Terrebonne Parish NAACP et al v. Jindal et al

Filing 32

RULING denying 18 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge James J. Brady on 7/18/2014. (SMG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
TERREBONNE PARISH NAACP, ET AL.
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 14-069-JJB-SCR
PIYUSH (“BOBBY”) JINDAL the GOVERNOR
of the STATE OF LOUISIANA, in his official
capacity, ET AL.
RULING
This matter is before the Court on a Motion (doc. 18) to Dismiss brought by Defendant,
Tom Schedler, in his official capacity as Secretary of State for the State of Louisiana
(“Schedler”). Plaintiffs, the Terrebonne Parish Branch of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, Reverend Vincent Fusilier, Sr., Lionel Myers, Wendell
Desmond Shelby, Jr., and Daniel Turner (collectively, referred to as “Plaintiffs”), have filed an
opposition (doc. 22), to which Schedler has filed a reply (doc. 24). Oral argument is not
necessary. The Court’s jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the reasons stated
herein, Schedler’s Motion (doc. 18) to Dismiss is DENIED.
I.

Background
Plaintiffs are Terrebonne Parish’s (“Terrebonne” or the “Parish”) local branch of the

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) and several Black
registered voters who reside in the Parish and are members of the Terrebonne NAACP.
Plaintiffs bring this action against Schedler, as well as, Piyush “Bobby” Jindal as Governor of
the State of Louisiana in his official capacity, and James “Buddy” Caldwell as Attorney General
of the State of Louisiana in his official capacity (collectively, referred to as “Defendants”), to
challenge Terrebonne’s use of at-large voting to elect judges to the 32nd Judicial District Court.

1

Plaintiffs contend that the Parish’s use of at-large voting “dilutes the voting strength of
Black voters in Terrebonne Parish” in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973 (Doc. 1, at ¶ 3). Plaintiffs further contend that at-large voting “was enacted and/or
maintained with a discriminatory purpose” in violation of Section 2 and the voting guarantees of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Doc. 1, at ¶ 4).
Plaintiffs allege that as a result of this unlawful voting scheme, no Black candidate has ever been
elected to the 32nd Judicial District Court in the 191 years that the Parish’s judiciary has existed.
(Doc. 1, at ¶¶ 39-40). According to Plaintiffs, this remains the case even though Terrebonne’s
Black voters constitute a cohesive voting bloc that overwhelmingly votes for Black candidates in
local elections. (Doc. 1, at ¶¶ 46-49).
Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants have maintained the at-large voting scheme to
“dilute, minimize, and cancel out the voting strength of Black voters in Terrebonne.” (Doc. 1, at
¶ 68). Plaintiffs further allege that “Defendants purported rationales for maintaining its at-large
method of electing members for the 32nd

Judicial

District are tenuous and/or

pretexual…[and]…cannot overcome the fact that at-large voting for the 32nd Judicial District
consistently yields and maintains a racially segregated body.” (Doc. 1, at ¶¶ 80-81). Plaintiffs
contend that a different voting scheme, one that gave the Black voters of the Parish the
opportunity to elect representatives responsive to their needs, would give Terrebonne’s Black
residents greater confidence in the administration of justice in the Parish and would make the
judicial committees, administrative bodies, and other important judiciary roles over which the
32nd Judicial District has power and influence fairer and more inclusive. (Doc. 1, at ¶ 66).
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs pray for, inter alia, the following declaratory and
injunctive relief: (1) a declaration that Defendants’ at-large method of electing members to the

2

32nd Judicial District was adopted and/or maintained with a discriminatory purpose in violation
of Section 2 and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution; (2) a declaration
that Defendants’ at-large method of electing members to the 32nd Judicial District has the result
of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color in violation of Section 2 and
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution; and (3) an injunction precluding
the Defendants, their successors, and agents from enforcing, administering, implementing, or
conducting any future elections to the Parish’s 32nd Judicial District under the current at-large
method of election.
Schedler brings this Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Schedler argues that this Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over the claims asserted against him because such claims do not present a case or
controversy as required by Article III of the United States Constitution. Alternatively, Schedler
argues that even if the Court does have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate these claims, the
Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to adduce enough factual matter to state a plausible claim for relief.
II.

Legal Standards for Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may challenge a court’ s subject

matter jurisdiction at any time. Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d 332, 336 (5th Cir.
1999). The party asserting that the court has jurisdiction bears the burden of proving that the
court may adjudicate the case. Ramming v. U.S., 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). In
determining whether it has subject matter jurisdiction, the court may look at the complaint alone,
the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts in the record, or the complaint supplemented by
undisputed facts plus the court’ s resolution of disputed facts. Id.

