United Steelworkers and its Local 275 v. Oxbow Calcining, LLC

Filing 22

RULING granting 12 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff, United Steel Workers and its Local 275, and denying 10 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Oxbow Calcining, LLC. Signed by Judge Shelly D. Dick on 9/14/2015. (LLH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

UNITED STEELWORKERS AND
ITS LOCAL 275

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

14-273-SDD-SCR

OXBOW CALCINING, LLC

RULING
This matter is before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment filed by
each of the parties.1 The Court has considered the respective Oppositions2 and Reply
Briefs.3 For the following reasons, United Steelworkers and its Local 275’s Motion shall
be granted and Oxbow Calcining, LLC’s Motion shall be denied.
I.

BACKGROUND
United Steelworkers and its Local 275 (collectively “Union”) and Oxbow

Calcining, LLC (hereinafter “Oxbow”) are parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement
(2013 CBA) that is effective from April 25, 2013, through March 31, 2016.4 The Union
represents certain hourly employees5 at Oxbow’s Baton Rouge processing plant.6 Prior
to the 2013 CBA, the Union and Oxbow had been parties to another Collective
Bargaining Agreement (2010 CBA) that had been effective from April 1, 2010 through

1

Rec. Doc. 10 and Rec. Doc. 12.
Rec. Doc. 16 and Rec. Doc. 17.
3
Rec. Doc. 21.
4
Rec. Doc. 10-3, p. 2, ¶3; Rec. Doc. 16-1, p. 2, ¶3.
5
The Union “represents the production, laboratory and maintenance employees of the Company at the
Company’s Baton Rouge facilities for the purpose of collective bargaining over wages, hours and other
terms and conditions of employment.” Rec. Doc. 10-3, p. 1, ¶2; Rec. Doc. 16-1, p. 2, ¶2.
6
Oxbow’s plant “receives raw petroleum coke from oil refineries” and “then processes that coke by
removing moisture through a series of kilns and then sells the end product.” Rec. Doc. 10-3, No. 1, p. 1,
¶1.
2

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March 31, 2013.

Notably, the 2010 CBA provided that “[u]nder the 401(k) plan

currently in effect, the Company matches fifty percent (50%) of the employees’
contributions up to a maximum of three percent (3%) of salary.”7 In the 2013 CBA the
parties agreed to amend the foregoing provision effective 2014, whereby Oxbow would
match 50% of the employee’s eligible contributions up to 10% of the employee’s salary.
The application and interpretation of the 2013 CBA language is the point of contention
between the parties today.8 The question before the Court is whether this controversy
is subject to arbitration.
The Union contends that the amended language requires Oxbow to contribute
$1.00 in matching funds for every $2.00 an employee contributes to his or her 401(k)
until Oxbow’s matching funds amount to 10% of the employee’s salary.9 On the other
hand, Oxbow contends that the language requires that Oxbow match 50% of the
employee’s contribution to his or her 401(k) up to a maximum of 10% of the employee’s
salary.10 Under Oxbow’s interpretation, an employee who contributed 10% of his or her
salary to the 401(k) Plan would receive a company match of 5%.11 In the event an
employee were to contribute more than 10% of his or her salary, Oxbow’s maximum
company match would remain at 5% because the 50% company match only applies to

7

Rec. Doc. 12-5, p. 34.
In its Complaint, the Union specifically alleges: “On or about January 14, 2014 the Union filed Grievance
Number WS 011414 disputing the Company’s interpretation and application of Article XXXII.C.” In its
Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, the Union goes into great detail
articulating how its “view of the CBA’s 401(k) match language” differs from Oxbow’s interpretation and
application of the language. Rec. Doc. 12-1, pp. 4-5.
9
In application, Oxbow achieved its obligations under the 2010 CBA by “contributing $1 for every $2
contributed by the employee until the employee had contributed up to six percent of his or her salary, at
which point [Oxbow’s] matching contributions totaled three percent of the employee’s salary.” Rec. Doc.
12-3, p. 2, ¶8.
10
Rec. Doc. 12-8, p.2; Rec. Doc. 10-4, p. 1.
11
Rec. Doc. 12-12, p. 2; Rec. Doc. 12-8, p.2; Rec. Doc. 10-4, p. 1.
8

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the first 10% employee contribution.12 Due to the parties’ differing positions, the Union
filed a grievance pursuant to the 2013 CBA Grievance and Arbitration procedures.13
Oxbow, however, asserted that the Union’s grievance was not subject to the 2013 CBA
Grievance and Arbitration procedures. Instead, Oxbow argued that because this is a
claim by union members seeking benefits under the Oxbow 401(k) Plan, the dispute
falls within the express purview of Article IX of the 401(k) Plan which requires such
claims be submitted to the Plan Administrator.

