Norton et al v. Livingston Parish Detention Center et al

Filing 55

RULING granting 35 Motion for Clarification Concerning Court's 30 Ruling on 7 Motion to Dismiss. GRANTING IN PART the Defendants Jason Ard, Willie Graves, Jim Brown, Thomas Martin, Jeremy Tripp, Joshua Groce, Jacob McKnight, and Bryan A llens 43 Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). GRANTING IN PART the Defendants Paul Gore and Matthew Walkers 47 Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). As a result of this Ruling, the Court REMANDS the case to the 21st Judicial District Court of Livingston Parish, Louisiana. Signed by Judge James J. Brady on 3/19/2014. (LLH) (Main Document 55 replaced on 3/19/2014) (LLH).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
STANLEY NORTON, ET AL.
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 13-437-JJB-SCR
LIVINGSTON PARISH DETENTION
CENTER, ET AL.
RULING
This matter is before the Court on the following motions: (1) Defendants Parish of
Livingston and Courtney Chaney’s Motion [doc. 35] for Clarification Concerning the Court’s
Ruling on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss; (2) Defendants Jason Ard, Willie Graves, Jim
Brown, Thomas Martin, Jeremy Tripp, Joshua Groce, Jacob McKnight, and Bryan Allen’s
Motion [doc. 43] to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6); and (3) Defendants Paul Gore and
Matthew Walker’s Motion [doc. 47] to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 1 The plaintiffs
opposed both motions to dismiss, but they have not opposed the motion for clarification. (Docs.
48 & 50). There is no need for oral argument. Jurisdiction is based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For
the reasons provided herein, the Court: (1) GRANTS the Defendants Parish of Livingston and
Courtney Chaney’s Motion [doc. 35] for Clarification Concerning the Court’s Ruling on
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss; (2) GRANTS IN PART the Defendants Jason Ard, Willie
Graves, Jim Brown, Thomas Martin, Jeremy Tripp, Joshua Groce, Jacob McKnight, and Bryan
Allen’s Motion [doc. 43] to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6); and (3) GRANTS IN PART the
Defendants Paul Gore and Matthew Walker’s Motion [doc. 47] to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6). As a result of this ruling, the Court REMANDS the remaining state law claims to the
21st Judicial District Court of Livingston Parish, Louisiana.
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In their motion to dismiss, Defendants Paul Gore and Matthew Walker adopt and incorporate the reasons contained
in the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Jason Ard, Willie Graves, Jim Brown, Thomas Martin, Jeremy Tripp,
Joshua Groce, Jacob McKnight, and Bryan Allen. (Doc. 47).

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Background
In the previous ruling, the Court delineated the facts alleged in the plaintiffs’ amended
complaint, and thus, the Court will not recount those facts at-length in the present ruling. (See
doc. 30). In that prior ruling, the Court granted both the Defendant Jason Ard’s and Defendant
Parish of Livingston’s motions to dismiss. As a result, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ Section
1983 claims against Defendant Sheriff Jason Ard and Defendant Livingston Parish. The Court
did give the plaintiffs 21 days to amend their complaint, in order to potentially plead sufficient
facts to overcome the motions to dismiss. Yet, the plaintiffs failed to amend, and thus, the
Section 1983 claims against Defendant Ard and Defendant Parish of Livingston are no longer
pending before this Court. Subsequently, the defendants filed the three pending motions, which
the Court will address seriatim.
1. Defendants Parish of Livingston and Courtney Chaney’s Motion for Clarification Concerning
the Court’s Ruling on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss [Doc. 35]
In the prior rulings on the defendants’ motions to dismiss, the Court failed to analyze
whether it must also dismiss the claims filed against Nurse Courtney Chaney. Defendant Parish
of Livingston sought dismissal of these claims through an additional Supplemental
Memorandum (doc. 27) to its motion to dismiss. As a result, the Court will now clarify its ruling
on the previous motions to dismiss, specifically as it relates to the federal claims asserted against
Defendant Courtney Chaney.
In the additional Supplemental Memorandum, the defendants sought to dismiss the
claims against Defendant Chaney primarily because the plaintiffs added these claims in an
amended complaint that was filed over a year after the alleged incident. (Doc. 27, p. 1–2).
Accordingly, the defendants argued that any claims against Defendant Chaney were barred by

