Brown v. Woodstream Corp. et al

Filing 23

RULING: The Court GRANTS Woodstream Corporation's 18 Motion for SummaryJudgment. Plaintiff Willie Brown's claims are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.Judgment shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Shelly D. Dick on 4/19/2016. (BLR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
WILLIE BROWN

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

14-545-SDD-RLB

HOME DEPOT USA, INC.
WOODSTREAM CORPORATION

RULING
Before the Court is Defendant Woodstream Corporation’s (“Woodstream”) Motion
for Summary Judgment.1 Pro se Plaintiff, Willie Brown, has filed an Opposition.2 For the
following reasons, the Court grants Woodstream’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
I.

RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This diversity action arises out of personal injuries allegedly caused by a snake

repellant manufactured by Woodstream and sold by Home Depot. Brown has alleged
that on September 3, 2013 he suffered a severe allergic reaction to his skin after applying
Woodstream’s snake repellant. In his Amended Complaint,3 Brown asserted claims
against Home Depot and Woodstream for negligent design and construction or
composition of the allegedly defective snake repellant.

Additionally, Brown asserted a

claim for failure to provide an adequate warning of the product. On August 17, 2015, the
Court dismissed Brown’s claims against Home Depot on summary judgment.4

1

Rec. Doc. 18.
Rec. Doc. 20.
3
Brown’s Complaint (Rec. Doc. 1) and Amended Complaint (Rec. Doc. 3) are conclusory. The Court will
construe the pro se Plaintiff’s filings liberally. Perez v. U.S., 312 F.3d 191, 194-95 (5th Cir. 2002)(citing
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652(1975)).
4
Rec. Doc. 17.
2

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Woodstream, the manufacturer of the allegedly defective snake repellant, now moves for
summary judgment on Brown’s remaining claims.5

Brown opposes Woodstream’s

motion.
II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.”6 “An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.”7
“When assessing whether a dispute to any material fact exists, we consider all of the
evidence in the record but refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the
evidence.”8 “A party moving for summary judgment ‘must “demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact,” but need not negate the elements of the nonmovant’s
case.’”9 If the moving party satisfies its burden, “the non-moving party must show that
summary judgment is inappropriate by setting ‘forth specific facts showing the existence
of a genuine issue concerning every essential component of its case.’”10 However, the
non-moving party’s burden “is not satisfied with some metaphysical doubt as to the

5

Woodstream does not dispute the fact that it manufactured the snake repellant that allegedly caused
Brown’s skin injuries. Rec. Doc. 18-2, pp. 4-5. La. R.S. § 9:2800.53(1) provides a statutory definition for
“manufacturer” under the Louisiana Products Liability Act.
6
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
7
DIRECTV Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2005)(quoting Weeks Marine, Inc. v. Fireman’s
Fund Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 233, 235 (5th Cir. 2003)(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248,
106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986))).
8
Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008)(citing
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000);
see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d
538 (1986)).
9
Guerin v. Pointe Coupee Parish Nursing Home, 246 F.Supp.2d 488, 494 (M.D.La. 2003)(quoting Little v.
Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)(en banc)(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).
10
Rivera v. Houston Independent School Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003)(quoting Morris v. Covan
World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998)(internal citations omitted)).

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material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a
scintilla of evidence.”11
Notably, “[a] genuine issue of material fact exists ‘if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’”12 The Court must resolve
all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.13 However, “[t]he court
has no duty to search the record for material fact issues. Rather, the party opposing the
summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate
precisely how this evidence supports his claim.”14 “Conclusory allegations unsupported
by specific facts, however, will not prevent an award of summary judgment.’”15 “A liberal
reading of plaintiff’s pleadings is the only special treatment afforded pro se plaintiffs by
the courts.”16 A “court is not required to search for or try to create causes of actions or
find material issues of fact for pro se plaintiffs.”17
B. Louisiana Products Liability Act18
Because subject matter jurisdiction in this case is based on diversity of citizenship,
the substantive law of Louisiana governs this dispute.19

Brown’s claims against

Woodstream arise under the Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA), which establishes
“the exclusive theories of liability for manufacturers for damage caused by their