Unable to engage Oxbow in an

arbitration process under the CBA, the Union filed the pending lawsuit pursuant to
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 142, et
seq.14
The parties have now presented the Court with cross-motions for summary
judgment. The Union seeks summary judgment on its claim that its grievance falls
within the purview of the CBA’s Grievance and Arbitration procedures. Oxbow claims
summary judgment on the Union’s claims is warranted because the claims fall beyond
the scope of the CBA. Oxbow contends that the underlying claims and grievance are
really challenges to the Plan Administrator’s interpretation and application of the 401(k)
Plan; therefore, such a dispute must follow the administrative appeals process set forth
in the 401(k) Plan.

12

Rec. Doc. 12-8, p. 2.
Rec. Doc. 12-9. The Union’s Grievance was given Grievance Number “WS011414.” In its Grievance,
the Union described the “Nature of Complaint or Grievance” as follows: “The Union was notified on
January 3, 2014 that the Company would limit its contribution to an employee’s 401(k) Plan account to
5% of the employee’s 10% contribution. The Collective Bargaining Agreement negotiated in 2013 states
that ‘the company will match fifty percent (50%) of the employees’ contribution up to a maximum of ten
percent (10%) of salary as provided in the Plan.” The Union explained that it sought the following
“Remedy”: “The 401(k) Plan provisions are clear and unambiguous. The Company must comply with the
negotiated language. Further, the Company must make whole any employee(s) that are adversely
impacted because of the Company’s non-compliance with the 401(k) Plan contributions.”
14
Rec. Doc. 1.
13

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II.

LAW
A. Summary Judgment Standard
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.”15 “When assessing whether a dispute to any material fact exists, we
consider all of the evidence in the record but refrain from making credibility
determinations or weighing the evidence.”16 “A party moving for summary judgment
‘must “demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,” but need not
negate the elements of the nonmovant’s case.’”17

If the moving party satisfies its

burden, “the non-moving party must show that summary judgment is inappropriate by
setting ‘forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue concerning every
essential component of its case.’”18 However, the non-moving party’s burden “is not
satisfied with some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory
allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.”19
Notably, “[a] genuine issue of material fact exists, ‘if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’”20 The Court must
resolve all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.21 However,
“[t]he court has no duty to search the record for material fact issues. Rather, the party
15

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) (West 2015).
Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008)(citing
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)).
17
Guerin v. Pointe Coupee Parish Nursing Home, 246 F.Supp.2d 488, 494 (M.D.La. 2003)(quoting Little
v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)(en banc)(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552)).
18
Rivera v. Houston Independent School Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003)(quoting Morris v. Covan
World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998)).
19
Willis v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc., 61 F.3d 313, at 315 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Little v.
Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)(internal quotations and citations omitted)).
20
Pylant v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co., 497 F.3d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 2007)(quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
21
Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985).
16

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opposing the summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record
and to articulate precisely how this evidence supports his claim.”22

“Conclusory

allegations unsupported by specific facts, however, will not prevent an award of
summary judgment; ‘the plaintiff [can]not rest on his allegations … to get to a jury
without “any significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.”’”23
B. Arbitration Under the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”)
As previously noted, this case arises under Section 301 of the LMRA. One of the
basic tenets of interpreting arbitration clauses in labor-management contracts “is that
‘arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration
any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.’”24

“[A] party that objects to

arbitration because it did not agree to arbitrate the disputed issue is entitled to a judicial
determination as to whether the collective bargaining agreement creates a duty for the
parties to arbitrate the grievance.”25

However, “where the contract contains an

arbitration clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability.”26 The Supreme Court has
instructed that the presumption applies “unless it may be said with positive assurance
that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted
dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.”27 Nevertheless, “the policy
that favors resolving doubts in favor of arbitration cannot serve to stretch a contractual

22

RSR Corp. v. International Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 2010)(citing Ragas v. Tenn. Gas
Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998)).
23
Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, Tex., 40 F.3d 698, 713 (5th Cir.
1994)(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249)(citation omitted)).
24
AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986)(quoting United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)) (hereinafter AT&T).
25
PDG Chem. Inc. v. Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers, 164 F.Supp.2d 856, 860 (E.D.Tex. 2001)
26
AT&T, 475 U.S. at 650.
27
Id. (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960)).

