Rodney v. Williams Olefins, L.L.C. et al

Filing 39

RULING: Defendant's 34 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Signed by Judge Shelly D. Dick on 9/8/2015. (JDL) (Main Document 39 replaced on 9/8/2015 to attach corrected document) (DCB).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
GARY RODNEY

CIVIL ACTION NO.

VERSUS

14-368-SDD-SCR

WILLIAMS OLEFINS, L.L.C.

RULING
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment 1 filed by
Defendant, Williams Olefins, L.L.C. (“Defendant”). Plaintiff, Gary Rodney (“Plaintiff”)
has filed an Opposition 2 to this motion, to which the Defendant filed a Reply. 3 For the
reasons that follow, the Court finds that the Defendant’s motion should be granted.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On June 13, 2013, Plaintiff was employed by Brock Services and performing

work at the Defendant’s Geismar Plant when an explosion occurred and allegedly
caused Plaintiff’s injuries. Plaintiff filed suit against the Defendant claiming that it was
negligent in causing the explosion. At the time of this accident, Plaintiff was performing
work pursuant to a Master Services Agreement No. UCN115357 dated January 1, 2012,
and Request for Services/Labor Contract No. UCN116545 (collectively “the Contract”)
which set forth the respective obligations between Defendant and Brock Services
(“Brock”).
Under the terms of the Contract, Brock was to provide onsite scaffolding,

1

Rec. Doc. No. 34.
Rec. Doc. No. 36.
3
Rec. Doc. No. 37.
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insulation, and asbestos abatement services through its employees and statutory
employees covered by the Contract. 4 The Contract also provided that Defendant was a
statutory employer of Brock’s direct and statutory employees under Louisiana law. 5 The
Contract also detailed that the products and services required by Brock were an integral
part of, and essential to, the Defendant’s ability to generate products and services. 6
Paragraph 44 reads as follows:
Company and Contractor agree that Company shall be and hereby is
designated as the statutory employer of Contractor’s direct and statutory
employees, pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. § 23:1061(A)(3). Company and
Contractor further agree that the products and services required of
Contractor and its direct and statutory employees pursuant to this Master
Agreement are an integral part of and essential to Company’s ability to
generate products and services. This provision is included for the sole
purpose of establishing a statutory employer relationship to gain the
benefits expressed in LSA-R.S. 23:1031(C-E) and LSA-R.S. 23:1061(A),
and is not intended to create an employer/employee relationship for any
other purpose.
Irrespective of Company’s status as the statutory
employer or special employer (as defined in LSA-R.S. 23:1031(C) et. seq.)
of Contractor’s employees, Contractor shall remain primarily responsible
for the payment of Louisiana Worker’s Compensation benefits to their
employees.
The Defendant moves for summary judgment based on the statutory employer
doctrine in the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act (“LWCA”) 7 based on the clear
terms of the Contract. Notably, Plaintiff filed an identical suit in state court against this
Defendant, which was dismissed with prejudice based on Defendant’s statutory
employer defense. 8

4

See Rec. Doc. Nos. 34-3 & 34-4.
La. R.S. § 23:1061(A)(3).
6
Rec. Doc. No. 34-4, p. 11, ¶ 44.
7
La. R.S. § 23:1021, et seq.
8
th
Gary Rodney v. Williams Olefins, L.L.C., 19 JDC, No. 631310, Section 24.
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II.

LAW & ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard 9
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” 10 “When assessing whether a dispute to any material fact exists, we
consider all of the evidence in the record but refrain from making credibility
determinations or weighing the evidence.” 11 A party moving for summary judgment
“must ‘demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,’ but need not
negate the elements of the nonmovant’s case.” 12

If the moving party satisfies its

burden, “the non-moving party must show that summary judgment is inappropriate by
setting ‘forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue concerning every
essential component of its case.’” 13 However, the non-moving party’s burden “is not
satisfied with some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory
allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.” 14
Notably, “[a] genuine issue of material fact exists, ‘if the evidence is such that a

9

The Court notes Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiff failed to comply with Local Civil Rule 56(b) in
filing “a statement of material facts as to which the opponent contends there exists a genuine issue to be
tried.” Plaintiff ultimately filed such a document (Rec. Doc. No. 38); however, this filing was untimely,
without leave of Court, and without any reason for the delay. Thus, while Defendant is technically correct,
out of an abundance of caution, and because it does not change the Court’s ruling in this matter, the
Court will consider Rec. Doc. No. 38 properly filed.
10
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
11
Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008).
12
Guerin v. Pointe Coupee Parish Nursing Home, 246 F.Supp.2d 488, 494 (M.D. La. 2003)(quoting
Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)(en banc)(quoting Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25, 106 S.Ct. at 2552)).
13
Rivera v. Houston Independent School Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003)(quoting Morris v.
Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998)).
14
Willis v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995)(quoting Little v.
Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
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reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” 15 All reasonable factual
inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. 16 However, “[t]he Court has no
duty to search the record for material fact issues. Rather, the party opposing the
summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to
articulate precisely how this evidence supports his claim.” 17 “Conclusory allegations
unsupported by specific facts … will not prevent the award of summary judgment; ‘the
plaintiff [can]not rest on his allegations … to get to a jury without any “significant
probative evidence tending to support the complaint.”’” 18
B. The Statutory Employer Doctrine
Under Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Law, when a “principal” hires a
contractor to perform work that is “a part” of the principal's “trade, business, or
occupation,” the principal is liable to pay workers' compensation benefits to any injured
employee of the contractor. 19 In such instances, the principal is commonly referred to
as the “statutory employer.”