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prescription. (Doc. 27, p. 2). Furthermore, the defendants alleged that the claims against
Defendant Chaney were actually medical malpractice claims. As the plaintiffs failed to assert a
single medical malpractice claim in the original state court petition, the defendants claimed that
these medical malpractice claims constituted an entirely new cause of action, and thus, there was
no relation back to the filing of the original petition. (Doc. 27, p. 2–3). Finally, the defendants
claimed that the plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient facts on which relief can be granted with
regards to the claims asserted against Defendant Chaney.
In their opposition, the plaintiffs averred that the claims against Defendant Chaney
related back to the filing of the original petition, pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. (Doc. 29, p. 1). Furthermore, the plaintiffs claimed that they pleaded sufficient
facts to show Defendant “Chaney’s deliberate indifference to Darrin Norton’s medical needs,
which is a violation of the Eighth Amendment and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.” (Doc. 29, p. 3).
While the defendants attempt to characterize the plaintiffs’ claims as medical malpractice
claims, the plaintiffs do not argue or even reference any hypothetical medical malpractice claims
in their response to the supplemental memorandum. (See doc. 29). Accordingly, the Court finds
that any hypothetical medical malpractice claims have been abandoned by the plaintiffs, and
thus, are not currently pending before this Court.
For purposes of this ruling, the Court must determine whether the federal claims against
Defendant Courtney Chaney were timely raised by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs’ sole argument
for timeliness is that the amended complaint “related back” to the filing of the state court petition
as to the claims brought against Defendant Courtney Chaney. The present plaintiffs filed the first
amended complaint on August 15, 2013, wherein, for the first time, the plaintiffs attempted to
assert a cause of action against Defendant Chaney. However, the alleged incident occurred on

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June 17, 2012. (Doc. 15, p. 5). Accordingly, the plaintiffs filed the amended complaint over a
year after the incident. It is well-settled that there is a one-year limitation period applicable to the
plaintiffs’ claims in the present matter. See Cook v. Lamont, 2013 WL 325557, at *2 (M.D. La.
Jan. 28, 2013) (citing Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616 (5th Cir. 1994)). See also Clifford v.
Gibbs, 298 F.3d 328 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Pursuant to well-settled jurisprudence, the limitations
period applicable to the plaintiff’s claims in this case is one year.”). Thus, because the one-year
limitation period had expired at the time the plaintiffs filed the amended complaint, the Court
must determine if the amended complaint related back to the filing of the original state court
petition in order to decide if the plaintiffs timely filed the federal claims against Defendant
Chaney.
This situation is unique in that the plaintiffs filed the original petition in state court, the
one-year limitation period expired on June 17, 2013, the defendants subsequently removed the
case to federal court, and then the plaintiffs filed the amended complaint adding these claims
against Defendant Chaney. As a result, the Court must initially determine whether the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure controls the “relation back”
issue. While this area of the law is somewhat uncertain, the plaintiffs filed the motion to amend
and the amended complaint after the case had been removed to this Court. See Dietz v.
McAdams-Norman Property, II, LLC, 2013 WL 247651, at *2–3 (W.D. Va. Jan. 23, 2013)
(citing Francis M. Dougherty, Rule 15(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or State Law As
Governing Relation Back of Amended Pleading, 100 A.L.R. Fed. 880 (1990 & 2011 Supp.)
(“Notably, there is no general consensus as to whether state law or federal law should apply to
the question of whether a new claim should relate back to the original complaint.”). “[I]t is clear
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ‘apply to a civil action after it is removed from a state

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court.’” Id. at *3 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c)(1)). As the plaintiffs filed the amended complaint
after removal, this Court will apply Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
determine whether the amended complaint relates back to the filing of the original petition.
Based on this Court’s review, Rule 15(c) does not allow relation back in the situation at
hand. Specifically, this is not a case where the plaintiffs mistakenly identified a particular party
and sought to change that party through the amended complaint. Under Rule 15(c)(1)(C), an
amendment to a pleading that “changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a
claim is asserted” will relate back to the filing of the original pleading when “the amendment
asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or
attempted to be set out—in the original pleading,” the new party “received such notice of the
action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits,” and the new party “knew or
should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake
concerning the proper party’s identity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1). In adding Defendant Courtney
Chaney, the plaintiffs did not simply correct a mistakenly-identified defendant. Instead, the
plaintiffs added an entirely new defendant, an individual who was not mentioned at any point in
the original state court petition. As the Eastern District of Louisiana previously stated, “under the
relation back framework, when an amended complaint adds ‘an additional defendant, not a
misnamed defendant,’ the amendment is essentially the filing of a new cause of action, and the
relation back rule does not apply.” Smith v. Auto Club Family Ins. Co., 2008 WL 5110590, at
*3 (E.D. La. Nov. 25, 2008) (citing Braud v. Transp. Serv. Co., 445 F.3d 801, 808 (5th Cir.
2006); Ray v. Alexandria Mall, 434 So. 2d 1083, 1085–87 (La. 1983)). Accordingly, because this
is a situation where the plaintiffs attempted to add a wholly-new defendant after the expiration of
the prescriptive period, the amended complaint does not relate back to the original state court

