Carter v. Benjamin et al

Filing 19

RULING AND ORDER granting 16 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's federal claims be DISMISSED with prejudice, and Plaintiff's state law claims be DISMISSED without prejudice. Signed by Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson on 05/20/2015. (BCL)

UNITE D STATES DISTRI CT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF L OUISIANA

TYRONNE CARTE R

CIVIL A CTION
NO.: 13-00016-BAJ-RLB
LEAD CASE

VER S US
KE VIN BENJAMIN, E T AL.

CIW 13-cv-00491-BAJ-RLB

13-cv-00278-BAJ-RLB
RULING AND ORDE R
Plain tiff Tyrone Carter ("Plaintiff') filed t he instant action pursu a nt to 42
U .S.C. § 1983 for a lleged violations of his constit utiona l righ ts t hat occurred while
he was housed at t he Louisiana State P enitentia ry in Angola, Louisia na. (Doc. 1).
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that prison officia ls failed to protect him from an
inmate-on-inmate attack that occurred on February 5, 2012, despite knowing of
"bad blood" be tween he and the other inmate. (Doc. 1 at p. 7).
Now before the Court is Defendants' Motio n for P artial Summa r y

Judg m e n t (Doc. 16) filed by Warden Burl Cain, Assistant Warden Kevin
Benj a min, a nd Colonel Chadwick Darbonne (collectively, "Defenda nts"), pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 56, seeking di missal of Pla intiffs claims
agains t th em. No opposition was filed. Oral a rgument is not necessary. The Court
h as jurisdiction pursua nt to 28 U .S.C. § 1331.

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I.

BACKGROUND 1
Plaintiff is an inmate sentenced to the custody of the Louisiana

Department of Public Safety and Corrections. (Doc. 16-2 at

,I 1).

At all times

pertinent to the instant claims, Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Louisiana State
Penitentiary ("LSP") in Angola, Louisiana. (ld. at

~

2). On February 5, 2012,

Plaintiff was involved in an aggravated fight with fellow inmate, Gary Landry,
("Landry") in the Interfaith Chapel located on prison grounds.

(!d. at

Landry was seriously injured, losing more than two liters of blood. (Id.

at~

~

3).

4).

Subsequent to the fight, an investigation was launched by Colonel Bobby
Achord of LSP ("Col. Achord") and Detective Shannon Tilley of the \iVest Feliciana
Sheriffs Office.z

(Id. at ~ 5).

As a result of that investigation, Col. Achord

determined that P laintiff fashioned a weapon composed of two razor blades
melted between two toothbrushes. (Id. at

~

6). The investigation also revealed

that Plaintiff violently attacked inmate Gary Landry with this weapon on
February 5, 2012. (!d. at

,I 7).

At the conclusion of the investigation, the District

Attorney for the Twentieth Judicial Court of the State of Louisiana, Samuel
D'Aquilla, charged Plaintiff with Aggravated Second Degree Battery, in violation
of Louisiana Revised Statute 14:34.7. (Id. at

,I 8).

Plaintiff was represented by

In accordance with Rule 56 of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Louisiana , Defendants s ubmitted a Statement of Undisputed Facts along with its Motion
for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 16-2). Because Plaintiff did not file an opposition to the instant
motion, all of the facts contained in Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts will be deemed
admitted for purposes of this Ruling and Order. See Local Rule 56(b) ("All material facts set forth in
the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed admitted . . . unless
controverted as required by t his Rule.").
2 The Court permitted Defendants to file the one-hundred-and -three-page Investigative Report
regarding this matter under seal at this stage in the proceedings given the existence of confidential
information regarding Plaintiff and inmate Gary Landry. (Docs. 17, 18).
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counsel for t his charge. (Id. at ,, 9). Thereafter , Plaintiff entered a plea of nolo

contendere and was sentenced to serve an additional three years in the custody of
the Depa rtment of Corrections. (Id. at
t his conviction.

~

10; Doc. 16-4). Plaintiff did not appeal

(Id. at , , 11; Doc. 16-5). Plaintiff's conviction has not been

overturned by a ny subsequent action. (ld. at ,1 12).

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[t]he court shall grant

summary judgment if t he movant shows that th ere is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is en titled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.
Civ . P. 56(a). In determining whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment,
the court views the fa cts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draws
all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor.