3

When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with a 12(b)(6) motion, the court
should resolve the jurisdictional issue before addressing any attack on the merits. Ramming, 281
F. 3d at 161. “A motion under 12(b)(1) should be granted only if it appears certain that the
plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.
Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir.
1998); see also Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of a complaint for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When
reviewing the complaint, a court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. C.C.
Port. Ltd. v. Davis-Penn Mortg. Co., 61 F.3d 288, 289 (5th Cir. 1995). Facts must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the non-movant. See Bass v. Stryker Corp., 669 F.3d 501, 506 (5th
Cir. 2012). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must plead “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007). A court need not determine at this preliminary stage whether the plaintiff’s claims
will ultimately succeed on the merits. Id. at 556. Instead, a court must identify the factual
allegations entitled to the presumption of truth and determine whether they state a plausible
claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
III.

Discussion
A. Standing
Article III of the United States Constitution establishes as an irreducible minimum that, in

order to invoke the judicial power of a federal court, there must exist a “case or controversy”
between the parties. United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742-43 (1995). Standing is thus a
jurisdictional requirement that focuses on the party seeking the remedy, not the issue presented
for adjudication. James v. City of Dallas, 254 F.3d 551, 562-63 (5th Cir. 2001). Standing
4

involves three elements: injury, causation, and redressability. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—that is, an
invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Hays, 515 U.S. at 742-43. Second, the injury must be
traceable to the defendant; in other words, a causal connection must exist between the injury
suffered and the complained of conduct. Id. Third, the injury must likely be redressable by a
favorable decision of the court. Id. Speculation as to the availability of relief is not enough. Id.
Schedler does not contest that Plaintiffs have alleged an injury in fact. Instead, Schedler
asserts that his duties as Secretary of State are primarily ministerial and concerned with the
mechanics of conducting elections and therefore, he is without the power to enforce, defend, or
change the laws governing the voting schemes in the State. For this reason, Schedler argues that
Plaintiffs’ injury is neither traceable to his conduct nor redressable by any correction of his
conduct.
In response, Plaintiffs assert that their complaint contains sufficient allegations to satisfy
the elements of Article III standing. First, Plaintiffs contend that their complaint sufficiently
pleads an injury in fact. As to the contested elements, Plaintiffs aver that Schedler’s conduct is
indisputably traceable to their injuries. Plaintiffs argue that Schedler’s role as “chief election
officer,” in which he is charged with maintaining an allegedly unlawful voting scheme, is “a
significant component of the discriminatory implementation and results of the electoral method
for the Parish court, which continue to harm Plaintiffs.” (Doc. 22, at p. 16). Plaintiffs further
aver that their sought after relief—an injunction preventing Schedler from continuing to hold,
supervise, administer, and certify future elections under an at-large voting method and an order
requiring Schedler to implement and maintain elections under a district-based plan for electing

5

judges to the 32nd Judicial District—will adequately redress their injury. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
argue that they have satisfied the redressabilty element of the Article III standing analysis.
To support his assertions, Schedler relies heavily upon the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Bauer v. Texas, 341 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2003). There, the plaintiff sued the presiding judge of a
Harris County probate court for judicial actions taken during state guardianship proceedings.
After addressing the standing issue sua sponte, the panel held that the plaintiff lacked standing to
pursue a claim against the probate judge. Bauer, 341 F.3d at 357-358. While the panel’s
holding was primarily based upon the fact that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the injury in fact
element of the Article III analysis since there were no ongoing probate proceedings and
therefore, no ongoing injury or threat of future injury, Schedler relies upon the panel’s related
finding that standing was absent due to a lack of adversity between the plaintiff and the
defendant. Id. at 359. Such reliance is misguided. The panel found that the parties lacked
adversity because the judge was acting in his adjudicatory capacity and therefore, his actions
could not constitute a justiciable controversy. Id. As these are not the facts presented in the
instant matter, Bauer is easily distinguishable and thus, unavailing.
More instructive to the Court’s determination is Fifth Circuit precedent that stands for the
proposition that state officials may be sued in their official capacities when they have the power
to enforce, defend, or apply the law in question. See Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 426 (5th
Cir. 2001) (en banc) (articulating “the long-standing rule that a plaintiff may not sue a state
official who is without power to enforce the complained of statute.”); Chancery Clerk of
Chickasaw County, Miss. V. Wallace, 646 F.2d 151, 160 (5th Cir. 1981) (allowing plaintiffs to
sue state officials with executive responsibility for defending the challenged laws).

