Savoy v. Davis et al

Filing 42

RULING denying 23 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge James J. Brady on 04/21/2015. (NLT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JOSEPH SAVOY

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS
NO. 14-700-JJB
DANIEL DAVIS, ET AL
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
This case is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23) filed by defendant
Captain James Savoy (Capt. Savoy). Joseph Savoy (Mr. Savoy), the plaintiff, filed an opposition
(Doc. 33) to which Capt. Savoy replied (Doc. 36). Oral argument is unnecessary.
Background
Mr. Savoy is currently an inmate at Elayn Hunt Correction Center, but in January 2014,
he resided at the Louisiana State Penitentiary (LSP) at Angola. He claims that, on January 4,
2014, Capt. Savoy witnessed several other correctional officers1 beat Mr. Savoy without
justification and failed to intervene. As a result of this incident, Mr. Savoy suffered multiple
physical injuries, including a broken shoulder. In November of 2014, Mr. Savoy filed a civil
rights lawsuit against Capt. Savoy and several others, and he alleged violations of his Fourth and
Eighth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. In response, Capt. Savoy filed
this motion to get himself dismissed as a defendant.
Standard of Review
Under Rule 12(b)(6), “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

1

The other defendants in this suit are among those officers.

1

544, 570 (2007)). The Court, “[i]n reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion . . . must accept all wellpleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Davis v. Bellsouth Telecomm., 2012 WL 2064699, at *1 (M.D. La. June 7, 2012) (citing Baker v.
Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996)). Still, the plaintiff must assert facts sufficient to
demonstrate that he may plausibly be entitled to relief. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Significantly,
“threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id.
Analysis
Capt. Savoy supports his motion with several arguments. First, he argues that he cannot
be sued in his official capacity due to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Second, he
argues that there are no factual allegations sufficient to establish that he violated Mr. Savoy’s
Fourth Amendment rights, therefore defeating any §1983 claim on that basis. Third, he argues
that there also no factual allegations sufficient to establish a violation of Mr. Savoy’s Eighth
Amendment rights—precluding a §1983 claim there as well. Fourth, and finally, he argues that
there are no facts alleged that would allow Mr. Savoy to overcome Capt. Savoy’s qualified
immunity defense. Mr. Savoy does not contest the first or second argument, but he does argue
that he states sufficient facts, if taken as true, for an Eighth Amendment violation—due to
bystander liability—and to establish first prong necessary to overcome the qualified immunity
defense. He also argues that he has alleged sufficient facts to establish that Capt. Savoy’s actions
were objectively unreasonable, thus satisfying the second prong and precluding dismissal due to
qualified immunity.

2

I.

Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity
Initially, Capt. Savoy argued that he could not be sued in his official capacity based on

well-established case law. Mr. Savoy clarified that he did not intend to sue Capt. Savoy in his
official capacity, so this argument is moot.
II.

Fourth Amendment Violations
The claims in this suit arise under §1983, which allows plaintiffs to sue for violations of

their constitutional rights and rights established under other laws. 42 U.S. C. § 1983 (2014). One
of those violations that Mr. Savoy alleges is that Capt. Savoy and the other defendants used
excessive force in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Capt. Savoy argues, however, that
the proper excessive force avenue for a prisoner is not the Fourth Amendment but the Eighth
Amendment, and he cites Graham v. Connor. 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989). In Graham, the
Supreme Court noted that the most common sources for excessive force claims were the Fourth
and Eighth Amendments, and the Court further declared that “where . . . the excessive force
claim arises in . . . an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly
characterized as . . . invoking . . . the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 394. Mr. Savoy, in his
opposition, does not address this argument; he instead focuses on the Eighth Amendment and
qualified immunity arguments. Consequently, allegations that Capt. Savoy violated Mr. Savoy’s
Fourth Amendment rights cannot sustain Mr. Savoy’s §1983 claims.
III.

