Hoffman v. Jindal et al

Filing 201

RULING AND ORDER granting 198 , 199 , and 200 Unopposed Motions to Intervene. The Petitions of Intervention filed by Todd Wessinger, Daniel Irish, and Shedran wiliams shall be filed into the record in this matter. Signed by Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder-Doomes on 7/29/2016. (LLH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JESSIE HOFFMAN, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 12-796-JJB-EWD

BOBBY JINDAL, GOVERNOR
OF LOUISIANA, ET AL.

RULING AND ORDER ON UNOPPOSED MOTIONS TO INTERVENE
Before the Court are three Motions to Intervene, filed by Todd Wessinger, Daniel Irish,
and Shedran Williams (collectively, “proposed Intervenors”).1 Proposed Intervenors seek to
intervene in this suit pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) & (b). The proposed Intervenors assert that
counsel for Jessie Hoffman was contacted and has no objection to their intervention in this case.2
Additionally, the time period for opposing the Motions has passed and no party has submitted an
opposition.
For the reasons set forth herein, the Motions to Intervene filed by Wessinger, Irish, and
Williams are GRANTED.3

1

R. Docs. 198, 199, 200.
R. Doc. 198-1 at 3; R. Doc. 199-1 at 3; R. Doc. 200-1 at 3.
3
Magistrate judges may “hear and determine” non-dispositive pre-trial motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
“A motion to intervene is considered a non-dispositive motion.” Johnson v. Qualawash Holdings, LLC, 2013 WL
3050021, at *2 (W.D. La. June 17, 2013) (citing S.E.C. v. Koirnman, 2006 WL 148733, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 18,
2006)). See also, Stephens v. State Farm and Cas. Co., 2010 WL 1292719, at *3 (E.D. La. March 8, 2010) (“The
portion of Road Home’s motion seeking leave to intervene is a non-dispositive matter which I may address by order.”).
2

I.

Background
A. Original Complaint
Plaintiff Jessie Hoffman is currently incarcerated under a sentence of death at the Louisiana

State Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana (“Angola”). On December 20, 2012, Hoffman filed a
Complaint against former Governor Bobby Jindal, James D. LeBlanc, Secretary of Louisiana
Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Warden Burl Cain, Assistant Warden Angela
Norwood, and the State of Louisiana through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections
(“DOC”) (collectively “Defendants”), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983.4 Hoffman challenges the constitutionality of his execution, asserting that the
undisclosed method of execution in Louisiana constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.5 Although no date was set for his execution when he filed
the Complaint, Hoffman seeks a permanent injunction barring Defendants from executing him
through unconstitutional means.6 Hoffman also seeks a declaratory judgment that the United
States Constitution prohibits the DOC from carrying out an execution without first promulgating
a viable protocol and providing him with a certified copy of said protocol with sufficient time for
review before any scheduled execution date.7
B. Sepulvado Intervention
On January 23, 2013, Christopher Sepulvado, an Angola inmate incarcerated under a
sentence of death, filed a Motion to Intervene in this action.8 On January 31, 2013, Sepulvado
filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction,9 seeking to stay his execution, which was scheduled for

4

R. Doc. 1.
R. Doc. 1 at 5.
6
R. Doc. 1 at 2, 5.
7
R. Doc. 1 at 5-6.
8
R. Docs. 11, 26.
9
R. Doc. 14.
5

2

February 13, 2013. The Court granted Sepulvado’s Motion to Intervene on February 6, 2013.10
On February 7, 2013, the Court granted Sepulvado’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and
stayed his execution “until further orders of this court.”11 Upon appellate review, the Fifth Circuit
reversed the preliminary injunction and stay of execution that was issued by this Court.12
Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2013).
C. Amended Complaint
While the appeal was pending, Hoffman and Sepulvado (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a
Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint on July 1, 2013, which the Court granted.13 The
Amended Complaint includes new allegations specific to a new execution protocol disclosed by
Defendants during discovery on June 18, 2013.14 In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs seek a
permanent injunction to prevent their executions and seek a declaratory judgment that Defendants
cannot execute Plaintiffs without allowing them access to counsel in the execution chamber.15
Plaintiffs also seek a declaratory judgment that it is unconstitutional for Defendants to carry out
an execution without first promulgating a viable protocol and providing Plaintiffs with a certified
copy of the applicable protocol within six months before any scheduled execution date. Plaintiffs
further seek a judgment ordering Defendants to timely notify Plaintiffs if the execution protocol is
revised.16 Plaintiffs assert that the additional claims are the result of Defendants’ practice of
revising the execution protocol on the eve of scheduled executions, not providing notice to the

