Foster v. City of Addis, et al

Filing 29

RULING granting 23 Motion for Summary Judgment. All claims against Defendants, the Town of Addis, Robert Arrazattee, and Kenneth DeCook, are DISMISSED. Signed by Judge James J. Brady on 11/3/2014. (NLT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ERIKA FOSTER
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
13-00702-JJB-SCR
CITY OF ADDIS, ET AL

RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on a Motion (doc. 23) for Summary Judgment brought by
Defendants, the Town of Addis,1 a political subdivision of the State of Louisiana, and Robert
Arrazattee and Kenneth DeCook of the Addis, La Police Department. Defendants seek dismissal
of Plaintiff Erika Foster’s claims for false arrest and failure to train and/or supervise under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, state law claims of assault and battery, cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution (doc. 23) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
excessive force (doc. 27).

Plaintiff has filed an opposition (doc. 27).

Oral argument is

unnecessary. The Court’s jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343. For the reasons
stated herein, the Defendants’ Motion (doc. 23) for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The evidence submitted on summary judgment establishes allegations arise out of an
incident that occurred on November 2, 2012, when Plaintiff was arrested at Chuck’s Bar in
Addis, Louisiana. Upon her arrival, Plaintiff noticed police officers present at the bar and soon
after “got into a fuss with the [bar’s] owner.”2

Next, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Officer

Arrazattee grabbed Ms. Foster by the collar, picked her up off her feet, before slamming her to
the ground. After Officer Arrazattee informed Plaintiff she was resisting arrest, and while still

1
2

Incorrectly named as the City of Addis in Complaint. Doc. 1 and Doc. 13.
Doc 27, p1.

on the ground, Defendant Officer DaCooked forcibly pounded his knee into Plaintiff’s back.
Afterwards, Ms. Foster was charged with remaining after forbidden, disturbing the peace, and
resisting an officer. After Plaintiff was arrested, she was transported to West Baton Rouge
Parish Law Enforcement Complex,3 which is neither owned nor operated by the Town of Addis
or any of its officers.4 Plaintiff alleges that, upon arriving at the jail, she advised that her head
was hurting and was told that someone from the medical department would come examine her
complaints. However, no examination ever took place. Plaintiff claims that after posting bond,
she rushed to Earl K. Long Hospital where she was diagnosed with a moderate to severe
concussion.5
On January 16, 2014, Plaintiff pled guilty to and was convicted of resisting an officer and
remaining after forbidden (doc. 23-3 p1).6 Plaintiff did not appeal the conviction, nor is there
any record the conviction has been overturned.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment
carries the burden of demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d
265 (1986). When the burden at trial rests on the non-moving party, the moving party need only
demonstrate that the record lacks sufficient evidentiary support for the non-moving party’s case.
Id. The moving party may do this by showing that the evidence is insufficient to prove the
existence of one or more essential elements of the non-moving party’s case. Id. A party must

3

In her complaint, Plaintiff states she was transported to the Addis Police Department. Doc 1, ¶ 16.
Doc 27, Exhibit E.
5
Plaintiff has not submitted any medical evidence into the record.
6
The charge of disturbing the peace was dismissed. Doc. 23-3 Exhibit A.
4

support its summary judgment position by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record”
or “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine
dispute.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1).
Although the Court considers evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party,
the non-moving party must show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). Conclusory
allegations and unsubstantiated assertions will not satisfy the non-moving party’s burden. Grimes
v. Tex. Dep’t of Mental Health, 102 F.3d 137, 139–40 (5th Cir. 1996). Similarly, “[u]nsworn
pleadings, memoranda or the like are not, of course, competent summary judgment evidence.”
Larry v. White, 929 F.2d 206, 211 n.12 (5th Cir. 1991). If, once the non-moving party has been
given the opportunity to raise a genuine fact issue, no reasonable juror could find for the nonmoving party, summary judgment will be granted for the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 32223.
III. Discussion
THE HECK DOCTRINE
The major issue in this ruling is whether or not Plaintiff’s suit could collaterally attack
the validity of her conviction. The Defendants argue Foster’s claims are barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme
Court held that to establish a cognizable claim for damages under § 1983 that would call into
question or otherwise invalidate a conviction or sentence, a plaintiff must prove “that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a
federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck 512 U.S. at 486-87. Courts refer to

