Terrebonne Parish NAACP et al v. Jindal et al

Filing 195

RULING denying 187 First MOTION for Leave to Intervene filed by Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government. Signed by Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder-Doomes on 05/11/2016. (ELW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
TERREBONNE PARISH BRANCH NAACP,
ET AL.
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 14-69-JJB-EWD
PIYUSH (“BOBBY”) JINDAL, THE
GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF
LOUISIANA, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY,
ET AL.
RULING ON MOTION TO INTERVENE OF THE TERREBONNE PARISH
CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT
Before the Court is a Motion to Intervene1 brought by the Terrebonne Parish Consolidated
Government (“TPCG”). The Motion is opposed by Plaintiffs, the Terrebonne Parish Branch
NAACP, Vincent Fusilier, Sr., Lionel Myers, Wendell Desmond Shelby, Jr., and Daniel Turner
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”).2 TPCG has filed a reply3 and Plaintiffs have filed a sur-reply.4 The
current defendants in this suit are the Attorney General of the State of Louisiana and the Governor
of the State of Louisiana (collectively, “Defendants”).5 Per TPCG’s Motion to Intervene, it
conferred with counsel for the Defendants, who confirmed that the Defendants have no objection
to the granting of this Motion to Intervene.6 For the reasons set forth herein, TPCG’s Motion to
Intervene is DENIED.7

1

R. Doc. 187.

2

R. Doc. 188.

3

R. Doc. 191.

4

R. Doc. 194.

Plaintiffs originally brought this action against three defendants: Piyush “Bobby” Jindal as Governor of the State of
Louisiana in his official capacity; James “Buddy” Caldwell as Attorney General of the State of Louisiana in his official
capacity; and Tom Schedler as Secretary of State of Louisiana in his official capacity. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed
Schedler with prejudice as a defendant in this action. R. Doc. 69.
5

6

R. Doc. 187, p. 3.

Magistrate judges may “hear and determine” non-dispositive pre-trial motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
“A motion to intervene is considered a non-dispositive motion.” Johnson v. Qualawash Holdings, LLC, 2013 WL
7

1

I.

Background
On February 3, 2014, Plaintiffs filed this challenge to the use of at-large voting for the 32nd

Judicial District Court (the “32nd JDC”) to dilute “Black” voting strength in violation of Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. §10301 (“Section 2”), and the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.8 The Plaintiffs pray for, inter alia, the
following relief: (1) a declaration that the at-large method of electing members to the 32nd JDC
was adopted and/or maintained with a discriminatory purpose in violation of Section 2 and the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution; (2) a declaration that the at-large
method of electing members to the 32nd JDC has the result of denying or abridging the right to
vote on account of race or color in violation of Section 2 and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments to the Constitution; (3) an injunction precluding the Defendants, their successors,
and agents from enforcing, administering, implementing, or conducting any future elections to the
32nd JDC under the current at-large method of election; (4) an order setting an immediate and
reasonable deadline for the State of Louisiana to enact and adopt a new method of election for the
32nd JDC or alternatively ordering the implementation of an election system for the 32nd JDC; and
(5) an order retaining jurisdiction over this action and requiring Terrebonne to obtain preclearance
for any and all future changes in voting law impacting the 32nd JDC.9
On February 29, 2016, TPCG filed the instant Motion to Intervene. TPCG explains that it
is the parish government of the Parish of Terrebonne and in that capacity, “has substantial

3050021, at *2 (W.D. La. June 17, 2013) (citing S.E.C. v. Koirnman, 2006 WL 148733, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 18,
2006)). See also, Stephens v. State Farm and Cas. Co., 2010 WL 1292719, at *3 (E.D. La. March 8, 2010) (“The
portion of Road Home’s motion seeking leave to intervene is a non-dispositive matter which I may address by order.”).
8

R. Doc. 1, p. 1.

9

R. Doc. 1, pp. 22-23.

2

administrative and fiscal pecuniary interests in its local court system.”10 TPCG further asserts that
it “will bring to the litigation a special ‘local perspective’ on the current historical, political, and
demographic factors at issue that are or may not be likely to be presented by Defendants and that
could benefit the court’s understanding of the factual and legal merits of Defendants’ position.”11
TPCG asserts that: (1) Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act grants it an unconditional right
to intervene; (2) it may also intervene of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2)
because it claims an interest relating to this matter and is so situated that disposition of the action
may, as a practical matter, impair or impede its ability to protect that interest; and (3) this Court
should exercise its discretion to allow it to permissively intervene under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(b)(2).12
II.