10

R. Doc. 26.
R. Docs. 27, 28.
12
R. Doc. 103.
13
R. Docs. 65, 66.
14
R. Doc. 65 at 2-3.
15
R. Doc. 65-1 at 5.
16
Id.
11

3

condemned inmate of such revisions, and prohibiting access to counsel at the time the condemned
inmate is put to death.17
D. Hampton, Code, Brumfield Intervention
On January 8, 2014, Bobby L. Hampton and Nathaniel Code, two other inmates
incarcerated at Angola under sentences of death, filed Motions to Intervene in this matter.18 On
January 10, 2014, Kevan Brumfield, another inmate incarcerated at Angola under a sentence of
death, filed a Motion to Intervene in this matter.19 The three motions are nearly identical, seeking
intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) and (b) and asserting the same allegations against
Defendants as those made in the Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.20 On February 10, 2014, the
Court granted all three motions, allowing Hampton, Code, and Brumfield to intervene in this
matter.21
E. Second Amended Complaint
Before the Court granted these motions to intervene, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to
File Second Amended Complaint on January 17, 2014, which this Court granted.22 In the Second
Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert that Sepulvado was scheduled to be executed on February
5, 2014, but as of January 16, 2014, Defendants did not have any pentobarbital in their possession.
According to Plaintiffs, the written execution protocol provides for pentobarbital as the singular
lethal drug to be used in executions and requires the DOC to maintain 15 grams of unexpired
pentobarbital in stock within 30 days of any scheduled execution date. Plaintiffs assert that these
and other material deviations from the written protocol show a pattern of disregard for the very

17

R. Doc. 65 at 3.
R. Docs. 94, 95.
19
R. Doc. 101.
20
R. Docs. 94-1, 95-1, 101-2.
21
R. Doc. 120.
22
R. Docs. 104, 117.
18

4

protocol that is supposed to provide safeguards for the execution process and creates a substantial
risk of harm. Plaintiffs further assert that they are at a substantial risk of suffering a lingering or
unnecessarily painful death due to the nature of the drug itself, which may be expired and/or
obtained from unregulated and unlawful sources.23
Plaintiffs also challenge the constitutionality of their executions, whether performed
pursuant to the latest protocol that would require the use of expired and/or illegally-obtained drugs
and does not adequately protect Plaintiffs from cruel and unusual punishment, or performed
pursuant to a newly amended protocol with insufficient time for review and evaluation. Since
pentobarbital, the drug identified in the DOC’s last-disclosed execution protocol, is completely
unavailable in the United States for use in executions, Plaintiffs assert there is a substantial risk
that the drug will be changed at the last minute or illegally compounded in violation of Louisiana
Administrative Code §§ 46:LIII.2303, 2305, 2535, and will subject Plaintiffs to a substantial risk
of serious harm. Plaintiffs further assert that Defendants are in violation of the federal Controlled
Substances Act by dispensing a Schedule II Controlled Dangerous Substances not in the course of
professional practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose.24 Plaintiffs assert that Defendants’
past practices and current material deviations from their written execution protocol create a
substantial risk of harm due to the lack of safeguards and subject Plaintiffs and other similarly
situated condemned inmates to differential treatment, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Plaintiffs allege that such last-minute changes to the execution protocols and core
deviations from the written protocol put Plaintiffs at a substantial risk of a violation of the Ex Post
Facto Clause under Article I, § 10 of the Constitution, because the method of execution may

23
24

R. Doc. 118 at 2.
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 353(b), 829(a), 841(a)(1), and 843(a); 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a).
5

become more painful or protracted than the method in effect at the time they were originally
sentenced.
Plaintiffs also seek a declaratory judgment that the United States Constitution prohibits
Defendants from carrying out an execution without first promulgating a protocol that has been
found constitutional by this Court and abiding by the protocol when an execution takes place.
Plaintiffs also seek a judgment ordering Defendants to timely notify them if the protocol is revised.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ lack of transparency regarding the execution protocol violates
their First Amendment right of access to government proceedings and that the secrecy of the
protocol constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiffs further
seek a declaratory judgment that Defendants cannot execute them without allowing access to
counsel in the execution chamber from the time the strap-down team arrives until they are
pronounced dead.