6

Here, it is uncontested that the Plaintiffs have alleged in injury in fact. They have further
alleged that this injury in fact was caused by Schedler’s conduct as “chief election officer,” in
which he was responsible for maintaining, executing, and enforcing1 the at-large voting method.
(Doc. 1, at ¶¶ 19-21). Finally, Plaintiffs have alleged that their injury would be redressed if
Schedler was enjoined from administering, implementing, and conducting future elections
pursuant to the at-large voting method and ordered to administer, implement, and conduct
elections in a non-discriminatory way consistent with the law. (See Doc. 1, at ¶ 85). Given that
the Plaintiffs have alleged an injury in fact which is fairly traceable to Schedler’s conduct and
can be redressed by a favorable order of this Court, Schedler cannot be said to be an “impotent
defendant.” To the contrary, this suit calls into question the legality of Schedler’s actions taken
pursuant to his duties as the secretary of state and calls upon him to defend those actions. Thus,
Plaintiffs have alleged that Schedler has a sufficiently “personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues on
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); see also Chancery Clerk of Chickasaw County, Miss., 646
F.2d at 160 (maintaining that state officials who were sued based upon their application and
enforcement of a challenged statute had the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the suit).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have satisfied all of the requirements of Article III by
alleging sufficient factual matter that would entitle them to relief.
B. Sufficiency of Complaint

1

Schedler argues at length that he does not have enforcement powers and therefore, cannot have caused the
Plaintiffs’ injury. The Court will address these arguments infra in its discussion of the sufficiency of the complaint.
It is enough to say here, however, that Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to withstand a motion to dismiss
pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).

7

Plaintiffs’ complaint asserts claims against Defendants under Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. Schedler does not contest the sufficiency of the Plaintiffs’ Section 2 claim and
therefore, it will not be addressed. Instead, Schedler focuses on Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.
Schedler argues at length that the Fourteenth Amendment claim fails as asserted against him
because he could not and therefore, did not take any of the allegedly unlawful actions upon
which the claim is asserted. He further argues that the complaint does not assert allegations
against him with the requisite specificity, but instead, lumps him together with the other
Defendants. Schedler argues that the Fifteenth Amendment claim must be dismissed because
Supreme Court precedent precludes a plaintiff from pursuing a vote dilution claim under the
Fifteenth Amendment.
i.

The Fourteenth Amendment Claim
A voting scheme violates the Fourteenth Amendment if it is “‘conceived or operated as

[a] purposeful device[] to further racial discrimination’ by minimizing, cancelling out or diluting
the voting strength of racial elements in the voting population.” Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613,
617 (1982). To succeed on a vote dilution claim, the plaintiff must show that the voting scheme
had a discriminatory effect and purpose. Backus v. South Carolina, 857 F.Supp.2d 553, 568
(D.S.C. 2012) aff’d 133 S.Ct. 156 (2012). To prove discriminatory effect, a plaintiff must offer
proof that “the racial minority’s voting potential ‘has been minimize[d] or cancel[led] out or the
political strength of such a group adversely affect[ed].’” Id. (citation omitted). Additionally, a
plaintiff must offer “a reasonable alternative voting practice to serve as the benchmark
‘undiluted’ voting practice.” Id. (quoting Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Reno I), 520 U.S.
471, 480 (1997)). To prove discriminatory purpose, a plaintiff may rely upon either direct or

8

circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent.

Rogers, 458 U.S. at 618.

Absent direct

evidence, “discriminatory purpose may be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts,
including the fact, if it is true, that the laws bear more heavily on one race than another.” Id.
(citation omitted). Relevant factors to be considered include, but are not limited to, whether
there is (1) bloc voting along racial lines; (2) low Black voter registration; (3) exclusion from the
political process; (4) unresponsiveness of elected officials to the needs of minorities, and (5)
depressed socio-economic status attributable to inferior education, inferior employment, and
housing discrimination. Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1406 (7th Cir. 1984).
After reviewing the complaint in light of the abovementioned case law, the Court finds
that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a Fourteenth Amendment claim against Schedler. First,
the complaint’s allegations satisfy the requirements for stating a Fourteenth Amendment claim.
To prove discriminatory effect, Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants’ method of at-large voting
dilutes the Parish’s Black vote which has resulted in no Black judge being elected to the Parish’s
judiciary in its 191-year existence. (Doc. 1, at ¶¶ 39-40). Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that
Terrebonne’s Black population is sufficiently numerous and geographically compact to provide
for the creation of a single-member district (Doc. 1, at ¶ 44), and offer single shot or bullet
voting as a reasonable alternative voting practice (Doc. 1, at ¶ 59). To prove discriminatory
purpose under the totality of the circumstances, Plaintiffs allege that: there is bloc voting along
racial lines (Doc. 1, at ¶¶ 45-52); there is an unresponsiveness of elected officials to the needs of
Black voters in the Parish as illustrated by the a racially insensitive incident involving Judge
Timothy Ellender (Doc. 1, at ¶¶ 63-65); Blacks in the Parish have higher rates of poverty and
lower rates of education and employment than whites in the Parish (Doc. 1, at ¶¶ 29-31); and that

9

the lower educational and socio-economic statuses of Black voters “undermine the ability of
Black citizens of Terrebonne to participate effectively in the political process” (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 62).
Second, the facts pled in the complaint make it facially plausible that Schedler has the
authority to take the allegedly illegal actions upon which the Fourteenth Amendment claim is
based. The complaint alleges that Schedler, as “chief election officer” has the power and
authority to maintain, execute, and enforce the 32nd Judicial District’s at-large voting method.
(Doc. 1, at ¶¶ 19-21).