Law and Analysis
A. Timeliness of Motion to Intervene
“Whether leave to intervene is sought under section (a) or (b) of Rule 24, the application

must be timely.” Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 1977). The timeliness
of a motion to intervene is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. McDonald
v. E.J. Lavino, 430 F.2d 1065, 1071 (5th Cir. 1970). Timeliness “is not limited to chronological
considerations but ‘is to be determined from all the circumstances.’” Stallworth v. Monsanto Co.,
558 F.2d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 1977). The Fifth Circuit has set forth four factors to consider when
evaluating whether a motion to intervene is timely: (1) the length of time during which the
proposed intervenor should have known of his interest in the case before he petitioned to intervene;
(2) the extent of prejudice that those parties already in the litigation would suffer “as a result of

10

R. Doc. 187, ¶ 2.

11

R. Doc. 187, ¶ 4.

12

R. Doc. 187-1.

3

the would-be intervenor’s failure to apply for intervention as soon as he actually knew or
reasonably should have known of his interest in the case;” (3) the extent of prejudice to the
proposed intervenor if he is not allowed to intervene; and (4) the existence of “unusual
circumstances militating either for or against a determination that the application is timely.” Ross
v. Marshall, 426 F.3d 745, 754 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257,
264-266 (5th Cir. 1977)). While the above factors “give structure” to the timeliness analysis, the
analysis “remains ‘contextual’ and should not be used as a ‘tool of retribution to punish the tardy
would-be intervenor, but rather [should serve as] a guard against prejudicing the original parties
by the failure to apply sooner.’” Ross v. Marshall, 426 F.3d 745, 754 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Sierra
Club v. Epsy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1205 (5th Cir. 1994)).
Plaintiffs argue that TPCG’s proposed intervention is untimely and that Plaintiffs would
be prejudiced by the proposed intervention. Plaintiffs point out that the current parties have
completed more than 16 months of fact and expert discovery, and have filed motions to dismiss,
Daubert motions, and cross motions for summary judgment such that this matter has advanced
past initial stages.13 Plaintiffs additionally assert that TPCG had “‘ample notice of its [purported]
interest in the lawsuit’”14 because Plaintiffs’ Complaint received widespread media coverage and
that TPCG will not be prejudiced if it is not a party to this case, especially if TPCG participates as
an amicus curiae.15 Finally, Plaintiffs assert that TPCG has provided no explanation or pointed to
any “unusual circumstances” justifying its two-year delay in seeking intervention.16

13

R. Doc. 188, pp. 2-3.

14

Citing Kneeland v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 806 F.2d 1285, 1289 (5th Cir. 1987).

15

R. Doc. 188, pp. 2-3.

16

R. Doc. 188, p. 4.

4

TPCG recognizes that this action was instituted on February 3, 2014 and that this action is
set for trial beginning March 13, 2017.17 Instead of discussing the four timeliness factors set out
above, TPCG asserts that, if leave for intervention is granted, it will “(i) participate in this action
on all schedules that have or will be established by the scheduling order for the existing parties;
(ii) avoid unnecessary delays or duplication of efforts in areas satisfactorily addressed and
represented by the existing Defendants, to the extent possible; (iii) coordinate all future
proceedings with the existing Defendants to the extent possible; (iv) not list or call any additional
witnesses not listed or disclosed by the existing parties; and (v) not call any expert witnesses other
than those listed and disclosed by the present Defendants.”18 Based on these limitations, TPCG
avers that the proposed intervention “will not retard the progress of this action or unduly delay the
current trial date fixing and the adjudication of the existing parties’ rights.”19
TPCG does not address Plaintiffs’ assertion that it had ample notice of this lawsuit due to
in-depth and widespread media coverage, nor does it provide any explanation for its two-year
delay. But the Court agrees that this matter has proceeded well beyond the initial stages of
litigation. Under similar circumstances, this Court has found proposed intervention to be untimely.
See, e.g., Keybank Nat. Ass’n v. Perkins Rowe Associates, LLC, 2010 WL 2008845, at *3 (M.D.
La. May 19, 2010) (motion to intervene filed nine months after action instituted and where
substantial discovery had taken place and dispositive motions had been filed was untimely where
“advancement beyond the initial stages evidences a significant prejudice to the existing parties,
particularly [plaintiff], whose orderly progression through the litigation would be hampered by
intervention.”). Moreover, while TPCG asserts that it will be bound by the present parties’ current