Finally, Plaintiffs continue to seek a permanent injunction to prevent

Defendants from executing them through unconstitutional means.
F. Stay of Proceedings
On January 27, 2014, Sepulvado filed another Motion for a Stay of Execution, a Temporary
Restraining Order, a Preliminary Injunction, and an Order Under the All Writs Act Staying His
Execution, which was scheduled for February 5, 2014.25 On February 3, 2014, this Court issued
a Notice To Counsel, stating that the parties had discussed the pending motion and had agreed to
a 90-day Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”).26 On February 3, 2014, this Court also issued
an Order granting a TRO, thereby restraining, enjoining, and prohibiting Defendants and their
officers, agents, employees, and servants from executing Sepulvado for a period of 90 days from
the date of the Order, or through May 4, 2014, without requiring renewal by either party until such

25
26

R. Doc. 105.
R. Doc. 116.
6

date or until the Court had ruled on the merits of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction.27
On March 14, 2014, this Court extended the TRO through July 23, 2014.28
During a status conference held on May 7, 2014, the parties requested a stay of all
proceedings, which this Court granted.29 On May 28, 2014, the Court issued a Consent Order
staying all proceedings and discovery and setting aside all trial settings and other deadlines until
November 17, 2014, and prohibiting Defendants from carrying out “any executions of any of the
Plaintiffs while this stay is in effect.”30 On November 13, 2014, the Court issued another Consent
Order extending the stay of all proceedings and executions in this matter through June 25, 2015.31
On June 23, 2015, the Court issued a third Consent Order extending the stay of all proceedings
and executions in this case through July 11, 2016.32 On June 1, 2016, the Court issued a fourth
Consent Order, extending the stay of all proceedings and executions in this matter through January
8, 2018.33
G. Proposed Motions to Intervene
On June 28, 2016, proposed Intervenors filed the three Motions to Intervene that are
currently before the Court.34 The Motions to Intervene are nearly identical35 and raise the same
grounds for intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) & (b). Each Motion asserts that the proposed
Intervenor is entitled to intervene as a matter of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) and is also
permitted to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b).36 Further, the three proposed Intervenor’s
27

R. Doc. 119.
R. Doc. 155.
29
R. Doc. 174.
30
R. Doc. 178.
31
R. Doc. 184.
32
R. Doc. 188.
33
R. Doc. 197.
34
R. Docs. 198, 199, 200.
35
The only difference between the three Motions is proposed Intervenor Wessinger’s assertion that his sentence of
death has been vacated by this Court, but that he filed a Motion to Intervene out of an abundance of caution pending
resolution of his case before the Fifth Circuit. (R. Doc. 198-2 at 2 n.1).
36
R. Doc. 198-1 at 2; R. Doc. 199-1 at 2; R. Doc. 200-1 at 2.
28

7

Complaints are identical, challenging the constitutionality of each proposed Intervenor’s execution
and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.37 In addition to being
identical to each other, each of the proposed Intervenor’s Complaints contains a “Statement of
Claims” that is identical to the “Statement of Claims” contained in the Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Complaint.38 For the sake of brevity, the Court will not restate those claims and instead refers the
parties to the Court’s prior discussion of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint.39
II.

Law and Analysis
Proposed Intervenors seek to intervene in this suit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a).40 That

section provides that on “timely motion” the court must permit intervention by anyone who is
either: (1) given an unconditional right to intervene by federal statute; or (2) “claims an interest
relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that
disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect
its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.”41 Proposed Intervenors do
not assert that a federal statute grants them an unconditional right to intervene. Instead, they move
for intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).42
A. Timelines of the Motion to Intervene
“Whether leave to intervene is sought under section (a) or (b) of Rule 24, the application
must be timely.” Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 1977) (citations