Coleman v. Houston

Indep endent School District, 113 F. 3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997).
After a proper motion for summary judgment is made, the non-movant must
set forth specific facts showing t here is a genuine issue for t rial.

Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). At this stage, the court does not
evaluate the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes.

Int'l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 1059 (1992).

However, if t he evidence in the record is such that a

reasonable jury, drawing a ll inferences in favor of t he non-moving party, could
arrive at a verdict in that party's favor, the motion for summary judgm ent must be
denied. Int 'l Shortstop, Inc., 939 F.2d at 1263.

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On t he other hand, the non-movant's burden is not satisfied by some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, or by conclusory a llegations,
unsubstant iated assertions, or a mere scintilla of evidence. Little u. Liquid Air

Corp., 37 F .3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is appropriate if the
non -movant "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of a n
elem ent essentia l to that party's case." Celotex Corp. u. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324
(1986).

I n other words, summary judgment will lie only "if the pleadings,

deposit ions, a nswers to interrogatories, a nd admissions on file, together with
a ffidavits if a ny, show that there is no genuine issue as to a ny materia l fact, and
t h at t he moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Sherman u.

Hallbauer, 455 F.2d 1236, 1241 (5th Cir. 1972).

III.

DISCUSSION
A.

Official Capacity Claims

Defenda nts contend that they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity insofar as Plain tiff sued them in their official capacity for damages.
(Doc. 16-1 at p. 4). The Court agrees.
The Elevent h Ame ndment to t he United States Constitution bar s a state's
citizens from filing suit against the state in federal court unless the state h as
waived its imm unity.

Cozzo u. Tangipahoa Parish Council-President

Government, 279 F.3d 273, 280 (5th Cir. 2002). As th e United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has noted: "By statute, Louisiana has refused any
such waiver of its Eleve nth Amendment sovereign immuni ty regarding suits in

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federal courts."

Cozza, 279 F.3d at 281 (cit ing La. Rev. Stat. § 13:5106(A)).

Simila rly, a suit for retrospective relief against a

tate official in his official

capacity is treated as a suit a gainst t he state itself, a nd is likewise barred by t he
Eleventh Ame ndmen t.

Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (suits brought

against a state official in his official capacity "genera lly represe nt only a nother
way of pleading an action against an entity of which a n officer is an agent")
(internal quota tions omitted) (quoting Kentuchy v. Graham., 473 U.S. 159, 165
(1985)) .
Base d on these principles of law, Plaintiff cla im against Defendants in
their officia l capacities are really claims against t he state, and thus, are barred
by the Eleve nt h Amendment. Moreover, Defenda nts did not consen t to suit in
this forum t hrough removal or otherwise wa ive their ove reign immunity from
suit in federa l court. See, e.g. , Meyers ex rel. Ben::ing v. Texas, 410 F.3d 236, 256
(5th Cir. 2005) (state wa ives its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity by
removing case to federal court). Accordingly, the Court must grant summary
judgmen t in favor of Defendants as a matter of law to the extent that Plaintiff
seeks relief fi·om Defendants in their officia l capacities beca use such claims are
barred by t he Eleve nth Amendment.

B.

Failure to Protect Claim Under§ 1983

U nlike officia l capacity cla ims, Defe ndant do not enjoy absolute immunity
with respect to Plaintiffs failure to protect cla im
individual cap acit ies.

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aga inst them in their

It is well-esta blished t hat the Eighth Amendment's proscription agains t

cruel and unusua l punishment affords inmates a measure of protection from
violent attacks by other inmates. See S m ith u. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983). To
recover on a failure to protect claim under § 1983, a pla intiff must show (1) th at
he was incarcera ted under conditions that posed a substantial risk of serious
h a rm to his safe ty, a nd (2) that the defenda nts were deliber ately indifferent t o
his need for protection. Farmer u. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). To act with
deliberate indifference, "the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be dra wn th at a sub tantia l risk of serious harm exists, and he
must a lso draw the inference." Id. at 837. However, prison officials will not be
held liable for failure to protect if (1) "they were unaware of even a n obvious risk
to inmate health or safety," (2) "they did not know of the underlying facts
indicating a sufficiently substantia l dangerous," (3) "they know of the underlying
facts but believed (a lbeit unsoundly) th at the risk to which the facts gave rise was
insubstantial or nonexistent," or (4) "they knew of a substantial risk to inmate
health or safety ... [and] responded reaso na bly t o the danger , even if the harm
was not ultimately ave rted."
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges t hat he was the victim of an attack by
a nother inmate. (Doc. 1 at p. 7). Pla intiff further asserts that Defendants were
on notice of "bad blood" between he and inmate Landry because the two en gaged