17

R. Doc. 185.

18

R. Doc. 187, ¶ 1.

19

R. Doc. 187, ¶ 1.

5

schedule and witness lists, “[a]dditional parties always take additional time. Even if they have no
witnesses of their own, they are the source of additional questions, briefs, arguments, motions and
the like….” Bush v. Viterna, 740 F.2d 350, 359 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting Crosby Steam Gage &
Valve Co. v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 51 F.Supp. 972, 973 (D. Mass. 1943)).20 Finally,
and as discussed below, this Court finds that TPCG’s interests are adequately protected by the
current Defendants. Under such circumstances, the Court finds TPCG’s proposed intervention
untimely.
B. Intervention of Right
1.

The Voting Rights Act

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1), on timely motion, the court must permit anyone who,
“is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute.” TPCG asserts that Section 2
grants it such unconditional right. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) provides:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote
on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set
forth in section 10303(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection
(b).
TPCG reasons that because it is the political subdivision Plaintiffs allege is applying a voting
practice or procedure in violation of Section 2, “it would have been a proper original defendant in
Plaintiffs’ Complaint” and accordingly, Section 2 “confers upon it an unconditional right to
intervene in this action.”21

TPCG’s proposal to be bound to the same witnesses as listed by the current parties underscores, in the Court’s
opinion, the fact that TPCG’s interests will be adequately represented by the current Defendants.
20

21

R. Doc. 187-1, p. 4.

6

The Fifth Circuit has found that “in the absence of an express provision for intervention,”
§ 707 of Title VII did not grant an unconditional right of intervention. United States v. AlleghenyLudlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 844 (5th Cir. 1975). In reaching that conclusion, the Fifth
Circuit contrasted the section at issue with another section of Title VII, which explicitly conferred
upon the “person or persons aggrieved” a right to intervene in a civil action. See, id. at 842-43.
TPCG argues that “[t]he fact that the Voting Rights Act incorporates specific reference to a state’s
political subdivision would logically seem to strongly militate in favor of the political
subdivision’s involvement as a party litigant in an action directly addressed to an issue arising
within the particular political subdivision’s geographic jurisdiction.”22 However, the Court finds
that while Section 2 prohibits both a State and a political subdivision from imposing or applying
practices or procedures that abridge or deny the right of any citizen to vote on account of race or
color, the section falls short of providing an express procedural provision for intervention. As
pointed out by Plaintiffs, Congress did expressly allow intervention in the context of other sections
of the Voting Rights Act. See, 52 U.S.C. § 10303(a)(4). Accordingly, the Court finds that Section
2 does not confer upon TPCG an unconditional right to intervene.
2.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2)

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), a party is entitled to intervene in a pending lawsuit
when: (1) the motion to intervene is timely; (2) the potential intervenor asserts an interest that is
related to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action in which he seeks to intervene;
(3) the potential intervenor is so situated that disposition of the case may as a practical matter
impair or impede his ability to protect his interest; and (4) the parties already in the action do not
adequately protect the potential intervenor’s interest. Ford v. City of Huntsville, 242 F.3d 235,

22

R. Doc. 191, p. 3.

7

239 (5th Cir. 2001). As noted above, the Court has found that TPCG’s proposed intervention is
not timely. However, in the interest of completeness, the Court will also analyze whether TPCG
has established the other requirements for intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
i.

