Terrebonne Parish NAACP et al v. Jindal et al

Filing 364

RULING denying 344 Motion for Reconsideration. This matter shall proceed to the remedy phase as set forth previously by the Court. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 11/05/2018. (NLT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
TERREBONNE PARISH BRANCH NAACP,
ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

14-69-SDD-EWD

PIYUSH (“BOBBY”) JINDAL, the GOVERNOR
of the STATE OF LOUISIANA, in his official
capacity, ET AL.
RULING
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
Defendant Attorney General (“Defendant”).1 Defendant seeks relief under Rule 60(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure from the Court’s previous Ruling of August 17, 2017.2
Plaintiffs have filed an Opposition to this motion.3 For the reasons set forth below, the
motion shall be denied.
I.

BACKGROUND
The Honorable James J. Brady presided over an eight-day bench trial from March

13-20 and April 26-28, 2017.4 The Court heard from 27 witnesses, and over 350 exhibits
were admitted into evidence.5 Following the bench trial, the Court issued a ninety-one
page Ruling wherein it held that at-large voting for the 32nd JDC deprives black voters of
the equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice in violation of Section 2 of the

1

Rec. Doc. No. 344.
Rec. Doc. No. 289.
3
Rec. Doc. No. 363.
4
Rec. Doc. No. 289.
5
Id.
2

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Voting Rights Act and in violation of the United States Constitution.1 The Court had
previously bifurcated the issues of liability and remedy.
Subsequent to this Ruling, Defendants moved to stay the case pending an appeal
to the Fifth Circuit.2 The Court denied the Motion to Stay, rejecting the Defendants’
argument that the Court’s Ruling had the “practical effect” of an injunction warranting a
stay under Rule 62(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 Thus, the Parties began
briefing the remedy issue for the Court.
Sadly, on December 9, 2017, the Honorable James J. Brady passed away. This
case was reassigned to the undersigned on January 5, 2018.4 On February 21, 2018,
the Court held a Status Conference to discuss the posture of the case, and the Court
ordered the Parties to submit briefs on the efficacy of a remedy by June 28, 2018.5 The
Court also advised that, if no Bill was passed during the 2018 regular Legislative Session,
the Court would hold another Status Conference.6 No such action was taken by the
Legislature; thus, the Parties filed the briefs ordered by the Court.
On July 9, 2018, nearly a year after the Court’s Ruling, Defendant filed this Motion
for Reconsideration pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) based on the United States Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Abbott v. Perez.7 Defendant seeks relief under Rule 60(b)(6),
any other reason that justifies relief, arguing that Abbott is “new, applicable, and

1

Id.
Rec. Doc. No. 311.
3
Rec. Doc. No. 320. (The Court reminded the Parties that the Ruling “strictly dealt with the issue of liability
and did not order any party or other entity … to take any immediate remedial action.”).
4
Rec. Doc. No. 326.
5
Rec. Doc. No. 332.
6
Id. The Parties represented to the Court at this Status Conference that they all believed the Legislature
might take action pursuant to the Court’s Ruling and moot the remedy phase of this matter.
7
138 S.Ct. 2305 (2018).
2

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controlling authority that was released after this Court issued its Ruling,” thus, “it creates
an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief from the judgment of the Ruling[.]” Plaintiffs
oppose this motion arguing that Defendant misinterprets Abbott, and Abbott does not
constitute a change in the intervening law applicable to this case, nor does it warrant
reconsideration of the Court’s previous Ruling.1
II.

RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 60(b)
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a court to relieve a party

from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: “(1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with
reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the
judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment
that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.”
“Several factors shape the framework of the court's consideration of a 60(b)
motion: ‘(1) That final judgments should not lightly be disturbed; (2) that the Rule 60(b)
motion is not to be used as a substitute for appeal; (3) that the rule should be liberally
construed in order to do substantial justice; (4) whether the motion was made within a
reasonable time; (5) whether—if the judgment was a default or a dismissal in which there
was no consideration of the merits—the interest in deciding cases on the merits

1

See Rec. Doc. No. 363.

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outweighs, in the particular case, the interest in the finality of judgments, and there is
merit in the movant's claim or defense; (6) whether there are any intervening equities that
would make it inequitable to grant relief; and (7) any other factors relevant to the justice
of the judgment under attack.’”1
The Court has carefully considered both Judge Brady’s previous Ruling and the
Supreme Court’s decision in Abbott, and the Court finds that reconsideration is
unwarranted. Defendant Caldwell particularly focuses on Judge Brady’s alleged heavy
reliance on Louisiana’s long history of using certain electoral systems to dilute the black
vote.2 However, the Ruling is clear that Plaintiffs met the three Gingles preconditions
and, further, the history of voting discrimination in the state or jurisdiction being
challenged was but one of several factors to consider the “totality of the circumstances”
for purposes of determining vote dilution.3

The record is replete with numerous other

bases that informed the Court’s determination of discriminatory motive in this case.
Further the Court’s analysis was appropriate under Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp.,4 which was not overruled by Abbott but in fact quoted
throughout.

1

Edward H. Bohlin Co., Inc. v. Banning Co., Inc., 6 F.3d 350, 356 (5th Cir. 1993)(quoting Seven Elves v.
Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir.1981)); see also Crutcher v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 746 F.2d 1076, 1082
(5th Cir.1984).
2
Rec. Doc. No. 344-1 at 2, quoting Rec. Doc. No. 289 at 52.
3
Rec. Doc. No. 289 at 51.
4
429 U.S. 252 (1977).

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Accordingly, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Defendant Attorney
General is DENIED.1

This matter shall proceed to the remedy phase as set forth

previously by the Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana the 5th day of November, 2018.

S

________________________________
SHELLY D. DICK
CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

1

Rec. Doc. No. 344.

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