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clause beyond the scope intended by the parties or authorize an arbiter to disregard or
modify the plain and ambiguous provisions of the agreement.”28
Recognizing the limited roles courts serve when deciding issues of arbitrability,
the Fifth Circuit in Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers International
Union Local No. 4-2001 v. ExxonMobil Refining & Supply Co., instructed that “[t]he
court’s function is to decide whether the claim asserted is the type of claim the parties
have agreed to arbitrate.”29

The Fifth Circuit warned that courts should “[i]n no

way…consider the merits of a claim. Rather, the court ‘is confined to ascertaining
whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by
the contract.’”30

The Fifth Circuit has further explained that if the presumption of

arbitrability applies, it may be rebutted “only if the party resisting arbitration shows either
(1) the existence of an express provision excluding the grievance from arbitration or (2)
the ‘most forceful evidence’ of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration.’”31 When
“interpreting an arbitration agreement, the ‘ordinary rules of construction’ apply, and
extrinsic evidence is only to be considered ‘where the contract language is ambiguous
as to arbitrability.”32

28

Houston Refining, L.P. v. United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., 765 F.3d 396, 412 (5th Cir.
2014)(quoting Smith v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO Air Transport Local 556, 374 F.3d 372
(5th Cir. 2004)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
29
Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers International Union Local No. 4-2001 v.
ExxonMobil Refining & Supply Co., 449 F.3d 616, 619 (5th Cir. 2006)(quoting Oil Chem. & Atomic
Workers’ Int’l Union, Local 4-447 v. Chevron Chem. Co., 815 F.2d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 1987)).
30
Id. (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d
1403 (1960)).
31
Id. at 620 (quoting Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 415 F.2d 35 (5th Cir.
1969)).
32
United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. and Serv. Workers Int’l Union v.
Noranda Alumina, LLC, No. 13-5059, 2015 WL 858589, at *15 (E.D.La. Feb. 27, 2015)(quoting Paper,
Allied-Indus., Chem. and Energy Workers Int’l, 449 F.3d at 620)).

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III.

ANALYSIS
The parties in this case disagree about whether the arbitration clause within the

2013 CBA applies to the present dispute. The Union maintains that “the presumption of
arbitrability applies here because [Article XXV of] the CBA contains a broad arbitration
provision.”33 Citing Article XXXII.E of the CBA, Oxbow maintains that the parties never
agreed to arbitrate disputes pertaining to the 401(k) Plan. Oxbow contends that the real
dispute concerns the Plan Administrator’s interpretation and application of benefits
under the Plan, hence, “the only recourse available to eligible employees” is through the
Plan’s grievance process, or Article IX of the 401(k) Plan.34
The relevant provisions of the CBA at issue are:
Article XXV of the 2013 CBA sets forth the Arbitration procedure in pertinent part
as follows:
A. Any dispute, difference, or grievance between the parties arising under
the terms of this Agreement, but not including any desired or proposed
change in the terms of this Agreement that shall not have been
satisfactorily settled by the operation of the grievance procedure
outlined in Article XXIV above, may be submitted to arbitration by the
Union by giving written notice to [Oxbow] within thirty (30) days after
[Oxbow’s] third step written answer.35
****
Article XXXII of the 2013 CBA entitled Insurance, Pension, Retirement and
Savings (401(k)), and Other Benefit Plans, provides as follows:
C. The parties agree to comply with and be bound by all of the terms and
provisions of the Retirement Savings Plan (401(k)) as currently in
effect and as may be amended from time to time. [Oxbow] will amend
the current 401(k) to provide that effective in 2014 [Oxbow] will match

33

Rec. Doc. 12-1, p. 8.
Rec. Doc. 17, p. 4.
35
Rec. Doc. 12-4, p. 32.
34

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fifty percent (50%) of the employees’ eligible contributions up to a
maximum of ten percent (10%) of salary....36
E. The information in this Article is a summary of Plan benefits. If there is
a conflict between this document and any of the Plan documents, the
terms of the Plan document govern.37
A. Presumption of Arbitrability
The parties do not dispute that the 2013 CBA contains an express agreement to
arbitrate.

