Breaux v. Social Security Administration

Filing 17

RULING: The decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED and that Plaintiff's appeal is DENIED with prejudice. Signed by Magistrate Judge Richard L. Bourgeois, Jr on 3/4/2015. (SMG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

VALENCIA P. BREAUX

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 13-712-RLB

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
ACTING COMMISSIONER
OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION

CONSENT

RULING

Plaintiff, Valencia P. Breaux (Plaintiff), seeks judicial review of a final decision by the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Commissioner) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
405(g). (R. Doc. 1). 1 The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s application for supplemental security
income “under Title XIX of the Social Security Act.” (Tr. 141-46). For the reasons given below,
the Court ORDERS that the decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED and Plaintiff’s
appeal be DISMISSED with prejudice.
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 13, 2011, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for supplemental security

income benefits. (Tr. 141-46). Plaintiff alleged that she became disabled on December 14, 2010
due to back problems, facet joint deterioration, anxiety and depression. (Tr. 72, 415). The claim
was initially denied and Plaintiff filed a timely request for a hearing that was held on June 19,

1

References to documents filed in this case are designated by: (R. Doc. [docket number(s)] at [page number(s)]).
References to the record of administrative proceedings filed in this case are designated by: (Tr. [page number(s)]).

2012. (Tr. 29-62). Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified at the hearing. (Tr.
33-56). Thomas Mungall, a Vocational Expert (VE), also provided testimony. (Tr. 56-60).
An unfavorable decision was rendered by the Commissioner, through the Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ), on August 15, 2012. (Tr. 13-23). The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been under
a disability since January 13, 2011, the application date. (Tr. 13). Plaintiff’s request for review
was denied by the Appeals Council on October 21, 2013. (Tr. 1-6). The ALJ’s decision rested as
the final decision when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.981 (“The Appeals Council’s decision, or the decision of the administrative law judge if
the request for review is denied, is binding unless you . . . file an action in Federal district court .
. . .”). The ALJ’s final decision is now ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to an inquiry into whether

there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Commissioner and whether the correct
legal standards were applied. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971); Falco v. Shalala, 27 F.3d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1994); Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019,
1021 (5th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence has been defined as “‘more than a mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.’” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. N.L.R.B.,
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (defining “substantial evidence” in the context of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e))). The Fifth Circuit has further held that substantial evidence
“must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established, but no
substantial evidence will be found only where there is a conspicuous absence of credible choices
or no contrary medical evidence.” Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1983).

2

Conflicts in the evidence are for the Commissioner “and not the courts to resolve.” Selders v.
Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1990). The court may not reweigh the evidence, try the case
de novo, or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner even if it finds that the
evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision. See, e.g., Bowling v. Shalala, 36
F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1994) (“This is so because substantial evidence is less than a
preponderance but more than a scintilla.”); Hollis v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1383 (5th Cir. 1988)
(“we must carefully scrutinize the record to determine if, in fact, such evidence is present; at the
same time, however, we may neither reweigh the evidence in the record nor substitute our
judgment for the Secretary’s”); Harrell v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 1988) (same).
If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, then it is conclusive
and must be upheld. Estate of Morris v. Shalala, 207 F.3d 744, 745 (5th Cir. 2000). If the
Commissioner fails to apply the correct legal standards, or fails to provide a reviewing court with
a sufficient basis to determine that the correct legal principles were followed, it is grounds for
reversal. Bradley v. Bowen, 809 F.2d 1054, 1057 (5th Cir. 1987).
III.

ALJ’S DETERMINATION
In determining disability, the Commissioner (through an ALJ) works through a five-step

sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The burden rests upon the
claimant throughout the first four steps of this five-step process to prove disability. If the
claimant is successful in sustaining his or her burden at each of the first four steps, the burden
shifts to the Commissioner at step five. See Muse v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 785, 789 (5th Cir. 1991)
(explaining the five-step process). First, the claimant must prove he is not currently engaged in
substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Second, the claimant must prove his or her
impairment is “severe” in that it “significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic

3

work activities . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). At step three the ALJ must conclude the claimant
is disabled if he proves that his or her impairments meet or are medically equivalent to one of the
impairments contained in the Listing of Impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d) (step three of
sequential process); 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 (Listing of Impairments). Fourth, the
claimant bears the burden of proving he is incapable of meeting the physical and mental
demands of his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).
If the claimant is successful at all four of the preceding steps then the burden shifts to the
Commissioner to prove, considering the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education
and past work experience, that he or she is capable of performing other work. 20 C.F.R §
404.1520(g)(1). If the Commissioner proves other work exists which the claimant can perform,
the claimant is given the chance to prove that he or she cannot, in fact, perform that work. Muse,
925 F.2d at 789.
Here, after reviewing the evidence contained in the administrative record, the ALJ made
the following determinations:
1.

Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 13, 2011, the
protective filing date.

2.

Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: status post anterior cervical
disc fusion, low back pain, obesity, depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD).

3.

Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medical equal the severity of any Listings, either
alone or in combination.

4.

Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work. However, she
could: (1) not climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; (2) not reach overhead; (3) only stoop,
kneel, crouch or crawl on occasion; and (4) only perform simple and routine work that
did not require public contact.

5.

Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work (PRW) as either a corrections officer or
a security guard because the exertional demands of those occupations exceeded the RFC.

4

6.

Plaintiff was a younger individual (age 18-49).

7.

Plaintiff had a high school education and could communicate in English.

8.

The transferability of job skills was immaterial to the ultimate determination of disability
because the Medical Vocational Guidelines (GRIDS) supported a finding of not-disabled,
regardless of the transferability of Plaintiff’s job skills.

9.

Given Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience and RFC, she could perform the
following jobs existing in the national economy: File Clerk I (DOT No. 206.387-034);
General Office Clerk (DOT No. 209.562-101); and Housekeeper/Cleaner (DOT No.
323.687-104).

(Tr. 15-22).
IV.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises three assignments of error in support of her appeal. First, Plaintiff

suggests the ALJ “erred in failing to provide any reasons whatsoever for her rejection of the
opinions of examining psychologist, Dr. Maxine Flint, whose opinions directly conflict with the
ALJ’s RFC assessment.” (R. Doc. 14 at 4). Plaintiff later suggests that Dr. Flint was actually a
“treating source” and that the ALJ’s failure to explain the weight given to Dr. Flint’s opinion
“renders her RFC assessment a nullity” and “remand is required.” (R. Doc. 14 at 5-6). Second,
Plaintiff believes remand is necessary because the ALJ failed to conduct a “sustainability
analysis” when presented with evidence that Plaintiff’s “signs and/or symptoms ‘wax and wane’
precluding an ability to sustain work-related activities on a regular and continuing basis.” (R.
Doc. 14 at 6). Finally, Plaintiff claims the ALJ committed reversible error by “failing to
consider plaintiff’s Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) in her RFC assessment and in her final
disability determination.” (R. Doc. 14 at 8).

5

A.

Medical Opinion Evidence

Plaintiff suggests the ALJ erred in failing to explain the weight given to the opinion of
her “treating source,” 2 Dr. Maxine Flint, who rated Plaintiff’s Global Assessment of Functioning
(GAF) at 41 on June 11, 2012. (R. Doc. 14 at 4, 6); (Tr. 967). A GAF score of 41 indicates
either “serious symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting)
or any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable
to keep a job).” American Psychiatric Association: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders 32 (DSM–IV) (Michael B. First, M.D., et al. eds., 4th ed. 2000). Plaintiff therefore
claims that Dr. Flint’s opinion “directly conflicts” with the RFC. (R. Doc. 14 at 4). For that
reason, the ALJ’s failure to explain why the opinion was not given controlling weight renders the
RFC “a nullity.” (R. Doc. 14 at 6). This argument fails for several reasons.
First, Dr. Maxine Flint is not a treating source as she only examined Plaintiff once, on
February 11, 2010, at the Commissioner’s request. (Tr. 652-54). See Clayborne v. Astrue, 260 F.
App’x 735, 737 (5th Cir. 2008) (doctor properly rejected as treating source where “isolated
visits” did not amount to an “ongoing treatment relationship” with doctor); Hernandez v.
Heckler, 704 F.2d 857, 860-61 (5th Cir. 1983) (doctor who only saw claimant twice in a 17month period was not a treating physician); Taylor v. Astrue, 245 F. App’x 387, 391 (5th Cir.
2007) (“[N]othing about Taylor’s relationship with Dr. Weisberg establishes the ‘longitudinal’
pattern of care described in [the regulations]; Taylor’s two visits to Dr. Weisberg, four years
apart, are the sort of “individual examinations” that are distinguished . . . from the continuous
care provided by a treating physician.”). Because Dr. Flint was not a treating source, the ALJ

2

While Plaintiff initially refers to Dr. Flint as an “examining psychologist,” she later claims that “Dr. Maxine Flint
was a treating source.” (R. Doc. 14 at 4, 6).