TPCG’s Interest

TPCG asserts that it “has a compelling and legitimate interest, on behalf of its citizens, that
each member of the 32nd Judicial District Court will impartially administer justice and be
responsive to each and every citizen of the Parish of Terrebonne.” 23 TPCG refers to this concern
as the concept of “linkage,” i.e., maintaining the “link” between judicial officers and the citizens
over whom they preside.24 In addition to its “linkage” concern, TPCG argues that the creation of
special subdistricts would “promote racial polarization rather than alleviate any purported
problem”25 and that the creation of such subdistricts would create administrative and fiscal burdens
on TPCG.26

Finally, TPCG argues that Plaintiffs’ Illustrative Plan,27 if adopted, “would

substantially and adversely impact [TPCG’s] existing election districts” 28 and would result in
increased election costs to the Parish Council and the State.29 Plaintiffs argue that TPCG does not

23

R. Doc. 187-1, p. 5.

24

R. Doc. 187-1, p. 5.

25

R. Doc. 187-1, p. 6.

R. Doc. 187-1, pp. 6-8. See also, R. Doc. 191, p. 3 (“As Proposed Intervenor has previously explained, it has direct,
substantial, and legally protectable interests, (a) both on behalf of its citizens and voters and in its own right as a
litigant, in the ‘linkage’ between its local judges and the constituency whom they serve, a concept promoting judicial
impartiality, and (b) also by reason of its direct fiscal responsibility toward its local court system.”). TPCG asserts
that it “has strong administrative and pecuniary fiscal interest that warrant consideration in this action.” R. Doc. 1871, p. 6. In support of that assertion, TPCG outlines its actual expenses for the 32 nd JDC and explains that if a sixth
judicial office in the 32nd JDC is created, it “would be forced to incur even more expenses….” R. doc. 187-1, p. 7.
26

In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs submitted an “Illustrative Plan” to demonstrate the
feasibility of a five-district plan that would comply with constitutional voting requirements. As Plaintiffs explain, the
Illustrative Plan demonstrates “the feasibility of a single-member district plan for electing members of the 32 nd JDC
in which Black voters constitute a majority (at 50.81%) of the VAP in one district.” R. Doc. 91-1, p. 4.
27

28

R. Doc. 191, p. 4.

29

R. Doc. 191, p. 5.

8

have a legally protectable interest in the first instance because it lacks the power to determine the
manner in which district judges are elected.30 Further, Plaintiffs assert that under Fifth Circuit
precedent, TPCG’s interest cannot be based on TPCG’s concerns about increased costs.31
“To prove the requisite interest, an intervenor must demonstrate a ‘direct, substantial and
legally protectable’ interest in the property or transaction that is the subject of the suit.” League
of United Latin American Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 884 F.2d 185, 187 (5th Cir.
1989). See also, John Doe No. 1. v. Glickman, 256 F.3d 371, 379 (5th Cir. 2001) (“A potential
intervenor asserts an interest that is related to the property or transaction that forms the basis of
the controversy in the case into which she seeks to intervene, if the potential intervenor has a
‘direct, substantial, [and] legally protectable’ interest in the property or transaction….”) (citing
Sierra Club v. Epsy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1207 (5th Cir. 1994) & Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d
983, 1004 (5th Cir. 1996)). “A movant found to be a ‘real party in interest’ generally establishes
sufficient interest.” League of United Latin American Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 884
F.2d 185, 187 (5th Cir. 1989). “Under that test, a ‘real party in interest’ may be ascertained by
determining whether that party caused the injury and, if so, whether it has the power to comply
with a remedial order of the court.” Id. The Fifth Circuit has denied intervention to a county in a
voting rights action where the county “played no part in creating judicial districts” such that it
“couldn’t have caused the injury, nor is it in any position to effect a remedy.” Id. at 187-88.
The Court notes that it has previously ruled that the current Defendants are proper
defendants in this action and that complete relief may be afforded amongst the existing parties.32
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has explained that “[b]y requiring that the applicant’s interest be not

30

R. Doc. 188, p. 5.

31

R. Doc. 188, pp. 6-7.

32

R. Doc. 171, p. 11.

9

only ‘direct’ and ‘substantial,’ but also ‘legally protectable,’ it is plain that something more than
an economic interest is necessary.” New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co.,
732 F.2d 452, 465 (5th Cir. 1984). See also, League of United Latin American Citizens, Council
No. 4434 v. Clements, 884 F.2d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1989) (county’s concerns “about increased
costs, voter confusion, venue problems, or the possible abolition of specialty courts” did not
amount to a legally cognizable interest sufficient to support intervention in Voting Rights Act
case). Accordingly, the Court finds it questionable that TPCG has a “legally protectable interest”
in this suit. However, even assuming TPCG has a legally protectable interest, as discussed below,
the Court finds that the Defendants already in the suit will adequately protect TPCG’s interest.
ii.