Eighth Amendment Violations
Mr. Savoy can also pursue §1983 claims for violations of his Eighth Amendment

protections against cruel and unusual punishment. Although typically this type of claim involves
a defendant who directly participated in the alleged cruel and unusual punishment, such as a
correctional officer accused of beating an inmate, the Eighth Amendment’s protection is broader.

3

An officer may be liable under §1983 if he is “present at the scene and does not take reasonable
measures to protect” an individual from a colleague’s actions when the officer knows that those
actions violate the person’s constitutional rights. Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir.
1995); See Also Randall v. Prince George’s County, Maryland, 302 F.3d 188, 204 (2nd Cir.
2002). In Hale, the case involved the Fourth Amendment, but its logic easily transfers to Eighth
Amendment cases as well; the only real difference, as discussed above, is the status of the person
whose rights are allegedly being violated—suspect/detained citizen versus prisoner. Capt. Savoy
first argues that because Mr. Savoy does not allege that Capt. Savoy actually participated in the
beating, there is no claim against Capt. Savoy. He next argues that any “bystander liability”
claims should be rejected because Mr. Savoy did not mention bystander liability in the
complaint. Mr. Savoy’s argument is that he alleged sufficient facts for bystander liability.
In the complaint, Mr. Savoy has alleged sufficient facts for his §1983 claim against Capt.
Savoy based on violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. He alleged that several of the
defendants beat him without justification, and he also alleged that Capt. Savoy stood by and
watched. Later, he also alleges that Capt. Savoy participated in the aftermath, if minimally.
These facts, as alleged, meet the standard from Hale: Mr. Savoy alleges that Capt. Savoy
witnessed a violation of his constitutional rights and took no reasonable measure to protect him.
Capt. Savoy’s argument that Mr. Savoy did not raise bystander liability in his complaint is not
persuasive; bystander liability here is not an independent claim but merely the basis for the claim
that Capt. Savoy violated Mr. Savoy’s Eighth Amendment rights. As a result, the motion to
dismiss is denied concerning Mr. Savoy’s §1983 claims that are based on violations of his Eighth
Amendment rights.

4

IV.

Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity protects government officials from suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 when

they are performing “discretionary duties” if their actions are reasonable regarding the rights that
the official allegedly violated. Good v. Curtis, 601 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 2010). Essentially, it
is a defense available to “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law.” Id. (Internal Citations Omitted). The Fifth Circuit uses a two-part test to evaluate qualified
immunity defenses: first, whether the defendant’s alleged action is a violation of the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, and second, “whether the defendant’s actions were objectively unreasonable
in light of clearly established law at the time of the conduct in question.” Freeman v. Gore, 483
F.3d 404, 410–11 (5th Cir. 2007). Capt. Savoy alleges first that no constitutional right was
violated, and second, that even if there was a violation, Mr. Savoy has not alleged sufficient facts
to show that Capt. Savoy’s actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established
law. Mr. Savoy refers back to his arguments on the Eighth Amendment violation, and he asserts
that he has alleged sufficient facts to support his allegation that Capt. Savoy’s actions were
objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law.
A. Constitutional Violation
Both parties use the same arguments here as they did regarding the Fourth and Eighth
Amendment violations. Therefore, because Mr. Savoy has alleged sufficient facts to support a
claim that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by Capt. Savoy, Mr. Savoy has also
alleged sufficient facts—taken as true—to establish the first prong necessary to overcome a
qualified immunity defense.

5

B. Objective Reasonableness in Light of Clearly Established Law
In his complaint, Mr. Savoy alleges that Capt. Savoy watched and did nothing while
several others beat and kicked a restrained Mr. Savoy. An objectively reasonable officer would
realize that he had a duty attempt to stop the beating by, for example, radioing for other officers
to assist him. The law against beating prisoners without justification is not unclear or ambiguous.
Further, Mr. Savoy alleges that, after the beating, Capt. Savoy helped the officers clean up the
scene. These allegations are sufficient, when taken as true and considered in the light most
favorable to Mr. Savoy, to overcome the qualified immunity defense of Capt. Savoy.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23) is DENIED.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on April 21, 2015.





JUDGE JAMES J. BRADY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

6