6

was not required to give great weight to her opinion, or assess her opinion using the factors
outlined by the Fifth Circuit in Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 455 (5th Cir. 2000).
Second, the June 11, 2012 medical record finding Plaintiff had a GAF of 41 is not
attributable to Dr. Flint, as Plaintiff suggests. There is only one piece of record evidence
attributable to Dr. Flint — a February 11, 2010 Consultative Psychological Evaluation. (Tr. 65254). In that report, Dr. Flint actually assesses Plaintiff’s GAF at 60. (Tr. 654). The report from
June 11, 2012 is an Initial Assessment from the Cognitive Development Center of Baton Rouge.
(Tr. 963-69). While the physician’s signature on the Initial Assessment is not legible, Plaintiff
attributes this evidence to a “Dr. Sanders” in her brief to the Appeals Council. (Tr. 234). Either
way, the GAF score was assessed during an “Initial Assessment.” (Tr. 963-69). Therefore, this
opinion cannot be considered as that of a treating source and the ALJ did not have to afford
controlling weight to the opinion or perform the detailed analysis required by Newton.
Aside from her treating source argument, Plaintiff contends that her GAF score of 41
establishes mental limitations that are incompatible with the RFC. However, she suggests the
ALJ “dismiss[ed]” the score “because it ‘occurred only eight days prior to the June 19, 2012
hearing.’” (R. Doc. 15 at 5) (quoting (Tr. 20)). A review of the entire decision, however, makes
clear that the ALJ found the date of the evaluation significant only because it was the first time
Plaintiff had sought mental health treatment in almost a year (Tr. 20, 967, 972). 3 In other words,
the ALJ properly relied on Plaintiff’s failure to obtain regular treatment as discrediting her
allegation that she suffered from disabling mental impairments. Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019,
1024 (5th Cir. 1990) (ALJ may rely on lack of treatment as an indication of non-disability).

3

This evidence also contradicts Plaintiff’s testimony that she was “receiv[ing] psychological counseling . . . [t]wo to
three times a week” at the time of the hearing. (Tr. 45).

7

Beyond that, the physician assessing Plaintiff’s GAF did not provide an explanation for
the score, or indicate the objective findings, if any, upon which it was based. Ray v. Barnhart,
163 F. App’x 308, 313 (5th Cir. 2006) (psychologist’s opinion was properly discredited where
his report did “not include an explanation for the GAF rating” given to claimant). Moreover, the
score was assessed during Plaintiff’s initial visit with the Cognitive Development Center. The
exam notes from that visit largely record Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and recount of her
personal history, as opposed to the physician’s observations — further diminishing the
significance of this evidence. Plaintiff’s GAF of 41 is likewise contradicted by two higher GAF
scores in the record — scores of 60 and 55 — which indicate moderate symptoms. (Tr. 654) (Dr.
Flint found Plaintiff had a GAF of 60 on February 11, 2010); (Tr. 977) (Dr. Michelle BrowneBarnum found Plaintiff had a GAF of 55 on October 19, 2011); DSM-IV at 32 (A GAF between
60 and 51 indicates “Moderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional
panic attacks) or moderate difficulty in social, occupational or school functioning (e.g., few
friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers).”).
Finally, Plaintiff’s GAF score it is not substantial evidence to contradict the RFC. For an
impairment to be disabling under the Act, it must be expected to last for at least 12 months.
With that in mind, a GAF score alone is not dispositive of a claimant’s ability to work because it
is not a longitudinal representation of the claimant’s mental impairment. Rather, a GAF score is
essentially a “snapshot” of the mental impairment — it only considers the claimant’s functioning
“at the time of the evaluation and the score can greatly fluctuate over time.” White v. Colvin,

8

2013 WL 441335 at *9 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2013). 4 And so, Plaintiff’s score simply represents
her level of mental functioning on June 11, 2012.
Plaintiff points to no other evidence to suggest that substantial evidence does not support
the ALJ’s RFC assessment. And so, the Court finds Plaintiff’s first assignment of error is without
merit.
B.

