Spears v. CB&I, Inc.
Filing
15
ORDER and REASONS: As to Plaintiff's allegations of age discrimination and retaliation, Defendant's 8 Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED IN PART and the allegations of age discrimination and retaliation are DISMISS ED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. As to these allegations, Plaintiff is given 30 days within which to amend his complaint to cure these deficiencies. In the event that Plaintiff fails to file an amendment to his complaint within that time, his claims of age discrimination and retaliation will be dismissed with prejudice. In all other respects, Defendants Motion is DENIED. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 10/27/2014. (SMG)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CARL SPEARS
CIVIL ACTION No. 3:14-cv-00231
VERSUS
JUDGE deGRAVELLES
C B & I, Inc.
MAG. JUDGE BOURGEOIS
ORDER AND REASONS
I. Background
Before the Court is Defendant’s Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc.
8). In his complaint, plaintiff Carl Spears alleges that he suffered damages by virtue of
Defendant’s conduct in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000e-2 as well as “the Louisiana
Anti-Discrimination [and] Anti-Retaliation Laws.” (Doc. 1, *1).
Plaintiff alleges three separate incidents support this general allegation: first, after being
hired by Defendant as a pipefitter on October 5, 2013, and before being discharged on October
29, 2013, he was “given absolutely no essential work assistance/support to the point where the
lack of work support may have caused a fire hazard, while all of the similarly situated white
employees were given the proper work assistance and were assigned to much easier work
tasks.”
(Doc. 1, §6).
Second, he alleges that on October 29, 2013, he was discharged by Piping Supervisor
Henry Garzer “for allegedly poor work performance while at the same time, white employees
who were similarly situated were not discharged for performing work in substantially the same
manner as plaintiff.” (Doc. 1, §7)
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Finally, he alleges that on January 8, 2014, he returned to work for C B & I by way of
employment agency job placement but “Henry Garza (sic)...refused to let plaintiff even begin
work at the facility despite the fact the plaintiff was qualified to do the assigned work. It is
respectfully alleged that white employees who were similarly situated were in fact allowed to
begin work on January 8, 2014, without any obstruction or interference from Henry Garza.”
(Doc. 1, §8)
Defendant argues that none of these factual allegations in any way support Plaintiff’s
broad allegation of age discrimination and retaliation. Defendant further argue that the
plaintiff’s allegations regarding race discrimination are conclusory and insufficient to meet the
requirements necessary to survive its motion.
II. Standard on Motion to Dismiss
In Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007), the Supreme Court
explained:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Specific
facts are not necessary; the statement need only “ ‘give the defendant fair notice
of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’
Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929
(2007)).
Interpreting Rule 8(a) and Twombly, the Fifth Circuit explained:
The complaint (1) on its face (2) must contain enough factual matter (taken as
true) (3) to raise a reasonable hope or expectation (4) that discovery will reveal
relevant evidence of each element of a claim. “Asking for [such] plausible
grounds to infer [the element of a claim] does not impose a probability
requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough facts to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal [that the elements of the claim
existed].”
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Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at
1965) (emphasis added). Later, in In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC., 624 F.3d 201,
210 (5th Cir. 2010), the Fifth Circuit explained:
To avoid dismissal [under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)], “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949,
173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570,
127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). To be plausible, the complaint's
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. In deciding
whether the complaint states a valid claim for relief, we accept all well-pleaded
facts as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. [Doe v. Myspace, 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008)] (citing [Hughes v.
Tobacco Inst., Inc., 278, 278 F.3d 417, 420 (5th Cir. 2001)]). We do not accept as
true “conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal
conclusions.” Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir.2007)
(quoting Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir.2005)); see also
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1940 (“While legal conclusions can provide the complaint's
framework, they must be supported by factual allegations.”).
Id. at 215.
Analyzing the above case law, our brother in the Western District stated:
Therefore, while the court is not to give the “assumption of truth” to conclusions,
factual allegations remain so entitled. Once those factual allegations are
identified, drawing on the court's judicial experience and common sense, the
analysis is whether those facts, which need not be detailed or specific, allow “the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 129 S.Ct. at 1949, Twombly, 555 U.S. at 556, 127
S.Ct. at 1965. This analysis is not substantively different from that set forth in
Lormand, supra, nor does this jurisprudence foreclose the option that discovery
must be undertaken in order to raise relevant information to support an element
of the claim. The standard, under the specific language of Fed. Rule Civ. P.
8(a)(2), remains that the defendant be given adequate notice of the claim and the
grounds upon which it is based. This standard is met by the “reasonable
inference” the court must make that, with or without discovery, the facts set forth
a plausible claim for relief under a particular theory of law provided there is a
“reasonable expectation” that “discovery will reveal relevant evidence of each
element of the claim.” Lormand, 565 F.3d at 257, Twombly, 555 U.S. at 556, 127
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S.Ct. at 1965.
Diamond Services Corp. v. Oceanografia, S.A. De C.V., No. 10-177, 2011 WL 938785, at *3
(W.D.La. Feb. 9, 2011) (citation omitted).
Afterward, in Harold H Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2011),
the Fifth Circuit explained:
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ”
A claim for relief is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” A claim for relief is implausible on its face
when “the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct.”
Id. at 796. Finally, in Thompson v. City of Waco, Texas, 764 F.3d 500 (5th Cir. 2014), the Fifth
Circuit recently summarized the Rule 12(b)(6) standard as thus:
We accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view all facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. We need not, however, accept the plaintiff's legal
conclusions as true. To survive dismissal, a plaintiff must plead enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Our
task, then, is to determine whether the plaintiff stated a legally cognizable claim
that is plausible, not to evaluate the plaintiff's likelihood of success.
Id. at 502-503 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
III. Law and Analysis
First, Defendant is correct that Plaintiff has pleaded no facts which support his
allegation
of age discrimination or retaliation. While Plaintiff’s allegations of discrimination based on race
(Doc. 1, §§ 6-9), might perhaps have provided more detail, nonetheless, the Court finds that
these allegations on their face contain enough factual matter (taken as true) to raise a reasonable
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hope or expectation that discovery will reveal relevant evidence of each element of a claim.
Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at
1965) (emphasis added).
Therefore, as to Plaintiff’s allegations of age discrimination and retaliation, Defendant’s
Motion is GRANTED IN PART and the allegations of age discrimination and retaliation are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. As to these allegations, Plaintiff is given 30 days
within which to amend his complaint to cure these deficiencies. In the event that Plaintiff fails
to file an amendment to his complaint within that time, his claims of age discrimination and
retaliation will be dismissed with prejudice. In all other respects, Defendant’s Motion is
DENIED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on October 27, 2014.
S
JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
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