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in two separate fist fights in January of 2012.:1 (Doc. 1 at ,[ 8). On February 1,
2012, Warde n Benjamin and Colonel Da rbonne met with Landry about the letters
and the fights.

(Jd. ).

After speakin g with Landry, they then allegedly "told

[Landry) to go and get Plaintiff from down t he walk." (Jd.). Plaintiff a lleges that
he went to Warden Benjamin's office and confirmed that the letter s were accurate
in that he a nd Landry had engaged in two fist fights. (!d.

at~

9). As a result of

these a lter cations, Defendants allegedly separated Pla intiff and Landry by
moving Plaintiff to a differe nt dormitory that same day. (Jd.). However, Plaintiff
avers t hat Defendants did nothing to alter his or Landry's work assignments,
both of which were assigned to jobs in the Interfaith Ch apel. (Jd.).
Plaintiff alleges that four days later, on February 5, 2012, Captain Mapels
let him into the I nterfaith Chapel for work at 4:30 a .m. (ld. at , , 10). He avers
that Landry a rrived thirty minutes later. (Jd.).

Plaintiff alleges that Landry

then attacked him with a "homemade knife ," cutting Plaintiff a nd "brutally
beat[ing] Pla intiff with a closed fist." (Jd .). Plaintiff ave rs that he sustained
several cuts a nd required serious medical attention.

(Jd. ).

Indeed, Plaintiff

a lleges t hat the cut sustained to his neck was "so bad" that he nearly died. (Jd.).
Plaintiff avers that he suffers nightmares as a result of the attack by his "known
enemy," and that he has been prescribed medication to address his mental h ealth
needs in the aftermath of the alleged assa ult. (Jd.).

Plaintiff a lso alleges that Warden Benjamin and Colonel Darbonne "received five (5) letters about
the 'fist fights"' prior to speaking with Landry on February L 2012. (Doc. 1 at ~~ 8, 9). However,
Plaintiff does not provide any specific information about who a uthored the letters or the contents.

3

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In response, Defenda nts have put forth substa ntial summary judgment
evidence concluding that Plaintiff was the aggressor in the fight on February 5,
2012, a nd that Landry's injuries were substantially more severe than Plaintiffs .
Eve n withou t such evidence, however, Defenda n ts aver that Plaintiffs claims are
barred under the principle elucidated by the United States Supreme Court in
H ech v. Humphrey, 5 12 U.S. 477 (1994), and its proge ny, namely that "civil tort

actions are not approp riate vehicles for cha lle nging the validity of outstanding
criminal judgme nts." Id. at 486. (Doc. 16-1 at p. 5).
In H ech, the Supre me Court held that any claim that effectively attacks
the cons titutionality of a conviction does not accrue until t hat conviction has been
"r ever e d on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a
state tribuna l a uthorized to make such a determination , or called into question
by a federa l court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." H eck, 5 12 U.S. at 48687. See also Clarhe v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1998) (prohibiting an
inmate from bringing claims for damages a nd reinstateme nt of good time credits
until his "conviction" had been declared inva lid).

Moreover , if a favorable

judgme nt would "necessarily imply the invalidity of [the prisoner's] conviction or
se ntence," the claim is not cognizable. Heel?., 512 U.S. at 487. Thus, unless the
plaintiff can prove that one of the above criteria is met, his claims against
Defenda n ts in their individual capacities are not cognizable and must be
dismissed. See Cronn v. Buffington, 150 F.3d 538, 541 (5th Cir. 1998).

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Plain tiff filed the instant action to recover da mages on a theory that
Defenda nts failed to protect him from inma te La ndry. (Doc. 1). However , as a
resul t of P la int iffs skirmish with La ndry, Pla in tiff ult imately pled nolo

contendere to Aggr avated Second Degree on J uly 12, 2012.