37

R. Docs. 198-2, 199-2, 200-2.
R. Doc. 198-2 at 4-6; R. Doc. 199-2 at 4-6; R. Doc. 200-2 at 4-6; See R. Doc. 118 at 4-7.
39
See pages 3-5 of the instant Order.
40
R. Doc. 198-1; R. Doc. 199-1; R. Doc. 200-1.
41
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
42
R. Doc. 198-1 at 2; R. Doc. 199-1 at 2; R. Doc. 200-1 at 2 (“[Proposed Intervenor] is entitled to intervene as a matter
of right pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) because (1) this application is timely; (2) [proposed
Intervenor] “claims an interest relating to the . . . transaction which is the subject of the action;” (3) [proposed
Intervenor] is “so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede [his] ability to
protect that interest” and (4) [proposed Intervenor’s] interests will not be adequately represented by existing parties.”).
38

8

omitted). The timeliness of a motion to intervene is a matter committed to the sound discretion of
the trial court. McDonald v. E.J. Lavino, 430 F.2d 1065, 1071 (5th Cir. 1970). Timeliness “is not
limited to chronological considerations but ‘is to be determined from all the circumstances.’”
Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 263 (quotation omitted). The Fifth Circuit has set forth four factors to
consider when evaluating whether a motion to intervene is timely: (1) the length of time during
which the proposed intervenor should have known of his interest in the case before he petitioned
to intervene; (2) the extent of prejudice that those parties already in the litigation would suffer “as
a result of the would-be intervenor’s failure to apply for intervention as soon as he actually knew
or reasonably should have known of his interest in the case;” (3) the extent of prejudice to the
proposed intervenor if he is not allowed to intervene; and (4) the existence of “unusual
circumstances militating either for or against a determination that the application is timely.” Ross
v. Marshall, 426 F.3d 745, 754 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 264-66).
Here, Hoffman filed suit on December 20, 2012.43 Christopher Sepulvado, another Angola
inmate, sought leave to intervene in this matter on January 23, 2013.44 Almost a year later, Bobby
Hampton, Nathaniel Code, and Kevan Brumfield, three other Angola inmates, sought leave to
intervene in this matter in January 2014.45 The Court granted each of these motions to intervene.46
Proposed Intervenors first sought leave to intervene in this matter on June 28, 2016, almost three
and a half years after the initial Complaint was filed.47 Given the lengthy delay between the filing
of the Complaint and the filing of the instant Motions to Intervene, the Court finds that the first
factor weighs in favor of finding the Motions to Intervene are untimely.

43

R. Doc. 1.
R. Doc. 10.
45
R. Docs. 94, 95, 101.
46
R. Docs. 26, 120.
47
R. Docs. 1, 198, 199, and 200.
44

9

However, the Court finds that the remaining three factors weigh in favor of finding the
Motions to Intervene were timely filed. With respect to the second factor, the Court concludes
that even if proposed Intervenors could have intervened in this matter sooner, allowing
intervention at this time will not prejudice the existing parties in this litigation. As previously
mentioned, three other Angola inmates incarcerated under sentences of death were allowed to
intervene in this matter in February 2014, apparently without prejudicing the existing parties.48
Since that time, all proceedings in this matter have been stayed through January 8, 2018 and there
is no trial date currently set.49 Further, no party has objected to the proposed interventions or
asserted that the Motions to Intervene are untimely. As such, the Court finds that allowing
intervention will not delay or disrupt litigation or prejudice the existing parties.
The Court also finds that the proposed Intervenors will be prejudiced if they are not allowed
to intervene in this matter. Proposed Intervenors seek to intervene in this case to challenge
Louisiana’s execution protocol on the same grounds as those alleged by the Plaintiffs in their
Second Amended Complaint. If this suit proceeds without the proposed Intervenors, a decision
rejecting Plaintiffs’ claims could establish unfavorable precedent that would make it more difficult
for proposed Intervenors to succeed on similar claims brought in separate lawsuits. See Roane v.
Leonhart, 741 F.3d 147, 151 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The Court further finds that the Plaintiffs do not
adequately represent the interests of proposed Intervenors because unlike the Plaintiffs, the
proposed Intervenors’ executions have not been stayed through January 8, 2018. Thus, the fourth
factor weighs in favor of finding the Motions to Intervene are timely.
Based on the foregoing four-factor analysis, the Court finds the three Motions to Intervene
to be timely.

48
49

R. Doc. 120.
R. Doc. 197.
10

B. Intervention of Right
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), a party is entitled to intervene in a pending lawsuit
when: (1) the motion to intervene is timely; (2) the potential intervenor asserts an interest that is
related to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action in which he seeks to intervene;
(3) the potential intervenor is so situated that disposition of the case may as a practical matter
impair or impede his ability to protect his interest; and (4) the parties already in the action do not
adequately protect the potential intervenor’s interest. Ford v. City of Huntsville, 242 F.3d 235,
239 (5th Cir. 2001). As discussed above, the Court finds the three Motions to Intervene to be
timely.
i.