11
Willis v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995)(quoting Little, 37 F.3d at
1075 (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
12
Pylant v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company, 497 F.3d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 2007)(quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
13
Galindo v. Precision American Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985).
14
RSR Corp. v. International Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 2010)(citing Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline
Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998)).
15
Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, Tex., 40 F.3d 698, 713 (5th Cir.
1994)(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249)(citation omitted)).
16
Kiper v. Ascension Parish School Bd., 2015 WL 2451998, *1 (M.D.La. May 21, 2015)(citing Callahan v.
C.I.R., Civ. A. 99-0295-C-M1, 2000 WL 1141607, at *1 (M.D.La. Apr. 10, 2000)).
17
Id.
18
La. R.S. § 9:2800.51, et seq.
19
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

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products.”20 “To maintain a products liability action under the LPLA, a plaintiff must show
that his damages were proximately caused by an unreasonably dangerous characteristic
of the product and that his damages arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the
product.”21 The LPLA establishes four ways in which a product may be unreasonably
dangerous: (1) construction or composition; (2) design; (3) failure to provide adequate
warning; or (4) nonconformity to an express warranty.22 Under the LPLA, the plaintiff has
the burden of proving a product is unreasonably dangerous.23 In this case, Brown has
failed to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether
Woodstream’s product was unreasonably dangerous.
1. Unreasonably Dangerous Construction or Composition
Woodstream submits that Brown has offered no evidence to support his allegations
that its snake repellant was unreasonably dangerous in construction or composition or
“deviated from the manufacturer’s specifications or performance standards.”24 The Court
agrees.
To be unreasonably dangerous in construction or composition, a product must
have “deviated in a material way from the manufacturer’s specifications or performance
standards for the product or from otherwise identical products manufactured by the same
manufacturer” when it left the manufacturer’s control.25 In his deposition testimony,
Brown admitted that he had no evidence that would show that Woodstream deviated from

20

La. R.S. § 9:2800.52.
Arant v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 628 Fed.Appx. 237, 239 (5th Cir. 2015)(citing La. R.S. § 9:2800.54(A)).
22
Johnson v. Transwood, 2016 WL 589875, *3 (M.D.La. Feb. 11, 2016)(citing La. R.S. § 9:2800.54(B)).
23
La. R.S. § 9:2800.54(D). Brown has not asserted a claim for failure to conform to an express warranty.
Therefore, only three theories of recovery under the LPLA are applicable.
24
Rec. Doc. 18-2, p. 6.
25
La. R.S. § 9:2800.55.
21

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its manufacturer’s specifications.26

In fact, Brown stated that he “believe[d] that

[Woodstream] followed their design.”27 The record also reveals that Brown has not
identified any expert to examine the manufacturer’s specifications or performance
standards for the snake repellant.28 In sum, Brown has presented no evidence showing
that the snake repellant deviated from the standards set by Woodstream, or the industry,
when the snake repellant left Woodstream’s possession and control.29

Therefore,

Brown’s claim that the snake repellant was unreasonably dangerous in composition or
construction must be dismissed.
2. Unreasonably Dangerous in Design
Under the LPLA, a product’s design is unreasonably dangerous if the plaintiff
demonstrates that, at the time the product left the manufacturer’s control, “(1) [t]here
existed an alternative design for the product that was capable of preventing the claimant’s
damage; and (2) [t]he likelihood that the product’s design would cause the claimant’s
damage and the gravity of that damage outweighed the burden on the manufacturer of
adopting such alternative design and the adverse effect, if any, of such alternative design
on the utility of the product.”30 The LPLA “does not allow a fact finder to presume an
unreasonably dangerous design solely from the fact that injury occurred.”31

26

Rec. Doc. 18-3, p. 4. When asked, Brown further agreed that he had “never seen or reviewed the product
design or specifications for the snake repellant.”
27
Rec. Doc. 18-3, p. 4.
28
Rec. Doc. 18-4. Moreover, the deadline for Brown to identify any experts—October 30, 2015—has long
since passed. Rec. Doc. 13.
29
See, Bennett v. MillerCoors, Inc., 838 F.Supp.2d 470, 472 (M.D.La. 2011)(summary judgment entered in
favor of beer distributing company where plaintiff failed to present any evidence showing that the
“corrugated fiberboard box deviated from the standards set by MillerCoors or the industry when the box left
MillerCoors’ possession and control”).
30
La. R.S. § 9:2800.56; Transwood, 2015 WL 5680369, at * 5.
31
Guidry v. Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2016 WL 633673, *4 (E.D.La. Feb. 17, 2016)(quoting McCarthy
v. Danek Medical, Inc., 65 F.Supp.2d 410, 412 (E.D.La. 1999)).