Adequacy of Representation

Plaintiffs additionally argue that even if TPCG had a cognizable interest in the 32nd JDC’s
electoral method, TPCG has made no showing that the current Defendants are inadequately
representing those interests.33
TPCG has “the burden of demonstrating inadequate representation.” Hopwood v. State of
Tex., 21 F.3d 603, 605 (5th Cir. 1994). “However, ‘minimal’ this burden may be, it cannot be
treated as so minimal as to write the requirement completely out of the rule.” Bush v. Viterna, 740
F.2d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1984). Further, “where the party whose representation is said to be
inadequate is a governmental agency, a much stronger showing of inadequacy is required.”
Hopwood v. State of Tex., 21 F.3d 603, 605 (5th Cir. 1994). “In a suit involving a matter of
sovereign interest, the State is presumed to represent the interests of all its citizens.” Id. Moreover,
the Fifth Circuit has held that “‘[w]hen the party seeking intervention has the same ultimate
objection as a party to the suit, a presumption arises that its interests are adequately represented,

33

R. Doc. 188, p. 7.

10

against which the petitioner must demonstrate adversity of interest, collusion, or nonfeasance.’”
Bush v. Viterna, 740 F.2d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting International Tank Terminals, Ltd. v.
M/V Acadia Forest, 579 F.2d 964, 967 (5th Cir. 1981)).
TPCG explains that “[w]hile [its] interests are certainly aligned and parallel with those of
the present Defendants, they are not perfectly congruent.”34 TPCG goes on to state that “[n]o
criticism of the Attorney General’s vigorous defense to date is intended or implied in the
conclusion that his representation is not adequate to protect the special local interests of the
Proposed Intervenor in this case.”35 While TPCG asserts that its intervention is necessary to
protect its “special local interests,” it does not explain what additional information it would
present. Instead, and contrary to a finding that TPCG’s interest are not subsumed into the general
interests of the current Defendants, TPCG asserts that if allowed to intervene, it would rely solely
on the witnesses already named by the present parties. Indeed, TPCG cites to the expert report of
one of Defendants’ experts to support its position that the creation of new precincts would create
additional costs.36 Moreover, the Court notes that Terrebonne Parish officials have previously
submitted declarations in support of Defendants’ dispositive motion37 and that the current
Defendants have raised the issue of “linkage” in previously-filed briefs.38
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that TPCG has failed to overcome the presumption that
the present Defendants are adequately representing its objectives. See, Bush v. Viterna, 740 F.2d
350, 357-58 (5th Cir. 1984) (denying intervention where Association failed to overcome the

34

R. Doc. 187-1, p. 8.

35

R. Doc. 187-1, p. 8.

36

See, R. Doc. 191, p. 5.

37

See, R. Docs. 129-12 & 129-13.

38

See, R. Doc. 129, pp. 34-35.

11

presumption that its interests were adequately represented where the Association “has not
indicated a single issue on which it and the Commission differ [and] has not demonstrated that it
has anything to contribute to this lawsuit beyond underlining the positions already taken by the
Commission or that the Commission will not adequately present those common positions.”).39
C. Permissive Intervention
Permissive intervention is provided for by Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) when, on timely motion,
the movant seeks intervention based on a “conditional right to intervene” granted by statute or “has
a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(A) & (B).40 TPCG asserts that “permissive intervention is warranted especially
in situations where those seeking intervention may help contribute special perspectives and
insights to aid in the proper development of the factual issues in the litigation” 41 and that its
intervention in this suit “will add the special perspective of the political subdivision with the
principal electoral responsibilities in the geographic area encompassing the 32nd Judicial District
Court.”42

