Sanders v. Safety Shoe Distributors
Filing
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RULING: The parties do not dispute that the complaint was filed beyond the 90-day right to sue period regarding the Title VII claims. Therefore, the 12 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to the claims of race discrimination and harassment brought pursuant to Title VII is GRANTED. Signed by Judge James J. Brady on 3/31/2015. (NLT)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
WILLIE SANDERS
CASE NO. 14-cv-139-JJB-SCR
VERSUS
SAFETY SHOE DISTRIBUTORS, L.L.P.
RULING
Before this Court is a Motion (doc. 12) for Partial Summary Judgment by Defendant,
Safety Shoe Distributors, L.L.P. “Safety Shoe”. Plaintiff, Willie Sanders, filed his complaint
with this Court based on his claim of employment discrimination.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment should be granted when the pleadings, depositions,
answers to the interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that
there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is genuine when “the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The admissibility of evidence for summary judgment purposes
conforms to the rules of admissibility at trial. Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 285 (5th
Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Material facts are those “that might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Whether a fact is material will depend on
the substantive law. Id. When addressing a summary judgment motion, the court must make
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Evans v. City of Bishop, 238 F.3d 586,
589 (5th Cir. 2000). If the movant meets his initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine
dispute of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to identify or produce evidence that
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establishes a genuine dispute of material fact. Allen v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 204 F.3d 619,
621 (5th Cir. 2000).
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Mr. Sanders was employed as a shoe salesman with Safety Shoes since September 2010
(doc. 1, at 2). Of Safety Shoe’s two Baton Rouge stores, Mr. Sanders claims to have been the
only African-American employed at either of the two stores. Id. One of the two Baton Rouge
stores is located onsite at the ExxonMobil refinery. Mr. Sanders claims that he was subject to
“repeated, racially charged, disparaging comments from customers, employees of ExxonMobil.”
Id. at 3. Mr. Sanders reported these incidents to his supervisor, who is Caucasian. The supervisor
“refused to do anything” and even “defended the actions of the customers/employees of
ExxonMobil.” According to Mr. Sanders, he filed a complaint of discrimination based on race
and color with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on August 15, 2012
(doc. 1, at 3).1 Further, Mr. Sanders states that the EEOC sent him a “notice of the charge” in a
letter dated August 27, 2012.2 Id.
On September 14, 2012, Mr. Sanders was terminated from employment by the same
supervisor (doc. 1, at 3). Defendant stated that Mr. Sanders was fired for lack of work
performance and cited to written Employee Reprimands from June 15, 2011 through July 16,
2012. Mr. Sanders claims that his signature was on only the first of the reprimands, and he denies
receiving any additional reprimands. Id. Following his termination, Mr. Sanders complained to
the EEOC of retaliation, also on October 3, 2012, for filing his initial complaint with the EEOC
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Mr. Sanders does not cite to an exhibit showing the EEOC charge he filed claiming race discrimination. Safety
Shoes, however, does include, as an exhibit, a charge filed by Mr. Sanders with the EEOC asserting race
discrimination by Safety Shoes (doc. 12-3, at 8). If this is the same charge that Mr. Sanders is referring, then the
correct date is October 3, 2012, the same day when the retaliation charge was signed.
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In Mr. Sanders’ Opposition he now states that the EEOC sent a letter to Mr. Sanders granting him the right to sue
on August 27, 2013, instead of the August 27, 2012 date from the Complaint (doc. 14, at 1). The date of August 21,
2013 is confirmed by the exhibit provided by Defendant (doc. 12-3, at 7).
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(doc. 12-4, at 3). According to the complaint, “[a]n $800 monthly salary, plus commission and
fringe benefits were part of Mr. Sanders’s [sic] compensation.” Id. Mr. Sanders claims that he
has had “no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law” and will therefore “continue to suffer
irreparable injury from his treatment by Defendant unless Defendant are [sic] are enjoined by
this Court.” Id.
ANALYSIS
With regards to Mr. Sander’s initial charge with the EEOC of discrimination based on
race, the Commission signed the dismissal of the charge and notice of Mr. Sander’s right to sue
on August 21, 2013 (doc. 12-3, at 7). As the Defendant notes, it is well established in the Fifth
Circuit that if a lawsuit is not filed within the 90 days of receiving notice of the claimant’s right
to sue, then it is untimely (doc. 12-1, at 5). The EEOC signed its Notice of Right to Sue letter on
August 21, 2013 regarding Mr. Sander’s first charge of race discrimination. The letter was in
response to Mr. Sander’s charge with the EEOC on October 3, 2012 of discrimination based on
race (doc. 12-3, at 8). While the notice was signed on August 21, 2013, Mr. Sanders does not
state when the notice was then received. In a recent decision, the Fifth Circuit faced similar facts
where the date notice was received was not stated (doc. 12-1, at 5, citing Washington v. City of
Gulfport, Mississippi, 351 Fed. Appx. 916, 918 (5th Cir. 2009)). In its decision the Fifth Circuit
applies a presumption of receipt that can range from three to seven days. Id. Even applying the
most generous of presumptions, i.e. seven days, Mr. Sanders did not file suit for discrimination
based on race until well beyond the 90-day period, specifically not until March 7, 2014 (doc. 1,
at 3).
Mr. Sanders’ Opposition “does not dispute…that he brought his suit more than 90 days
after receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC” (doc. 14, at 6). However, Mr. Sanders
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believes that the same facts asserted in the complaint support claims under different statutes,
namely 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Id. Safety Shoe’s reply (doc. 16) limits this Motion (doc. 12) only to
the discrimination and harassment claims brought pursuant to Title VII.
CONCLUSION
The parties do not dispute that the complaint was filed beyond the 90-day right to sue
period regarding the Title VII claims. Therefore, the Motion (doc. 12) for Partial Summary
Judgment as to the claims of race discrimination and harassment brought pursuant to Title VII is
GRANTED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on March 31, 2015.
JUDGE JAMES J. BRADY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
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