Proposed Intervenors’ Interest

“To prove the requisite interest, an intervenor must demonstrate a ‘direct, substantial and
legally protectable’ interest in the property or transaction that is the subject of the suit.” League
of United Latin American Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 884 F.2d 185, 187 (5th Cir.
1989). See also, John Doe No. 1. v. Glickman, 256 F.3d 371, 379 (5th Cir. 2001); Sierra Club v.
Epsy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1207 (5th Cir. 1994); Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 1004 (5th Cir.
1996). The Fifth Circuit has explained that “[b]y requiring that the applicant’s interest be not only
‘direct’ and ‘substantial,’ but also ‘legally protectable,’ it is plain that something more than an
economic interest is necessary.” New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co.,
732 F.2d 452, 465 (5th Cir. 1984). However, “In the context of intervention, the Fifth Circuit has
warned against defining ‘property or transaction’ too narrowly.” Ford v. City of Huntsville, 242
F.3d 235, 240 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Ceres Gulf v. Cooper, 957 F.2d 1199, 1203 (5th Cir. 1992)).

11

In the Motions to Intervene, each proposed Intervenor asserts that he “claims an interest
relating to the . . . transaction which is the subject of the action.”50 Proposed Intervenors do not
elaborate on this claim. The Court finds, however, that proposed Intervenors’ interest in the subject
matter of this case is identical to that of the existing Plaintiffs, namely, avoiding execution by
Louisiana’s allegedly flawed lethal injection protocol.51 Each proposed Intervenor challenges “the
constitutionality of his execution, whether performed pursuant to the latest protocol that would
require the use of expired and/or illegally-obtained drugs and does not adequately protect
[proposed Intervenor] from cruel and unusual punishment, or performed pursuant to a newly
amended protocol with insufficient time for review and evaluation.”52 Each proposed Intervenor
also asserts that Defendants’ past practices and current material deviations from their written
execution protocol create a substantial risk of harm and “subject [proposed Intervenor] and other
similarly situated condemned inmates to different treatment, in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.”53 Plaintiffs make the same allegations in their Second Amended
Complaint.54 As such, the Court finds that proposed Intervenors have amply demonstrated a clear
interest in the outcome of this case, such that factor two supports intervention.
ii.

Adequacy of Representation

Proposed Intervenors have “the burden of demonstrating inadequate representation.”
Hopwood v. State of Tex., 21 F.3d 603, 605 (5th Cir. 1994). “However, ‘minimal’ this burden may
be, it cannot be treated as so minimal as to write the requirement completely out of the rule.” Bush
v. Viterna, 740 F.2d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1984). “In a suit involving a matter of sovereign interest,

50

R. Doc. 198-1 at 2; R. Doc. 199-1 at 2; R. Doc. 200-1 at 2.
See Roane v. Gonzales, 269 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2010), vacated in part sub nom. Roane v. Tandy, 2012 WL 3068444
(D.C. Cir. July 6, 2012), and rev’d and remanded sub nom. Roane v. Leonhart, 741 F.3d 147 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(concluding that inmate was entitled to intervene as of right).
52
R. Doc. 198-2 at 4; R. Doc. 199-2 at 4; R. Doc. 200-2 at 4.
53
R. Doc. 198-2 at 5; R. Doc. 199-2 at 5; R. Doc. 200-2 at 5.
54
R. Doc. 118 at 5-6.
51

12

the State is presumed to represent the interests of all its citizens.” Id. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit
has held that “‘[w]hen the party seeking intervention has the same ultimate objection as a party to
the suit, a presumption arises that its interests are adequately represented, against which the
petitioner must demonstrate adversity of interest, collusion, or nonfeasance.’”

