Williams v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company

Filing 144

RULING that the Daubert Motion to Exclude Causation OpinionTestimony of Alan L Taylor PhD (Doc. 63) filed by DuPont is DENIED. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 04/11/2016. (ELW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ALLEN WILLIAMS
CIVIL ACTION
v.
NO. 14-382-JWD-EWD
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND
COMPANY
RULING ON DAUBERT MOTION OF
DEFENDANT E.I. du PONT de NEMOURS COMPANY
This matter comes before the Court on the Daubert Motion to Exclude Causation
Opinion Testimony of Alan L Taylor PhD brought by Defendant E.I. du Pont de Nemours and
Company (“DuPont” or “Defendant”). (Doc. 63.) Plaintiff Allen T Williams (“Williams” or
“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion. (Doc. 67.) DuPont has replied. (Doc. 73.) Considering the law,
arguments of the parties, facts in the record and, for reasons explained more fully hereinafter,
DuPont’s motion to exclude is denied.
I.

Background

Plaintiff claims that he suffered race-based discrimination and retaliation as an employee at
DuPont’s Burnside facility in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”)
and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”). He claims to have suffered mental and emotional
distress, and that he is entitled to compensatory, special, and punitive damages. Plaintiff has
listed psychologist Alan L Taylor PhD (“Taylor”) as an expert witness.
DuPont does not challenge Taylor’s anticipated opinion testimony regarding Taylor’s
diagnosis and treatment of Plaintiff’s mental health condition and the impact it has had on
Plaintiff. (Doc. 63-1 at 2.) Rather, DuPont charges that “Dr. Taylor’s opinion that alleged racial
discrimination and retaliation at Burnside caused Plaintiff’s mental health conditions is not a

properly supported conclusion or opinion.” (Id.; see also Doc. 63 at 1.) In its motion, DuPont
charges more broadly that Taylor should not be able to testify as to “any causation opinions.”
(Doc. 63 at 1; see also Doc. 63-1 at 3.) DuPont argues that Taylor’s opinion has insufficient
foundation, and utilizes an inadequate and improper methodology. Finally, DuPont argues that
Taylor’s opinion is an ultimate conclusion reserved to the jury and, for that reason also, should
be disallowed. (Doc. 63-1 at 2.)
Plaintiff counters that DuPont has created a “strawman” by claiming that Taylor intends to
opine that plaintiff’s mental damages are the result of racial discrimination when, in fact, Taylor
gives no such opinion. (Doc. 67 at 1-2.) He argues that Taylor’s opinion is based not only on
Plaintiff’s medical history but also on a review of deposition testimony, objective testing, and
years of experience as a clinical psychologist who has treated many plant workers like Plaintiff.
(Doc. 67 at 9.) In sum, Plaintiff contends that, under applicable federal jurisprudence, Taylor’s
opinion is reliable, trustworthy and should be allowed.
II.

Standard to Be Applied

The role of the trial court is to serve as the gatekeeper for expert testimony by making the
determination of whether the expert opinion is reliable. As the Fifth Circuit has held:
[W]hen expert testimony is offered, the trial judge must perform a screening function
to ensure that the expert's opinion is reliable and relevant to the facts at issue in the
case. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. at 2794-95. Daubert went on to make
"general observations" intended to guide a district court's evaluation of scientific
evidence. The nonexclusive list includes "whether [a theory or technique] can be (and
has been) tested," whether it "has been subjected to peer review and publication," the
"known or potential rate of error," and the "existence and maintenance of standards
controlling the technique's operation," as well as "general acceptance." 509 U.S. at
593-594, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-97. The Court summarized:

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The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one. Its
overarching subject is the scientific validity and thus the evidentiary
relevance and reliability-of the principles that underlie a proposed
submission. The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and
methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.
Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 988-89 (5th Cir. 1997).
The cases following Daubert have expanded the factors and explained the listing is neither
all-encompassing nor is every factor required in every case. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522
U.S. 136, 143 (1997); Guy v. Crown Equipment Corp., 394 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2004).
Indeed, courts may look to other factors. Joiner at 146.
This Court has explained:
The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702
and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., (509 U.S. 579) (1993), which
provide that the court serves as a gatekeeper, ensuring all scientific testimony is
relevant and reliable. This gatekeeping role extends to all expert testimony, whether
scientific or not. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).
Under Rule 702, the court must consider three primary requirements in determining
the admissibility of expert testimony: 1) qualifications of the expert witness; 2)
relevance of the testimony; and 3) reliability of the principles and methodology upon
which the testimony is based.
Fayard v. Tire Kingdom, Inc., No. 09-171, 2010 WL 3999011, at *1 (M.D. La. Oct. 12, 2010).
This Court has broad discretion in deciding whether to admit expert opinion testimony. See
General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1997) (holding that appellate courts review a
trial court’s decision to admit or exclude expert testimony under Daubert under the abuse of
discretion standard); see also Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 988 (5th Cir. 1997)
(holding “[d]istrict courts enjoy wide latitude in determining the admissibility of expert
testimony”); Hidden Oaks Ltd. v. City of Austin, 138 F.3d 1036, 1050 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Trial
courts have ‘wide discretion’ in deciding whether or not a particular witness qualifies as an
expert under the Federal Rules of Evidence.” ).