In exchange for the responsibility placed on statutory

employers, the statute affords them immunity from tort liability to their statutory
employees. 20 Thus, a principal is immune from tort liability if the contract work was a
part of the principal's trade, business, or occupation. 21 The law further provides that a
written contract establishes a rebuttable presumption of a statutory employee-employer
relationship, which may be defeated by showing that “the work being performed is not
15

Pylant v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company, 497 F.3d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 2007)(quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
16
Galindo v. Precision American Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985).
17
RSR Corp. v. International Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 2010).
18
Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, Tex., 40 F.3d 698, 713 (5th
Cir. 1994)(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).
19
La. R.S. § 23:1061.
20
La. R.S. § 23:1032.
21
Salsbury v. Hood Indus., Inc., 982 F.2d 912, 913–14 (5th Cir. 1993).
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an integral part of or essential to the ability of the principal to generate the individual
principal's goods, products, or services.” 22
Plaintiff contends that the Contract does not entitle the Defendant to statutory
employer immunity for several reasons. First, Plaintiff contends that the parties are not
of equal bargaining power, and the Defendant is free to “dictate any terms it so
desires.” 23 Further, Plaintiff himself is not a party to the Contract, and he contends
Brock cannot surrender Plaintiff’s legal rights without his consent.

Plaintiff also

contends that the separate contract governing the services Brock was performing lacks
any designation of statutory employer status. Plaintiff also argues that the Contract
“has contradictory terms, ambiguity and a lack of defined object of conventional
obligation attempted to be created.” 24 In particular, Plaintiff contends that the plain
language of Paragraph 19 entitled “Independent Contractor” 25 states that he cannot be
deemed an employee of Defendant under any circumstances. Additionally, Plaintiff
avers that the insurance provision in Paragraph 12 requiring Brock to provide insurance
with the Defendant as an additional insured further reveals the lack of any risk taken on
the part of the Defendant. 26

Plaintiff argues that Paragraph 44, by which Defendant

claims statutory employer immunity, “has no force and effect,” because it “attempts to
make a legal determination” regarding “an undetermined product and undetermined
service.” 27 Finally, Plaintiff maintains that, because the Contract makes Brock “primarily

22

La. R.S. § 23:1061(A)(3).
Rec. Doc. No. 36, p. 2.
24
Id.
25
Rec. Doc. No. 34-4, p. 4.
26
Id. at p. 3, ¶ 12.
27
Rec. Doc. No. 36, p. 4.
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responsible” 28 for the payment of workers’ compensation benefits, the Defendant cannot
receive tort immunity under Louisiana law because it has contracted out of paying
workers’ compensation benefits.
1. The Obligation to Pay Compensation
The language in Paragraph 44 of the Contract states that the “Contractor shall
remain primarily responsible for the payment of Louisiana Workers’ Compensation
benefits to their employees.” 29

Plaintiff contends that such a provision precludes

statutory employer immunity because, under the law, it constitutes the illegal contracting
out of paying for workers’ compensation benefits under La. R.S. 23:1033. 30 Plaintiff
relies in large part on Prejean v. Maintenance Enterprises, Inc. 31

This reliance is

misplaced.
In Prejean, the plaintiff brought a tort action against his employer (MEI) and a
refinery (Murphy Oil) seeking damages for injuries sustained while performing work at
Murphy's refinery. 32

The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the

contract between Murphy and MEI was invalid because the specific contractual
language permitted Murphy to pay worker's compensation benefits only if “the direct
employer ... is unable to pay.” 33 The specific language of the contract was troubling to
the Court because it reasoned that the plaintiff would have to expend a considerable
amount of resources just “to prove that his direct employer was ‘unable’ to pay him

28

Rec. Doc. No. 34-4, p. 11, ¶ 44.
Id.
30
La. R.S. § 23:1033 states: “No contract, rule, regulation or device whatsoever shall operate to
relieve the Employer, in whole or in part, from any liability created by this chapter.”
31
2008-0364 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/25/09), 8 So.3d 766.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 775.
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benefits,” before moving to the merits of the case. 34

