further testified that she “felt like [she] was being watched” by
179
Rec. Doc. 21-6, p. 2.
Rec. Doc. 22-4.
181
Rec. Doc. 22-4.
182
Rec. Doc. 22-4.
183
Rec. Doc. 22-15.
184
Rec. Doc. 22-3, p. 116.
180
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Standige and Tate.185 The Court finds that the foregoing evidence offered in support of
Schilling’s harassment claim, turns on Shilling’s subjective belief that she was being
harassed because of her disability. However, it is well established that “[a]n employee’s
subjective belief that he was discriminated against, standing alone, is not adequate
evidence to survive a motion for summary judgment.”186 Therefore, such statements
standing alone simply do not create a genuine issue of material fact.
Additionally, Schilling’s contention that Tate’s brief office visit amounted to
harassment must also fail. Schilling testified that at some point after the meeting in April
of 2008, Tate stopped by her office one morning with a notebook and folders and stated
“Well, I want to see what you do.”187 The evidence shows that the meeting lasted for
approximately one hour to four hours at the most.188 Schilling said that would be “fine”
and instructed Tate to “[h]ave a seat.”189 Schilling further testified that she told Tate
about her different job functions. However, Schilling admitted that Standige and Tate
“visited everyone’s desk to see what everyone did” and that she “was just in the mix.”190
Tate further attested to the fact that her purpose for in observing Schilling, as well as
other employees, was so she could be “aware of the duties of each employee under
[her] supervision.”191 Based on the evidence, this one time visit by Schilling’s supervisor
for the legitimate purpose of observing her job duties does not amount to the necessary
severe or pervasive level to be characterized as harassment.
185
Rec. Doc. 22-3, p. 125.
Raina v. Veneman, 152 Fed.Appx. 348, 350 (5th Cir. 2005)(citing Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc.,
209 F.3d 419, 427 (5th Cir. 2000)).
187
Rec. Doc. 41-4, p. 218.
188
Rec. Doc. 22-11; Rec. Doc. 22-6.
189
Rec. Doc. 41-4, p. 218.
190
Rec. Doc. 41-4, p. 218-19.
191
Rec. Doc. 22-6, p. 1.
186
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And yet, even if the Court were to assume, arguendo, that Schilling had been
subjected to severe or pervasive harassment, her claim would still fail as she cannot,
and has not attempted to show that the alleged harassment affected a term, condition,
or privilege of employment.192 Schilling testified to the fact that while she was employed
at DOTD she was never demoted, issued a letter of reprimand or counseling, or ever
suspended from work.193 She further testified that she never received a negative rating
on a performance review, had her work hour involuntarily reduced, or was transferred to
another job or location.194 In addition, Schilling’s salary was never reduced, and unless
there was a freeze on all employee raises, she continued to receive her annual raise
yearly.195 The evidence further shows that DOTD considered Schilling to be a model
employee and recognized her as District 62’s employee of the quarter in October of
2008.196 Rylatt also testified that Schilling always received “above average” ratings on
her performance evaluations.197
Accordingly, the Court finds that, considering all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to Schilling, she has failed to satisfy her burden of creating a genuine issue of
material fact to defeat summary judgment on her harassment claim. Hence, DOTD’s
motion shall be granted as to Schilling’s claim for disability-based workplace
harassment/hostile work environment.
192
In her opposition, Schilling states that DOTD’s repeated denials of her requests for reasonable
accommodations “stressed her out terribly and affected her work.” Rec. Doc. 42, p. 13.
193
Rec. Doc. 44-2, pp. 141-42.
194
Rec. Doc. 44-2, pp. 141-43.
195
Rec. Doc. 44-2, pp. 141 and 143.
196
Rec. Doc. 44-11, p. 8.
197
Rec. Doc. 44-9, p. 3.
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36
b. Retaliation Claims: Based on Reasonable Accommodations
DOTD contends that Schilling’s claims of retaliation must be dismissed because
she cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Specifically, Schilling cannot
show an adverse employment action, she cannot establish a causal connection, and
DOTD has a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. DOTD further argues
that even if Schilling could satisfy her burden, she cannot show that her disability was
the “but for” cause of DOTD’s decision.
To establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation, a plaintiff must show that
(1) she engaged in an activity protected by the ADA, (2) she suffered an adverse
employment action, and (3) a causal connection between the protected act and the
adverse action.198 If the plaintiff establishes his prima facie case of retaliation, then the
“defendant must come forward with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action. If that reason is provided, Plaintiff must produce evidence
that the proffered reason is a pretext and that but for his protected activity, the adverse
employment action would not have occurred.”199 In other words, “the employee must
show that ‘but for’ the protected activity, the adverse employment action would not have
occurred.”200
The parties dispute whether Schilling can establish the second and third
elements necessary to establish a prima facie claim of retaliation. As to the second
element, to prove that an employer took an adverse employment action of “sufficient
seriousness to support” a retaliation claim “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable
198
Seaman v. CSPH, Inc., 179 F.3d 297, 301 (5th Cir. 1999).
Butler v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 838 F.Supp.2d 473, 495 (M.D.La. 2012)(citing Tabatchnik v. Continental
Airlines, 262 Fed.Appx. 674, 676 (5th Cir. 2008)(unpublished opinion)(2008 WL 248595)).
200
Seaman v. CSPH, 197 F.3d 297, 301 (5th Cir. 1999).
199
DM No. 1813
37
employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this
context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.” 201
Considering the third element, “[a] ‘causal link’ is established when the evidence
demonstrates that ‘the employer’s decision to terminate was based in part on
knowledge of the employee’s protected activity.”202 The Fifth Circuit has recognized
three indicia of causation in the context of employment retaliation: “(1) the absence of
any reference to the conduct at issue in the employee’s disciplinary record, (2) deviation
from the employer’s customary ‘policy and procedures in terminating the employee,’ and
(3) temporal proximity between the termination and protected conduct.”203 The Fifth
Circuit has also explained that “[t]he timing of the adverse employment action can be a
significant, although not necessarily determinative, factor.”204
Schilling contends that the following actions constitute adverse employment
actions under the ADA: (1) the instances she asserted as harassment; (2) the change in
Schilling’s work schedule to five (5) eight (8) hour days; and (3) Schilling’s termination.
As an initial matter, the Court adopts its prior analysis and finding that Schilling did not
suffer an adverse employment action as a result of her alleged harassment, and further
finds for the same reasons, that Schilling cannot satisfy her prima facie case of
201
Picard v. St. Tammany Parish, 611 F.Supp.2d 608, 625 (E.D.La. 2009)(quoting Burlington Northern
and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)).
202
Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., Inc., 238 F.3d 674, 684 (5th Cir. 2001)(quoting Sherrod v. American
Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1122 (5th Cir. 1998)).
203
Stewart v. RSC Equipment Rental, Inc., 485 Fed.Appx. 649, 653 (5th Cir. 2012)(quoting Nowlin v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 33 F.3d 498, 508 (5th Cir. 1994)).
204
Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir. 1995). See also, Shirley v. Chrysler
First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1992). In fact, the Fifth Circuit has held that the existence of a causal
nexus when 14 months had lapsed between the protected activity and the adverse employment, where a
party did not rely on temporal proximity alone; rather the plaintiff offered additional evidence that only
after filing her EEOC Complaint, did her employer complain to her about filing her EEOC Complaint and
criticize her work performance. See also Russell v. University of Texas of Permian Basin, 234 Fed.Appx.
195 (5th Cir. 2007) (discussing temporal proximity).
DM No. 1813
38
retaliation as to this claim. However, the Court will address whether the remaining two
actions satisfy the adverse and causal connection elements necessary to establish a
prima facie case of retaliation below.
i.
Business Section Employees’ October 2008 Schedule Change
Schilling contends that her schedule changed in October of 2008 in retaliation for
other requests she had made for a modified schedule. DOTD admits that Tate informed
all of the business section employees on October 23, 2008, that a new work schedule
would be going into effect on November 3, 2008, that would apply across the board.
Specifically, all business section employees working in District 62 would have five (5)
eight (8) hour workdays.
Learning of this new schedule change, Schilling made a
request under the ADA to have her schedule changed back to four (4) nine (9) hour
days with half a day on Friday.
The Court finds the fact that Schilling sought to have her schedule revert back to
its previous schedule is significant, because it shows that she was not dissuaded from
requesting an accommodation to her schedule. This works against Schilling’s argument
that this schedule change was a materially adverse employment action.