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Although Brown claims that he was injured and harmed by Woodstream’s product,
this factual allegation alone cannot establish a prima facie case of defective design under
the LPLA. Rather, Brown must come forward with evidence of the existence of an
alternative design that could have prevented his injuries.32

Brown has failed to do so.

Even if the Court were to assume arguendo the existence of such a design, there is no
evidence regarding the burden of adopting such an alternative design and any adverse
effect on the utility of the snake repellant. Hence, Brown cannot prove that the subject
snake repellant was unreasonably dangerous in design.
3. Inadequate Warning
Under the LPLA, “[a] product is unreasonably dangerous because an adequate
warning about the product has not been provided if, at the time the product left its
manufacturer’s control, the product possessed a characteristic that may cause damage
and the manufacturer failed to use reasonable care to provide an adequate warning of
such characteristic and its danger to users and handlers of the product.”33 As this Court
has recently explained, “[t]he manufacturer is liable for an inadequate warning only if the
defect proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.”34 Ultimately, “[t]he plaintiff bears the
burden of proving that ‘but for’ the inadequate warning, the accident in question would not

32

In his deposition, Brown testified that he did not know of any alternative design that would have made
the snake repellant safer. Rec. Doc. 18-3, pp. 2-3. Brown has not identified any experts who would offer
their expert or technical opinions to support his contention that the snake repellant’s design was defective
or to establish that an alternative design existed that would have prevented his injuries. Rec. Doc. 18-4;
Rec. Doc. 18-5. See, McCarthy, 65 F.Supp.2d at 412 (“Without expert or technical evidence to support the
contention that the design was defective or to establish an alternative design, plaintiff has failed to create
an issue of fact to be left to a jury.”).
33
La. R.S. § 9:2800.57(A). The LPLA defines an “adequate warning” as “a warning or instruction that would
lead an ordinary reasonable user or handler of a product to contemplate the danger in using or handling
the product and either to decline to use or handle the product or, if possible, to use or handle the product
in such a manner as to avoid the damage for which the claim is made.” La. R.S. § 9:2800.53(9).
34
Johnson, 2015 WL 5680369 at *7 (citing La. R.S. § 9:2800.54(A)).

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have occurred.”35 Like his other LPLA claims, the Court finds that Brown’s inadequate
warning claim cannot withstand summary judgment.
As previously discussed herein, the Court found that Brown failed to present any
evidence of a possible defect with the snake repellant. Without evidence of a defect,
Brown’s failure to warn claim inherently fails. And yet, even if Brown had established the
existence of some defect with Woodstream’s product, he has not offered any evidence to
establish the “but for” connection between the defect and his injury. Based on the record
evidence, Brown admitted that he failed to read the “[a]pplication directions” which
directed users to wear gloves when using the snake repellant.36

Brown also

acknowledged that, if he had been wearing gloves when using Woodstream’s product, he
would not have suffered his alleged injuries.37 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds
that Brown has failed to prove that a genuine material fact issue exists on his inadequate
warning claim and summary judgment in favor of Woodstream is proper on this claim.

35

Id.
Rec. Doc. 18-3, p. 5 (“Q. So you’re telling me you didn’t see where it says – you didn’t read the section
called ‘Application directions’? A. No. Q. You didn’t see where it said to use gloves? A. No. I didn’t see
that. It should be on the front.”).
37
Rec. Doc. 18-3, p. 6. (“Q. Would you agree with me that if you were wearing gloves you more likely than
not would not have gotten the snake repellant on your hands, because you were wearing gloves? A. I
believe so.”).
36

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III.

CONCLUSION
Wherefore, the Court GRANTS Woodstream Corporation’s Motion for Summary

Judgment.38 Plaintiff Willie Brown’s claims are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on April 19, 2016.

S

JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

38

Rec. Doc. 18.

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