McCadney v. Hamilton

Filing 19

RULING denying 12 MOTION to Dismiss pursuant to FRCP Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1). Signed by Judge Shelly D. Dick on 7/30/2014. (SMG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DANNY McCADNEY

CIVIL DOCKET NO.

VERSUS

13-824-SDD-RLB

LOUIS HAMILTON
RULING
Before the Court is the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP Rules
12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1)1. Plaintiff has filed a Memorandum in Opposition2.
I.

PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS AND CLAIMS
The Plaintiff, Danny McCadney, is an inmate at Elayn Hunt Correctional Center

in St. Gabriel, Louisiana. He alleges that on or about July 15, 2013 he was subjected to
cruel and unusual punishment at the hands of a correctional officer, Defendant Sgt.
Louis Hamilton. Plaintiff alleges that as he “began to exit the cell, Sgt. Hamilton kicked
the door closed and the cell door struck [Plaintiff] on his left shoulder and slammed his
head between the door and door frame rendering [him] unconscious”.3 The Plaintiff
alleges that the “use of force was unnecessary and excessive” and “it was not
objectively reasonable to use force on an inmate who was restrained and not resisting”.4
Plaintiff brings a claim under 42 USC § 1983 for violation of his “Eighth
Amendment Right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment”.5 Plaintiff also asserts
State Law negligence claims.

1

Rec. Doc. 12.
Rec. Doc. 13.
3
Rec. Doc. 1, ¶9.
4
Id. ¶s15 and 21.
5
Id. ¶25. Plaintiff also claims a violation of the Fourth Amendment but there are no facts pled which
support a Fourth Amendment claim.
2

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II.

LAW AND ARGUMENT
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Defendant moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). In evaluating subject matter jurisdiction, the
Court accepts all uncontroverted factual allegations as true, viewing the Complaint as a
whole.
This Court is vested with jurisdiction pursuant to 28 USC 1331. The Plaintiff has
pled a colorable claim “arising under” the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Accordingly, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss6 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is
denied.
B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Hamilton are “in
reality a suit against the State” and, therefore, the Eleventh Amendment Immunity shield
applies.
While it is true that State officials acting in their official capacities are not
considered “persons” subject to liability under 42 USC 1983, State officials sued in their
individual capacities are “persons” for purposes of 1983 liability and are subject to suit in
Federal Court.7 While official capacity suits are treated as suits against the State and,
therefore, subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity, personal capacity suits “seek to
impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under color of
State law.”8

6

Rec. Doc. 12.
Hayfer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991).
8
Id. at 26, 112 S.Ct. at 362.
7

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In this case, the Plaintiff pleads that the Defendant, Sgt. Hamilton, was an
employee of the Department of Corrections in the course and scope of his employment
and acting under color of state law when he allegedly used excessive force on the
Plaintiff. “Congress enacted 42 USC 1983 ‘to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment against those who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in
some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it’.”9 The
allegations of the Plaintiff’s Complaint plead that, acting under color of State law, the
Defendant, Louis Hamilton, allegedly subjected the Plaintiff, Danny McCadney, to cruel
and unusual punishment – a Constitutional violation made actionable against individual
actors by 42 USC 1983.

Accordingly, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss10 on the

grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity is denied.
C. Failure to State a Claim
Defendant argues that the Plaintiff’s allegations arise under State tort law and fail
to state a claim under Federal law. As previously set forth, the factual allegations of the
Plaintiff’s Complaint allege Constitutional deprivation and liability under 42 USC 1983.
The Plaintiff also brings claims under Louisiana tort law over which this Court may
exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 28 USC Section 1367 provides that “district courts
shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in
the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution”. For the reasons outlined
above, this Court has primary jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s civil rights claims brought
pursuant to 42 USC 1983. In order to be part of “the same case or controversy” the

9

Id. at 27, 112 S.Ct. at 363 (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243 94 S.Ct. 1963, 40 L.Ed.2d 90
(1974), and Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-172, 365 U.S. 167, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961).
10
Rec. Doc. 12.

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State law claims “must derive from a common nucleus of operative facts” such that a
Plaintiff would “ordinarily be expected to try them in one judicial proceeding”.11
Considering the allegations of the Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges State
law claims which arise out of the same operative facts as the Plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983
claim. Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss supplemental jurisdiction over the
Plaintiff’s State Law claims.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP

12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)12 are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on July 30, 2014.

S

JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 

11
12

United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).
Rec. Doc. 12.

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