39

TPCG relies on Mille Lacs Bank of Chippewa Indians v. State of Minnesota, 989 F.2d 994 (8th Cir. 1993). There,
the court allowed certain counties and landowners to intervene in an action for declaratory and injunctive relief in
connection with hunting, fishing, and gathering rights under an 1837 treaty between the United States and the
Chippewa Nation. The proposed intervenors were counties that owned certain land outright and landowners with
interests in real estate in the ceded territory. Id. at 997. The court allowed intervention, noting that the intervenors
sought “to protect local and individual interests not shared by the general citizenry of Minnesota.” Id. at 1001.
Accordingly, while the Mille Lac Court recognized that in some instances, a presumption of adequate representation
arises, it declined to apply such a presumption because proposed intervenors’ interests were narrower and not
subsumed in the general interest of Minnesota. Because the Court finds that TPCG’s interests (i.e., in defending the
current at-large system in the 32nd JDC) are the same as the current Defendants’ interests, the Court applies the
presumption of adequate representation here.
40

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2), a government officer or agency may be permitted to intervene on timely motion
if “a party’s claim or defense is based on: (A) a statute or executive order administered by the officer or agency; or
(B) any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or made under the statute or executive order.”
41

R. Doc. 187-1, p. 8.

42

R. Doc. 187-1, p. 9.

12

“District Courts are given broad discretion in granting motions to intervene under Rule
24(b)(2).” League of United Latin American Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 884 F.2d
185, 189 (5th Cir. 1989). “When acting on a request for permissive intervention, a district court
should consider, among other factors, whether the intervenors are adequately represented by other
parties and whether they are likely to contribute significantly to the development of the underlying
factual issues.” Id. As discussed above, the Court finds that TPCG’s interests are adequately
represented by the Defendants. To the extent TPCG cannot, as it has apparently done in the past,
support Defendants’ effort to defend Plaintiffs’ suit via declarations from Parish officials or other
coordination with Defendants, TPCG may consider seeking leave to be granted amicus curiae
status.43 See, Bush v. Viterna, 740 F.2d 350, 359 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting that proposed intervenors
had already been granted amicus curiae status and that “where, as here, the intervenor merely
underlines issues of law already raised by the primary parties….a third party can contribute usually
most effectively and always most expeditiously by a brief amicus curiae and not by intervention.”)
(quoting Crosby Steam Gage & Valve Co. v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 51 F.Supp. 972,
973 (D. Mass. 1943)); New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d
452, 473 (5th Cir. 1984) (“Where the intervenors do not have a legally protectable interest, are
adequately represented by an existing party and will not add to the relevant factual development
of the case, the position of amicus may be considered more appropriate than an intervention with
full-party status, if, as here, such intervention may materially diminish the original parties’
rights.”).44

43

Plaintiffs do not oppose TPCG’s participation as amicus curiae. R. Doc. 188, p. 3.

44

TPCG cites Theriot v. Parish of Jefferson, 1996 WL 517695 (E.D. La. Sept. 11, 1996) and Nash v. Blunt, 140 FRD
400 (W.D. Mo. 1992) in support of its position that permissive intervention is proper. The Court finds both cases
distinguishable. In Theriot, the City of Kenner and members of the City Council in that capacity were allowed to
permissively intervene with no opposition and “the recognition that these intervenors have enunciated a unique and
distinguishable interest apart from the Parish of Jefferson and the United States.” 1996 WL 517695 at * 1. Setting

13

III.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion to Intervene filed by Terrebonne Parish

Consolidated Government45 is DENIED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on May 11, 2016.

S
ERIN WILDER-DOOMES
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

aside the fact that the intervention was unopposed, the Court here finds that TPCG has failed to enunciate a “unique
and distinguishable interest” apart from that already protected by the current Defendants. In Nash, the court allowed
permissive intervention based on a jurisdictional concern. As it explained, “[t]his court was (and, to some extent, is
still) concerned that the parties might actually agree on many of the central issues involved in this case, thereby
depriving the court of ‘opposing parties representing adverse interests’ as required by Article III.” 140 FRD at 403.
While the Nash court noted that “[r]edistricting cases seem typically to follow the exception rather than the general
rule,” thereby indicating intervention in redistricting cases may be more likely, it failed to cite any redistricting cases
supporting this proposition.
45

R. Doc. 187.

14