The present case is

distinguishable, however, because the contract between Brock and the Defendant does
not contain specific contractual language that would create a similar perquisite.
Moreover, the Prejean court implicitly upheld the contractual provision that is in
dispute in this case. Prejean cites a contractual provision from Smith v. Marathon
Ashland Petroleum LLC, 35 which the Prejean court found acceptable. In Smith, the
court upheld the following statutory employer language.
“... regardless of any other relationship or alleged relationship between the
parties [sic] employees, contractor shall be and remain at all times
primarily responsible for the payment of Louisiana Worker's
Compensation Benefits to its employees, and neither contractor not its
underwriter shall be entitled to seek contribution for any such payment
form company.” 36
The provision upheld by the Smith court, and found acceptable in Prejean, is
nearly identical to the provision between Brock and the Defendant in the case before
the Court. Furthermore, the Prejean court expressly stated that none of its discussion
precluded “either the statutory employer or the direct employer from contracting as
between themselves rights of contribution or indemnification.” 37 This holding, and the
clear language of La. R.S. 23:1031(B), 38 also forecloses Plaintiff’s argument regarding
the insurance requirement in Paragraph 12 of the Contract.
Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the validity of
this particular provision in Paragraph 44 regarding responsibility to pay workers’
34

Id.
04–517 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/26/04), 887 So.2d 613.
36
Id. at 617 (emphasis added).
37
Prejean, 8 So.3d at 774; See also English v. Apache Corp., No. 10-4419, 2011 WL 3352011 at *8
(E.D. La. Aug. 3, 2011).
38
Indeed, the LWCA expressly provides that “nothing in this Section shall prevent any arrangement
between the employers for different distribution, as between themselves, of the ultimate burden of such
payments.” La. R.S. § 23:1031(B).
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compensation benefits. This language has clearly been upheld by other courts. This
Court likewise finds no reason to declare such a provision invalid. 39
2. The Scope of the Work
Plaintiff also contends that the Contract cannot control the specific work activity
being performed by Plaintiff at the time of the explosion because the Contract’s terms in
Paragraph 3 state that “[e]ach request for services creates a separate contract between
the Contractor and the Company that signed the request for services.” 40 Because the
determination of statutory employer status must be judged by the scope of the work
being performed in the specific request for services, Plaintiff argues the Court lacks the
ability to make such a determination without reference to the specific activity being
performed on the date of the accident.
To counter Plaintiff’s assertion, Defendant points to the “Request for Services”
(“RFS”) agreements which are “part and parcel” of the Master Services Agreement No.
UCN115357 dated January 1, 2012. 41

Defendant contends the RFS easily negates

Plaintiff’s allegations as the RFS clearly outlines the scope of work to be performed by
Brock employees: to “provide Labor, Supervision, Tools, and Equipment necessary to
provide onsite Scaffolding, Insulation and Asbestos Abatement Services… .” 42 The
Request for Services is incorporated into the Master Service Agreement by reference in
Paragraph 3. 43

The summary judgment evidence offered by the Defendant is the

contract, which incorporates the RFS, and Plaintiff offers nothing in opposition to rebut
39

The Plaintiff also relies on Smith v. Brown, 2011-1749 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/15/12), 97 So.3d 1186. As
Smith v. Brown does not involve a statutory employer provision, the Court finds it inapplicable to this
analysis.
40
Rec. Doc. No. 34-4, p. 2, ¶ 3.
41
Rec. Doc. No. 37, p. 4.
42
Rec. Doc. No. 34-4, p. 16.
43
Rec. Doc. No. 34-4, p. 2.
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this evidence. The Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact whether
Plaintiff was preforming work that was an integral part of, or essential to, the ability of
the principal to generate its products or services.
3. The Independent Contractor Provision
Plaintiff argues that the Independent Contractor provision 44 conflicts with the
Statutory Employer provision and makes it impossible to for him to be considered an
“employee” of Defendant in any manner. This argument is without merit. Courts have
previously rejected such arguments, finding that “there is no conflict between ... [an]
independent contractor and the amendment to the agreement defining ... [the
defendant] as a statutory employer.” 45 In addition, “[e]ven if a worker is found to be an
independent contractor, he may still be subject to the worker's compensation ... [as] a
statutory employee under Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032 or 23:1061.13. 46

44

Rec. Doc. No. 34-4, p. 4, ¶ 19.
Johnson v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 99 F. Supp.2d 755, 758 (E.D. La. 2000); see also Taylor
v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., No. 11CV1292, 2012 WL 3707480 at *4 (W.D. La. Aug. 24, 2012).
46
Salmon v. Exxon Corp., 824 F.Supp. 81, 84 (M.D.La. 1993).
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CONCLUSION 47

III.

For the reasons set forth above, and because no material fact issues are present
in this case, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

48

is GRANTED.

Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on September 8, 2015.

JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICTCOURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

47

The Court has considered all of the arguments of the parties whether or not specifically addressed
herein.
48
Rec. Doc. No. 36.
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