Recently this
this Court, relying on sound Fifth Circuit jurisprudence, also found that a change in an
employee’s work schedule did not rise to a material adverse employment action
because it was basically a shift change that had no effect on compensation or the total
hours worked.205
In Schilling’s case, she, like all of the employees in District 62’s
business section, would have to work five (5) eight (8) hour days per week. Schilling
has neither argued nor presented evidence showing that this shift change altered the
205
McKneely v. Zachary Police Dept., 2013 WL 4585160, *10 (M.D.La. Aug. 28, 2013) (discussing Lusute
v. Louisiana Dept. of Social Services, 479 F. App’x 553, 2012 WL 1889684, *2 (5th Cir. May 25,
2012)(citing Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare Syst., L.L.C., 277 F.3d 757, 769 (5th Cir. 2001))
DM No. 1813
39
number of hours she was required to work or her compensation. Hence the Court finds
that this change in schedule did not amount to an adverse employment action.
Even assuming that the October 2008 schedule change amounted to an adverse
employment action, Schilling could not carry her burden of establishing a prima facie
case of retaliation because she could not satisfy the causation element.
Schilling
contends that the modified schedule was implemented based upon a request she made
six months earlier for a schedule change.
The sixth month gap in time between
Schilling’s requested modification in her schedule in April of 2008 and the October 2008
District 62 schedule change is too far apart, without more, to establish a causal
connection.206 As additional evidence, Schilling offers her own testimony that she felt
the schedule change was retaliatory based on Tate’s previous comment that she was
tired of accommodating people.207
Therefore, the Court finds that the additional
evidence offered by Plaintiff to show causation—her own subjective belief and
conclusory allegations about Tate’s decision being retaliatory—is insufficient to defeat
summary judgment and does not lend itself to establishing the causation element.208
Accordingly, the Court finds that DOTD’s motion shall be granted as to this retaliation
claim.
ii.
Schilling’s May 2012 Termination
Schilling contends that her May 7, 2012 termination from DOTD was in retaliation
for her recurring exercises of protected activities. She argues that as DOTD’s continued
denials of her requests from 2008 up until her termination required her to use and
206
Raggs v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 471-72 (5th Cir. 2002)(holding that five month period
alone is insufficient to establish a causal link).
207
Rec. Doc. 44-2, pp. 147-49.
208
Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 2002).
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40
ultimately exhaust her leave resulting in her termination. Schilling’s wrongful discharge
claim was subject of her 2012 EEOC Charge of Discrimination; Schilling recently
received her Right to Sue letter and it has been filed into the record as part of her
Amended Complaint.209
DOTD does not contend that Schilling cannot satisfy the first two elements of her
prima facie case. Rather, the focus of DOTD’s argument is on the causal connection,
and DOTD’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating Schilling. While the
Court agrees with Schilling’s position that it may consider the intervening period of time
for other evidence of retaliatory animus and that recurring retaliatory animus may be
sufficient to satisfy the elements of causation, the time periods are far too attenuated to
enable Schilling to show causation here.
Relying on Schilling’s own documented evidence within her first EEOC Charge,
Schilling’s requests for reasonable accommodations of her supervisors span from 2007
through 2009. She also documented her 2010 Complaint to DOTD Compliance which
was joined by several of her co-workers regarding their individual requests. Other than
this, Schilling documented no additional requests for accommodations past that point in
time leading up to her termination on May 16, 2012.210 And yet, the evidence does
show that during this three year time span, certain accommodations Schilling had
requested were actually provided to her, including her handicap parking spot in the rear
of the building, the door to her office was reinstalled, and she had reverted back to the
four nine hour days and one half day work schedule. The Court finds that, when it
considers the intervening time period between Schilling’s original requests for
209
210
Rec. Doc. 54 and Rec. Doc. 55-1.
Rec. Doc. 13-2.
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41
accommodations and her termination, the activities are far too attenuated to be deemed
causally related. Accordingly, the Court finds that Schilling has failed to produce any
evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact that could lead a reasonable trier
of fact to find that her termination was causally connected to her requests under the
ADA.
Even assuming Schilling could establish prima facie case, DOTD has articulated
a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for her termination and Plaintiff cannot show that
it fired her “but for” her repeated requests for accommodations.