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“Notwithstanding Daubert, the Court remains cognizant that ‘the rejection of expert
testimony is the exception and not the rule.’” Johnson v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 277
F.R.D. 161, 165 (E.D. La. 2011) (citing Fed.R.Evid. 702 Advisory Committee Notes to 2000
Amendments). Further, as explained in Scordill v. Louisville Ladder Group, L.L.C., No. 02-2565,
2003 WL 22427981, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 24, 2003) (Vance, J.):
The Court notes that its role as a gatekeeper does not replace the traditional adversary
system and the place of the jury within the system. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596
[113 S.Ct. 2786]. As the Daubert Court noted, “[v]igorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are
the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”
Id. (Citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987)).
The Fifth Circuit has added that, in determining the admissibility of expert testimony,
a district court must defer to “‘the jury’s role as the proper arbiter of disputes between
conflicting opinions. As a general rule, questions relating to the bases and sources of
an expert’s opinion affect the weight to be assigned that opinion rather than its
admissibility and should be left for the jury’s consideration.’” United States v. 14.38
Acres of Land, More or Less Sit. In Leflore County, Miss., 80 F.3d 1074, 1077 (5th
Cir. 1996) (quoting Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987)).
The Supreme Court has recognized that not all expert opinion testimony can be measured by
the same exact standard. Rather, the Daubert analysis is a “flexible” one, and “the factors
identified in Daubert may or may not be pertinent in assessing reliability, depending on the
nature of the issue, the expert’s particular expertise and the subject of his testimony.” Kumho,
526 U.S. at 150, cited with approval in Pipitone v. Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 244 (5th Cir.
2002).
In that vein, the Fifth Circuit has concluded that “soft sciences,” like psychology, involve
“necessarily diminished methodological precision” when compared to other scientific disciplines
like mathematics and engineering. U.S. v. Simmons, 470 F.3d 1115, 1123 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing
and quoting Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287 (8th Cir. 1997)).
In such instances, other indicia of reliability are considered under Daubert, including
professional experience, education, training, and observations. See e.g., Pipitone v.
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Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 247 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding expert’s testimony reliable
under Daubert where “based mainly on his personal observations, professional
experience, education and training”). Because there are areas of expertise, such as the
“social sciences in which the research theories and opinions cannot have the
exactness of hard science methodologies”, Jenson, 130 F.3d at 1297, trial judges are
given broad discretion to determine “whether Daubert’s specific factors are, or are
not, reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case.” Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S.
at 153, 119 S.Ct. 1167.
Simmons, 470 F.3d at 1123.
III.

Application

In reviewing Dr. Taylor’s curriculum vitae, it is apparent that he is highly qualified and very
experienced. (Doc. 67-1 at 34-38.) Indeed, Defendant does not question his qualifications.
Rather, Defendant seems to challenge Taylor’s ability to render “any causation opinions”, but
focuses on his purported opinion “that alleged race-based discrimination caused plaintiff … to
suffer mental health problems.” As to the latter, Plaintiff responds that Taylor is not opining that
race-based discrimination caused plaintiff’s mental health problems.
An expert cannot render conclusions of law. Louisiana Health Care Self Ins. Fund v. United
States, No. CIV.A. 12-766, 2014 WL 4828940, at *6-7 (M.D. La. Sept. 29, 2014). If Taylor was
opining that Plaintiff suffered race-based discrimination, the Court would agree that this would
improperly invade the province of the jury. Whether or not race-based discrimination occurred is
for the jury to decide. However, after reviewing the briefs and attachments, the Court agrees with
Plaintiff. Taylor does not opine that Plaintiff’s mental issues flow from “race-based
discrimination” but, rather, is a product of the work atmosphere at the DuPont Burnside facility
and the ongoing conflict with his supervisors, which, Taylor states, are obvious stressors
contributing to his mental health condition. (See, e.g. Doc. 63-3 at 8.)
While not entirely clear, Defendant seems to go further and argue more broadly that Taylor
should not be permitted to render any causation opinion regarding Plaintiff’s mental condition. In
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this regard, Defendant argues that Taylor’s opinion lacks an adequate foundation, and his
methodology is insufficient. (Doc. 63-1 at 2.) The Court disagrees.
Defendant argues that “Dr. Taylor essentially relied on the Plaintiffs’ history as to the cause
of his problems[,]” (Doc. 63-1 at 3.) and therefore his opinion lacks sufficient support to be
valid. This significantly understates the basis for Taylor’s opinion which, it is clear from a
review of the materials attached to the respective briefs, included his psychological assessment
of Mr. Williams using well-known standardized tests, his observations of his patient over a
number of visits, his experience of over 30 years including specific experience treating people
who work in the petrochemical industry at all levels of employment (frequently seeing operators
and engineers), his review of two separate sworn depositions of Plaintiff, his review of the
depositions of plaintiff’s supervisor, the Burnside plant manager and Plaintiff’s coworkers, and,
finally, his review of peer-reviewed literature speaking to the issues in his report.
Furthermore, Defendant’s argument assumes that a patient’s detailed history is insufficient
and unreliable, by itself, to support Taylor’s testimony that Plaintiff’s emotional distress is due to
the actions of his employer in this Title VII case. Even if this is correct, the bases for Taylor’s
opinions go far beyond Plaintiff’s history. The Court concludes that the methodology and
foundation used to support Taylor’s opinion is more than adequate to defeat DuPont’s Daubert
challenge. As a result, Defendant’s motion is denied.

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IV.

Conclusion

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Daubert Motion to Exclude Causation Opinion
Testimony of Alan L Taylor PhD (Doc. 63) filed by DuPont is DENIED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on April 11, 2016.

S

JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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