Article XXV(A) of the 2013 CBA specifically states that “[a]ny dispute,

difference or grievance between the parties arising under the terms of this
Agreement,…that shall not have been satisfactorily settled by the operation of the
grievance procedure outlined in Article XXIV … may be submitted to arbitration by the
Union by giving written notice to [Oxbow] within thirty (30) days after [Oxbow’s] third
step written answer.”38

Article XXV(B) establishes the procedure for selecting an

“impartial arbitrator” whose decision “shall be final and binding upon both parties.”39 In
the Supreme Court decision, AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of
America, the arbitration clause at issue required arbitration of “any differences arising
with respect to the interpretation of this contract or the performance of any obligation
hereunder.”40

The AT&T Court held that the presumption of arbitrability was

“particularly applicable” in cases where the arbitration clause at issue was “as broad” as
the one before it.41 The scope of the arbitration clause in this case is similarly broad

36

Rec. Doc. 12-4, p. 36.
Rec. Doc. 12-4, p. 37.
38
Rec. Doc. 12-4, p. 32.
39
Rec. Doc. 12-4, p. 32.
40
AT&T, 475 U.S. at 650.
41
Id. (“Such a presumption is particularly applicable where the clause is as broad as the one employed in
this case, which provides for arbitration of ‘any differences arising with respect to the interpretation of this
contract or the performance of any obligation hereunder.”)
37

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inasmuch as it applies to “any dispute, difference or grievance.”42 Accordingly, the
Court finds that the presumption of arbitrability applies here.
B. Has Oxbow Rebutted the Presumption of Arbitrability?
In response, Oxbow argues that the “presumption of arbitrability is overcome by
the clear language of both the CBA and The [401K] Plan” and the Fifth Circuit’s decision
in Local Union No. 4-449, Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. Amoco
Chem. Corp. (hereinafter “Amoco’).43 Oxbow contends that Amoco is directly on point
and controls the outcome of this case. The Union disagrees arguing that there is no
express provision that exempts grievances over the 2013 CBA’s 401(k) provision from
the CBA’s broadly-defined arbitration procedure. The Union further contends that the
recent Fifth Circuit decision, Houston Refining, L.P. v. United Paper and Forestry,
Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International
Union; United Steel Workers Local Union No. 13-227, supports its position and requires
arbitration of the Grievance under the 2013 CBA.44
In Amoco, the sole issue before the court was whether the defendant-company
breached the CBA by refusing to arbitrate three grievances concerning the company’s
refusal to pay certain sick-pay benefits.

The union and defendant-company were

parties to a CBA and a separate Disability Benefits Plan, which was incorporated into
the CBA. The Amoco court began its analysis by examining the relevant provisions of

42

Rec. Doc. 12-4, p. 32.
Rec. Doc. 10-1, p. 8. Local Union No. 4-449 Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union, AFL-CIO v.
Amoco Chemical Corp., 589 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1979)(hereinafter “Amoco”).
44
Houston Refining, L.P. v. United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied
Industrial and Service Workers International Union; United Steel Workers Local Union No. 13-227, 765
F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 2014)(hereinafter “Houston Refining”).
43

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the CBA and the Plan. Article VIII of the CBA contained the following provision which
provided for the payment of sickness and disability benefits:
Benefits with respect to sickness and disability shall be payable in
accordance with the Company’s Sickness and Disability Benefits Plan as
presently in effect except that an employee will be paid holiday pay in
place of sick leave pay for a holiday falling on a normally scheduled day of
work, but which normally would not have been worked by the employee.45
Section IX of the Disability Benefits Plan (Plan) Section IX of the Disability Benefits Plan
(Plan) provided that:
The decision of the Board of Directors of the Company on any matter
concerning the administration of this plan as a whole or as applied to any
specific case [s]hall be final and the Board reserves the right to interpret,
apply, amend or revoke this Plan at any time.46
The union argued that its grievances regarding sick pay benefits “must be arbitrated
since there [was] no express exclusion of sick pay benefits from arbitration in the
[CBA].”47 The Amoco court held otherwise. In its reasoning, the court made the initial
observation that Section IX of the Plan clearly “states that the Board reserves the right
to interpret and apply the Plan, and that the decision of the Board will be final.”48
Considering that the CBA incorporated the Section IX of the Plan’s language, the court
found that it was “clear … that questions concerning sickness and disability benefits
should be presented to the Board, whose decisions would be final.”49

Hence, the

Amoco court concluded that the process for addressing problems concerning sickness

45

Amoco, 589 F.2d at 163 (emphasis added).
Id.(emphasis added).
47
Id. at 164.
48
Id.
49
Id.
46