Ability to Sustain Work Activity

Plaintiff suggests that under Watson v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2002), the ALJ
was required to consider her “ability to sustain work-related activities on a regular basis” because
the evidence suggests that the symptoms of her anxiety, depression, headaches, CFS and neck
impairment, “‘wax and wane.’” (R. Doc. 14 at 6). Put another way, in addition to finding
Plaintiff’s impairments did not prevent her from obtaining employment, Watson required the
ALJ to separately consider whether she would be able to maintain that employment. Plaintiff
supports this contention by pointing to instances in which physicians have described her anxiety,
depression, headaches and neck pain as “chronic and/or recurring.” (R. Doc. 14 at 6-7) (citing
(Tr. 367, 473, 511, 624, 627, 636, 652-54, 680-83, 689, 967)). She further suggests that her
diagnoses of CFS, “by definition,” clearly involves “‘waxing and waning.’” (R. Doc. 14 at 7). In
response, the Commissioner argues that even if Plaintiff’s symptoms waxed and waned,
“Plaintiff fails to establish that her symptoms, even at their worst, were sufficiently severe as to
prevent her from holding a job for a significant period of time.” (R. Doc. 16 at 8). The Court
agrees.
Plaintiff insists that her symptoms wax and wane simply because she was diagnosed with
chronic fatigue syndrome and either “chronic” or “recurrent” anxiety, depression, neck pain, and
4

Recognizing these differences, the Commissioner has advised that the “GAF scale . . . is endorsed by the American
Psychiatric Association” and it “does not have a direct correlation to the severity requirements” of the Social
Security Act. 65 Fed. Reg. 50746, 50764-50765 (Aug. 21, 2000).

9

headaches. However, “[t]he mere presence of some impairment is not disabling per se. Plaintiff
must show that [she] was so functionally impaired by [her diagnosed conditions] that [she] was
precluded from engaging in any substantial gainful activity.” Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162,
165 (5th Cir. 1983). To cast doubt on the RFC assessment, Plaintiff would have to show that her
“waxing and waning” impairments produce disabling symptoms when active or recurring. She
has failed to make this showing.
The majority of the records cited by Plaintiff are from various emergency room
physicians who examined her on one occasion. Their descriptions of Plaintiff’s impairments as
either “chronic or recurrent” are attributable to her subjectively reported medical history, as
opposed to objective medical findings. (Tr. 367) (during an August 11, 2010 emergency room
visit, Plaintiff reported a history of “chronic” headaches); (Tr. 473) (during a March 2, 2011
emergency room visit, Plaintiff reported a “history of chronic neck pain” (Tr. 472) and was then
diagnosed with chronic neck pain by a one-time examining ER physician); (Tr. 511) (during a
July 2010 emergency room visit, Plaintiff reported a history of recurrent migraines (Tr. 509));
(Tr. 652-54) (on February 11, 2010, one-time examining psychologist, Dr. Flint, diagnosed
Plaintiff with “mild, recurrent” depression); (Tr. 689) (Plaintiff presented to the emergency room
on March 2, 2012 (Tr. 673-93) complaining of anxiety and increased stress, she was diagnosed
with acute anxiety and acute neck pain); (Tr. 967) (Plaintiff was diagnosed with recurrent
depression at her initial visit to the Cognitive Development Center after relaying her history of
depressive symptoms). Put into context, the characterization of Plaintiff’s impairments as
chronic or recurrent is the result of Plaintiff’s reported medical history as opposed to a
longitudinal treatment relationship with the examining physicians. Therefore, this is insufficient

10

to demonstrate that her impairments wax and wane to a degree that would require the ALJ to
perform a Watson analysis.
Otherwise, the medical records show that Plaintiff neither suffers from disabling
symptoms or symptoms that “wax and wane.” For example, Plaintiff frequently exhibited full
or normal range of motion in her extremities, back or neck; full or normal strength; and intact
sensory. (Tr. 361, 368, 374, 419, 449, 472, 480, 491, 628, 629, 716, 825) (full or normal range of
motion); (Tr. 361, 368, 374, 420, 449, 629, 631, 636, 716, 825) (normal strength); (Tr. 361, 368,
373, 374, 420, 461, 480, 636, 825) (no numbness or sensory intact). On occasion, Plaintiff also
denied any symptoms of headaches, back pain, depression or anxiety. (Tr. 373, 395, 624, 628,
631, 635) (denies headaches); (Tr. 367, 373) (denies back pain); (Tr. 623, 627, 630, 634) (denies
feelings of depression and hopelessness). As the ALJ pointed out, the record also demonstrates
that Plaintiff went relatively long periods of time without refilling her prescription medications,
which indicates her impairments were not disabling. (Tr. 19, 973, 981); (Tr. 993) (on June 11,
2012 Plaintiff did not report that she took any medications).
The record does not support Plaintiff’s allegations of “chronic” or even “recurrent”
disabling symptoms. As such, Plaintiff has failed to show that substantial evidence does not
support the RFC or that the ALJ should have determined whether her symptoms precluded her
from sustaining employment.
C.