The complaint’s allegations are not conclusory, but rather factual

allegations that Plaintiffs support with citations to Louisiana law, which provides that, “The
secretary of state…shall be the chief election officer of the state…He shall…promulgate and
publish all laws enacted by the legislature…” LA. CONST. ART. IV, § 7. Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “enforce” as “To give force or effect to (a law, etc.); to compel obedience to,” and
“promulgate,” inter alia, as “To put (a law or decree) into force or effect.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 608, 1334 (9th ed. 2009).
Viewing the complaint’s allegations in light of Louisiana law and these widely accepted
definitions, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have pled sufficient factual allegations to make their
claim against Schedler plausible on its face. At the very least, it is plausible that Schedler’s role
as chief election officer requires him to engage in conduct that gives effect to the allegedly
unlawful voting scheme. The Court’s conclusion finds further support in its recent decision in
Hall v. Louisiana, 12-cv-00657-BAJ-RLB (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2013). There, Chief Judge Brian
Jackson found that a plaintiff making similar allegations as those made by Plaintiffs in the instant
case had sufficiently alleged that Schedler had at least some connection with the enforcement of
the challenged judicial election plan. It is important to observe that the Court’s conclusion in the
instant matter is in no way a dispositive finding that Schedler has enforcement authority, as such

10

would be improper at this stage of the litigation. Instead, the Court finds that the factual
allegations are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Finally, Schedler’s contention that
the allegations are not pled against him with the requisite specificity is without merit. For the
abovementioned reasons, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled a vote dilution claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment against Schedler.
ii.

The Fifteenth Amendment Claim
As to Plaintiffs’ Fifteenth Amendment claim, a review of the jurisprudence reveals a

purported circuit split on whether a vote dilution claim is cognizable under the Fifteenth
Amendment. See Backus, 857 F.Supp.2d at 569 (recognizing the split). This purported split
results from the Supreme Court leaving open the question of whether the Fifteenth Amendment
is a vehicle by which to bring a vote dilution claim. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 159
(1993) (“This Court has not decided whether the Fifteenth Amendment applies to vote dilution
claims; in fact, we never have held any legislative apportionment inconsistent with the Fifteenth
Amendment.”).
In Backus, the court pointed to the differing opinions of the Fifth Circuit and the Third
Circuit to illustrate the circuit split. While the court in Backus and Schedler view the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in Prejean v. Foster, 227 F.3d 504, 519 (5th Cir. 2000) as definitively stating
that a vote dilution claim is not cognizable under the Fifteenth Amendment, this Court disagrees.
In fact, the panel in Prejean did not specifically address whether the Fifteenth Amendment
applied to vote dilution claims as it was charged with determining whether subdistricting for
state judicial elections was done for predominately racial reasons in violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment. Prejean, 227 F.3d at 518. Instead, to dismiss the state’s “floodgates of litigation”
argument, the panel stated, “Indeed, the Supreme Court has rejected application of the Fifteenth

11

Amendment to vote dilution causes of action.”

Id. at 519.

This is not a definitive

pronouncement of the Fifth Circuit’s position, but rather recognition of the fact that the
jurisprudence makes it difficult to succeed on a vote dilution claim under the Fifteenth
Amendment. Difficult neither means precluded nor impossible. See e.g., Rodgers v. Lodge, 458
U.S. 613 (1982) (affirming the Fifth Circuit and district court’s finding that a county’s at-large
voting method impermissibly diluted the vote of black residents in violation of, inter alia, their
Fifteenth Amendment rights); Jones v. City of Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364, 370-372 (5th Cir. 1984)
(evaluating a Fifteenth Amendment claim under the assumption that it proscribes voting
dilution). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs may bring a vote dilution claim under the
Fifteenth Amendment.
Finally, a substantive review of the complaint reveals that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled
a vote dilution claim under the Fifteenth Amendment. Courts have observed that the elements of
a Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment vote dilution claim mirror one another. See Backus, 857
F.Supp.2d at 569. Indeed, both require a discriminatory or dilutive effect and a discriminatory
purpose. See id.; see also Jones, 727 F.2d at 370. Therefore, for the same reasons that the Court
has found that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled a Fourteenth Amendment vote dilution claim, the
Court now finds that they have successfully pled a Fifteenth Amendment vote dilution claim.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the Defendant’s Motion (doc. 18) to Dismiss is DENIED.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on July 18, 2014.





JUDGE JAMES J. BRADY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

12