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and disability benefits, as expressly constructed by the CBA and the Plan, “sufficiently
exclude[d] arbitration for grievances concerning sickness and disability benefits.”50
Recently, in Houston Refining, the Fifth Circuit revisited its Amoco decision.51 In
Houston Refining, the CBA provided that employees could participate in various benefit
plans including a 401(k) plan, that would be “administered by the Benefits
Administrative Committee,” and that “‘the Company [would] provide advance notice of
proposed changes to the benefit plans’, after which the Union [would] have ‘[a]
reasonable time period … to elect inclusion in or exclusion from the amended benefits
plan.’”52 In the throes of bankruptcy, the company unilaterally eliminated its matching
contributions to the union employees’ 401(k) plans.

The union challenged the

company’s actions and an arbitrator found in the union’s favor. In moving to vacate the
award, the company argued that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority because the
company’s unilateral suspension of the 401(k) Plan did not concern wages, and any
dispute relating to the Plan did not fall under the CBA’s arbitration clause.53
While the Fifth Circuit did not reach the issue of arbitrability, remanding it instead
to the district court, it explained its disagreement with the dissenter, who would have
vacated the arbitral award on the grounds that the arbitrator exceeded his authority
because the term wages in the CBA’s arbitration clause cannot encompass the dispute
over the 401(k) match suspension.54
In its analysis, the Houston Refining court suggested that the current state of the
law for determining whether a grievance is arbitrable could be summarized as follows:
50

Id.
Houston Refining, 765 F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 2014).
52
Id. at 399.
53
Id, at 411.
54
Id.
51

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A dispute is arbitrable if the dispute concerns a direct violation of a right
under the CBA, rather than a challenge to a determination of an
employee’s eligibility for benefits under the benefits plan. This principle
recognizes the importance of the source of the disputed right, and,
furthermore, prevents clashes between arbitration and disputes governed
by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).55
The Houston Refining court also distinguished its decision from Amoco.
First, the court noted that, unlike Amoco, the union’s grievance in Houston
Refining did not involve a challenge to the denial of benefits under a 401(k) plan, which
would have fallen within the express purview of the company’s benefits committee, that
had been charged with administering and interpreting the 401(k) Plan. Instead, the
union’s grievance alleged that the company’s procedure for amending the 401(k) plan--a unilateral amendment---violated its obligation under the 2006 CBA.

The court

reasoned that, “[h]ad [the] Union members sought to enforce their rights under the
401(k) Plan, then the [benefits] Committee could certainly ‘interpret and apply’ that
Plan,” taking it out of the purview of the CBA’s grievance and arbitration process.56
However, the company had not offered any evidence showing that the committee, in the
course of administering the 401(k) Plan, could determine whether the Plan had been
lawfully amended.

Therefore, the Fifth Circuit concluded that, if a valid arbitration

clause did in fact exist, then the CBA’s arbitration clause would be “susceptible of an
interpretation that would not bar arbitration of this dispute.”57
As discussed in Houston Refining, this case hinges on the Court’s determination
of the “source of the disputed right.”58 In the 2013 CBA, the parties agreed in Article

55

Id. at 415 (emphasis added). The court explained that it “must ask whether any interpretation [of the
CBA] could bring this dispute within the ambit of the arbitration clause.”
56
Id. at 414.
57
Id. at 415.
58
Id.

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XXXII.C to “amend the current 401(k) to provide that effective in 2014 [Oxbow] will
match fifty percent (50%) of the employees’ eligible contributions up to maximum of ten
percent (10%) of salary.”59 Contrary to Oxbow’s strained position otherwise, the Union’s
grievance is not a direct challenge to union member benefits under the 401(k) Plan.
Instead, the Union’s grievance is a direct challenge to the proper interpretation and
application of Article XXXII.C of the 2013 CBA.

As in Houston Refining, the Union is

seeking to enforce Oxbow’s obligation under the 2013 CBA to provide for specified
matching contributions. Therefore, the Court finds that the source of the disputed right
is the CBA.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Oxbow has failed to overcome the

presumption of arbitrability, and that the Union’s grievance is subject to arbitration under
the 2013 CBA.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment60 filed by Plaintiff,

United Steel Workers and its Local 275 is hereby GRANTED, and the Motion for
Summary Judgment61 filed by Oxbow Calcining, LLC is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on September 14, 2015.

S

JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

59

Rec. Doc. 12-4, p. 36.
Rec. Doc. 12.
61
Rec. Doc. 10.
60

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