Chronic Fatigue Syndrome

Plaintiff finally argues that the ALJ “erred in failing to consider Plaintiff’s Chronic
Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) in her RFC assessment and her final disability determination.” (R. Doc.
14 at 8). According to Plaintiff, she was diagnosed with CFS in April and June of 2011 (Tr. 624,
632), by a treating source, Dr. Trenton Hinds of the Teche Action Clinic. (R. Doc. 9-10). This

11

diagnosis “should have set off ‘alarms’ warranting consideration because of the close association
between CFS and fibromyalgia and the fact that the Social Security Administration now
considers this impairment serious enough to warrant an expansive discussion of it in a single
Social Security Ruling.” (R. Doc. 14 at 9). But the ALJ, according to Plaintiff, “did not even
mention, let alone consider,” Dr. Hind’s medical opinion diagnosing Plaintiff with CFS. (R. Doc.
14 at 10).
Plaintiff is correct that the ALJ did not mention her diagnosis of CFS. However, the ALJ
extensively discussed the treatment records in the administrative transcript, including those from
Dr. Hinds and other examining physicians at the Teche Action Clinic. The ALJ even discussed
the actual treatment records in which Dr. Hinds diagnosed Plaintiff with CFS, along with 9 other
impairments. (Tr. 18, 624, 632). Therefore, there is no merit to Plaintiff’s contention that the
ALJ ignored Dr. Hinds’ medical opinion.
Otherwise, Plaintiff argues that her diagnosis of CFS, alone, warrants remand for
consideration by the ALJ. The fact that Plaintiff has been diagnosed with CFS is insufficient to
warrant remand. Again, it is the actual limitation(s) resulting from an impairment and not the
impairment itself that is relevant to establishing disability. Plaintiff harps on her diagnosis
without ever mentioning any limitations resulting from her CFS that might conflict with the
ALJ’s determinations.
The SSA recognizes that CFS may be a medically determinable impairment. But unlike
the Center for Disease Control, which permits a diagnosis of CFS based solely on a patient’s
subjective complaints, the SSA requires a diagnosis of CFS to additionally be accompanied by
“medical evidence, consisting of medical signs, symptoms and laboratory findings” before a
diagnosis of CFS will be considered a medically determinable impairment. SSR 99-2P, 1999 WL

12

271569, at *1 (April 30, 1999). The SSA advises that ‘medical signs’ must be “clinically
documented over a period of at least 6 months” and may include “palpably swollen or tender
lymph nodes on physical exam; nonexudative pharyngitis; persistent, reproducible muscle
tenderness on repeated examination, including the presence of positive tender points; or any
other medical signs consistent with medically acceptable clinical practice . . . .” SSR 99-2P, 1999
WL 271569, at *3.
Dr. Hinds is the only physician to diagnose Plaintiff with CFS and that diagnosis only
appears in his treatment records on three occasions between April 14, 2011 to June 2, 2011 — a
period of less than 2 months. (Tr. 624, 632, 636). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot show that her
diagnosis was consistently accompanied by objective medical signs for a period of 6 months
where the diagnosis itself was only made over a period of two months. Moreover, Dr. Hinds
provides no explanation for his diagnosis, nor does he indicate the signs, symptoms or laboratory
findings, if any, that supported his conclusion. (Tr. 624, 632). Dr. Hinds’ treatment records
likewise do not indicated that he performed any of the diagnostic tests cited in SSR 99-2P that
should accompany a diagnosis of CFS. (Tr. 623-639). See SSR 99-2P, 1999 WL 271569, at *3-4.
Instead, the only relevant notes throughout his treatment records are of Plaintiff’s subjective
reports of fatigue, which she attributed to “pain” in May of 2011. (Tr. 624, 628, 632).
Otherwise, CFS is not mention in the record after June 2, 2011 (Tr. 624). Plaintiff also did not
allege CFS as a severe or disabling impairment before the ALJ. (Tr. 72, 157, 415) (alleging
disability based on sciatica, neck pain, herniated lumbar disc and facet joint deterioration, back
problems, anxiety and depression). Therefore, the record indicates that the ALJ did not err in
failing to discuss Plaintiff’s CFS in her opinion as the medical evidence is insufficient to
establish CFS as a medically determinable impairment.

13

V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the

Commissioner is AFFIRMED and that Plaintiff’s appeal is DENIED with prejudice.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on March 4, 2015.

S

RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

14