The undisputed
evidence shows that Schilling went on leave on October 11, 2011 and did not return to
work thereafter.211
DOTD has provided additional evidence that shows that on
December 5, 2011, Schilling exhausted all of her FMLA leave, and that as of November
15, 2011, Schilling had less than eight hours of sick leave.212 The evidence further
shows that, in spite of her absence and lack of leave time, DOTD did not terminate
Schilling from her position at DOTD until May 16, 2012.213 Schilling’s termination was
described as a Non-Disciplinary Removal and authorized under Civil Service Rule
12.6(a)(1) since Schilling was “unable to perform the essential functions of [her] job due
to illness or medical disability and [she had] fewer than eight (8) hours of sick leave to
[her] credit and [her] job must be performed without further interruption.”214 As a nondisciplinary, no-fault separation, Schilling was not disqualified from certain reemployment opportunities.215 Additionally, another district court within the Fifth Circuit
recently
found
that
an
employer
had
211
Rec. Doc. 22-8.
Rec. Doc. 22-8; Rec. Doc. 22-9.
213
Rec. Doc. 22-8.
214
Rec. Doc. 22-8.
215
Rec. Doc. 22-8.
212
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produced
evidence
of
a
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating an employee because she had exhausted her
FMLA leave and failed to return to work after her FMLA leave was exhausted.216
Accordingly, the Court finds that DOTD has satisfied its burden of production in support
of its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Schilling’s termination.
Because DOTD has satisfied its burden, Schilling must adduce sufficient
evidence that the proffered reason is merely pretext for retaliation. Essentially, Schilling
“must show that ‘but for’ the protected activity, the adverse employment action would
not have occurred.”217 Schilling relies upon an award she received in October of 2008
where she was recognized as the employee of the quarter.
According to the award,
Schilling was described as “one of District 62’s greatest assets,” “meticulous and well
organized,” “a team player,” someone who “never leaves a job undone and works sick
many days to ensure that the District’s needs are met,” and “was able to create
Purchase Orders to extend funding, thereby enabling the District to utilize these funds
despite the extreme stress she was under.”218 The Court finds that while this evidence
shows that Schilling was able to perform her job functions in 2008, it does not show that
DOTD’s proffered reason for her termination in 2012—over three years after she was
recognized as the employee of the quarter and for exhaustion of her leave—was
pretextual. If anything, this evidence calls into question whether Schilling was, in fact,
qualified for her position during her six month absence from work.
Schilling also refers to her deposition testimony wherein she stated it was her
belief that had her requests for reasonable accommodations been granted and her
216
Johnson v. Dallas County Southwestern Institute of Forensic Science & Medical Examiner Dept., 2014
WL 177284, *7 (N.D.Tx. Jan. 16, 2014).
217
Seaman v. CSPH, Inc., 179 F.3d 297, 301 (5th Cir. 1999).
218
Rec. Doc. 44-11.
DM No. 1813
43
stress level reduced, she would not have had to exhaust as much leave, and therefore,
would not have been terminated for exhausting her leave.
Once again, however,
Schilling’s own subjective beliefs cannot satisfy her burden of production on summary
judgment. Accordingly, the Court finds that Schilling has failed to produce evidence that
would enable a reasonable jury to find that DOTD’s proferred reason for terminating
Schilling’s employment is pretextual.
Hence, DOTD’s second Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment shall be granted as to Schilling’s retaliation claim arising out of her
termination.
III.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the first Motion for Partial Summary Judgment219 filed by Defendant,
Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD) is hereby GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART.
Furthermore, the second Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment220 filed by Defendant, Department of Transportation and Development
(DOTD) is hereby GRANTED and Schilling’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, disability-based workplace harassment/hostile work environment arising under
the ADA and LEDL, and retaliation claims arising under the ADA are hereby dismissed
with prejudice in favor of DOTD.
As to DOTD’s first Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the motion is
GRANTED as to the prescription of Schilling’s claims for failure to accommodate arising
out of her April 2008 request for a modified work schedule and failure to engage in the
interactive process; Schilling’s claim for failure to accommodate her four (4) ten (10)
hour schedule request; Schilling’s claim for punitive damages; and Schilling’s claim that
219
220
Rec. Doc. 21.
Rec. Doc. 22.
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DOTD’s failure to provide her with reasonable accommodations caused her health to
worsen. Accordingly, these claims shall be dismissed with prejudice in favor of DOTD.
DOTD’s first Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED as to Schilling’s
qualification as an individual with a disability, and as to Schilling’s claims for failure to
accommodate and failure to engage in the interactive process arising out of her
requests for a handicapped parking spot, to wear slipper-like shoes to work, and for the
reinstallation of a door to her office.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on July 28, 2014.
S
JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
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