Southern University System Foundation v. Henderson et al

Filing 74

RULING granting 39 Motion to Dismiss third party claims asserted against MillerCoors without prejudice to Defendant properly seeking and obtaining leave to amend from the Magistrate Judge. Signed by Judge James J. Brady on 02/23/2015. (BCL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY SYSTEM
FOUNDATION
CASE NO. 14-cv-288-JJB-RLB
VERSUS
ANDRE HENDERSON AND
GARY SHELTON
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Third Party Defendant, MillerCoors LLC, moves for this Court to dismiss all claims
asserted against it by original Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff, Gary Shelton. (Doc. 39).
MillerCoors LLC is one of the twelve Third Parties named by Mr. Shelton. (Doc. 6, at 17). All
responsive briefs were considered for purposes of this ruling.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A
pleading is plausible when the plaintiff pleads “factual content” that allows the Court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 663. When a
complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of
the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly,
U.S. at 557 (2007)). “In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept all wellpleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Davis v. Bellsouth Telecomm., 2012 WL 2064699, at *1 (M.D. La. June 7, 2012) (citing Baker v.
Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996)).
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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
The original lawsuit by Plaintiff, Southern University System Foundation, against
Defendants, Andre Henderson and Gary Shelton, was first filed in state court. (Doc. 1-1, at 3).
The original claims include those of trademark infringement, fraudulent registration, dilution,
unfair competition, and unfair trade practices under the Lanham Act, and Louisiana trademark
law. Id. Plaintiff claims that Defendants, by registering the BAYOU CLASSIC marks, seek to
“commercially profit from the substantial goodwill long associated with THE BAYOU
CLASSIC marks developed and promoted over the past few decades by Southern University, as
opposed to Defendants’ own products and services.” Id. at 7. There are several other factual
allegations asserted against Defendants in the original complaint. However, the original claims
asserted against Defendants are not at issue in the motion considered herein.
Mr. Shelton, one of the two named defendants, asserts claims, in his capacity as a Third
Party Claimant, against several third parties to the original suit. (Doc. 6, at 17-18). Mr. Shelton
asserts these Third Party claims under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mr.
Shelton’s Third Party Complaint asserts that the Third Parties have “contractual obligations with
the Board of Supervisors for University of Louisiana on behalf of Grambling, Board of
Supervisors for Southern University and Agricultural and Mechanical College and Southern
University System Foundation for the ‘Bayou Classic.” (Doc. 6, at 17-18). In connection with
these alleged contractual obligations, Mr. Shelton “alleges profits which have not inured to his
benefit in spite of his rights in the subject rights concerning ‘Bayou Classic’.” Id. at 18. Further,
Mr. Shelton claims damages “from his inability to benefit from the contractual obligations
damages to include past, present and future losses of income and opportunity and earning
capacity and all other damages to be determined at a trial in this matter.” Id. Finally, Mr. Shelton

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claims that he is “entitled to any and all injunctive relief where applicable and any benefits under
the Cooperative Agreement and that all [Third Party] Defendants are jointly and solidarily
liable…for all actual and constructive violations of Gary Shelton’s rights and or protection”
under the law. Id.
DISCUSSION
MillerCoors moves to dismiss all claims asserted against it in the Third Party Complaint
on the grounds that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc.
39, at 2). Rule 14, as relied on by Mr. Shelton for his third party claims, permits a defendant to
“serve a summons and complaint on a party who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the
claims against it.” Id. Thus, MillerCoors argues, Mr. Shelton must allege that MillerCoors is
liable to Mr. Shelton for all or part of the original Plaintiff’s trademark infringement claim
against Mr. Shelton. Id. Rule 14 requires that the defendant show that “the third-party is liable to
the defendant and that the liability is ‘in some way derivative of the outcome of the main
claim.’” (Doc. 39-1, at 2 quoting CheckPoint Fluidic Sys. Int’l, Ltd. v. Guccione, No. Civ.A. 104505, 2011 WL 3268386, at *5 (E.D. La. July 28, 2011)). Mr. Shelton’s Third-Party Complaint
does not allege a relationship or even interaction between MillerCoors and Mr. Shelton,
specifically there is no allegation of such an interaction regarding the use of the BAYOU
CLASSIC mark. (Doc. 39-1, at 3).
Outside of third-party claims asserted under Rule 14, Mr. Shelton also fails to state any
cognizable claim against MillerCoors. (Doc. 39-1, at 1). Mr. Shelton failed to allege a legal
obligation owed to him by MillerCoors, any conduct that would have violated such an obligation,
or any injury to Mr. Shelton as a result of any such conduct. (Doc. 39, at 2). Even reading the
factual allegations from Mr. Shelton’s Third-Party Complaint as true, the complaint merely

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asserts that MillerCoors has “contractual obligations” to the Foundation and others relating to
THE BAYOU CLASSIC mark, and there are “profits which have not inured to [Mr. Shelton’s]
benefit.” MillerCoors’ understanding of the Complaint is that Mr. Shelton believes himself to be
the true owner of THE BAYOU CLASSIC mark and is, therefore, due any monies MillerCoors
has paid to the Foundation. (Doc. 39-1, at 4). Even if true, this does not support a third party
claim against MillerCoors, but supports a theory of damages against the Foundation. Id.
In Mr. Shelton’s Opposition (doc. 50), a claim of unjust enrichment is asserted against
MillerCoors for the first time. This cause of action was not asserted in Mr. Shelton’s Third Party
Complaint and is, therefore, outside the bounds of the Motion to Dismiss considered herein. Mr.
Shelton’s new claim also relies on factual allegations that were not asserted in the original Third
Party Complaint. For example, only in his Opposition has Mr. Shelton now claimed that
MillerCoors has used the name “Bayou Classic” in its advertisements and should have known
that Mr. Shelton was the owner of the trademark as it is public record. (Doc. 50, at 1-2). For the
first time in his Opposition, Mr. Shelton claims that he has “no other remedy at law.” Id. at 2.
With regard to the pending motion, Mr. Shelton’s Opposition does not respond to MillerCoors’
argument that there is no proper Third Party Claim under Rule 14 asserted.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, the Motion (doc. 39) to Dismiss the third party claims asserted against
MillerCoors in Mr. Shelton’s Third Party Complaint is GRANTED without prejudice to
Defendant properly seeking and obtaining leave to amend from the Magistrate Judge.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on February 23, 2015.

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JUDGE JAMES J. BRADY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
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