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petition under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, at least with regards to the
Section 1983 claims filed against Defendant Courtney Chaney. Therefore, the plaintiffs failed to
timely bring the Section 1983 claims against Defendant Chaney, and thus, the federal claims
must be dismissed. It must be emphasized that the Court is not ruling on any lingering state-law
claims filed against Defendant Courtney Chaney, as the timeliness and validity of those claims
will be dealt with by the state court upon remand of this case.
2. Defendants Jason Ard, Willie Graves, Jim Brown, Thomas Martin, Jeremy Tripp, Joshua
Groce, Jacob McKnight, and Bryan Allen’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
[Doc. 43]
Initially in the motion to dismiss, the Defendant Jason Ard seeks dismissal of the
remaining state law claims against him, as he alleges that the plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient
facts to support a claim, or alternatively, the plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient facts to overcome
Defendant Ard’s immunity afforded by La. R.S. § 9:2798.1 for policymaking or discretionary
acts. (Doc. 43, p. 1). Furthermore, Defendants Willie Graves, Jim Brown, Thomas Martin,
Jeremy Tripp, Joshua Groce, Jacob McKnight, and Bryan Allen seek dismissal of the claims
brought against them in the amended complaint, because they assert that the plaintiff failed to
timely bring those claims. (Doc. 43, p. 1–2).
a. Timeliness of Section 1983 Claims
The Court will first turn its attention to the Section 1983 claims against Defendants
Willie Graves, Jim Brown, Thomas Martin, Jeremy Tripp, Joshua Groce, Jacob McKnight, and
Bryan Allen. With regards to these claims, the defendants’ only contention is that these claims
must be dismissed because the plaintiffs joined these defendants after the expiration of the oneyear prescription period. The defendants claim that the filing of the original petition did not

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interrupt the one-year period, and the amended petition cannot relate back pursuant to Rule 15(c)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
As aforementioned, the plaintiffs filed the amended complaint almost two months after
the one-year anniversary of the alleged incident. Accordingly, the federal claims were brought
after the expiration of the one-year prescriptive period for Section 1983 claims. Nevertheless, the
plaintiffs argue the newly-added Section 1983 claims against these defendants were timely
because the filing of the original petition interrupted the one-year prescriptive period and the
amended complaint relates back to the filing of the original petition. Similar to above, the Court
finds that relation back under Rule 15(c) does not apply to the present situation, as the plaintiffs
joined entirely-new parties in the amended complaint, as opposed to correcting a mistakenlynamed party. Therefore, the Court will now address the plaintiffs’ second argument for
timeliness—that filing suit against Defendant Jason Ard interrupted the limitation/prescriptive
period as to the federal claims against these named individuals.
In a previous case, the Western District of Louisiana provided the following:
The Supreme Court has held that the statute of limitations for a § 1983 action is
the same as the statute of limitations in a personal injury action in the state in
which the claim arose. The Fifth Circuit has approved application of Louisiana’s
one-year personal injury statute of limitations provided by Louisiana Civil Code
article 3492 in a § 1983 action. The date of accrual for a § 1983 claim is a
question of federal law. However, federal courts look to state law for its tolling
provisions.
Giles v. Ackal, 2012 WL 1458117, at *2 (W.D. La. March 27, 2012), report and
recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 1458110 (W.D. La. April 26, 2012) (internal citations
omitted). See also Fruge v. Conoco, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 615, 617 (W.D. La. 1988) (quoting
Williams v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 1226, 1231 (E.D. La. 1973) (“Thus, ‘[w]hen the federal
courts borrow a state statute of limitations to decide a federal cause, the entire state limitations