this requirement as the “favorable termination rule.” Ballard v. Burton, 444 F. 3d 391, 396 (5th
Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court explained that if the plaintiff’s claim sought to invalidate the
underlying conviction or sentence, such claim must be dismissed unless the plaintiff could show
that the conviction or sentence had already been invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. If the
district court determines that the Plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not inherently imply
the nullification of the criminal judgment against the Plaintiff, the action should be allowed to
proceed. Arnold v. Town of Slaughter, 2003 WL 25739166 at 1 (M.D. La. 2003).
PLAINTIFF’S § 1983 CLAIM
False Arrest
Foster’s first claim alleges, while acting under the color of state law, Defendants
Arrazattee and DaCook violated her civil and constitutional rights by wrongfully arresting her,
offending her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful seizure. Defendants argue
Plaintiff’s conviction in state court bar all § 1983 claims under the Heck doctrine. The “core of
Heck is a proscription against allowing a civil tort suit to cast doubt on a criminal conviction.”
Faulkner v. McCormick, 2002 WL 31465892 at 2 (E.D. La. 11/1/02) (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at
487). Here, Foster pled guilty7 and was convicted of resisting an officer and remaining after
forbidden. Consequently, Plaintiff’s claim of false arrest under § 1983 would directly contradict
her conviction because part of the conviction of resisting an officer requires that there be a lawful
arrest. To succeed under this claim, Plaintiff would have to prove that the arrest was unlawful,
casting doubt on the subsequent conviction of resisting arrest. “Heck will not permit such a
conflict between civil and criminal proceeding to stand simultaneously.” Arnold v. Town of
Slaughter, 2003 WL 25739166 at 3 (M.D. La. 2003). Allowing the Plaintiff to proceed with her

7

Foster’s attorney recalls her client pled nolo contrendere to these charges; however, court minutes reflect a guilty
plea was entered. Doc 23-3 (Exhibit A).

false-arrest claim would necessarily attack one of the grounds for her arrest because she was
charged with, and ultimately pleaded guilty to, resisting arrest. Daigre v. City of Waveland,
Miss., 549 Fed. Appx. 283, 287 (5th Cir. 2013). Unless and until Plaintiff’s criminal conviction
is expunged or invalidated, a § 1983 claim for false arrest is therefore “not cognizable.”
Excessive Force
In her Opposition to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff raises a
claim8 of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.

There, the Plaintiff argues that an

excess force claim does not necessarily imply the invalidity of her resisting arrest conviction. A
§ 1983 claim for excessive force is cognizable under Heck when the claimant proves the facts
surrounding the state conviction are “temporally and conceptually distinct from the excessive
force claim.” Bush v. Strain, 513 F. 3d 492, 498 (5th Cir. 2008). “Although the Heck principle
applies to § 1983 excessive force claims, the determination of whether such claims are barred is
analytical and fact-intensive, requiring us to focus on whether success on the excessive force
claim requires negation of an element of the criminal offense or proof of a fact that is inherently
inconsistent with one underlying the criminal conviction.” Id. at 497.
Plaintiff suggests Graham v. Connor offers the proper analysis for examining an
excessive force claim in this instance. 490 U.S. 386, 39, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443
(1989). While citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S. Ct. 169, 485 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985),
the court in Graham reasoned an excessive force claim, in light of the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the person, considers that the “‘reasonableness’ of a
particular seizure depends not only on when it is made, but also on how it is carried out.” 490
U.S. at 395. Further, “Proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances
8

Plaintiff’s Petition does not allege a claim for excessive force. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires a short and plain statement of a claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest
or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396. “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of
force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene . . . . [And] must
embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount
of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396-97.
Conversely, in Deleon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F. 3d 649 (5th Cir. 2007), when
applying Heck to a claim of excessive force, the court found the claim was not conceptually
different or separable from the underlying conviction of aggravated assault. Id. at 656. Further,
there was no alternative pleading or theory of recovery that would allow the claim to proceed
without interfering with the criminal proceeding in which the plaintiff had already been found
guilty. Id.
Here, Ms. Foster alleges excessive force was used while she was being restrained.9
Again, the Defense points to Heck as legal grounds to bar this claim. This Court must agree; to
question the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force while detaining an arrestee, who
subsequently was convicted with resisting arrest, is to contradict the underlying factual bases of
that conviction. Similar to the ruling in DeLeon, this claim is not “conceptually different” or
separable from the state charge of resisting an officer. Here, such a claim “squarely challenges
the factual determination that underlies [the Plaintiff’s] conviction.” Arnold v. Town of

9

In her Opposition, it is unclear whether Ms. Forster raises self-defense as a justification for her resisting an officer.
Regardless, considering she did not avail herself of such a defense during her state proceeding, such a claim now
would be Heck barred because it factually calls into question the validity of her conviction. See Hudson v. Hughes,
98 F. 3d 868, 873 (5th Cir. 1996).