(Doc. 16-4).

Notwithstanding t he fact t hat t he uncontested summ a ry judgment evidence
suggests th at Plaintiff was the a ggressor, a ny a ward of da ma ges here would
undermine Pla intiffs conviction. More specifically, a ny attempt by Plaintiff to
a rgue t hat he was not the aggressor, and instead, acted in self-defen se, would
undermine his aggr avated battery conviction. Accordingly, Pla intiffs claims are
ba rred under Hech.
F urt her , a lt hough Plaint iff did not file a n opposition to t he instant motion ,
a ny a r gume nt that he pled nolo contendere, as opposed to pleading guilty or being
convicted at a tria l on the merits, would be simila rly unavailing. It is wellestablished in Louisiana t hat "[a] plea of nolo conte nde re is not technically a plea
of guilty, bu t it is one in substance if accepted by t he court; for whe n so accepted,
it becomes a n implied confession of guilt." Louisiana State Bar Ass 'n v. Connolly,
206 La . 883, 890-91, 20 So. 2d 168, 170 (1944) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).

In a ddition , a nolo plea tra dit iona lly "has no effect beyond th e

particula r case, a nd it can not be employed aga inst t he defenda nt as a n
a dmission in a ny civil suit for t he same a ct. In other words it does not [typically]
est op t he defe nda nt to plead a nd prove his innocence in a civil action." Id . While
true, th e bar on using a nolo plea does not govern in the instant action beca use

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"[w]heth er the conviction was obta ined at trial, by a guilty plea, or by a nolo plea
is irrelevant" to the inquiry as to whether P laint iff s 1983 cla im would necessarily
imply th e inva lidity of his conviction. Hernandez v. Boles, 184 F. 3d 8 19 (5th Cir.
1999).
In Hernandez, the Fifth Circuit rejected a plaintiffs ar gume nt t hat Texas law
preve nted the use of a nolo contendere plea in a civil case as a n a dmission. Id.
(finding t h a t pla intiffs objection "misse[d] the mark."). I ndeed, t he co urt fo und that
in con sidering a defense under Hech, a co urt need not consider the p lea as evidence
at a ll; instead, the co urt need only look to whether a n implicated conviction h as
bee n overt urne d. I d . (cit ing Hech, 512 U .S . at 486-87). See also Ballad v. Burton,
444 F.3d 391, 396-97 (5th Cir . 2006) (applying Hech to a conviction obtained
pursua n t to an Alford plea). The Court finds this reasoning equa lly applicable here .
For purposes of the instant claims, Plaintiffs plea of nolo is not different t ha n th at
of a guilty plea or of a conviction at trial.
Because a ny decision by this Court regarding t he constit ut iona lity of
Pla intiffs con viction would "necessarily imply" it s invalidity, P laint iff cannot state a
cla im upon which relief can be gr a nted until he successfully ch allen ges his
conviction. Therefore, Plain tiffs claims must be dismissed unt il s uch time, if a ny,
the requirements of Hech are met.

C.

State Law Claims

Fina lly, to the extent t hat Plaint iff seeks to invoke the supplemen tal
jurisdiction of t his Court over pote nt ia l state law claims, a district court is

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auth orized to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction if th e cla ims r a ise
novel or complex issue of state law, if t he claims subst antially predominate over
t he claims over which the district court h as original jurisdiction, if t he district
court h as dismissed a ll cla ims over which it ha d origina l jurisdiction , or for other
compelling reasons . 28 U .S.C. § 1347.
Considering th e a llegations in Plaintiffs Comp laint and the dismissal of
Pla int iffs federa l claims in the instan t Ruling, the Court declines t he exercise of
supplementa l jurisdiction over Plaintiffs st a te la w claims .

IV.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED t hat Defenda nts' Motion for P a rt ial Summary
Judgmen t is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED tha t Plaintiffs federal cla ims be
DISMISSED wit h prejudice, a nd Pla intiffs st ate law claims be DISMISSED
without prejudice .

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, t his

2..0~day of May, 2015.

BRIAN A. JACKSON, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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