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law, including its tolling provisions, is generally applied.’”). Here, the Court applies Louisiana’s
one-year prescriptive period for the Section 1983 claims, as any federal claims arose in
Louisiana. See La. Civ. Code art. 3492.
The Louisiana Civil Code provides that “[p]rescription is interrupted when the owner
commences action against the possessor, or when the obligee commences action against the
obligor, in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue.” La. Civ. Code art. 3462. “If prescription
is interrupted, the time that has run is not counted. Prescription commences to run anew from the
last day of interruption.” La. Civ. Code art. 3466. The 1982 revision comments to Article 3462
provide that “[t]he filing of suit in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue interrupts any
kind of prescription as to the causes of action therein sued upon, provided the plaintiff is a proper
party plaintiff and the defendant is a proper party defendant.” La. Civ. Code art. 3462 cmt. (b).
Furthermore, “[i]nterruption of prescription against one joint tortfeasor is effective against all
joint tortfeasors.” La. Civ. Code art. 2324(C). “The same rule [also] applies with respect to
solidary obligors.” Adams v. Dupree, 663 So. 2d 433, 435 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1995) (citing La. Civ.
Code arts. 1799, 3503).
As this Court found in its prior ruling, the plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient facts to state
a cause of action under Section 1983 against Defendant Ard. (See doc. 30). As mentioned above,
“[i]nterruption of prescription against one joint tortfeasor is effective against all joint
tortfeasors.” La. Civ. Code art. 2324. However, “[w]hen no liability is found on the part of a
timely sued alleged tortfeasor, prescription will not be interrupted as to another joint tortfeasor,
who is not timely sued, since no joint or solidary obligation exists.” Joseph v. Port of New
Orleans, 2002 WL 342424, at *13 (E.D. La. Mar. 4, 2002). See also Gioustover v. Progressive
American Ins. Co., 561 So. 2d 961, 964 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1990) (“The law is equally clear that

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where no liability is found on the part of a timely sued alleged tortfeasor, prescription will not be
interrupted as to another joint tortfeasor, who is not timely sued, since no joint or solidary
obligation exists.”). Based on this Court’s dismissal of the Section 1983 claims in the previous
ruling, Defendant Ard is not liable to the plaintiffs on the Section 1983 claims as a matter of law.
Thus, there can be no joint and solidary liability between Defendant Ard and these newly-added
defendants as to any Section 1983 claims. See Joseph, 2002 WL 342424, at *13. Accordingly,
because there is no joint and solidary obligation between Defendant Ard and these newly-named
defendants, there was never an interruption of prescription for the Section 1983 claims as to
these newly-added defendants. Therefore, any Section 1983 claims against these late-added
defendants must be dismissed as untimely, because they were filed over a year after the alleged
incident without any relevant interruption of prescription.
3. Defendants Paul Gore and Matthew Walker’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
[Doc. 47]
For similar reasons as above, the Section 1983 claims against Defendant Paul Gore and
Defendant Matthew Walker must be dismissed as untimely. There is no joint and solidary
obligation as to any Section 1983 claims, and as a result, there was no interruption of
prescription on the Section 1983 claims. Consequently, the Section 1983 claims against
Defendant Paul Gore and Defendant Matthew Walker must also be dismissed as untimely.
4. Supplemental Jurisdiction
Based on the Court’s review, the only possibly remaining claims in this case are state law
claims. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, [t]he district courts may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). As the Court has dismissed all of the claims over

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which it has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
this case, as only state law claims remain pending at this early stage of the litigation.
Accordingly, the Court will remand the case to the 21st Judicial District Court of Livingston
Parish, Louisiana.
Conclusion
Therefore, the Court: (1) GRANTS the Defendants Parish of Livingston and Courtney
Chaney’s Motion [doc. 35] for Clarification Concerning the Court’s Ruling on Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss; (2) GRANTS IN PART the Defendants Jason Ard, Willie Graves, Jim
Brown, Thomas Martin, Jeremy Tripp, Joshua Groce, Jacob McKnight, and Bryan Allen’s
Motion [doc. 43] to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6); and (3) GRANTS IN PART the
Defendants Paul Gore and Matthew Walker’s Motion [doc. 47] to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6). As a result of this ruling, the Court REMANDS the case to the 21st Judicial District
Court of Livingston Parish, Louisiana.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on March 19, 2014.





JUDGE JAMES J. BRADY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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