Slaughter, 100 F. App’x 321, 324-225 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Bates, 2012 WL 3309381, at 5.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim for excessive force is barred by the Heck doctrine.
STATE ASSAULT AND BATTERY
Plaintiff alleges state law claims of assault and battery, specifically that she was slammed to the
ground by Officer Arrazattee and that Officer DeCook put his knee into her back during the
arrest.10 Under the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction,11 a federal court has the power to hear
a state law claim if it has a common nucleus of operative fact or arises out of the same
transaction or occurrence as another federal claim. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1966); Robertson v. Nueromedical Center, 161
F. 3d 292 (5th Cir. 1998). In order to recover for an alleged battery, a plaintiff must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that his damages were the result of an unprovoked attack by the
defendant. Baugh v. Redmond, 565 So. 2d 953 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990); Minkler v. Chumley, 32558 (La. App. 2nd Cir.12/08/99), 747 So. 2d 720; Lowery v. Savana, 33-384 (La. App. 2nd Cir.
5/10/00), 759 So. 2d 1020. Because an officer may use reasonable force to overcome resistance
by the person being arrested, Plaintiff’s claim that there was an unprovoked attack by Defendants
would be necessarily inconsistent with, and call into question, the conviction for resisting arrest.
Consequently, under Heck the existence of Plaintiff’s conviction for resisting an officer
precludes the instant state law action.
LIABILITY OF THE TOWN OF ADDIS
Plaintiff alleges the Town of Addis is liable for its failure to instruct, supervise, control,
and monitor the actions of the officers.12 “The inadequacy of police training may serve as the
basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the
10

Doc. 1, ¶10 and 13.
U.S.C. § 1367(C).
12
Doc. 1, ¶ 34.
11

rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378, 388, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1989) (emphasis added). A municipality can
be held liable under §1983 only where its policies are the “moving force [behind] the
constitutional violation.” Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694,
98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). Municipal liability for a constitutional injury therefore
requires a finding that the individual officer is liable on the underlying, substantive claim. If
there is no underlying constitutional violation against the plaintiff, then there can be no award of
damages against a municipality. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S. Ct.
1571, 89 L. Ed. 2d 806 (1986). While Plaintiff’s claims—that the city's failure to provide
training to municipal employees resulted in the constitutional deprivation she suffered—are
cognizable under § 1983, they can only yield liability against a municipality where that city's
failure to train reflects deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of its inhabitants. City
of Canton, Ohio, 489 U.S. at 392. However, after applying the ruling under Heck, there can be
no cognizable §1983 claim against the officers, thus there can be no §1983 claim against the
municipality for damages. Therefore, the allegations of failure to train and/or supervise against
the Town of Addis are dismissed.
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Plaintiff alleges that the prison officials did not provide her medical care, which violated
her 8th Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth Amendment
provides that “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fine imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. “The Cruel and Unusual
Punishments clause ‘was designed to protect those convicted of crimes,’ and, consequently, the
Clause applies ‘only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally

associated with criminal prosecutions.’” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318-19, 106 S. Ct.
1078, 89 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1986) (internal citations removed).
In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants make two arguments: (1) at the time
of the alleged Eighth Amendment violation, Ms. Foster had not been convicted of a crime, and
(2), that the site where the alleged injury occurred was not a facility owned or operated by the
Town of Addis.

Because Plaintiff alleges she was denied medical treatment prior to her

conviction13—and thus no formal adjudication at the time of denial of constitutional rights—the
Eighth Amendment does not apply. See City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hosp., 463
U.S. 239, 244, 103 S. Ct. 2979, 77 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1983). As to the denial of care itself, Plaintiff
has made no allegation that she requested medical care or that officers denied her of any.14 The
only allegations regarding medical care are made against a prison that is not owned nor operated
by the Town. Therefore, regarding any claims of inadequate medical care occurring at the
prison, the Town of Addis is not the appropriate defendant and are dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the Defendants’ Motion (doc. 23) for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED. All claims against Defendants, the Town of Addis, Robert Arrazattee, and Kenneth
DeCook, are DISMISSED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on November 3, 2014.





JUDGE JAMES J. BRADY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
13

On January 16, 2014 Plaintiff was only fined as a result of her conviction of resisting arrest and remaining after
forbidden. Doc 23-3 (Exhibit A and Exhibit C).
14
In her original complaint, Plaintiff states she advised that her head was hurting and asked Officer Arrazattee if she
could use her phone to call someone to post bail and take her home. Doc. 1, ¶16. In her subsequent Opposition to
Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff states en route to the police station she begged for medical attention and
was refused even after arriving at jail. Doc. 27, p1. However, this discrepancy is not discussed in Plaintiff’s
Statement of Contested Facts, filed in conjunction with her Opposition. Doc 27-1.