Id. (quoting

International Tank Terminals, Ltd. v. M/V Acadia Forest, 579 F.2d 964, 967 (5th Cir. 1981)).
In the Motions to Intervene, each proposed Intervenor asserts that his interests “will not be
adequately represented by existing parties.”55 Although proposed Intervenors do not elaborate
upon this assertion, the Court finds it “obvious that the existing parties to the suit may be
inadequate representatives” of proposed Intervenors because unlike the Plaintiffs, there is no courtimposed stay prohibiting the proposed Intervenors’ executions. Roane v. Leonhart, 741 F.3d 147,
151 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Thus, unlike the proposed Intervenors, Plaintiffs have no reason to seek the
rapid resolution of this suit because Plaintiffs’ executions have been stayed through January 8,
2018. See Leonhart, 741 F.3d at 151. Although the interests of the proposed Intervenors are
aligned with those of the Plaintiffs, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are not adequately representing
the proposed Intervenors’ objectives.
iii.

Ability of the Proposed Intervenors to Protect Their Interests

The fourth requirement for intervention of right is for the proposed Intervenors to show
that they are so situated that disposition of the case may as a practical matter impair or impede
their ability to protect their interests. Ford v. City of Huntsville, 242 F.3d 235, 239 (5th Cir. 2001).
Here, each of the proposed Intervenors asserts that he is “so situated that the disposition of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impeded [his] ability to protect that interest.” 56 Again,
proposed Intervenors do not elaborate upon this assertion. However, the Court finds that if this

55
56

Doc. 198-1 at 2; R. Doc. 199-1 at 2; R. Doc. 200-1 at 2.
R. Doc. 198-1 at 2; R. Doc. 199-1 at 2; R. Doc. 200-1 at 2.
13

suit proceeds without the proposed Intervenors, a decision rejecting Plaintiffs’ claims could
establish unfavorable precedent that would make it more difficult for proposed Intervenors to
succeed on similar claims brought in separate lawsuits. Roane v. Leonhart, 741 F.3d 147, 151
(D.C. Cir. 2014).
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds proposed Intervenors are entitled to intervention
of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
C. Permissive Intervention
The Court further finds that proposed Intervenors may also intervene in this action based
on permissive intervention, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). Permissive intervention is provided
for by Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) when, on timely motion, the movant seeks intervention based on a
“conditional right to intervene” granted by statute or “has a claim or defense that shares with the
main action a common question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(A) & (B). In exercising
its discretion, “the court must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3).
Here, proposed Intervenors assert that they are entitled to intervene under Rule 24(b)
because, “The questions of fact and law in this case are identical to the questions of fact and law
in Mr. Hoffman’s case” and that allowing them to intervene “will promote judicial economy.”57
The underlying claims in this litigation are Plaintiffs’ legal challenges to Louisiana’s execution
protocol. Like the Plaintiffs, each of the proposed Intervenor’s is incarcerated at Angola under a
sentence of death and seeks to intervene in this case to challenge the constitutionality of
Louisiana’s execution protocol. Further, the proposed Intervenors’ Complaints make the same
allegations and seek the same form of relief sought by the Plaintiffs in their Second Amended

57

R. Doc. 198-1 at 2-3; R. Doc. 199-1 at 2-3; R. Doc. 200-1 at 2-3.
14

Complaint. The Court finds that proposed Intervenors’ claims have common questions of law and
fact with the main action because they, like the existing Plaintiffs, face execution under
Louisiana’s lethal injection protocol and seek to challenge the protocol on the same bases as those
asserted by the Plaintiffs. See Roane v. Gonzales, 269 F.R.D. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2010).
Further, other Angola inmates incarcerated under sentences of death were allowed to
intervene in this case in February 2014,58 apparently without prejudicing the existing parties. Since
that time, this Court has stayed all proceedings in this matter and has stayed the Plaintiffs’
executions through January 8, 2018. As such, the Court finds that allowing proposed Intervenors
to intervene in this action would not prejudice any of the existing parties and, in fact, no party has
objected to the proposed interventions.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds proposed Intervenors are entitled to intervene in
this matter under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
III.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, the Motions to Intervene filed by Todd Wessinger,59 Daniel

Irish,60 and Shedran Williams61 are GRANTED.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petitions of Intervention filed by Todd Wessinger,62

58

R. Doc. 120.
R. Doc. 198.
60
R. Doc. 199.
61
R. Doc. 200.
62
R. Doc. 198-2.
59

15

Daniel Irish,63 and Shedran Williams64 shall be filed into the record in this matter.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on July 29, 2016.

S
ERIN WILDER-DOOMES
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

63
64

R. Doc. 199-2.
R. Doc. 200-2.
16